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Foreword
Elizabeth Schmidt’s earlier work, Foreign Intervention in Africa (2013), 
focused on the period 1945–91, with a brief concluding chapter on 1991–
2010. This companion volume focuses on 1991–2017, with a final chapter 
highlighting the potential impact of the Trump presidency. Schmidt’s ap-
proach in the two volumes is similar. Her aim is not to provide a compre-
hensive narrative or advance an explanatory theory, but to introduce a 
series of case studies, taking into account global narratives and common 
factors as well as the particularity and nuances of each case.
 Intended for undergraduate and graduate students as well as policy-
makers, humanitarian and human rights workers, activists, and other 
concerned citizens, both books provide succinct and readable narratives, 
without detailed footnotes but with abundant recommended readings 
for those who wish to dig more deeply into particular cases.1 As such, 
they are unique resources that provide an overview and introduction to 
the complex realities they portray, complementing but not duplicating 
more detailed scholarly or journalistic accounts of specific cases.
 As this foreword is written in early 2018, the Trump presidency in 
the United States has been the catalyst for a level of uncertainty about the 
shape of the international political order not matched since World War II. 
Any predictions would be perilous, except to affirm that African countries 
will continue to be gravely affected by global political developments as well 
as by the distinct internal dynamics of specific countries and regions.
 As Schmidt explains, global narratives are both essential and mis-
leading in explaining the course and outcomes of intervention in spe-
cific conflicts. Thus the grand narrative of the “Cold War” between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, from 1945 to 1991, was decisive for 
interventions in African conflicts insofar as it motivated perceptions and 
policy in Washington, Moscow, and other capitals. Cold War percep-
tions conflating radical African nationalism and communism affected 
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policymakers, the media, and public opinion, not only in countries such 
as the United States and South Africa, but also in transnational networks 
and multilateral organizations.
 Even in this period, however, the Cold War paradigm was not fully 
hegemonic. The alternative framework of a united stand against Nazism, 
racism, and colonialism, linked to the common experience of World War 
II, was shared by Southern African liberation movements and by gov-
ernments and movements around the world, including many in West-
ern Europe and North America. An exclusive focus on the superpowers, 
moreover, ignores the distinct interests and roles of other external actors, 
including the European colonial powers and other communist states, most 
prominently Cuba and China. And finally, the interests of the African ac-
tors involved in conflicts, and the colonial and precolonial histories of spe-
cific countries, also shaped the outcomes. In some cases, African parties to 
conflict sought out foreign interventions—for their own reasons.
 Unraveling the course of any specific intervention thus requires a 
high degree of granularity, at the risk of asking the reader to assimilate a 
potentially bewildering range of names and places. Political actors such 
as states, parties, and agencies are not unitary: each is made up of sub-
groups and individuals with distinct interests, ideologies, and analyses. 
Schmidt’s clear writing style balances brevity with nuance. Readers who 
take their time and pay attention will be rewarded—not with definitive 
answers, which the author does not promise, but with a solid basis for 
asking more questions and pursuing further research.
 In the post–Cold War period examined in this book, Schmidt identi-
fies two distinct paradigms applied by policymakers. A specific intervention 
might fall primarily under the paradigm of a “response to instability,” some 
cases of which might also fit under the newly defined multilateral rubric of 
the “responsibility to protect.” Alternatively, an intervention might fit within 
the framework of the “war on terror.” Or, as in the case of Somalia, both 
paradigms might be at work simultaneously. Characteristically, war on terror 
interventions were often counterproductive, increasing rather than decreas-
ing the impact of movements defined as terrorist threats. Globally, these in-
terventions were driven particularly by the United States, with accelerated 
militarization in Africa as well as around the world in the period following 
the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
 Interventions in response to instability, including those justified 
by the responsibility to protect, on the other hand, featured a far wider 
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range of subregional, regional, and global actors. There was vacillation 
between indifference, leading to failure to respond in a timely way, and 
complex multiyear efforts in diplomacy and peacekeeping. The actors 
most consistently involved, for their own reasons, were neighbors of the 
countries beset by conflict, as well as African multilateral organizations 
such as the African Union and its subregional counterparts. And, as the 
cases considered in this book illustrate, the results, as well as the motives 
of outside actors, were decidedly mixed. The outcomes were difficult to 
evaluate, as were the possible alternative courses of action that might 
have produced different results (counterfactuals). While the United 
States was often a partner in multilateral efforts, consistent policy and 
commitment to multilateral engagement was in short supply.
 Despite the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the shift of paradigms jus-
tifying foreign intervention in Africa, there were many institutional conti-
nuities in the international order in the period that followed. The “Western 
alliance” continued, with prominent roles for NATO and the United Na-
tions. The UN Security Council, with its five permanent members, contin-
ued to dominate international peacekeeping policy. Africa remained at the 
margins of foreign policymaking for the United States and other powers 
outside the African continent, with the exception of the North African re-
gion, given its proximity to Europe and close links with the Middle East.
 The marginal position of Africa in global politics is almost certain to 
continue for the foreseeable future. But the election of Donald Trump has 
brought unprecedented questioning about the continuity of multilateral in-
stitutions and alliances, and challenges to the frameworks for understanding 
them. The incoherence of policymaking under Trump, rapid staff turnover 
in his immediate entourage, lack of staffing in government agencies, and the 
ongoing investigations into his administration make even the immediate 
future highly uncertain. But there can be little doubt that new elements have 
been introduced into the international arena, including high-level advocacy 
of Islamophobia and white nationalism, as well as a Hobbesian disregard 
for any values other than narrow political and economic self-interest. It is 
clear both that the United States retains enormous power for destructive 
action on the world stage and that its capacity for constructive engagement 
and leadership is plummeting. And whatever remains to be revealed about 
the ties between the Trump campaign and Putin’s Russia, there is abun-
dant confirmation of the ideological convergence between the two in le-
gitimizing kleptocracy and autocracy and in heralding “traditional” values 
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of hierarchy and exclusionary identity in contrast to “cosmopolitan” values 
such as peace, development, and human rights.
 What does this mean for ongoing conflicts in Africa in which multi-
lateral institutions or outside powers are engaged, or for future conflicts 
that are highly likely to emerge? The case studies in this book make clear 
that no easy generalizations can be applied. But one can perhaps suggest 
a few questions that will need to be posed.
 1. To what extent will US policy toward Africa under the Trump ad-
ministration be distinctively new or a continuation of previous trends? Will 
there be “no policy” on Africa, or “bad policy?”2
 At the most general level, both globally and by extension in Africa, 
one can say that there will be a continuation of the so-called war on ter-
ror that has driven US policy since 2001. But both global debates and 
responses to specific African cases may vary enormously, depending on 
the level of attention from the White House and on the outcome of de-
bates between zealots and the few more sober-minded members of the 
administration. As for responses to humanitarian crises, these will un-
doubtedly be affected by the general climate of increased US disrespect 
for multilateral institutions and by the “America First” ideology. The ex-
tent of the damage will also depend on reactions not only from within 
executive branch agencies but also from the US Congress and public.
 2. If, as expected, the Trump presidency leads to a loss of US influence 
on the world stage, what regional or global powers will gain influence on 
policies related to intervention in Africa?
 Most analyses of global economic or geostrategic changes anticipate 
rising influence on the part of China and other regional or midlevel pow-
ers, as well as reduced international capacity for a Europe facing its own 
internal divisions. But it is not at all clear what these macro-level power 
balances imply for multilateral or bilateral interventions in Africa. A sce-
nario in which a rival alternative power or coalition replaces the United 
States as the most prominent party in defining global agendas, including 
intervention in Africa, seems improbable. Instead, there will likely be 
even more uncertainty about which outside actors will be involved and 
the extent to which there will be coordination or conflict among them.
 3. Finally, what will be the effects of structural factors such as climate 
change, global inequality, economic stresses, gross human rights violations 
by states, ethnic and national stereotypes, and others? To what extent, and 
how, will they increase the risks of conflict and subsequent intervention?
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 Such structural issues go far beyond the scope of this book. But 
whether the issue is climate change, economic policy, or the fate of global 
human rights norms, Africa cannot escape the fallout from worsening 
global trends or the failure to find global solutions. The impact of these 
structural issues on conflict in Africa will surely be as great as, or greater 
than, the impact of policy decisions on intervention in specific crises.
 In her concluding chapter, Schmidt notes that her book offers no 
solutions. Rather, “its goal is to question faulty assumptions, to expose 
superficial understandings and simplistic analyses, and to offer deeper 
knowledge to those hoping to glean lessons from the past that will en-
hance future prospects for positive social change.” Her key point is that 
durable solutions cannot come from formulas, from leaders of states, or 
from multilateral agencies, but instead must build on inclusion of voices 
from African civil society.
 In previous generations, African movements fighting against co-
lonialism and racism inspired worldwide mobilizations that changed 
Africa and the world. Now, as Africa and the world are struggling to 
confront new challenges and address the unfinished agendas of struggles 
for freedom, the Trump administration epitomizes the impulse to return 
to a past explicitly based on hatred, division, and inequality.
 Both national states and multilateral agencies have a role to play in 
setting a different course. But these efforts will fall short unless they are 
driven by mobilization on the part of social movements and committed 
individuals working within those structures. We need a vision as encom-
passing as that evoked by Nelson Mandela, speaking to a rally in Lon-
don’s Trafalgar Square in 2005:
 “As long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality persist in our 
world, none of us can truly rest. . . . Like slavery and apartheid, poverty 
is not natural. It is man-made and it can be overcome and eradicated by 
the actions of human beings. . . . Overcoming poverty is not a gesture of 
charity, it is an act of justice. . . . Sometimes it falls on a generation to be 
great. You can be that great generation. Let your greatness blossom.”3
William Minter
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political and Military engagement  
on the Continent (1991–2017)
africa is a continent that is often misunderstood. Misleading stereo-
types smooth over differences among the continent’s fifty-four countries, 
resulting in oversimplifications and distortions. During the periods of 
decolonization (1956–75) and the Cold War (1945–91), discussions of 
Africa evoked images of poverty, corruption, and communist subver-
sion. African nationalists, who were viewed as threatening to Western 
interests, were dismissed by many as communists controlled by external 
powers. During the first post–Cold War decade (1991–2001), images of 
brutal civil wars, and their expansion into regional conflagrations, domi-
nated media portrayals of the continent. In the wake of the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the presence of terrorists in 
Africa—real and imagined—became the new bogeyman.1
 As is the case with many stereotypes, there is a grain of truth in these 
simplistic understandings. Poverty, corruption, and violent conflicts 
have devastated many African countries. Less well known is the fact that 
many of the challenges facing the continent today are rooted in colonial 
political and economic practices, in Cold War alliances, and in attempts 
by outsiders to influence African political and economic systems during 
the decolonization and postindependence periods. Although conflicts in 
Africa emerged from local issues, external political and military inter-
ventions altered their dynamics and rendered them more lethal.
 This book provides a new framework for thinking about foreign 
intervention in Africa, its purposes, and its consequences. It is not in-
tended for specialists. It does not advance new theories, present the 
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results of recent primary research, or provide a detailed survey of cur-
rent literature. Its target audience includes policymakers, humanitarian 
and human rights workers, students, and the general reading public. Its 
purpose is pedagogical, and the main points are illustrated with case 
studies synthesized from previously published work. The book’s format 
minimizes footnoting in favor of Suggested Reading sections at the con-
clusion of each chapter. This approach allows readers to follow the out-
lines of the argument without the distraction of footnotes and yet benefit 
from the direction of bibliographic essays. The recommended readings 
are limited to sources in English; most of the articles, reports, and docu-
ments are readily available online.
 This book is the companion to an earlier work, Foreign Intervention 
in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013). Both volumes elucidate the role of outside powers in 
the political and economic crises that plague Africa today. The earlier 
volume focuses on foreign political and military intervention in Africa 
during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, when the most 
significant intervention came from outside the continent. Intervention 
during those periods involved the former colonial powers (France, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Portugal), as well as the Cold War powers 
(the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, 
and Cuba).2 External support for repressive regimes that served internal 
elites and outside interests and stole the people’s patrimony laid the foun-
dations for numerous post–Cold War conflicts, which in turn attracted 
further foreign intervention. The present volume investigates external 
political and military intervention in Africa during the quarter century 
following the Cold War (1991–2017), when neighboring states and sub-
regional, regional, and global organizations and networks joined extra-
continental powers in support of diverse forces in the war-making and 
peace-building processes.3 During this period, the Cold War paradigm 
as justification for intervention was replaced by two new ones: response 
to instability, with the corollary of responsibility to protect, and the war 
on terror. These paradigms are developed more fully in chapter 2.
Historical Background: Decolonization and the Cold War
The following assessment of decolonization and the Cold War in Africa 
establishes the basis for understanding the conflicts that troubled the 
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continent in their aftermath. During these overlapping periods, which 
spanned the years 1956 to 1991, European imperial powers and Cold War 
superpowers struggled to control African decolonization. As popular 
forces challenged the existing order, external powers intervened to impose 
or support African regimes that catered to their political and economic 
interests. Former colonial powers and the United States tended to support 
regimes that opposed communism and left colonial economic relation-
ships intact. They often confused radical nationalism with communism, 
imagining Soviet manipulation where none existed. Western patronage 
was often based on the willingness of local actors to serve as Cold War al-
lies and regional policemen, providing military bases for Western use and 
thwarting radical movements among their neighbors. With fewer means 
at its disposal and less intrinsic interest in the continent, the Soviet Union 
tended to increase its presence in response to escalated Western and, to a 
lesser extent, Chinese involvement. It supported movements and regimes 
that declared themselves in favor of scientific socialism and a Soviet-style 
model of development—regardless of their internal practices—as well as 
radical nationalist regimes that were shunned by the West. Although per-
ceived by the United Sates to be following the Soviet lead, Cuba often 
took an independent route that was not always to the liking of its Soviet 
ally. China favored African political parties, movements, and regimes that 
opposed Soviet influence and ideology, which sometimes resulted in un-
official collaboration with the United States.
 Serving outside interests and internal elites rather than popular ma-
jorities, many postcolonial African leaders were autocrats who used state 
resources to bind loyalists to them in a system called neopatrimonial-
ism.4 Weakened by corruption and mismanagement, their governments 
clung to power through repression, co-optation, and fraud. Since colo-
nial times, African countries had exported cheap primary commodities 
and imported expensive manufactured goods. Following the worldwide 
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, they faced crushing debts. They 
turned to international financial institutions and foreign banks and 
governments for relief. Embracing a market-oriented economic model 
known as neoliberalism, these Western-dominated entities required Af-
rican countries to reduce state involvement in the economy as a condi-
tion for loans.5 Such policies imposed the greatest burdens on the poor, 
provoking food and fuel shortages, inflation, and unemployment. Eco-
nomic hardship, political repression, and widespread corruption, which 
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exacerbated growing income gaps, led to a continentwide surge of pro-
democracy movements in the early 1990s. Popular forces increasingly 
challenged repressive regimes, demanding fundamental political and 
economic reforms.
 As their economies went into a tailspin, neopatrimonial states could 
no longer perform their basic functions: monopolizing the means of 
coercion, safeguarding their territories, and providing protection and so-
cial services to their citizens. Weakened leaders lost the means to appease 
their loyalists with power and resources. Dictators once bolstered by out-
side powers were swept away as internal prodemocracy forces struggled 
with warlords and other strongmen to control the political process.6 
The ensuing chaos provided fertile ground for a new wave of foreign in-
tervention, both internal and external to the continent. Resource-rich 
countries were particularly vulnerable as outsiders fought to control the 
production and flow of oil, natural gas, and strategic minerals.
 During the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, extracontinen-
tal powers, neighboring states, and subregional, regional, and global 
organizations became entangled in numerous African conflicts, sup-
porting governments and rebel movements as well as war-making and 
peace-building processes. Although countries outside the continent con-
tinued to involve themselves in African affairs, the most consequential 
foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental. A number of 
African states, sometimes assisted by extracontinental powers, supported 
warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries 
and fought for control of their neighbors’ resources. The United Nations 
(UN), the African Union (AU), and various subregional organizations 
regularly intervened to broker, monitor, and enforce peace agreements.7 
However, conflicting interests, corrupt practices, and human rights abuses 
by some member states at times worsened the strife.
 The launch of the war on terror following the 2001 terrorist attacks 
on the United States brought new forms of intervention to Africa. Wash-
ington cultivated alliances with African governments and trained and 
equipped their militaries to assist in the US counterterrorism agenda. 
Some of these governments, like their Cold War predecessors, used US 
training and equipment to quash internal opposition. The United States 
also intensified unconventional military actions on the continent, deploy-
ing Special Operations Forces and utilizing unmanned drones outside 
of established war zones. US support for repressive regimes, warlords, 
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and foreign occupiers sometimes intensified local support for antigov-
ernment insurgencies. International terrorist networks often seized the 
opportunity to harness local grievances and expand into territories they 
previously had not penetrated.
 The Arab Spring (2011–13) generated another wave of external in-
volvement as prodemocracy demonstrators and rebel movements ousted 
repressive rulers across North Africa and the Middle East. Extraconti-
nental organizations, political powers, and networks responded to the 
instability with both unilateral and multilateral actions, allying them-
selves with forces they hoped would protect their long-term interests. 
International terrorist networks led by al-Qaeda and its Iraqi offshoot, 
the Islamic State, took advantage of local grievances to support a wide 
range of violent extremists, including drug smugglers, human traffickers, 
and petty criminals, as well as indigenous groups fighting secular or sup-
posedly impious Muslim governments.
 The societal breakdown that characterized the late Cold War and 
early post–Cold War periods resulted in the emergence of two new ratio-
nales for foreign intervention: response to instability—with its corollary, 
responsibility to protect—and the war on terror. Military intervention 
in a number of African countries was justified on the grounds that their 
domestic instability threatened international peace and security. In some 
cases, where large numbers of civilians were at risk and population dis-
placement exacerbated regional tensions, the response to instability was 
reinforced by claims of the responsibility to protect. A relatively new in-
ternational legal norm, this standard holds nation-states accountable for 
securing their citizens against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity” and grants the international community 
the right to intervene if governments fail to fulfill their “responsibility 
to protect.”8 Emerging from the post–World War II expansion of demo-
cratic values and concern for human rights, the principle gained support 
after the Cold War, when internal breakdown in Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia, and Africa forced the international community to rethink its alle-
giance to the seventeenth-century principle of state sovereignty. In 2005, 
UN member states concluded that a state’s failure to protect its citizens 
could warrant foreign intervention.
 The war on terror, which is generally associated with the George W. 
Bush administration and the 9/11 attacks, had roots in the late Cold War 
period. During the Cold War, the United States often deployed religion 
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in the struggle against communism. The US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) backed conservative Christian parties in Europe after World 
War II, hoping to undermine the appeal of communism to populations 
devastated by the war. In the Middle East, the CIA countered radical 
nationalism—which it erroneously conflated with communism—by 
supporting autocratic Muslim regimes that shared Western interests 
in opposing communism and in controlling the region’s enormous oil 
wealth. Where radical nationalists came to power, their secular regimes 
were frequently challenged by local Islamists, who believed that Islamic 
religious principles should serve as the basis of the social, political, and 
legal order.9 The secular regimes frequently responded with repression, 
arresting and imprisoning Islamists and forcing others to flee into exile. 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to shore up its re-
gional interests, the United States seized the opportunity to rally support 
from a Muslim minority who had turned to violence to achieve their 
ends. In collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other allies, the 
United States mobilized a multinational coalition that recruited, trained, 
armed, and financed Muslim militants from around the world to fight 
the 1979–89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After Soviet withdrawal, 
the militants dispersed, taking their weapons and terror tactics to new 
battlegrounds around the globe. Osama bin Laden, founder and patron 
of al-Qaeda, was among the most prominent of the Soviet-Afghan War 
veterans who spearheaded the emerging terrorist networks. In the 1990s, 
his organization was responsible for a number of attacks on US citizens 
and property, culminating in the September 11, 2001, strikes on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon.
 The 9/11 attacks opened a new chapter in the war on terror and 
marked the beginning of another era of US military intervention, first 
in Central Asia and the Middle East, and subsequently in Africa. Cold 
War experiences had left a deep imprint on US attitudes and actions. 
Having mobilized violent extremists who claimed the mantle of Islam to 
counter the communist menace during the Cold War, the United States 
contributed to the globalization of terror in its aftermath. Following the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Soviet-Afghan War veterans and their 
acolytes turned their attention to the United States as the last remain-
ing superpower and patron of what they perceived as impious Muslim 
regimes. During the Cold War, the United States had confounded radi-
cal African and Arab nationalism with communism and intervened in 
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local conflicts, with disastrous results. After the Cold War, many in the 
US government viewed a wide range of Muslims with suspicion, failing 
to distinguish between nonviolent Muslims with conservative religious 
beliefs and a small minority with questionable religious credentials who 
used violence to achieve their ends. Officials in Washington often glossed 
over differences between those who targeted local regimes due to long-
standing grievances and a much smaller segment who attacked Western 
countries that, in their view, supported impious rulers, oppressed Mus-
lims, and defiled Muslim holy lands. As a result, the US war on terror, 
like the war on communism, had unintended consequences that some-
times intensified local support for violent opposition groups.
Central Propositions
The impact of foreign political and military intervention in Africa after 
the Cold War is illuminated by a series of subregional case studies, de-
scribed at the end of this chapter. They provide evidence to support the 
book’s four central propositions.
 First, free market austerity policies, imposed by international finan-
cial institutions acting through weak postcolonial states during decolo-
nization and the Cold War, contributed to deadly struggles over power 
and resources in the post–Cold War period. As dictators were driven 
from power, indigenous strongmen, and in some cases neighboring 
states, intervened to further their own interests. Other international 
actors interceded in an attempt to restore regional stability or protect 
civilian lives. However, they tended to engage selectively, choosing con-
flict zones that impinged on their own political, economic, and strategic 
interests, while ignoring other conflicts and casualties. Although some 
interventions benefited civilian populations, others harmed them. The 
failure to intervene when strategic interests were not at stake also had 
dire consequences. 
 Second, the war on terror, like its Cold War antecedent, increased 
foreign military presence on the African continent and generated new 
external support for repressive governments. Expanded US involvement 
was particularly noteworthy. Concerned about US energy and physical 
security, Washington focused on countries rich in energy resources and 
those considered vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. US military aid, 
combined with commercial military sales and arms left over from the 
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Cold War, contributed to an escalation of violence in many parts of Af-
rica. Rather than promoting security, US military and covert operations 
often intensified strife and undermined prospects for peace.
 Third, although US counterterrorism initiatives cast a long shadow, 
they were not the only foreign interventions in Africa during this period. 
After the Cold War, the UN, the AU, and African subregional organiza-
tions played a growing role in diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives, 
sometimes leading to multilateral military action. France, a former co-
lonial power, maintained a strong military presence on the continent 
and intervened in numerous conflicts. Emerging powers such as China, 
India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf states, which were heavily invested in 
African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, exerted new political influ-
ence.10 While these countries often reinforced the powers of repressive 
regimes, in some instances they used their authority to promote peace 
and security efforts. The success of externally brokered agreements was 
largely determined by the degree to which all parties to the conflict and 
representative civil society organizations were engaged in the process. 
Accords imposed from above or outside, with little buy-in from relevant 
groups on the ground, were least likely to succeed. Public pressure for 
humanitarian intervention in response to African crises also contrib-
uted to new waves of foreign involvement. Activist groups in Western 
countries put the spotlight on mass atrocities and mobilized support for 
action to protect African civilians. However, they often oversimplified 
complex issues and sometimes proposed the kinds of military solutions 
that historically have harmed civilian populations.
 The fourth proposition suggests that during the period under con-
sideration, foreign political and military intervention in Africa often did 
more harm than good. External involvement motivated by the war on 
terror tended to intensify conflicts, and foreign response to instability 
often rendered local conflagrations more lethal. In addition, the empha-
sis on quick military action diverted attention from the political, eco-
nomic, and social grievances that lay at the root of the conflicts. Even 
humanitarian missions, which were premised on the responsibility to 
protect, sometimes hurt the people they were intended to help. They 
were often weakened by inadequate mandates and funding and under-
mined by conflicting interests. 
 In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the merits and 
demerits of foreign intervention remained hotly contested, while the 
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impact of failures to intervene was also the subject of much debate. The 
voices of African civil societies were not yet central to the discussions, 
nor were the concerns of affected populations foremost on the agenda. 
The prioritization of these constituencies is critical to the long-term 
success of any peace initiative.
Scope and Limitations
For the purposes of this study, foreign political and military intervention 
refers to the involvement of external powers or organizations in the in-
ternal affairs of an African country. These entities may be based on other 
continents, or they may be neighboring African states or subregional 
or regional organizations. The term “intervention” implies an unequal 
power relationship. It occurs when a dominant country or organization 
uses force or pressure to exert power over a weaker sovereign entity 
or when a weaker entity requests external assistance to restore order, 
monitor a peace accord, or end a humanitarian crisis. Intervention can 
be viewed in a positive light, such as when powerful nations intervene to 
halt a genocide or enforce peace agreements. However, when outsiders 
have intervened to enslave, conquer, colonize, overthrow or install gov-
ernments, or plunder resources, intervention has had extremely negative 
ramifications.
 Although this book focuses on political and military intervention, 
the enormous problems that afflict Africa today cannot properly be un-
derstood without taking into account the impact of foreign intrusion 
into African economies, externally induced climate change, and envi-
ronmental destruction and plunder of resources by outside forces. These 
factors, which have contributed to many African conflicts, are beyond 
the purview of this book, as is the growing presence of China. However, 
their significance should not be underestimated, as noted briefly below.
Foreign Intrusion into African Economies
Although outside powers had attempted to control the lucrative Afri-
can trades in gold, ivory, and slaves for centuries before the Industrial 
Revolution, it was rapid industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe 
that sparked the continentwide scramble for African resources, labor, 
and markets. The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 devised rules to legiti-
mate European claims, and imperial powers rushed to establish “effective 
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occupation” that would entitle them to a share of what Belgian King Leo-
pold II termed “this magnificent African cake.”11 The ensuing “scramble 
for Africa” unleashed a wave of foreign intervention that brought most 
of the continent under European authority within a few decades. France, 
the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Spain established regimes 
to extract African wealth—especially rubber, minerals, cotton, and plant 
oils—and to force African people to provide the labor and taxes neces-
sary to keep the system afloat.
 Political independence, beginning in the 1950s, did little to alter the 
unequal economic relationships established during the colonial era. 
Former imperial powers sustained governments that perpetuated the 
status quo. Resource extraction, primarily for the benefit of outsiders 
and small groups of indigenous elites, continued, along with political re-
pression to guarantee access. The Cold War exacerbated tensions in new 
African states as rival powers, seeking to protect their own economic and 
strategic interests, supported repressive regimes.
 The colonial legacy of unequal exchange between African com-
modity producers and industrialized countries has contributed to the 
deep impoverishment of African populations. When African colonies 
achieved political independence in the mid- to late twentieth century, 
the inequality inherent in these economic relationships persisted in 
a system dubbed neocolonialism. In the words of pan-African leader 
Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonial states had “all the outward trappings of 
international sovereignty,” but their economies and political programs 
were “directed from outside.”12 Deeply rooted economic inequalities 
were exacerbated by the steep rise in oil prices in the early 1970s and the 
worldwide collapse in commodity prices at the end of that decade. Af-
rican political economies, which had been structured to export primary 
products and import manufactured goods, suffered severe balance of 
trade deficits. The economic crisis stemming from structural inequalities 
was aggravated by inflated military budgets, corruption, and economic 
mismanagement. With their economies crumbling, many African coun-
tries turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and Western commercial banks and governments for help.
 Foreign assistance came with strings attached. Embracing free market 
ideologies that promote global capitalism, the Western-dominated inter-
national financial institutions required governments to implement dra-
conian stabilization and structural adjustment programs as a condition 
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for foreign loans. Private banks usually required the IMF’s seal of ap-
proval before granting commercial loans. Western development agen-
cies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) refused assistance to 
projects that did not conform to neoliberal free market norms. The result 
was the imposition of economic development models in which African 
populations had no voice. The Washington Consensus, named for the 
power hub of the IMF, the World Bank, and the US government, limited 
government involvement in the economy, requiring an end to subsidies, 
price controls, and protective tariffs. The mandated government cutbacks 
undermined health and education systems and destroyed social safety 
nets. Obligatory currency devaluations brought about soaring inflation 
and import shortages. Enforced privatization resulted in widespread re-
trenchment, higher unemployment, and an upsurge in crony capitalism 
as state-owned assets were transferred to government loyalists. These 
measures were particularly damaging to women, children, the elderly, 
and the poor. Imposed from above, the structural adjustment programs 
were inherently undemocratic. In many countries, the new balance 
of power favored governments with the means to impose unpopular 
measures. Foreign intervention in African economies thus resulted in 
widespread economic hardship and increased political repression, con-
stituting a fundamental denial of African sovereignty.
 Massive foreign debts incurred by African governments in the 
1970s and 1980s continued to take their toll in the decades that followed. 
In many cases the borrowed money was spent on extravagant show-
case projects, or on military rather than economic development; or it 
was lost to corruption. Successor governments were forced to service 
the debts with scarce foreign currency, which exhausted export earn-
ings and resulted in further borrowing. Debt service to foreign govern-
ments, banks, and international financial institutions consumed a large 
percentage of government revenues that might otherwise have been 
allocated to essential services and economic development. Externally 
imposed economic policies thus laid the foundations for the political 
crises of the 1980s and 1990s.
 When the Cold War ended, Western powers cut ties to repressive 
regimes they had once cultivated as Cold War allies and regional po-
licemen. Aid pipelines were shut down, and bank loans were no lon-
ger forthcoming. Neoliberal reforms, which promoted the privatization 
of assets previously controlled by the state, failed to strengthen state 
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institutions as intended. Instead, they laid the groundwork for new kinds 
of patronage networks that enriched loyal political and military officials, 
who benefited from the privatization schemes, and marginalized others, 
who were laid off. Some of those who were sidelined, along with others 
who sought a greater share of the spoils, abandoned established political 
and economic structures and began to operate as warlords. The warlords 
mobilized loyalists from the ranks of downsized functionaries and estab-
lished militias of unpaid former soldiers, unemployed youth, and press-
ganged children. The economic crises and externally imposed reforms 
thus sparked new political turmoil, which in turn stimulated further 
waves of political and military intervention.
 After the Cold War, countries with emerging economies in the 
Global South joined former colonial and Cold War powers in taking a 
new interest in Africa. Foreign powers and corporations focused their 
attention on countries that were rich in crude oil, natural gas, and stra-
tegic minerals.13 They also paid attention to those that offered access to 
arable land, markets for manufactured goods, and lucrative infrastruc-
ture contracts. However, economic interests were rarely the primary 
motives for military intervention, and the relationship between the two 
was varied and complex. Three points should be borne in mind. First, 
the interests of foreign governments and corporations were not always 
in sync, although critics frequently conflate them. Governments some-
times protected private interests with military might; however, they also 
compromised those interests for broader political gains. Second, exter-
nal actors made deals with African governments and local strongmen 
that gave them direct access to desired commodities, and they acquired 
rule-making powers that tipped the system in their favor. They generally 
prized stability, and only when political mechanisms failed did they con-
sider military means. Third, although competition for strategic minerals 
figured in many conflicts, control over those resources was not always 
the source of the conflict. Rather, disputes with diverse origins some-
times expanded to include struggles for control over resources that in 
turn fueled the war efforts.
Externally Induced Climate Change
Like foreign intrusion into African economies, climate change, caused 
primarily by greenhouse gases generated by industrialized countries, has 
contributed to a growing number of the continent’s conflicts.14 As the 
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gases trap heat in the earth’s atmosphere, glaciers have melted and oceans 
have warmed, causing sea levels to rise, water to evaporate, and ocean 
storms to intensify. These factors have resulted in increased rainfall over 
the oceans and less over adjacent land, provoking both severe flooding 
and extreme drought in many parts of the African continent. The warm-
ing of the Indian Ocean has contributed to the intensification of droughts 
from the Horn of Africa to the Cape and across the Eastern Sahel, while 
the warming of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea have exacer-
bated droughts in the Western Sahel. Climate change has dried up lakes 
and rivers and destroyed crops, herds, fish, and game. It has threatened 
food production, drinking water, and hydroelectric capabilities. Resi-
dents in drought-ravaged areas, in search of fuel, have denuded hills of 
trees; when rains finally come, they wash away the topsoil. Malnutrition 
and tropical diseases associated with high temperatures and humidity 
have grown more severe. The rapidly expanding desert has encroached 
on arable land. All of these factors have led to human migration on an 
unprecedented scale.15 Massive population displacements caused by cli-
mate change have resulted in competition for increasingly scarce arable 
land and water, which in turn has generated conflict between farmers 
and herders and between members of different ethnic groups, clans, and 
lineages.16 The confluence of these factors has provided fertile ground for 
extremist ideologies that have harnessed local discontent and mobilized 
populations with few alternatives for channeling their grievances.
Environmental Destruction and Plunder of Resources by Outsiders
Environmental destruction resulting from climate change has contrib-
uted to several of the regional conflicts investigated in this study. Foreign 
interest in African resources to mitigate the effects of climate change and 
population growth on other continents may be an important factor in 
future conflicts. The global food crisis and the search for new sources 
of fuel have led to substantial African land grabs by emerging economic 
powers, which are producing food and biofuels in Africa for consump-
tion elsewhere. Former imperial powers that continue to hold land in 
their old colonies have been joined by China, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Malaysia, which have taken 
over major land assets in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Morocco, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Tan-
zania, and elsewhere. Foreign investors, primarily from Singapore and 
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Malaysia, control virtually all of Liberia’s arable land, while 86 percent 
of Gabon’s arable land is under foreign contract, most of it held by Sin-
gapore. African citizens have had little if any say in these arrangements, 
which include no provisions for African food security or for environ-
mental controls to protect the land, water, and air from pollution. Com-
petition for arable land and clean water, already a factor in contemporary 
conflicts, is likely to contribute to future conflicts as well.
 Environmental destruction as a by-product of foreign ventures 
is also the source of considerable conflict in Africa. Pollution of land, 
water, and air by foreign oil and gas companies, deforestation by for-
eign timber interests, and the destruction of wildlife habitats and toxic 
waste dumping by other external interests have jeopardized lives and 
livelihoods across the continent. Pollution by foreign oil companies has 
destroyed the fishing and agricultural industries of the Niger Delta and 
led to civil unrest, military crackdowns, and the emergence of criminal 
gangs that engage in illegal oil tapping, piracy, and kidnapping for ran-
som as alternative sources of subsistence. Similarly, unauthorized fishing 
and toxic waste dumping by foreign concerns have devastated the local 
fishing industry in northeastern Somalia, while climate change–induced 
droughts have decimated food crops and pastureland. Unemployed men 
have turned to piracy, first demanding fees from South Korean, Indian, 
and Taiwanese fishing fleets, then attacking oil tankers and container 
ships and holding their crews for ransom. Individual ventures have been 
transformed into sophisticated criminal rackets led by warlords who at 
times have controlled thousands of gunmen.
 Economic growth and technological development outside of Africa 
have sparked a new scramble for African resources, which has fueled 
repressive governments, separatist movements, and broader regional 
conflicts. Corrupt politicians, military personnel, and warlords have 
contracted with foreign interests to extract and export valuable resources 
for enormous profits. “Conflict diamonds” were the object of wars in 
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), and also helped fund those wars. In the DRC, control over col-
tan, tin, tungsten, gold, and cobalt was also at stake, while the Liberian 
war was financed by timber as well as diamonds, and cocoa bankrolled 
the war in Côte d’Ivoire. Competition for Africa’s vast and largely un-
exploited oil and natural gas reserves is likely to be at the root of future 
conflicts involving both internal and external interests.
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China’s Growing Presence
The expanding role of China on the African continent has been the focus 
of considerable attention, both in Africa and in the West. The United 
States and Western Europe have seen their African trade and invest-
ments eclipsed by those of the Asian giant. Their leaders have warned 
that Beijing is exploiting African resources, taking African jobs, support-
ing African dictators, and demonstrating disregard for human rights, 
good governance, and sound environmental practices on the continent. 
African civil society organizations have frequently leveled the same criti-
cisms—although many note the irony in the concerns of former imperial 
and Cold War powers, which historically have engaged in similar prac-
tices. Chinese involvement is primarily economic, rather than political 
or military, and thus falls outside the scope of this study. However, be-
cause Beijing’s practices may be laying the groundwork for future con-
flicts, a brief description of China’s impact on the continent is warranted.
 The People’s Republic of China developed an interest in Africa 
during the Cold War, when it supported African liberation movements 
and governments that strove to build socialist societies—as well as others 
that opposed Beijing’s Cold War rivals. Seeking allies in the global arena, 
China was motivated principally by politics rather than economics. Its 
attitude shifted in the mid-1990s, after a massive program of industri-
alization and economic development transformed the Chinese economy 
into one of the world’s most powerful. Africa was no longer viewed as 
an ideological proving ground, but rather as a source of raw materials 
and a market for Chinese manufactured goods. By the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, China had surpassed the United States as Afri-
ca’s largest trading partner, and it had become the third-largest source 
of the continent’s direct foreign investment. In exchange for guaranteed 
access to energy resources, agricultural land, and other strategic materi-
als, China spent billions of dollars on African infrastructure—develop-
ing and rehabilitating roads, railroads, dams, bridges, ports, oil pipelines 
and refineries, power plants, water systems, and telecommunications 
networks. Chinese concerns also constructed hospitals and schools and 
invested in clothing and food processing industries, agriculture, fisher-
ies, commercial real estate, retail, and tourism.
 Unlike the Western powers and the international financial institu-
tions they dominated, Beijing did not impose political and economic 
prescriptions as conditions for its loans, investments, aid, and trade. 
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Although it mandated that infrastructure contracts be awarded to Chi-
nese companies and that Chinese supplies be used, the agreements did 
not require economic restructuring, adherence to democratic principles, 
respect for human rights, or the implementation of labor and environ-
mental protections. While Beijing’s noninterference policies were often 
popular in ruling circles, civil society organizations frequently criticized 
them. African labor, business, civic, and human rights organizations 
noted that Chinese firms drove African-owned enterprises out of busi-
ness and often employed Chinese workers rather than providing local 
populations with jobs. When they hired African labor, Chinese con-
cerns paid poverty-level wages and engaged in practices that endangered 
worker health and safety. Most importantly, Beijing backed corrupt Af-
rican elites in exchange for unfettered access to resources and markets, 
strengthening regimes that stole the people’s patrimony, engaged in do-
mestic repression, and waged wars of aggression against neighboring 
states. Like the Western-backed autocrats who preceded them, China’s 
clients are likely to face popular discontent in the future.
 Although China’s involvement in Africa is principally economic, the 
country’s economic clout has been accompanied by growing political 
and military influence. Beijing’s decades-long policy of noninterference 
in host country affairs has shifted noticeably in recent years, motivated 
by its desire to protect Chinese economic interests and citizens living 
abroad. In the early 2000s, Beijing joined multinational mediation efforts 
and UN peacekeeping operations for the first time, focusing on coun-
tries and regions where it had valuable investments and export markets. 
In 2006, for instance, China pressed Sudan, an important oil partner, to 
accept an AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, and in 2015 it worked 
with an East African subregional organization and Western powers to 
mediate peace in South Sudan. Initially, China refrained from military 
involvement, preferring to contribute medical workers and engineers. It 
provided a 315-member engineering unit to the peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur, but no troops. However, as Beijing’s global stature and interests 
grew, so too did its military engagement. In 2013, Beijing supplied some 
400 engineers, medical personnel, police, and combat troops to the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Mali, marking the first time Chinese combat 
forces had joined a UN operation. Similarly, in 2015, Beijing assigned 
350 engineers, medical personnel, and other noncombatants to the UN 
peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. However, it also contributed an 
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infantry battalion composed of 700 armed peacekeepers—the first Chi-
nese infantry battalion ever deployed in a UN peacekeeping mission. 
Chinese military presence was also notable in UN peacekeeping mis-
sions in Burundi (2004–6) and the Central African Republic (2014–).
 The trend toward heightened Chinese political and military engage-
ment in Africa culminated in a 2016 agreement that permitted China to 
construct a military base in Djibouti—its first permanent military facility 
overseas. Strategically located on the Gulf of Aden near the mouth of the 
Red Sea, the base will allow Beijing to resupply Chinese vessels involved 
in UN antipiracy operations and to protect Chinese nationals living in 
the region. It will also enable China to monitor commercial traffic along 
its evolving 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will link maritime 
countries from Oceania to the Mediterranean in a vast production and 
trading network.17 It will allow China to safeguard its supply of oil, half 
of which originates in the Middle East and transits through the Red Sea 
and Djibouti’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Gulf of Aden. Most of China’s 
exports to Europe follow the same route. Because China’s growing eco-
nomic interests in Africa have led to greater concern about the continent’s 
political stability, the projection of Chinese military power in Africa is 
likely to intensify in the future. Such developments will have significant 
implications in Africa. However, they are a topic for another book.
The Book’s Architecture and Case Studies
This book explores foreign political and military intervention in Africa 
after the Cold War through the lens of case studies from East, Central, 
West, and North Africa. Southern Africa is not a primary focus. Although 
that subregion was the site of significant foreign intervention during the 
Cold War, it was largely exempt from external political and military in-
terference during the first two and a half decades that followed.18 How-
ever, South Africa, the subregion’s leading power, wielded continental 
and global influence and played an important role in international peace 
initiatives on the continent. Its efforts are discussed in case studies focus-
ing on the other subregions.
 Chapters 1 through 3 establish the book’s framework. This first chap-
ter introduces the book’s purpose, historical and chronological context, 
and central propositions, and explains the book’s scope and limitations. 
Chapter 2 begins with a portrait of Africa at the end of the Cold War, 
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when political and economic crises attracted a new wave of outside en-
gagement. It develops the two paradigms that were used to justify foreign 
intervention after the Cold War—response to instability and the war on 
terror—and examines common Western misconceptions about Islam 
and its history, which have influenced the trajectory of the war on terror. 
Chapter 3 introduces the key international actors that intervened in Af-
rica after the Cold War and explores their motivations and rationales for 
intervention. 
 At the heart of the book, chapters 4–11 present a series of subregional 
case studies, illustrating the two paradigms that were used to justify for-
eign intervention. Some cases exemplify foreign intervention as a re-
sponse to instability and its corollary, responsibility to protect. Others 
typify external action as a component of the war on terror, a justifica-
tion that was especially prevalent after the September 2001 attacks on 
the United States. Some cases are characterized by a single paradigm, 
while others bridge the two. Together the case studies offer evidence 
that supports the book’s four central propositions. Although the politi-
cal, economic, and social components of each conflict are described, the 
case studies emphasize the impact of foreign intervention rather than the 
internal dynamics of the struggles. They offer overviews of each conflict 
and do not attempt to evaluate the relative importance of internal and 
external factors. For readers interested in other aspects of the conflicts, 
Suggested Reading sections are appended to each chapter. 
 Chapters 12 and 13 look more closely at the role of the United States. 
Chapter 12 investigates US involvement in Africa after the Cold War, 
from the Clinton through Obama administrations. Concerns about po-
litical and economic instability and international terrorism shaped US 
policies and had a significant impact on outcomes in Africa. Chapter 13 
offers a window on US Africa policy during the first year of the Trump 
administration, exploring continuities and discontinuities with previous 
administrations. The Conclusion summarizes the pitfalls of foreign po-
litical and military intervention in Africa during the first quarter century 
after the Cold War and suggests some requirements for the establishment 
of lasting peace.
 The sections below briefly summarize the case studies featured in 
chapters 4–11, grouped by subregion, and the elements of US Africa pol-
icy discussed in chapters 12–13, noting how they illustrate the paradigms 
used to justify foreign intervention after the Cold War.
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East Africa: Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan
Chapter 4 focuses on foreign intervention in Somalia from 1991 through 
2017. After the central state collapsed in 1991, warlords and Islamists vied 
for control. The UN, the United States, the AU, and neighboring coun-
tries interceded, initially motivated by the response to instability and the 
responsibility to protect, but increasingly galvanized by the war on terror 
as a jihadist insurgency emerged in response to outside intervention. The 
response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable to 
Somalia for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant to 
the period before September 2001, but it took on greater urgency in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
 Chapter 5 examines foreign intervention in Sudan (1991–2017) and 
South Sudan (2011–17). In Sudan, civil war, local insurgencies, ethnic 
cleansing, and terrorist networks generated enormous instability inside 
the country and across its borders. Neighboring states supported rival 
factions in the north-south civil war (1983–2005), while the UN, the 
United States, European countries, and African subregional organiza-
tions mediated problematic peace accords that ended the war but laid the 
groundwork for future conflicts. The AU and the UN staged inventions 
to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of western Sudan from 
2003, but they failed to sustain the operations until peace was restored. 
The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applica-
ble to Sudan for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant 
to much of the 1990s; however, by the end of the decade Khartoum had 
begun to collaborate in the US-led war on terror in the hope that its co-
operation would lead to the lifting of sanctions.
Central Africa: Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
Chapter 6 investigates foreign involvement in Rwanda before and during 
the 1994 genocide, and chapter 7 examines foreign intervention in neigh-
boring Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo from 1994 to 2017.19 In both 
cases, France exercised its presumed right as the world’s dominant franco-
phone power, intervening unilaterally or pushing the UN Security Council 
to act. Neighboring states also promoted their own interests, sometimes 
backing existing governments and at other times supporting rebel move-
ments. UN peacekeeping missions, weakened by conflicts inside the Se-
curity Council, were ineffectual and marred by controversy. In Rwanda, 
France sustained the genocidal regime, while Uganda supported the rebel 
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movement that ousted it. As the genocide unfolded, powerful members 
of the Security Council terminated a peacekeeping operation and refused 
to authorize an intervention to halt the killing. When Rwandan refugees 
streamed into Zaire, that country became a new battleground. Regional 
powers took sides, with some supporting the ruling regime and others 
backing rebel proxies. All parties fought over Zaire’s riches, while the UN 
made futile efforts to reestablish peace. The response to instability/respon-
sibility to protect paradigm applies to both Rwanda and the DRC during 
the period under consideration. The war on terror did not play a role in 
international response to the crisis in either country.
West Africa, Part 1: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire
Chapter 8 explores foreign intervention in the West African countries of 
Liberia (1990–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002), while chapter 9 consid-
ers external involvement in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–11). In each case, war and 
plunder took an enormous toll after the Cold War. A West African sub-
regional body interceded in all three conflicts, purportedly to reestablish 
peace and security, but sometimes to further member states’ political and 
economic interests. Liberia promoted a proxy war in Sierra Leone, and this 
in turn stimulated intervention by the UN, foreign mercenaries, and the 
UK, which asserted its prerogative as the former colonial power. France 
claimed a similar prerogative in Côte d’Ivoire. Neighboring states mean-
while pursued their own interests, either through the subregional body or 
unilaterally. The AU provided mediators, and the UN sent a peacekeeping 
mission. In all three cases, the response to instability/responsibility to pro-
tect paradigm was paramount; the war on terror was not a factor.
North Africa: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
Chapter 10 considers the role of foreign intervention in North Africa 
from 2011 to 2017. This period encompasses the Arab Spring (2011–13), 
a series of popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian regimes and 
transformed the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East. 
It also considers the uprisings’ aftermath (2013–17), when old regime 
remnants and other armed groups vied with prodemocracy forces for 
control. The chapter gives special consideration to Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya—the three African countries involved in the movement for so-
cial and political change. France, the United States, the European Union 
(EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Saudi Arabia, 
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Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were the most consequential for-
eign actors. They intervened first in response to instability and, in the 
case of Libya, to protect civilian lives. In Libya, regime change was also 
the goal of several external powers. After the old regimes fell and inter-
national terrorist networks joined the fight, the war on terror paradigm 
was used to justify further foreign involvement.
West Africa, Part 2: Mali, Nigeria, and the Western Sahel
Chapter 11 examines foreign intervention in the Western Sahel states of 
Mali and Nigeria during the period 2009 to 2017.20 Regime change in 
Libya provoked an influx of fighters and weapons into the Western Sahel, 
where they destabilized weak governments. In Mali, these developments 
bolstered a secessionist movement and stimulated a military coup, an in-
surgency linked to al-Qaeda, and another round of foreign intervention 
that had ripple effects across the region. The most significant external ac-
tors included the UN, the AU, the EU, a West African subregional body, 
France, and the United States. In Nigeria, militants who had trained in 
Mali’s al-Qaeda-linked camps returned home with weapons from Lib-
yan arsenals, which they used to strengthen a growing insurgency in 
the northeast. The Nigerian conflict spilled into neighboring Niger and 
Cameroon and attracted fighters from Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. It 
also garnered support from the Islamic State and sparked another wave 
of intervention by foreign governments and institutions. Neighboring 
states joined forces with the Nigerian military to respond to regional in-
stability, while Western nations, worried by the presence of al-Qaeda and 
the Islamic State and motivated by the war on terror, provided military 
training, technical, and financial support.
The United States and Africa
Chapter 12 investigates the evolution of US Africa policy from 1991 
through 2017, focusing especially on the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, 
and Barack Obama administrations. As the dominant world actor after 
the Cold War, the United States used its political, economic, and military 
clout to sway international bodies and influence world events. In Africa, 
the United States supported initiatives that improved health and pro-
moted economic development—prerequisites for social stability. It also 
strengthened the military capabilities of African states and intervened 
with force when its perceived interests were deemed threatened. During 
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the 1990s, US actions were most often justified by the response to insta-
bility/responsibility to protect paradigm. However, after the September 
2001 attacks, the US counterterrorism agenda took increasing prece-
dence. Washington provided money, training, hardware, and equipment 
to dozens of countries that were considered vulnerable to terrorist activ-
ity. It provided air support in conventional military actions and engaged 
in a growing number of covert military operations. The increasing secu-
ritization of US Africa policy shifted attention and resources from health 
and development to counterterrorism and favored countries that were 
rich in resources or strategically located over other countries that may 
have had more pressing needs.
 Chapter 13, focusing on 2017, surveys the first year of Donald Trump’s 
presidency and suggests how his administration’s policies and perspectives 
are likely to affect Africa. Based on statements made during the presiden-
tial campaign and evidence from Trump’s first year in office, the chapter 
explores continuities and discontinuities with policies of past administra-
tions. It foresees the continued militarization of US Africa policy and a 
diminished emphasis on public health, economic development, good gov-
ernance, and human rights. Although the counterterrorism agenda gained 
precedence in the Bush and Obama administrations, officials in those 
administrations regarded physical well-being, economic prosperity, and 
accountable governance as critical components of the counterterrorism 
toolkit. Trump, in contrast, sees little value in diplomacy and foreign aid. 
He opposes US support for UN peacekeeping efforts and for postconflict 
nation building. Although early renditions of Trump’s “America First” for-
eign policy hinted at a rollback of US intervention, his subsequent actions 
in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia suggest an intensification 
of US military involvement in global trouble spots. In Africa, such inter-
ventions are likely to be justified by the war on terror paradigm.
the next chapter advances the book’s agenda in three ways. First, 
it offers an overview of Africa in the 1990s, when political and economic 
crises opened the door to a new round of external involvement. Second, 
it develops more fully the paradigms used to justify foreign invention, 
providing historical context for the constituent ideas and examining 
their evolution. Finally, the chapter discusses common misunderstand-
ings about Islam that have influenced the execution of the Western war 
on terror and that continue to influence government actions.
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The Post–Cold War Context
Shifting paradigms and Misconceptions
this chapter provides historical context for foreign intervention 
in Africa after the Cold War, performing three important tasks. First, it 
describes how the political and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which were rooted in colonial and Cold War policies, ushered in a new 
wave of external involvement in the 1990s. Second, it shows how the 
outside powers that responded to this instability had additional tools 
at their disposal. Post–World War II institutions and legal frameworks 
threw into question longstanding views concerning state sovereignty and 
international law. Postwar conventions and interpretations advanced 
new rationales for foreign intrusion into the affairs of nation-states 
that threatened regional stability and civilians’ lives. The paradigms of 
response to instability/responsibility to protect and the war on terror—
put to use after the Cold War—emerged from this intellectual ferment. 
Third, the chapter investigates Western misconceptions about Islam that 
underpinned the war on terror and had devastating effects on millions of 
Muslims worldwide.
Africa after the Cold War
The roots of many problems afflicting Africa today lie in its colonial and 
Cold War past. Distinctions in power and privilege and conflicts over 
natural resources have long been a part of human history; in Africa, 
these phenomena predated the colonial period. However, the plundering 
of riches through unequal exchange was embedded in colonial economic 
practices, and colonial-era ethnic and regional hierarchies—sometimes 
built on preexisting distinctions—often assumed new potency after 
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independence. Internal corruption, economic mismanagement, and pyra-
mids of privilege resulted in unstable societies marked by huge disparities 
in wealth and power. Money and weapons distributed by Cold War pa-
trons entrenched power differentials and rendered local conflicts dead-
lier than those of previous eras. The end of the Cold War introduced a 
new set of problems with roots in this troubled past.
 The Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when 
the Soviet Union collapsed economically and politically. African conflict 
zones that were once Cold War battlegrounds were increasingly ignored, 
and dictators who were no longer useful to their Cold War patrons were 
rapidly abandoned. Across the continent, nations suffered the conse-
quences of depleted resources, enormous debts, dysfunctional states, and 
regional wars over the spoils. Weapons left over from the Cold War poured 
into volatile regions and fueled new competition for riches and power. 
Countries already weakened by economic and political crises descended 
into violent conflicts that often transcended international borders. In 
some cases, popular movements or armed insurrections ousted dictators 
who had lost the support of outside powers. However, because war and 
repression had stymied organized political opposition in many countries, 
warlords and other opportunists often moved into the power vacuums. 
Unscrupulous leaders manipulated ethnicity to strengthen their drive for 
power and privilege, sometimes unleashing ethnically based terror.
 During the first post–Cold War decade, foreign intervention as-
sumed a new character. Many Western nations that had been impli-
cated in African conflicts during the Cold War turned their attention 
elsewhere. The United States, as the self-proclaimed Cold War victor, 
showed little interest in direct military intervention and severely re-
duced its economic assistance as well. However, in keeping with its call 
for African solutions for African problems, Washington initiated new 
programs to bolster African military capabilities and others that focused 
on free market economic development and trade. Recognizing that Af-
rica’s enormous external debts, often incurred by Cold War clients, and 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic contributed to political and economic insta-
bility, the United States also introduced programs to address these prob-
lems. The policy shift meant that most military interventions during the 
1990s were conducted by African countries—sometimes to reestablish 
regional peace and security, but in other cases to support proxy forces 
that granted access to their neighbors’ resources.
Shifting Paradigms and Misconceptions  |  25
 Although extracontinental powers were less likely to intervene uni-
laterally during the 1990s, multilateral intervention by both African and 
non-African powers intensified and took shape under new auspices. The 
UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and various subregional 
bodies intervened in response to instability—to broker, monitor, and en-
force peace accords and to facilitate humanitarian relief operations. Peace-
keeping and humanitarian interventions were viewed positively by many 
African constituencies, although disparities in power meant that African 
agents had little authority over external forces once implanted on African 
soil. In a striking deviation from Cold War trends, critics castigated the in-
ternational community for not acting quickly or boldly enough—as in the 
case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Liberian civil war that ended in 
2003, and the Darfur conflict in Sudan that began in 2003. The UN Security 
Council, in particular, was criticized for its refusal to thwart the Rwan-
dan genocide and to act more forcefully in Darfur. Under pressure from 
human rights and humanitarian lobbies and from African civil societies, 
the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 2005 that held countries 
responsible for protecting their citizens from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.” Sometimes called the R2P resolu-
tion, the General Assembly action granted the international community 
the right to intervene through UN Security Council–sanctioned opera-
tions if governments failed to fulfill their “responsibility to protect” (R2P).1
 Appeals for humanitarian intervention in African affairs increased 
during the first decade of the twenty-first century; military intervention 
for other ends also intensified. The ongoing struggle to secure energy 
and other strategic resources and the onset of the war on terror brought 
renewed attention to the continent. Heightened foreign military pres-
ence, external support for repressive regimes, and disreputable alliances 
purportedly intended to root out terror resulted in new forms of foreign 
intervention in Africa. The continent, its people, and its resources again 
became the object of internal and external struggles in which local con-
cerns were frequently subordinated to foreign interests.
Paradigm 1: Response to Instability and the Responsibility to Protect
The political, economic, and social upheavals that characterized the 
late Cold War and early post–Cold War periods resulted in severe in-
stability in numerous African states and regions. Foreign powers and 
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multilateral institutions took note when domestic turmoil was perceived 
to jeopardize international peace and security. In most instances, their 
involvement entailed brokering, monitoring, and enforcing peace agree-
ments. Diplomatic and military interventions were often justified on the 
grounds that outside actors had both the right and the responsibility to 
guarantee international peace and security if individual states failed to 
do so. In such cases, intervention was authorized under Chapters VI, 
VII, or VIII of the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945.2 In instances 
where large civilian populations were at risk and refugee flows height-
ened regional tensions, the response to instability was bolstered by newer 
claims that the international community had a responsibility to protect 
civilian lives. In such cases, intervention was justified by the 2005 UN 
General Assembly resolution, mentioned above, that bestowed on the in-
ternational community the responsibility to protect civilians when their 
governments were unable or unwilling to do so.
 Post–Cold War intervention in African affairs saw increased involve-
ment by multinational bodies that drew on changing notions concerning 
the right to intervene. Since the mid-1990s, when the international com-
munity largely ignored appeals to thwart the Rwandan genocide, grow-
ing constituencies in Africa and the West have called for humanitarian 
interventions to end human rights abuses and protect civilians, with or 
without the consent of the states in question. Such interventions might 
include military force, sanctions, or the forcible delivery of humanitarian 
aid. Although the notion of humanitarian intervention has gained sup-
port, it remains controversial. External interference in a state’s domestic 
affairs challenges a premise of international law, national sovereignty, 
that has held sway for more than three and a half centuries.
 The contemporary system of international law emerged from the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia, a series of treaties that concluded the Thirty Years’ 
War in Europe and laid the foundations for the modern nation-state. 
Enshrined in the treaties is the principle of national sovereignty, which 
granted monarchs control over feudal princes and inhabitants of their 
territories, as well as absolute power to maintain order within their 
realms and to protect the state from external forces. Deemed above 
the law, sovereigns were exempt from moral scrutiny. From 1648 until 
the end of World War II, the sovereignty of the nation-state was de-
fined in such a way that internal conflicts and their consequences were 
considered domestic matters outside the purview of the international 
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community. However, another seventeenth-century principle of inter-
national law eventually established a framework for a more expansive 
understanding of national sovereignty. The notion that a state and its citi-
zenry are bound by a social contract that carries reciprocal rights and re-
sponsibilities gradually superseded the view that sovereigns are beyond 
moral scrutiny. If the social contract requires citizens to relinquish some 
of their liberties in exchange for state protection, then the state bears a 
responsibility to ensure its citizens’ welfare by protecting their rights and 
liberties and maintaining peace and security within state borders.
 The mass exterminations of European Jews and other populations 
during World War II challenged the principles of international law that 
had allowed such crimes to occur, and the impunity of national leaders 
was called into question. The Nuremberg trials (1945–49), which held key 
individuals in Nazi Germany’s political, economic, and military estab-
lishment accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, led to 
increased scrutiny of national leaders. The postwar order witnessed an 
expansion of democratic values and institutions. Universal principles of 
human rights were enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, 
comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). In 1948, 
the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), 
which required member nations “to prevent and to punish” genocide 
wherever and whenever it is found.3 Emergent human rights and hu-
manitarian movements gave primacy to individual over states’ rights and 
emphasized the protection of minorities and other vulnerable members 
of society. National laws were no longer off limits to international investi-
gation. Subject peoples in Europe’s African and Asian empires embraced 
universal human rights claims and demanded equal treatment under the 
law and national self-determination. In the 1950s and 1960s, their efforts 
culminated in widespread decolonization.
 The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 further under-
mined the seventeenth-century notion that state sovereignty is absolute. 
Like the post–World War I League of Nations, the UN was founded to 
promote international peace and security. However, the UN’s mission, 
which was uniquely premised on respect for universal human rights and 
freedoms, led to a supplementary mandate. The UN was also charged 
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with promoting “the economic and social advancement of all peoples.”4 
Aware that conflicts were frequently rooted in material deprivation and 
in unequal distribution of power and resources, political and human 
rights leaders argued that the maintenance of international peace and 
security required governments to use their capacities to benefit all their 
citizens and that states should be held accountable for the protection of 
basic human rights within their borders.
 The end of the Cold War brought additional challenges to the state 
sovereignty principle. The Soviet Union had disintegrated, and the 
United States and other Western powers no longer felt the same need 
for strongmen to protect their interests. Newly critical of their clients’ 
corrupt practices and human rights abuses, they withdrew their sup-
port from longstanding dictators and called for accountability in gover-
nance. These momentous political shifts provided opportunities for new 
ways of thinking, and a cadre of public intellectuals in the Global North 
and South began to argue for a fundamental reconceptualization of the 
premises of state sovereignty, one that harkened back to the social con-
tract that sometimes had confounded sovereigns’ ability to wield their 
power with impunity. These thinkers charged that to legitimately claim 
sovereignty, a state must provide basic conditions for the well-being of its 
citizenry, including not only peace, security, and order, but also adequate 
food, clean water, clothing, shelter, health care, education, and employ-
ment. In some polities, dominant groups target populations who differ 
in race, ethnicity, or religion from those in power. In some cases, the 
state not only fails to protect vulnerable populations from gross human 
rights violations, ethnic cleansing, or genocide, but is also complicit in 
perpetrating those crimes. According to the new paradigm, a state that 
is unable or unwilling to fulfill its foundational responsibilities forfeits 
the right to sovereignty over its territory and people—and its exemption 
from outside interference.
 It was in this new context that the UN moved toward a broader defi-
nition of international responsibility for the protection of human rights. 
In June 1993, governmental and nongovernmental representatives from 
171 nations met in Vienna at the UN-sponsored World Conference on 
Human Rights, where they endorsed the claim that “All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. . . . While the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
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States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to pro-
mote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”5 In theory, 
a state’s failure to protect its citizens could warrant UN intervention.
 After the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the splin-
tering of states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and challenges to 
other states elsewhere produced millions of refugees and spawned un-
told numbers of armed insurgents who crossed borders and fomented 
instability. Because the UN’s purpose is to “maintain international peace 
and security,” and because massive human rights violations have ripple 
effects that affect entire regions, rectifying such wrongs increasingly was 
understood to be within the UN’s purview.6 However, UN actions did 
not keep pace with the expanded understanding of the organization’s ju-
risdiction. Prioritizing their own domestic and foreign policy agendas, 
permanent members of the Security Council opposed measures that 
might have thwarted the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and ethnic cleans-
ing in Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003–4. Continued pressure from non-
governmental organizations and human rights activists pushed the UN 
General Assembly to pass the 2005 R2P resolution, which allowed the in-
ternational community to intervene if governments did not protect their 
citizens from gross human rights violations.7 Supported by 150 countries, 
the R2P resolution upended an understanding of state sovereignty that 
had been one of the fundamental tenets of international law since the 
seventeenth century. In theory, deference to “state sovereignty” no longer 
could be used as an expedient to allow ethnic cleansing, genocide, or 
other crimes against humanity to proceed unhindered.
 Once again, the reality was far more complicated. New principles 
of international intervention had been endorsed, but enforcement re-
mained problematic. Governments were reluctant to set precedents that 
might be used against them in the future, and powerful members of the 
Security Council rarely committed the resources or personnel necessary 
to implement the R2P resolution. If a culpable state opposed external in-
volvement, outside powers ordinarily persisted only if their own interests 
were at stake. Action was likely solely in the case of weak states or those 
without powerful allies on the Security Council—that is, in states that 
could not effectively challenge foreign intervention.
 As calls for multilateral diplomacy evolved into appeals for military 
intervention under the mantle of responsibility to protect, there was 
sharp disagreement over the motives of those intervening, the means 
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they employed, and the nature of the outcomes, that is, whether inter-
vention provided protection for civilians or only increased their insecu-
rity. Some governments reacted to international scrutiny by invoking the 
old principle of national sovereignty. Others charged that international 
human rights laws were based on Western capitalist norms that give pri-
macy to the rights of individuals over those of society and thus were 
not applicable to their cultures or conditions. They argued that Western 
claims regarding the universality of their human rights definitions were 
yet another example of cultural imperialism and neocolonialism. Still 
others claimed that humanitarian intervention was simply a guise for 
Western powers’ pursuit of their own economic or strategic objectives, 
and they warned that Western countries were attempting to recolonize 
the Global South. In countries and regions affected by conflict, govern-
ments and citizens were divided on the merits of outside intervention, 
whether by international organizations, neighboring states, or extra-
continental powers. Many remained skeptical of outsiders’ motives and 
their capacity to bring peace, even when their actions were part of an 
approved multilateral initiative.
 Similar problems have plagued the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which was established in 2002 to investigate and prosecute indi-
viduals believed to have engaged in war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
or genocide. Just as the UN Security Council may not intervene without 
a host country’s consent unless the government has failed to protect its 
citizens from gross human rights violations, the ICC is authorized to act 
against alleged human rights abusers only if their national governments 
and courts are unable or unwilling to do so. However, the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion is far from universal. The international court may investigate alleged 
crimes in countries that have ratified the ICC treaty, in cases referred to 
it by the UN Security Council, or when the ICC prosecutor opens a case 
of his or her own volition. Although 123 UN member states had ratified 
the ICC treaty by 2017, 70 others had not. Among the holdouts were three 
permanent members of the UN Security Council that have veto-wielding 
powers: the United States, China, and Russia. These countries refused to 
recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over their own citizens, and they also 
shielded their allies from the court’s authority. ICC member states have 
also undermined ICC operations. Although they are technically obliged 
to comply with the court’s decisions, the ICC has no police or military to 
enforce summonses or arrest warrants. As a result, alleged perpetrators 
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with powerful allies avoid prosecution, while those without connections 
are more likely to be held accountable.
 Like advocates of R2P, the ICC has been accused of bias against Af-
rican countries and norms. The court is authorized to investigate human 
rights abuses worldwide, but nine of the ten investigations it conducted 
between 2002 and 2017 and all of its indictments, prosecutions, and con-
victions involved African political and military figures. As a result, some 
critics have charged that the ICC is simply another neocolonial institu-
tion. Criticism from the African Union has been especially sharp, with 
some African leaders urging AU member states to withdraw from the 
international court—a step that Burundi took in 2017. However, other 
African leaders and many civil society organizations have voiced strong 
support for the court and urged it to expand its protection of African 
civilians rather than to reduce it. The degree to which the ICC can pro-
mote equal justice in an unequal international order remains an open 
question.
Paradigm 2: The War on Terror
If the roots of the first paradigm can be traced to post–World War II un-
derstandings of the need for peace, justice, and human rights to ensure a 
stable international order, the seeds of the second paradigm can be found 
in the Cold War struggle between capitalism and communism. From the 
outset, the United States recognized the power of religion as a weapon 
against its atheistic opponents, and it mobilized conservative religious 
groups to fight the communist menace. In Europe, it supported Christian 
parties and organizations that opposed the Italian, Greek, and French 
communist parties that had gained strength during World War II and 
its aftermath. In the Middle East, it backed conservative Muslim organi-
zations and regimes that sought to suppress both communism and radi-
cal nationalism. When the pro-Western Shah of Iran was overthrown in 
January 1979 and replaced by militants who embraced the Shi’a branch of 
Islam, Washington rallied extremists in the rival Sunni branch to counter 
Iran’s growing prominence.8 Saudi Arabia, a staunch US ally, promoter of 
fundamentalist Sunni teachings, and competitor with Iran for regional 
dominance, joined the United States in its patronage of Sunni militants.
 Most relevant for this study is the CIA-led multinational coalition 
that recruited, trained, armed, and financed Sunni militants from all 
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corners of the globe to challenge the decade-long Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan (1979–89). After ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan, the 
fighters dispersed to their home countries, where they founded new or-
ganizations and spearheaded insurgencies, primarily against Muslim 
states they deemed impious. These Soviet-Afghan War veterans played 
prominent roles in most of the extremist groups that emerged in Africa 
and the Middle East in the decades that followed. A brief summary of 
that history provides the context for the war on terror.
 In 1978, a military coup in Afghanistan installed a communist gov-
ernment that was sympathetic to Moscow. It was also brutal, internally 
divided, and challenged by popular opposition, including an Islamist- 
backed Sunni insurgency. Faced with instability on its borders, the So-
viet Union had two fundamental concerns: first, that the Afghan govern-
ment would fall and that a new regime would ally with US interests; and 
second, that the Islamist-backed insurgency in Afghanistan might stim-
ulate similar uprisings in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, which in-
cluded large Muslim populations. To bolster the Kabul regime, Moscow 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, beginning an occupation that 
would result in a decade-long war. Determined to secure US dominance 
over Indian Ocean communication lines and the oil-rich countries of the 
Persian Gulf, the United States mobilized an international coalition to 
challenge the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and undermine its authority 
in adjacent Soviet republics.
 For the duration of the ten-year war, the United States and its allies 
recruited tens of thousands of Muslim fighters from Africa, Asia, Europe, 
and North America to combat the Soviet occupation. The anti-Soviet re-
cruits, many of whom were inspired by Saudi Arabia’s fundamentalist 
teachings, referred to themselves as mujahideen—those who struggle 
to defend the Islamic faith. Spearheaded by the CIA, the endeavor was 
largely funded by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The CIA provided 
the militants with sophisticated weapons, including shoulder-fired, 
heat-seeking Stinger antiaircraft missiles that easily circumvented Soviet 
decoy flares.9 The CIA and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force Special 
Operations Forces, along with the UK’s Special Air Service, trained and 
instructed Pakistani officers and mujahideen leaders in guerrilla and 
terrorist tactics. Pakistan’s intelligence services trained the bulk of the 
mujahideen forces on the ground and provided critical logistical, intel-
ligence, and military support, while France, Israel, Egypt, and Morocco 
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also helped train and arm the anti-Soviet forces. Iran played a significant 
but independent role, training both Shi’ite and Sunni militias.
 The CIA and Pakistani intelligence countered Iran’s support for Shi’ite 
militants in Afghanistan by bolstering Sunni organizations such as that of 
Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi of Yemeni descent whose family had 
close ties to the ruling Saudi dynasty and had made its fortune in business 
and finance. Bin Laden’s organization raised funds, recruited, and pro-
vided services for the mujahideen, including a hostel for Algerian, Egyp-
tian, Saudi, and other fighters in Pakistan and a camp in Afghanistan. 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, some Afghan 
militants—primarily religious students and mujahideen fighters—recon-
stituted themselves as the Taliban (Seekers of the Truth) and fought re-
gional warlords and other mujahideen factions for political control. By 
1996, the Taliban had seized most of the country, imposing law and order 
in areas rife with corruption, banditry, and the drug trade. Turning to 
opium and heroin to finance their operations, the Taliban employed 
brutal methods to impose their own interpretation of Islamic law.
 After the Soviet departure, the foreign fighters carried their terror 
tactics and sophisticated weapons to new battlegrounds around the 
globe. Soviet-Afghan War veterans were at the forefront of guerrilla in-
surgencies in Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Gaza, Kashmir, 
the Philippines, the West Bank, and Yemen. They engaged in terrorist 
activities in Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, France, and the United States. CIA-
backed drug lords and allies, including Osama bin Laden, funded the 
new networks, joined by Muslim banks and charities.
 One of the most significant terrorist networks was al-Qaeda (The 
Base), which was established from the core of fighters and other vol-
unteers who had passed through Osama bin Laden’s camps. Founded 
in 1989 with bin Laden as its primary organizer and patron, al-Qaeda 
advocated jihad against apostate Muslim regimes and their supporters 
worldwide.10 Although bin Laden considered Saddam Hussein’s secular 
Arab nationalist regime in Iraq to be apostate, he opposed military in-
tervention by the US-led coalition during the First Gulf War (1990–91); 
he also denounced the Saudi government’s decision to allow hundreds of 
thousands of US and allied troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia, which 
was home to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Saudi government 
responded by expelling bin Laden from the country and, eventually, 
revoking his citizenship. When the Gulf War ended, the United States 
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retained its military bases and thousands of troops on the Arabian 
Peninsula. The removal of US military forces from the holy land was 
one of al-Qaeda’s primary objectives. As a result, the United States—bin 
Laden’s onetime ally—would become an important al-Qaeda target.
 The First Gulf War also precipitated the 1991 transfer of al-Qaeda’s 
headquarters and training camps to Sudan. From there the organization 
launched a network of cells and allied organizations that radiated into 
the Greater Horn of Africa, a geographic region that included Burundi, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. In May 1996, under pressure from the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UN Security Council, the Sudanese government asked 
bin Laden to leave. He moved al-Qaeda’s headquarters back to Afghani-
stan, where the organization allied with the Taliban. Blaming the United 
States for his ejection from Sudan, bin Laden focused new attention on 
this distant enemy. In August 1996 he issued a declaration of jihad against 
US military forces in Saudi Arabia and called on all Muslims to expel 
Americans and Israelis from Muslim lands.
 Al-Qaeda’s September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, were preceded by 
a number of other assaults against US citizens and infrastructure. These 
included the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as thwarted at-
tacks on New York City bridges and tunnels, the UN headquarters, and 
the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the 1998 
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; a failed attempt in 
1999 to blow up Los Angeles International Airport; and in 2000, a suc-
cessful attack on the US Navy destroyer USS Cole, which was docked in 
Yemen. Although al-Qaeda’s September 2001 attacks opened a new chap-
ter in the war on terror, the United States had been fighting the terrorist 
organizations it had helped to create since the mid-1990s.
Misconceptions about Islam
If the role of the United States and its allies in fomenting extremist vio-
lence is frequently overlooked, the role of Islam in abetting terrorism is 
often misunderstood. The US-led war on terror has inspired or reinforced 
many misconceptions about Islam, a religion that originated on the Ara-
bian Peninsula in the seventh century and has spread around the world 
since then. The emergence of modern political movements operating 
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under Islam’s banner has led to considerable debate over appropriate 
ways to distinguish these movements and the terminology used to de-
scribe them. The lack of authoritative consensus has resulted in much 
confusion. Islamism, a twentieth-century ideology and movement per-
taining to social, political, and religious life, has been confounded with 
Islamic fundamentalism, which pertains to religious doctrine. Similarly, 
political Islam—one aspect of Islamism—is often conflated with political 
terrorism, actions that are embraced by only a small minority of Muslims 
and whose legitimacy is widely challenged in the world Muslim com-
munity. Finally, the Arabic word jihad is frequently translated as “holy 
war” and associated with death by the sword. In Islam, however, there 
are three meanings of jihad, two of them nonviolent. Although experts 
continue to debate the precise meaning of these terms, this study has 
adopted the following definitions as the most appropriate.11
 Islam is the name of a world religion, derived from the Arabic word 
salema, which means peace, purity, submission, and obedience. The 
name implies submission to Allah’s will and obedience to his law. The 
two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi’a, agree on its five pillars: (1) 
faith in a monotheistic deity, Allah, whose messenger is Muhammad; 
(2) engaging in prayers five times daily; (3) giving alms to the poor; (4) 
fasting during the holy month of Ramadan; and (5) making a pilgrimage 
to Mecca at least once, if physically and financially able.
 Islamic fundamentalism refers to Islamic beliefs that reject religious 
innovation or adaptation in response to new circumstances. Practi-
tioners of fundamentalism, more generally, advocate a return to basic 
religious principles and the strict application of religious law. Fundamen-
talism often emerges as a reaction to liberalizing trends within a reli-
gion or to secularization in the broader society. It represents a struggle 
between tendencies within a given religion, rather than a clash between 
religions. The descriptor “religious fundamentalism” was first associated 
with late nineteenth-century Protestant Christians in the United States 
who embraced a literal interpretation of the Bible. Like their Christian 
counterparts, Islamic fundamentalists promote strict observance of their 
religion’s basic tenets and laws. Their movements have gained strength 
in the face of the religious innovation, Westernization, and secularization 
that followed the establishment of European colonialism in the twentieth 
century and globalization in the twenty-first. The vast majority of Islamic 
fundamentalists are law-abiding and oppose violent jihad, focusing instead 
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on the ethical, moral, and personal aspects of jihad (see below). They be-
lieve that an Islamic state will emerge from a Muslim community that has 
been purified from within through preaching and proselytizing and that 
such a state cannot be established through political or armed struggle.
 Islamism refers to a social, political, and religious ideology and move-
ment that emerged in response to European colonialism and the social 
instability wrought by encounters with the West. Its adherents hold that 
Islamic principles should serve as the basis of the social, political, and legal 
order and guide the personal lives of individual Muslims. Often led by in-
tellectuals rather than clergy members, Islamist movements focus on social 
and political change rather than on religious doctrine. Moderate Islamists 
work within established institutions and political processes to pursue so-
cial and political reforms that, they hope, will result in states that are pre-
mised on Islamic law and built from the bottom up. Radical Islamists strive 
to monopolize political power so that they can construct Islamic states 
from the top down. Islamists do not reject all aspects of Western culture, 
and they may even embrace Western education and technology as useful 
tools for the construction of Islamic states. Islamists, in contrast to jihadis 
(defined below), reject the use of violence to achieve their objectives.
 Political Islam is sometimes used synonymously with Islamism, even 
though it constitutes only one aspect of the social, political, and religious 
ideology and movement. Although political Islam employs the language 
of religion, it represents a political rather than a religious response to 
Westernization. Its adherents do not reject modernity, but they repudiate 
a particular brand of modernity. They refute the claim that the Western 
definition of modernity is a universal one and embrace an Islamist vari-
ant in its place.
 Jihad means effort or struggle. A person who engages in jihad is a 
mujahid (plural, mujahideen). Jihad has three interrelated meanings: 
first, the inner spiritual struggle to live righteously, as a good Muslim; 
second, the struggle to build and purify the Muslim community; and 
third, the struggle to defend the Islamic faith from outsiders, with force 
if necessary. The first meaning, which refers to a personal spiritual strug-
gle, constitutes the greater jihad. The second and third meanings, which 
focus on the outside world, comprise the lesser jihad. Historically, jihad 
has been understood first and foremost as an inner struggle that begins 
with the self and extends outward to the broader society. Those who un-
dertake such struggle believe that social and political reforms are best 
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achieved through preaching, proselytizing, and mobilizing the masses to 
effect change from the bottom up. Engaging in the lesser jihad is held to 
be a collective duty of the Muslim community, as determined situation-
ally by religious and legal authorities, rather than a permanent personal 
duty as determined by individuals or self-appointed preachers.
 Since the onset of the war on terror, Western observers have fre-
quently collapsed all forms of jihad into one, erroneously defined as a 
“holy war” against nonbelievers. The concept of holy war originated 
among Christians in medieval Europe to justify crusades against Mus-
lims; it has no direct counterpart in mainstream Islamic thought. Jihad 
is not one of the five pillars of Islam and thus is not a practice that is 
essential to Muslim identity.
 Jihadism refers to a minority insurgent movement that broke from 
Islamism and employs violence in the name of religion. Jihadism emerged 
in the context of severe social, political, and economic inequalities, and in 
many cases, political persecution. The movement has primarily attracted 
young men who feel alienated from mainstream society. Its adherents 
reject the traditional interpretation of the lesser jihad as a collective 
struggle of the Muslim community, determined by officially recognized 
religious and legal authorities, and define it instead as a personal one, to 
be determined by each individual as he or she sees fit or by self-described 
clerics. From the early 1970s until the mid-1990s, jihadis generally tar-
geted local secular and Muslim regimes that they deemed impure (the 
“near enemy”), with the goal of overthrowing them and Islamizing state 
and society from the top down. However, from the mid-1990s, a small 
minority began to focus on distant impious or non-Muslim regimes (the 
“far enemy”), heralding the emergence of global jihad.
 Western commentators often overlook these distinctions, failing to dif-
ferentiate between jihadist factions and frequently merging Islamism and 
jihadism under the misleading rubric of “Islamic terrorism.” Some errone-
ously deem both movements a threat to Western societies and argue that 
both must be opposed in an open-ended war on terror and an effort to re-
structure the Muslim world. Policies based on this misunderstanding have 
tended to result in increased hostility and an even greater threat to the West.
 A jihadi is a militant Muslim activist who opposes the secular so-
ciopolitical order at home, and Westernization and globalization more 
broadly, and who engages in armed struggle to establish an Islamic state. 
The term is not synonymous with mujahid, which refers to a person 
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engaged in any of the three forms of jihad. The term jihadi (jihadist, 
adjective) was coined in the early twenty-first century by militants who 
self-identified as such. Jihadis who focus on local struggles against pur-
portedly impious Muslim or secular regimes constitute the majority of 
this minority faction, while those who focus on distant or non-Muslim 
regimes—the so-called global jihadis—are a tiny minority of the mi-
nority movement.
 Islamic terrorism is a commonly used but misleading term that asso-
ciates religious doctrine with terrorist activity. Islamic fundamentalism, 
radical Islamism, and political Islam are not equivalent to Islamic terror-
ism. Muslims who engage in terrorism and claim religious justification for 
these activities constitute a minuscule minority of Muslims worldwide, 
and their actions are strongly condemned by the majority. Although these 
violent extremists deploy the language and symbols of religion to justify 
their actions, their turn to terrorism was often inspired by social, politi-
cal, and economic grievances rather than by religious beliefs. This study 
rejects the use of the term Islamic terrorism as both inaccurate and dan-
gerous. Violence that targets civilians for political reasons is described as 
“violent extremism” or simply “terrorism.” In some instances, “Muslim 
extremist” is used to distinguish violent actors who claim to be operating 
on behalf of their Islamic faith from other violent actors.
Conclusion
Political, economic, and social instability in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries brought renewed attention to the African conti-
nent. Employing new justifications for their actions, foreign powers and 
multilateral institutions challenged the centuries-old principle of na-
tional sovereignty and claimed the right to intervene to restore stability, 
protect civilian lives, and combat terrorism. Although some of these in-
terventions reestablished law and order and saved civilian lives, others 
left conflicts unresolved and laid the groundwork for future strife. Misin-
terpretations and distortions of Islam, which influenced external actions 
in the war on terror, often had devastating consequences for civilians. 
Chapter 3 introduces the major foreign actors involved in African con-
flicts after the Cold War, including extracontinental powers, neighboring 
states, multilateral state-based organizations, and nonstate actors associ-
ated with international terrorist networks.
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Suggested Reading
Suggested readings relevant to specific countries follow chapters 4–11. 
The works listed below provide general overviews or are pertinent to 
multiple African countries.
 African economic crises that began in the 1970s sparked many of 
the continent’s political crises. The following works provide contrasting 
views of the origins of these crises and their solutions. For an insider’s 
critique of the role of the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization in promoting global inequality, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Glo-
balization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). Nico-
las van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 
1979–1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), argues that the 
internal dynamics of neopatrimonial African states rather than external 
impositions were primarily responsible for the postcolonial economic 
crises. David Sahn and colleagues contend that the policies mandated 
by international financial institutions did not harm the African poor, 
but neither were they sufficient to reduce poverty. See David E. Sahn, 
ed., Economic Reform and the Poor in Africa (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1996); and David E. Sahn, Paul A. Dorosh, and Stephen D. 
Younger, Structural Adjustment Reconsidered: Economic Policy and Poverty 
in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Léonce Ndiku-
mana and James K. Boyce, Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and 
Capital Flight Bled a Continent (London: Zed, 2011), focuses on capital 
flight from Africa and the role of foreign debt in the current crises.
 Post–Cold War political crises in African states are considered from 
diverse perspectives. Books on the failure of state institutions written 
from Western political science perspectives include I. William Zartman, 
ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Robert I. Rotberg, When 
States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2004); and Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State 
Failure in Late-Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). A critique of Western theories of weak, fragile, troubled, failed, 
and collapsed African states and the ways in which Western powers have 
responded can be found in Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed 
State,’” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1491–1507. Diverse views 
are offered in the collection edited by Leonardo A. Villalón and Phillip A. 
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Huxtable, The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration 
and Reconfiguration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
 Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou, The Crimi-
nalization of the State in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1999), examines the role of the state in the plunder of resources, privatiza-
tion of armies and state institutions, and involvement in global criminal 
networks. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder 
as Political Instrument (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 
shows how African political actors have manipulated ethnic and regional 
tensions and used the ensuing disorder to obtain and maintain power. 
William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998), considers the destruction of bureaucratic state structures 
of revenue collection, policing, and provision of social services in post–
Cold War Africa and their replacement by warlords whose goal is to plun-
der economic resources rather than to mobilize citizens. Pierre Englebert, 
Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2009), argues that states have failed to protect their citizens yet continue 
to endure because they offer benefits to regional and national elites.
 A number of works provide a deeper understanding of post–Cold 
War conflicts in Africa. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized 
Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
explores the causes of increased ethnic violence in the 1990s and the rea-
sons the international community failed to stop it. William Reno, War-
fare in Independent Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
focuses on African internal conflicts, including anticolonial movements, 
reformist rebellions, and warlord-led insurgencies. David Kilcullen, The 
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), offers an overview of the interac-
tions of local insurgencies, international movements, and the global war 
on terror. Several edited collections examine diverse insurgencies and 
civil wars. Paul D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, 2nd ed. (Mal-
den, MA: Polity, 2016), assesses the causes and consequences of more 
than 600 armed conflicts in Africa from 1990 to 2015, including the im-
pact of outside intervention. See also Christopher Clapham, ed., African 
Guerrillas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); Morten Bøås 
and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007); Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn, 
eds., Africa’s Insurgents: Navigating an Evolving Landscape (Boulder, CO: 
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Lynne Rienner, 2017); Paul Richards, ed., No Peace, No War: An Anthro-
pology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2005); and Preben Kaarsholm, ed., Violence, Political Culture and Devel-
opment in Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006).
 Several works examine African conflicts and peace agreements. Two 
companion volumes edited by Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza 
examine the causes of and possible solutions to African conflicts from 
African perspectives: The Roots of African Conflicts and The Resolution 
of African Conflicts (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008). Adebayo 
Oyebade and Abiodun Alao, eds., Africa after the Cold War: The Chang-
ing Perspectives on Security (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), as-
sesses civil conflicts, economic crises, and environmental degradation 
as the primary threats to post–Cold War African security. Grace Maina 
and Erik Melander, eds., Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa 
(Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2016), of-
fers a framework for evaluating prospects for a successful accord. Case 
studies for Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Somalia, and Sudan are especially 
relevant. Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Ev-
eryday Politics of International Intervention (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014), explains why international peace interventions often 
fail, scrutinizing the modes of thought and action that prevent foreign 
interveners from thinking outside the box. A sharp assessment of past 
failures and future prospects for democracy can be found in Nic Cheese-
man, Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political 
Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
 The post–World War II emphasis on human rights and humanitar-
ian intervention is the focus of several works. Samantha Power, A Prob-
lem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), analyzes six twentieth-century genocides and the US government’s 
failure to stop them. This study has been pivotal to recent debates on in-
ternational law and human rights policies and had an important political 
impact on the Obama administration. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: 
Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), contends that post-1960s discontent with regimes established 
on the basis of utopian and anticolonial ideologies paved the way for 
human rights as a justification for international actions that challenged 
state sovereignty. Timothy Nunan, Humanitarian Invasion: Global De-
velopment in Cold War Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University 
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Press, 2016), argues that foreign intervention in Afghanistan during the 
Cold War and its aftermath became the model for future humanitarian 
interventions that destabilized societies and undermined national sover-
eignty in the Global South. Alex de Waal, “Writing Human Rights and 
Getting It Wrong,” Boston Review, June 6, 2016, casts a critical eye on 
humanitarian intervention lobbies, particularly those that focused on 
Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. He argues that their judgments were often 
ill-informed and reduced complex situations to straightforward narra-
tives of heroes and villains; as a result, the military interventions they 
promoted sometimes did more harm than good. Carrie Booth Wall-
ing and Susan Waltz’s website, Human Rights Advocacy and the History 
of International Human Rights Standards (http://humanrightshistory.
umich.edu/). It is especially useful for teachers, students, researchers, 
and advocates. 
 A number of works examine the reshaping of international legal 
principles and the struggle for global accountability. Two are central to 
discussions of the responsibility to protect: Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel 
Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, 
Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Wash-
ington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996); and Francis M. Deng, “From 
‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the Responsibility to Protect,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 2, no. 4 (2010): 353–70. Elizabeth Borgwardt, A 
New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), examines the role of New Deal 
visionaries in constructing the postwar international order that eroded 
the primacy of national sovereignty and strengthened the position of 
human rights.
 Other works critique the new human rights/R2P discourse and in-
ternational actions based on its principles. Robert Meister, After Evil: A 
Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 
argues that the democratic capitalist world has monopolized the concept 
of “human rights,” producing a version that does not challenge the struc-
tural inequalities that underlie poverty and oppression, and has used the 
responsibility to protect paradigm to justify militaristic ventures. Alex J. 
Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte 
d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs 87, 
no. 4 (July 2011): 825–50, explores the role of external powers and stake-
holders in determining which civilians are to be protected. A critical 
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assessment of the International Criminal Court and its uneven record in 
advancing global accountability can be found in David Bosco, Rough Jus-
tice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 Two important works focus on the UN’s role in humanitarian in-
tervention: Norrie MacQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), provides an over-
view of UN interventions in various world regions, including sub- 
Saharan Africa, and assesses their impact and moral implications. Car-
rie Booth Walling, All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Hu-
manitarian Intervention (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), investigates the ways in which human rights concerns have altered 
Security Council attitudes toward state sovereignty and explains the vari-
ation in UN response to violations.
 The Cold War roots of international terrorist movements associ-
ated with Islam are explored in several texts. Three works investigate the 
CIA’s role in recruiting, training, and financing Muslim fighters to wage 
war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan; they also explore how Soviet- 
Afghan War veterans subsequently established worldwide terrorist net-
works, including al-Qaeda and its spinoff, the Islamic State. See John K. 
Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, 
3rd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret 
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 
September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); and Mahmood Mamdani, 
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror 
(New York: Pantheon, 2004). Jean-Pierre Filiu, From Deep State to Islamic 
State: The Arab Counter-Revolution and Its Jihadi Legacy (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2015), exposes the ways in which Arab autocracies 
quashed the Arab Spring uprisings by unleashing internal security, intel-
ligence, and military forces, as well as street gangs and violent extrem-
ists. He argues that these actions opened the door to the Islamic State. 
The origins of the Islamic State are also examined in Joby Warrick, Black 
Flags: The Rise of ISIS (New York: Doubleday, 2015), which contends that 
the policies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations 
aided in the organization’s emergence and expansion.
 Conceptions and misconceptions about Islamic fundamentalism, 
Islamism, and jihad are examined in a number of works. They include 
International Crisis Group, Understanding Islamism, Middle East/
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North Africa Report 37 (Cairo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
2005); Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (mentioned previously); 
and Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?” 
Middle East Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 65–77. Richard C. Martin 
and Abbas Barzegar, eds., Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political 
Islam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), presents diverse 
interpretations of Islamism by Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals. 
Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), dispels misconceptions about various movements within Islam, 
distinguishing between extremists and Islamic fundamentalists who re-
ject violence. John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), contrasts the teachings of the 
Qur’an with their manipulation by a violent minority and examines the 
political roots of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Contributors 
to Roel Meijer’s edited collection, Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious 
Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), explore commonalities and differ-
ences among various strands of Salafism and examine tensions between 
local and global goals. Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went 
Global, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), argues 
that the majority of jihadis strive to transform or overthrow local regimes 
in the Muslim world and that only a small minority target the West. He 
also examines the reasons that global jihadism emerged in the late 1990s 
and analyzes the split in the jihadist movement that ensued. The United 
Nations Development Programme, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Driv-
ers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment (New York: UNDP, 
2017), considers economic marginalization, low levels of education, ab-
sence of good governance, and security sector abuse as factors driving 
extremism, with religious knowledge often serving as a deterrent.
 Two French scholars, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, have engaged in 
a heated public debate about the origins of the violent extremism asso-
ciated with contemporary jihadist movements. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The 
Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
provides an overview of Islamist movements in the twentieth century, 
focusing especially on Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and Afghani-
stan. Kepel argues that in the late 1990s, Islamist movements split into 
a majority faction that favored Muslim democracy and a small minority 
that engaged in terrorist attacks to promote their goals. Gilles Kepel, The 
War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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University Press, 2004), tracks the origins of global jihad to the Soviet- 
Afghan War and argues that al-Qaeda’s ideology emerged both from Is-
lam’s strict Salafist and Wahhabi traditions, which advocate abstention 
from worldly affairs, and from the more political Muslim Brotherhood, 
whose goal is to establish an Islamic state. Gilles Kepel, with Antoine 
Jardin, Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017), examines Muslim youth who were 
radicalized in the West and targeted Western populations. Olivier Roy, 
Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), disputes the significance of conservative Islamic 
traditions and instead explains violent jihad as a response to social, 
political, and economic changes, one that is politically rather than re-
ligiously inspired. Roy argues that Islam has not been radicalized, but 
rather that radicalism has been Islamized. Alienated youth who had not 
previously been religious turned to a distorted variant of Islam for mean-
ing, identity, and respect, just as earlier generations had embraced other 
radical ideologies; the result is the nihilistic rejection of a society that has 
rejected them. In the West, these youths have been radicalized not by 
established religious scholars and mosques, but in prisons—where they 
often serve time for petty crime—and by self-proclaimed authorities on 
the internet. Roy’s widely quoted challenge to Kepel’s thesis appears in 
Olivier Roy, “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste,” 




Who intervened and Why
political, economic, and social instability in Africa after the Cold 
War resulted in new waves of foreign intervention. Global, regional, and 
subregional state-based organizations were central to war-making and 
peace-building processes, and nonstate actors associated with interna-
tional terrorist networks played key roles in some conflicts. During the 
periods of decolonization and the Cold War, foreign states intervened in 
African affairs unilaterally or in collaboration with other states. Former 
imperial powers and new Cold War powers were the most significant 
sources of external intervention. After the Cold War, unilateral engage-
ment continued. Onetime imperial and Cold War powers continued to 
intercede in their historical spheres of interest; Middle Eastern states 
and organizations took a special interest in North Africa; and African 
countries intervened in their neighbors’ affairs. However, multilateral 
intervention by organized groups of states (intergovernmental organi-
zations) and transnational networks of nonstate actors grew increasingly 
important. 
 This chapter introduces the major foreign actors involved in African 
conflicts after the Cold War, including nation-states on other continents, 
neighboring African countries, multilateral state-based organizations, 
and nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks. It 
distinguishes the outside contestants in decolonization and Cold War 
conflicts from those involved in their aftermath, and it establishes a 
framework for understanding the interests and motivations of the for-
eign actors featured in the regional case studies.
 During the post–Cold War period, Western nations continued to 
implicate themselves in African affairs. France and the United Kingdom 
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intervened in their former colonies, while the United States focused on 
its former Cold War allies and on countries deemed strategic in the war 
on terror. In some instances, Western powers and their allies interceded 
under the auspices of intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, 
NATO, or the EU.1 In other cases, they took unilateral action. Middle 
powers like the Nordic states also played significant roles in multilateral 
peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations, and they often engaged 
in independent diplomatic initiatives.2
 The other former Cold War powers, China and Russia, ordinarily 
opposed political and military intervention in the internal affairs of other 
nations—their immediate neighbors excepted. As permanent members 
of the UN Security Council, they frequently challenged Western-sponsored 
initiatives focusing on human rights and governance issues. Like other 
industrial states, China was particularly interested in regions that were 
rich in strategic natural resources. In exchange for guaranteed access to 
such resources, China invested heavily in African industries and infra-
structure and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, political repres-
sion, and corruption. However, China, like the West, recognized that its 
economic interests would be best served by peace and stability. In conse-
quence, Beijing expanded its involvement in multilateral disaster relief, 
antipiracy, and counterterrorism operations. In 2016, it contributed more 
military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations than any other per-
manent member of the Security Council. It engaged in mediation and 
peacekeeping efforts in Sudan and South Sudan, where it had significant 
investments in oil production and infrastructure, and also in Mali, where 
its primary interests lay in the oil and uranium of neighboring countries. 
China also joined France, the United States, Italy, and Japan in estab-
lishing a military facility in Djibouti, which overlooks one of the world’s 
most lucrative shipping lanes.
 Russia, like China, viewed post–Cold War Africa as a new frontier of 
political and economic opportunity. Itself the target of Western economic 
sanctions, Moscow had no interest in critiquing its partners’ domestic 
human rights abuses or international transgressions. It offered goods 
and services to countries sidelined by Western restrictions and used its 
power on the Security Council to oppose robust military interventions 
that would encroach on national sovereignty and promote Western in-
terests. Critical of Western influence over peacekeeping structures and 
initiatives, Moscow also recognized that its participation provided it 
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with an avenue toward increased global prominence. Although its per-
sonnel contributions to African peacekeeping missions have been rela-
tively small, Russia has trained African peacekeepers for both UN and 
AU missions, and it has sought leadership roles in the UN peacekeep-
ing headquarters in New York and in missions on the ground. In Africa, 
Moscow’s military imprint is more evident in its substantive weapons 
trade: a major military supplier to African governments during the Cold 
War, Moscow has continued to expand its arms trade on the continent. 
It has also used its military connections to extend its influence in other 
arenas. Although Russia’s commerce with Africa is still small relative to 
that of China, Europe, and the United States, it has increased dramati-
cally since 2000. Like China, Russia has focused its investments on the 
energy and mining sectors and on infrastructure development.
 Middle Eastern powers also intervened in Africa after the Cold 
War. Historically, Middle Eastern countries maintained strong political 
and cultural ties with North Africa, which was commonly considered 
part of the Arab World. During the post–Cold War period, a number of 
Middle Eastern nations intervened in North Africa and the Horn of Af-
rica, acting unilaterally or through the intergovernmental Arab League. 
Most significant for this study, the Gulf states and Turkey provided im-
portant political, economic, and military support to established govern-
ments and their opponents during the Arab Spring uprisings and their 
aftermath.3 
 African states also implicated themselves in their neighbors’ affairs 
through the UN, the AU, and subregional organizations, as well as uni-
laterally. Like other outside powers, they often had mixed motives: they 
sought to engender peace and stability but also to further their own aims 
and interests. In some cases, they backed the governments in power. In 
others, they supported warlords or rebel movements.4 Somalia (chap-
ter 4) was the subject of interference from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda, while the conflict in Sudan (chapter 
5) sparked intervention by Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Uganda. 
Uganda and Zaire implicated themselves in Rwandan affairs before and 
after the 1994 genocide (chapter 6), while wars in Zaire’s successor state, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (chapter 7), engaged Angola, Bu-
rundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In West 
Africa’s Mano River region (chapters 8 and 9), the civil war in Liberia 
involved intervention by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Libya; 
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the related civil war in Sierra Leone implicated Liberia and Libya; and the 
ensuing civil war in Côte d’Ivoire involved Liberia and Burkina Faso. The 
Egyptian military intervened in Libya after the Arab Spring revolt (chap-
ter 10). In Mali, the French-led intervention to counter a secessionist move-
ment and jihadist insurgency was joined by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, 
and Niger, while the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was challenged by 
armies from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (chapter 11).
 Some individual states played outsized roles in their own subregions 
and, in a few cases, wielded considerable influence continentwide. In par-
ticular, Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa were 
notable for both their subregional and continental influence. In North, 
East, and Central Africa, no single nation could claim subregional domi-
nance. However, Algeria and Egypt possessed considerable clout in North 
Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia carried significant weight in East African af-
fairs, while Egypt also aspired to wider influence in the Greater Horn.5 In 
Central Africa, the DRC was large in size and rich in minerals, but internal 
conflicts prevented it from assuming a leadership role.
 Several intergovernmental organizations and nonstate actors 
played key roles in shaping the post–Cold War order in Africa. The 
most consequential included one global organization, the United 
Nations; four regional bodies, the Organization of African Unity, the 
African Union, the European Union, and the Arab League; and five 
subregional organizations, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The most 
significant nonstate actors were the international jihadist networks, al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and af-
filiates. The composition, purpose, and interests of these organizations 
are described below.
Global Organization: The United Nations
Established in 1945 to promote international peace, security, and social 
progress, the United Nations is dominated by the nations that won World 
War II. The UN General Assembly includes representatives of all member 
states. However, its resolutions are not legally binding, and it possesses 
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no enforcement powers. The UN Security Council comprises five veto- 
bearing permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, and China) and ten rotating members that serve two-
year terms and have no veto power. The Security Council can impose 
sanctions and authorize military intervention. The United States, which 
pays the largest share of the organization’s operating expenses, dom-
inated UN structures throughout the Cold War, when the US agenda 
generally prevailed. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council 
has continued to promote a Western agenda, although its powers have 
been limited by Russia and China, which historically have opposed UN 
intervention in the internal affairs of member nations.
 Two chapters of the UN Charter spell out the organization’s role 
in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. Chapter VI permits the Security Council to investigate 
disputes that threaten international peace and security, to issue recom-
mendations, and to monitor peace accords. The main parties to the dis-
pute must consent to UN involvement. Under a Chapter VI mandate, a 
neutral UN force composed of troops from member states is stationed 
between warring parties that have endorsed a peace accord and empow-
ered the UN to monitor it and maintain the peace. UN troops may use 
their weapons only if attacked or threatened with attack. They are not 
authorized to use force to protect civilians or to disarm parties to the 
dispute. They may not impose peace in the context of war. If war re-
sumes, peacekeeping forces authorized under Chapter VI are generally 
withdrawn or their mandate is transformed into a Chapter VII peace en-
forcement mandate. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for UN in-
tervention to maintain or restore peace, even in cases in which the main 
parties to the conflict have not acceded to UN involvement. Under this 
more robust mandate, UN troops are permitted to use force to counter 
threats to international peace and security even when peacekeepers are 
not directly threatened. They also may be authorized to protect civilians, 
humanitarian aid workers, and relief convoys, and to disarm and demo-
bilize warring parties.
 Because the UN Security Council determines which peacekeeping 
operations will be authorized and funded, the five permanent members 
wield enormous power. They generally choose to fund only those opera-
tions that support their interests and to end operations that oppose or no 
longer serve their interests. The three Western members fund nearly half 
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the peacekeeping budget.6 Therefore they exercise disproportionate con-
trol over the operations, using their financial clout to determine where 
UN missions are sent and for how long.
 Because East and West often failed to agree, there were few UN 
peacekeeping missions during the Cold War. In its immediate aftermath, 
Western powers were more concerned about maintaining the peace in 
Europe—specifically in the Balkans—than in Africa, where Cold War 
dictators were left to fail and rival forces jockeyed for position in the 
resulting power vacuums. During the 1990s, the Security Council with-
drew UN peacekeepers from Somalia in the face of a deepening crisis 
and from Rwanda in the midst of a genocide, while the growing con-
flict in Liberia was ignored. By the decade’s end, however, the Security 
Council had begun to work with African regional and subregional orga-
nizations to secure peace in Sudan, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Côte d’Ivoire—all countries of considerable interest to the West, and in 
the case of Sudan, also to China. The UN provided significant funds for 
these operations, which in turn enabled it to influence the substance of 
the peace agreements and, to a lesser extent, their implementation.
 A third chapter of the UN Charter provides for subregional and re-
gional involvement in dispute settlement. Chapter VIII stipulates that 
if strife within or between countries threatens international peace and 
security, subregional and regional bodies are the most appropriate first 
responders. If one or more states cannot resolve a conflict or are not 
deemed neutral arbiters, the appropriate subregional organization is 
expected to respond. If those efforts fail, the continentwide regional 
organization is called upon. If the subregional or regional body lacks 
material resources or political will, the UN may intervene, often in col-
laboration with those organizations. No enforcement actions may be 
taken by subregional or regional bodies without UN Security Council 
authorization.
Regional Organizations
Organization of African Unity
During the first post–Cold War decade, the most important regional 
organization in Africa was the Organization of African Unity. Estab-
lished in May 1963 by thirty-two independent African states, the OAU 
promoted national liberation in territories still under colonial or white 
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minority rule and provided liberation movements with military, eco-
nomic, and diplomatic support. For nearly four decades the organization 
served as an important voice for African emancipation. Many African 
states argued that the OAU should assume responsibility for conflict pre-
vention and resolution on the continent, countering the great-power bias 
on the UN Security Council. However, the OAU Charter was the product 
of compromise, drafted under the conservative influence of Ethiopian 
emperor Haile Selassie and sensitive to the political realities of a divided 
continent. It prohibited the organization’s interference in the internal af-
fairs of member states. Moreover, unity among African states was both 
fragile and superficial. The OAU was marked by political, economic, 
religious, and personal rivalries, and the organization represented the 
interests of autocratic rulers more often than those of grassroots citizens. 
Because the organization did not possess enforcement powers, its reso-
lutions had little effect beyond their moral appeal.
African Union
In July 2002 the OAU was succeeded by the African Union, an amal-
gam of the OAU and the African Economic Community, which was 
established in 1991 to promote African economic integration. Address-
ing deficiencies in the OAU mandate, the AU’s mission is to integrate 
Africa politically and economically and to promote peace, security, sta-
bility, and sustainable development on the continent. In contrast to the 
OAU Charter, which supported the principle of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of member states, the AU’s Constitutive Act permits the 
organization to take punitive action against member states that violate 
principles of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. It may 
authorize military intervention in a member state if it determines that 
“war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” are being commit-
ted or if the state’s actions threaten regional stability.7 However, even the 
AU’s strengthened mandate provides insufficient protection to victims 
of human rights abuses. The actions of corrupt or authoritarian regimes 
may fall outside the categories stipulated in the Constitutive Act, and 
governments that engage in human rights abuses are unlikely to support 
intervention in states with similar practices. The Constitutive Act autho-
rizes the establishment of an African standby force composed of military, 
police, and civilian brigades from each of Africa’s five subregions, which 
would be capable of rapid deployment to crisis areas. However, such a 
Who Intervened and Why  |  53
force was still in the formative stages in 2017. Other factors that weaken 
AU effectiveness include rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa and 
AU dependence on outside sources for funding. Many of the organiza-
tion’s peacekeeping missions are financed by extracontinental entities—
most importantly, the UN, the EU, the United States, and France. Their 
financial clout gives these external powers undue control over AU mis-
sions and actions.
European Union
Established in 1958 to promote economic cooperation between European 
countries, the European Economic Community (EEC) was renamed the 
European Union in 1993, reflecting an expanded mission that embraced 
foreign policy and security, climate change and environment, and inter-
national development and migration. In 2017, the EU had twenty-eight 
members.8 Strong historical and geographic links and rich natural re-
sources have made Africa central to European concerns. The Joint Africa- 
EU Strategy, endorsed in 2007 by eighty African and European heads 
of state, highlighted areas of common interest, including peace and se-
curity, international development and migration, and democracy, good 
governance, and human rights. The EU has provided substantial funds 
to strengthen African conflict resolution, security, and counterterrorism 
capacities and for African-led peacekeeping operations, such as the AU 
mission in Somalia. Its financial role gives the European organization 
significant influence over African affairs and establishes yet another kind 
of Northern dominance. The EU has also contributed considerable sums 
to develop African capacities to impede the flow of refugees and other 
migrants to Europe, an effort that serves European, rather than African, 
interests.
Arab League
Established in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans- 
jordan, and Yemen, the League of Arab States, or Arab League, was a 
product of the pan-Arab nationalist movement that rose in response to 
Ottoman and European rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The League’s vision also harkened back to the Islamic caliphates estab-
lished by Muhammad and his successors, which, during the seventh and 
eighth centuries, united all Muslims in a single political entity. The or-
ganization aspired to promote collaboration between its member states, 
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to protect their independence and sovereignty, and to advance Arab 
interests more generally. It opposed the violent settlement of disputes 
between members and often mediated in regional conflicts. However, it 
had no mechanism to enforce compliance with its resolutions, and only 
member states that approved the resolutions were bound to adhere to 
them. As a result, actions taken in the name of the Arab League were 
often motivated by the interests of particular member states, which fi-
nanced and spearheaded the operations. In fact, Arab unity was more 
a hope than a reality. The Arab world, like other invented communities, 
was torn by rivalries—political, economic, religious, and personal. Mem-
ber states’ divergent interests often resulted in paralysis in the face of 
regional conflicts. Like the OAU, the Arab League has generally repre-
sented the interests of powerful autocratic regimes rather than those of 
its members’ citizens.9
 By 1958, the League included four newly independent North African 
nations: Libya, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 2017 it comprised twenty- 
two member states, ten of which were African.10 Although it remained 
on the sidelines in many African conflicts, the Arab League or its mem-
bers played significant roles in some. Acting unilaterally or through the 
League, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emir-
ates, and Yemen intervened in Somalia’s affairs after the Cold War. The 
Council of the Arab League endorsed the UN-imposed no-fly zone in 
Libya in 2011, and member states Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
participated in the NATO-led military operation that paved the way for 
regime change in that country. During the Arab Spring and its aftermath, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates supported opposing sides in Libya’s 
civil war and in Egypt, where an elected Islamist-led government was 
ousted in a military coup.
Subregional Organizations
A number of African subregional organizations were established in the 
1970s and 1980s to deal with common economic, environmental, and 
political problems. Several of these organizations assumed important 
roles in conflict mediation, peace negotiations, and peacekeeping pro-
cesses after the Cold War. Especially significant for their diplomatic 
and military efforts were the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African 
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States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Re-
gion (ICGLR), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD). The Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
which had been central to struggles against white minority rule during 
the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, was a less significant po-
litical and economic actor in later decades. Like the global and regional 
organizations described earlier, the subregional organizations also suf-
fered from internal conflicts that reduced their effectiveness.
Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS was established in 1975 by sixteen West African states whose 
leaders hoped to promote subregional economic cooperation and de-
velopment.11 Some members imagined ECOWAS as an instrument for 
undermining French influence in a subregion where the former impe-
rial power maintained close political, economic, and military ties to its 
onetime colonies and intervened frequently in their affairs. Nigeria, the 
anglophone subregional powerhouse, hoped to use the organization as a 
launching pad for its own political and economic ambitions, which in-
cluded weakening the francophone powers and establishing a common 
market with Nigeria as the linchpin.
 Although ECOWAS was not conceived as a security organization, it 
increasingly assumed that role, especially after the Cold War, when ex-
ternal interest in Africa diminished. A 1981 protocol provided for mutual 
assistance against external aggression and for the establishment of an 
ECOWAS military force to protect member states from such aggression. 
The ECOWAS force was permitted to intervene in an internal conflict 
in a member state at the request of that state’s government if the conflict 
was promoted by external forces and if it jeopardized subregional peace 
and stability. The 1999 “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Con-
flict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” 
elaborated on the force’s function. It could assist in conflict prevention, 
humanitarian intervention to thwart subregional instability, sanctions 
enforcement, peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilization, and peace 
building, and in the policing of gun running, drug smuggling, and other 
transterritorial crimes. The protocol was to be applied in cases of threat-
ened or actual external aggression or conflict in a member state, conflict 
between two or more member states, internal conflict that could pro-
voke humanitarian disaster or threaten subregional peace and security, 
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serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law, the 
overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected govern-
ment, and other situations as determined by the ECOWAS Mediation 
and Security Council.
 Although ECOWAS members agreed to cooperate on subregional 
security issues, francophone and anglophone states often maintained 
uneasy relationships. Even when the organization was charged with the 
purportedly neutral task of peacekeeping, its constituent members some-
times supported opposing sides of a conflict—as was the case in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, larger, wealthier states often 
wielded undue influence over the organization’s actions. As the largest 
financial contributor to ECOWAS, for instance, Nigeria ensured that its 
own interests were protected and promoted. Because the AU funds many 
ECOWAS operations, powerful AU members states have had dispropor-
tionate influence over West African affairs.
Economic Community of Central African States
ECCAS was established in October 1983 by member states of the Central 
African Customs and Economic Union and of the Economic Commu-
nity of the Great Lakes States. In 2017, ECCAS included eleven member 
states.12 The organization’s goal was to establish a wider economic com-
munity and to promote peaceful resolution of political disputes. Nota-
bly, in July 2015, the UN Security Council asked ECCAS to work with 
ECOWAS and the AU to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat 
the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon—the lat-
ter an ECCAS member state. Like other multinational bodies, ECCAS 
was sometimes weakened by internal disagreements. Conflicts in the 
DRC, the geographic linchpin of the subregion, split the organization, 
with Angola and Chad supporting the DRC government and Burundi 
opposing it.
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICGLR was established in 2000 by eleven African states to promote 
subregional cooperation for international peace and security, political 
stability, and sustainable development in the Great Lakes subregion.13 
The organization aspired to address the structural causes of enduring 
conflicts and underdevelopment. Like other subregional bodies, ICGLR 
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was sometimes compromised by internal rivalries. Conflicts in the DRC 
pitted ICGLR member states Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda against the 
DRC government, which was supported by Angola as well as by several 
non-ICGLR states. ICGLR mediation efforts were occasionally led by 
interested parties. Some questioned the organization’s ability to engage 
impartially in the South Sudan conflict, noting Uganda’s military support 
for the government, which along with rebel forces had been accused of 
massive human rights violations.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development was 
established in 1986 by six East African countries to cooperate on prob-
lems resulting from the severe drought, environmental degradation, and 
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1996 the organization was su-
perseded by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
which expanded the areas of subregional cooperation to include the pro-
motion of subregional peace and stability and the creation of mechanisms 
to prevent, manage, and resolve intra- and interstate conflicts through 
dialogue.14 As was the case for other subregional organizations, IGAD 
was weakened by internal rivalries, and member states sometimes pur-
sued parochial interests rather than promoting broader regional benefits. 
Ethiopia and Kenya struggled to assert subregional dominance, while 
Sudan and Uganda also jockeyed for influence. Operating within these 
constraints, IGAD helped broker an accord that established a transi-
tional federal government in Somalia; it also provided a military force 
to protect that government and train its security forces. However, the 
foreign-backed regime, beholden to powerful warlords and their exter-
nal patrons, had scant support inside Somalia. IGAD also played a key 
role in mediating an end to Sudan’s civil war in 2005 and in attempting 
to resolve subsequent conflicts in South Sudan in 2014–17. However, the 
competing interests of IGAD member states and the continued sup-
port of some states for rival factions seriously undermined the resulting 
agreements.
Southern African Development Community
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 
was established in 1980 by nine Southern African states to build new 
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networks of trade, transportation, communications, and energy and to 
promote agricultural and industrial alternatives that would break apart-
heid South Africa’s economic stranglehold on the subregion. In 1992, 
SADCC was reformulated as the Southern African Development Com-
munity, or SADC, which aimed to promote subregional integration, 
economic growth, development, peace, and security in the aftermath of 
white minority rule. SADC eventually broadened its membership to in-
clude fifteen African countries.15
 Although SADCC had played a pivotal role in the struggles for 
majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa in the 1980s, 
its successor organization was less significant in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Member states sometimes promoted opposing strategies. In the DRC, 
for instance, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supported the Congo-
lese government militarily, while South Africa attempted to mediate a 
negotiated solution to the conflict. In 2013, SADC as an entity became 
more directly involved in the DRC when it joined ICGLR in promoting 
a regional peace and security framework and contributed soldiers to 
the UN intervention brigade that was intended to enforce the agree-
ment. South Africa also played an independent role outside SADC 
and the subregion, helping to broker peace agreements in Burundi, the 
Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan. 
 Although the political, economic, and military destabilization asso-
ciated with apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa continued to domi-
nate the subregion and played a growing role on the continent and in the 
global arena. South African mining, construction, retail, and media and 
telecommunications companies invested heavily in the Southern Afri-
can subregion and across the continent. Pretoria’s economic clout was 
accompanied by growing political influence. After apartheid’s demise, 
South Africa became the unofficial African voice in key international 
organizations. It played a prominent role in organizations that promote 
alternative visions in the Global South, including the AU, in which it was 
a prime mover, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and BRICS, an association 
that champions the interests of the major emerging economies of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
 An advocate for populations in the southern hemisphere, South 
Africa also supported initiatives that strengthened the position of the 
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Global North. It encouraged participation in the AU-led New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which embraces the neoliberal 
economic policies of international financial institutions and the North-
ern industrialized countries—particularly those of the powerful Group 
of Seven (G7), an organization that aims to build consensus on econom-
ics, energy, security, and terrorism.16 In 2017, South Africa was the only 
African member of the Northern-dominated Group of 20 (G20), which 
included nineteen of the world’s largest industrialized and emerging 
economies, plus the EU.17 South Africa’s prominence was also evident in 
its designation as one of the EU’s strategic partners and its election to two 
terms on the UN Security Council (2007–8 and 2011–12), where it had a 
voice, if not a veto, on matters relating to foreign intervention in Africa. 
As a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, South Africa was 
susceptible to external pressure. It sometimes broke with AU positions 
to support those of the Western powers, as it did when it voted to estab-
lish a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. However, it endorsed the AU’s call for 
UN reforms that would grant African countries two permanent and five 
rotating seats on the Security Council. South Africa, like Nigeria, aspired 
to assume a veto-wielding position.
 Pretoria’s increasingly forceful presence in Africa and on the world 
stage was embraced by some on the continent as an example of Afri-
cans finding solutions for African problems. However, others charged 
that South Africa subordinated subregional and regional interests to 
its own interests—or to those of global capital. While Northern pow-
ers looked to Pretoria to protect their interests, Nigeria resisted South 
Africa’s heightened continental profile, and neighboring states remained 
wary of the subregional giant, which, no longer fettered by international 
sanctions, aggressively expanded its economic reach. Egypt, Ethiopia, 
and Kenya—with their growing economies and strong ties to the West—
joined Nigeria in challenging South Africa’s presumed right to represent 
the continent in global bodies.
International Jihadist Organizations and  
Their African Branches and Affiliates
Nonstate actors also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. The most 
significant of these were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates.
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Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War and to the interven-
tion of outside powers in Afghanistan (see chapter 2). In December 
1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to assert control over a 
weak Afghan government that had failed to quash a Sunni insurgency 
that challenged Moscow’s hegemony in Central Asia. During the ensu-
ing Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89), the United States, Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, and their allies recruited, trained, and financed tens of thousands 
of Sunni militants from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America to 
topple the Soviet-backed Afghan regime. After the Soviet withdrawal 
in 1989, the militants dispersed, fortified by sophisticated weaponry 
and new training in terror tactics. In the decades that followed, they 
established terrorist organizations and networks on several continents. 
Among the most significant was al-Qaeda, a Salafi jihadist organiza-
tion that had established training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
during the war.18 In 1991 al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to Sudan, 
where it initiated a network of cells and allied organizations that oper-
ated in the Greater Horn.
Al-QAedA’s AfricAn AffiliAtes
In 2017, al-Qaeda had two important African branches: al-Shabaab (The 
Youth), which was based in Somalia and launched attacks in Somalia, 
Kenya, and Uganda; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
which operated in North Africa and the Western Sahel.19 Al-Qaeda also 
claimed a number of local affiliates and associated organizations. Some 
of these had splintered from AQIM because of internal disputes; others 
were the result of mergers between AQIM and groups that were indige-
nous to the region. Most of the African entities emerged from local con-
ditions and turned to al-Qaeda for political, material, and propaganda 
aid after they were established. The following list, organized by country, 
is based on data collected in 2017. It is subject to change as allegiances 
fluctuate, existing organizations dissolve, and new ones form.
 Algeria: Al-Mulathameen (Masked Brigade)—also known as 
al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those Who Sign with Blood Brigade)—was 
founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Soviet- 
Afghan and Algerian wars and a former AQIM leader. The organization 
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cut ties to AQIM in December 2012 and reported directly to the al-Qaeda 
leadership.
 Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House) was 
established in the Sinai Peninsula after the 2011 ouster of the Mubarak re-
gime. Although the organization’s ideology was influenced by al-Qaeda, 
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis’s focus was primarily local, and it was not a formal 
al-Qaeda affiliate. The group’s activities intensified following the 2013 
military coup that removed a democratically elected Islamist president 
and led to a brutal crackdown on Islamists and other opponents of the 
new regime. In 2014, the organization split when numerous members in 
the Nile Valley retained links to al-Qaeda, while many in Sinai pledged 
allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Another al-Qaeda associate, 
Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam), was established in Sinai in 2013. After 
initial activity and a four-year hiatus, it reemerged in 2017. The same year, 
Ansar al-Islam (Followers of Islam), a new al-Qaeda-linked organiza-
tion, began operating in the desert southwest of Cairo.20
 Libya: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was founded in 
1995 by Libyan veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Al-Qaeda members 
have held prominent leadership positions in the organization. Al-Qaeda- 
linked groups that emerged in Libya after the 2011 overthrow of Muammar 
Qaddafi include Ansar al-Shari’a (Followers of Islamic Law) in Benghazi, 
Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte, and the Abu Salim 
Martyrs’ Brigade. The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was formed in 
2015 by Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade to 
counter the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna, which supported the 
Islamic State.
 Mali: Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) was established in 2011 
and gained AQIM support after its founding. Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) splintered from AQIM in 2011 but con-
tinued to collaborate with it. Al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels), which 
reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership, was formed in August 
2013 as a merger of the Algerian-based al-Mulathameen and a MUJWA 
faction. Al-Mourabitoun fractured in 2015, with some members main-
taining their ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the 
leader of the Islamic State. In late 2015, al-Mourabitoun’s al-Qaeda 
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faction affiliated with AQIM. The Macina Liberation Front, which as-
pires to reinstate the nineteenth-century Macina Empire in modern 
Mali, originated among Fulanis in central Mali in 2015. Although it was 
led by a fundamentalist cleric and collaborated with AQIM, MUJWA, 
and Ansar Dine, the organization presented itself as a liberation move-
ment rather than a jihadist organization. In March 2017, Ansar Dine, 
al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Ja-
ma’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam 
and Muslims).
 Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People 
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), 
established in 2002, is commonly known as Boko Haram (Western 
Education Is Forbidden). In 2014, the UN Security Council listed the 
organization as an associate of AQIM. However, in 2015 Boko Haram 
pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and began to refer 
to itself as the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Jama’atu Ansarul 
Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims 
in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru, splintered from Boko 
Haram in 2012. In 2014, the UN Security Council listed Ansaru as an 
associate of AQIM.
 Somalia: Al-Shabaab (The Youth), inspired by Somali veterans of 
the Soviet-Afghan War, originated as a youth militia linked to the Islamic 
Courts Union. It established ties to al-Qaeda following a US-backed 
Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and became an official branch of al-Qaeda in 
2012. Its focus was primarily local. However, it also attacked Ethiopia and 
countries that contributed to an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.
 Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, established in 2011, had strong 
links to al-Qaeda. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which drew much of its 
membership from Ansar al-Shari’a, described itself as an AQIM battal-
ion. In 2014 some members of both groups switched their allegiance to 
the leader of the Islamic State.
The Islamic State
The Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).21 In contrast 
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to local Salafi jihadist groups that focus on establishing or purifying 
a Muslim state in a single country, the Islamic State aims to establish a 
caliphate that would unite Muslims worldwide in one political entity—a 
phenomenon last achieved in the eighth century. The origins of the mod-
ern Islamic State can be traced to the US-led military intervention in 
Iraq in 2003, which precipitated the Second Gulf War (2003–11). The in-
vasion and occupation sparked a Sunni insurgency led by the Jordanian- 
Palestinian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who transformed his orga-
nization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism 
and Jihad), into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which targeted US military and 
international coalition forces as well as local collaborators. After Zarqawi 
was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, his successors began to refer to the al-
Qaeda branch and associated organizations as the Islamic State in Iraq. 
When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State expanded its 
reach into that country, and by 2013 it was calling itself the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who 
honed his ideas and mobilizing skills in an US internment camp, the Is-
lamic State recruited followers from among the Sunni minority that had 
been favored under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized politically 
after his ouster by US and coalition forces. In February 2014, al-Qaeda 
severed its ties to the Islamic State, criticizing its persistent aggression 
against Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, as well as its brutal 
treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, particularly 
Shi’as.22 Noted for its ruthless methods, the Islamic State attracted inter-
national jihadis who felt that al-Qaeda was too moderate. However, both 
Muslims and non-Muslims widely condemned the organization for its 
harsh practices and attacks on civilians.
 A number of African entities have pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State leader. Like those that developed links to al-Qaeda, these groups 
emerged from local conditions and only later established ties to the in-
ternational jihadist organization.
AfricAn OrgAnizAtiOns AssOciAted with the islAmic stAte
 Algeria: Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria split 
from AQIM in 2014 and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
 Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, established in 2011, was influenced 
by al-Qaeda ideology but was not a formal affiliate. The organization 
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fractured in 2014 when many Nile Valley members retained links to al-
Qaeda, while others in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Is-
lamic State and named their faction Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) or 
Islamic State–Sinai Province.
 Libya: A brigade of fighters from eastern Libya, who had fought on 
behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, returned home in 2014 and 
reconstituted themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna. 
They declared eastern Libya to be a province of the Islamic State, which 
they called Cyrenaica Province. Two other Islamic State provinces were 
established in Libya in 2015: Tripolitania Province in the west and Fezzan 
Province in the south. In early 2015, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte split into 
two factions, with some members retaining ties to al-Qaeda and others 
pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
 Mali: Although most Malian jihadist organizations retained their 
ties to al-Qaeda, some al-Mourabitoun members left the organization in 
2015 to form the Islamic State in Mali, subsequently renamed the Islamic 
State in the Greater Sahara (sometimes translated as the Islamic State in 
the Sahel).
 Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly 
known as Boko Haram, switched its allegiance from AQIM to the Islamic 
State in 2015 and adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province.
 Somalia: Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), based in 
Puntland, broke from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab in 2015. Another al-
Shabaab splinter, Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 
(also known as Jahba East Africa or the East African Front) emerged in 
early 2016.
 Tunisia: Following a government crackdown, some remnants of 
Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, previously associated with al-Qaeda, pledged 
allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2014. Some members of the 
AQIM-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade also switched allegiances in 2014 
and established a new organization, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, which 
aligned with the Islamic State. The Tunisian jihadist group Mujahidin of 
Kairouan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2015. 
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Conclusion
Sustaining a pattern established during decolonization and the Cold War, 
foreign governments and other entities intervened in African affairs in 
the decades that followed. Although individual states continued to inter-
cede unilaterally, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states 
and by nonstate actors became more frequent than previously. In some 
cases, the presence of nonstate actors associated with international ter-
rorist networks provoked intervention by foreign states or institutions. 
In other cases, intrusion by foreign entities stimulated local insurgencies 
that in turn attracted international terrorist support. State-based actors 
justified their involvement as a response to instability, an effort to pro-
tect civilian lives, and a necessity for advancing the war on terror. How-
ever, they also promoted their own more parochial interests. Conflicting 
agendas often weakened multilateral efforts, and the priorities of the most 
powerful countries generally took precedence. While African political 
and military leaders participated in war-making and peace-building pro-
cesses, African civil society representatives remained in the background. 
These deficiencies undermined the prospects for a lasting peace, as the 
following case studies demonstrate.
 Chapter 4, which focuses on Somalia, is the first of two chapters 
that explore post–Cold War intervention in East Africa. When foreign 
powers withdrew their support for the Somali government after the Cold 
War, insurgent forces overthrew the authoritarian regime. Concerned 
about the humanitarian crisis inside the country as well as the potential 
for regional destabilization, multilateral organizations, extracontinental 
powers, and neighboring countries intervened. Their motivations were 
varied, often at odds, and subject to change over time. Although some 
of the initial outcomes were positive, the long-term effects were largely 
negative, contributing to increased human suffering and instability.
Suggested Reading
African international relations are explored in a number of recent works. 
Two recommended volumes investigate the role of extracontinental 
powers in Africa after the Cold War, including the major Western powers 
along with Russia, China, Japan, India, the UN, the EU, and international 
financial institutions. See Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in 
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International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (New York: 
Routledge, 2004); and Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub- 
Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010). John W. Harbeson and 
Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing 
World Order, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), explores inter-
state conflict, the impact of outside investment and externally induced 
political reforms, and the role of international peacekeeping forces. 
Errol A. Henderson, African Realism? International Relations Theory and 
Africa’s Wars in the Postcolonial Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little-
field, 2015), challenges the applicability of Eurocentric international re-
lations theories to African cases and explores the relationship between 
Africa’s domestic and international conflicts.
 Several books examine the role of the UN in the post–World War 
II international order. Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End 
of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), argues that the UN was created to 
protect the interests of empire but was reshaped by formerly colonized 
states and transformed into an instrument for ending the old imperial 
order. David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council 
and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), explores the role of the five permanent members of the UN Secu-
rity Council in shaping the post–Cold War world. A number of works 
investigate UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Africa, elu-
cidating the reasons for their success or failure. See Andrzej Sitkowski, 
UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Nor-
rie MacQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Norrie MacQueen, United 
Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Pearson Education, 
2002); Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis 
to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011); and Adekeye 
Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2010).
 Other books examine international peacekeeping in Africa. Two 
wide-ranging studies are particularly useful: Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping 
in Africa (mentioned previously); and Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy, 
eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Structure (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), which considers UN, AU, EU, and ECOWAS operations, 
as well as unilateral actions by outside powers. For the role of African 
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regional organizations and peacekeeping forces, see David J. Francis, 
Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Burling-
ton, VT: Ashgate, 2006); and Abou Jeng, Peacebuilding in the African 
Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2012).
 A number of recommended works consider the role of subregional 
peacekeeping forces. The strengths and weaknesses of ECOWAS peace-
keeping missions in West Africa are investigated in Adekeye Abebajo, 
ed., Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, 
eds., West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil 
War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, 
eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1998). SADC’s efforts in Southern Africa are considered in Laurie Na-
than, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in 
Southern Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).
 Other studies examine the hegemonic influence of particular coun-
tries on the African continent. Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin (mentioned 
previously), considers South Africa, Nigeria, China, France, and the 
United States. Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American 
Peace-Building Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), written by 
a diplomatic insider, focuses on the role of the United States in postcon-
flict peace building. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperi-
alism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2008), investigates the impact of French security and cooperation poli-
cies in postindependence Africa and argues that French intervention de-
nied Africans political freedom and sustained their political, economic, 
and social domination by outsiders. The growing role of China in Africa 
is considered in Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of 
China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ian Taylor, 
China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); David H. 
Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Howard W. 
French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building 
a New Empire in Africa (New York: Knopf, 2014). Ian Taylor, Africa Ris-
ing? BRICS—Diversifying Dependency (Martlesham, UK: James Currey, 
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2014), provides a critical examination of the roles of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa in post–Cold War Africa, arguing that the 
emerging economies of the Global South, like the Western powers before 
them, have an interest in perpetuating an unequal system that consigns 
Africa to the bottom rung.
 The emergence of South Africa as both a regional and continental 
player is considered in several works. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman 
explore South Africa’s growing economic involvement in Africa and its 
expanding political role on the continent and the global stage. See Chris 
Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants: 
The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” Interna-
tional Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): 111–29; and Chris Alden and Maxi 
Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa,” International 
Politics 52, no. 2 (2015): 239–54. William G. Martin, South Africa and the 
World Economy (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), 
examines the transformation of South African political and economic 
power from the era of colonialism and white minority rule to the present, 
marked by its recent alliances with Northern industrialized powers and 
new challenges from Asia. Chris Alden and Miles Soko, “South Africa’s 
Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Its Discontents,” Journal 
of Modern African Studies 43, no. 3 (September 2005): 367–92, differen-
tiates between the roles played by the regional bodies, SADC and the 
Southern African Customs Union, on the one hand, and by South Africa’s 
private and parastatal corporations, on the other. Fred Ahwireng-Obeng 
and Patrick J. McGowan examine the impact of South African trade, in-
vestment, and infrastructure and telecommunications developments in 
Africa in a two-part article: Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. Mc-
Gowan, “Partner or Hegemon: South Africa in Africa, Part I,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 16, no. 1 (January 1998): 5–38; and Patrick 
J. McGowan and Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, “Partner or Hegemon: South 
Africa in Africa, Part II,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 16, no. 
2 (July 1998): 165–95. Recent developments in South African foreign pol-
icy are explored in Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, South Africa’s Post- 
Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Renewal? Adelphi Paper 
362 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003); and 
Laurie Nathan, “Consistencies and Inconsistencies in South Africa For-
eign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 (March 2005): 361–72. Pretoria’s 
role in conflict mediation in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Sudan 
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are assessed in Kurt Shillinger, Africa’s Peacemaker? Lessons from South 
African Conflict Mediation (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2009).
 For the role of warlords in post–Cold War African conflicts, see two 
important books by William Reno: Warlord Politics and African States 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), and Warfare in Independent Africa 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 For the role of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Africa, see the Sug-
gested Reading for chapter 2.





Conflicting Missions and Mixed results (1991–2017)
focusing on somalia from 1991 through 2017, this chapter explores 
how the collapse of the central state, conflict between warlords and Is-
lamists, and a devastating humanitarian crisis stimulated intervention 
by the United Nations, the United States, the African Union, and neigh-
boring countries. Foreign military involvement was initially justified as 
a response to instability and the responsibility to protect civilian lives. 
However, it was subsequently absorbed into the wider war on terror 
when a jihadist insurgency emerged in response to foreign intrusion. The 
response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable for 
the duration of the intervention. The war on terror paradigm is relevant 
to the period before September 2001, but it assumed greater importance 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The results of exter-
nal involvement were mixed. Although the initial intervention thwarted 
some conflict-related starvation, subsequent actions jeopardized civilian 
lives and increased regional instability. Somalia’s post–Cold War expe-
rience illuminates the ways in which foreign intervention can be coun-
terproductive—not only failing to promote peace and security, but even 
provoking a terrorist insurgency. Rather than strengthening Somalia’s 
internal peace-building and nation-building efforts, foreign powers and 
multilateral agencies often played roles that prolonged or exacerbated 
local tensions.
 The post–Cold War conflicts in Somalia have deep historical roots, 
embracing the precolonial, colonial, and independence periods. The 
promises of political independence were undermined by the enduring 
effects of colonial policies, by corruption, and, eventually, by a mili-
tary coup that installed a dictator who manipulated social divisions to 
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maintain power. During the Cold War, Somalia allied first with the Soviet 
Union and then with the United States. As the East-West conflict waned, 
Washington abandoned the Somali dictatorship, and warlords and their 
clan-based militias overthrew the regime. The central government dis-
integrated in 1991, and Somalia fell into chaos. State institutions broke 
down, and basic services, if they were provided at all, were supplied by 
nongovernmental actors. Islamist organizations, especially, played critical 
roles in restoring order and reestablishing social services. External pow-
ers intervened, both to provide security for the Somali people and to 
advance their own interests.
 The first post–Cold War intervention began in 1992 with a UN man-
date to monitor a ceasefire and to provide protection for famine relief 
operations. It fell apart in 1993 with the downing of two US helicopters 
and the deaths of eighteen US soldiers and approximately one thousand 
Somalis, mostly civilians. The second intervention began in 2006 with 
CIA support for anti-Islamist warlords and culminated in a US-backed 
Ethiopian invasion of Somalia the same year. External involvement ac-
celerated the growth of a jihadist movement that quickly dominated the 
antiforeign insurgency. The UN, the AU, and IGAD were the most sig-
nificant multilateral actors, lending their support to a new transitional 
government, while the EU joined in brokering peace talks and funding 
peacekeeping operations. The United States, Ethiopia, and Kenya played 
crucial roles, acting unilaterally or in conjunction with other entities, 
while neighboring Uganda and Djibouti also intervened in Somali af-
fairs, mostly under AU and IGAD auspices. Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates joined the UN, the EU, the UK, and the United States as the 
Somali government’s primary security partners.1 Eritrea, a regional out-
lier, supplied weapons to the jihadist insurgency, primarily to counter 
Ethiopian influence, while the al-Qaeda network also provided critical 
support.
 The interests of external bodies and powers were not always in ac-
cord with those of the Somali people. The UN and US interventions that 
favored one warlord over another (1992–95), followed by Ethiopian in-
cursions and support for diverse warlords (1996–2000), generated enor-
mous hostility among the Somali population. The imposition of a corrupt 
transitional government by outside powers (2004), CIA backing of a new 
warlord coalition (February–June 2006), and a US-endorsed Ethiopian 
invasion and occupation (July 2006–January 2009) resulted in a backlash 
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that intensified popular support for al-Shabaab (The Youth). This Isla-
mist youth militia, inspired by Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan 
War, found recruits among the country’s unemployed young men. The 
Ethiopian invasion sparked an antiforeign insurgency, with al-Shabaab at 
its helm. While the organization maintained a local focus, targeting pri-
marily Somali military and government officials, it also established ties 
with al-Qaeda and expanded its attacks to Westerners working in Soma-
lia and to neighboring states that were associated with the intervention.2
 By early 2007, al-Shabaab insurgents had gained control of much of 
southern Somalia, provoking another round of foreign military interven-
tions. In February the UN Security Council used Chapter VIII powers to 
authorize the African Union Mission in Somalia, which eventually sent 
some 22,000 peacekeepers to restore order. The conflict continued, and 
the election of yet another foreign-backed government in 2012 did little 
to resolve it. The government had limited authority outside the capital 
and relied on AU forces for defense. Its operations were characterized by 
widespread corruption and monopolization of power. Al-Shabaab con-
tinued to exploit legitimate local grievances for its own ends.
Setting the Stage: Somalia during the Cold War (1960–91)
A brief description of Somalia during the last decades of the Cold War 
provides a framework for understanding the conflicts that followed in 
its wake. A union of British and Italian colonies that had been joined 
at independence in 1960, Somalia was the object of US-Soviet competi-
tion.3 With the Gulf of Aden to the north and the Indian Ocean to the 
east, Somalia was strategically placed to control access to the Red Sea and 
to Middle Eastern oil routes. The country was plagued by both internal 
and external problems that provided outsiders with opportunities for in-
fluence. Colonial boundary treaties had left millions of ethnic Somalis 
in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. After independence, successive cam-
paigns to unite all ethnic Somalis in a Greater Somalia led to numerous 
border conflicts and devastating regional wars. Inside Somalia, ethnic 
Somalis shared a common language, culture, and religion. However, ge-
nealogical groupings, reified by colonial policies as distinctive clan iden-
tities, were manipulated by political leaders to mobilize constituents and 
consolidate power.4 Ethnic minorities, set apart by race, class, region, 
language, and occupation, suffered harsh discrimination. Among the 
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most vulnerable were the Somali Bantu, a recently coined umbrella term 
for people with Bantu-speaking ancestors who settled along the Shabelle 
River centuries before the arrival of Somali speakers, as well as those in 
the Jubba River valley whose ancestors were brought to Somalia as slaves 
in the nineteenth century.
 The first democratically elected postindependence governments 
were challenged by sectarian and patronage interests, corruption, and 
disputes over the country’s expansionist goals. Relations with the United 
States were uneasy. Fearing Somali designs on its primary regional allies, 
Ethiopia and Kenya, Washington balked when Somalia requested mili-
tary aid shortly after independence. The Soviet Union stepped into the 
gap. In October 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre, commander in chief 
of the Somali army, seized power in a military coup. The following year, 
after Somalia expelled a number of US diplomats, military attachés, and 
the Peace Corps, Washington terminated all economic aid. Moscow in-
tensified its military and economic assistance programs, and Siad Barre 
soon proclaimed that Somalia would follow the tenets of scientific social-
ism. During the early years of his regime, the country made important 
strides in mass literacy, primary education, public health, and economic 
development, particularly in the rural areas, while new laws on marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance expanded women’s rights. However, the military 
strongman also abolished local authority structures, suspended the con-
stitution, banned political parties, and imprisoned or killed dissenters.
 Somalia’s political, economic, and social tensions were exacerbated 
by the Somali-Ethiopian War of 1977–78. As one of sub-Saharan Afri-
ca’s most heavily armed nations, Somalia possessed a 22,000-man army 
that had been trained and equipped by the Soviet Union and its allies. 
Ethiopia maintained an even stronger military apparatus, a 40,000-
man army that had been trained and outfitted by the United States. A 
1974 military coup had ousted the US-backed emperor of Ethiopia, and 
the new rulers had embraced Marxism-Leninism. Yet the alliance with 
Washington endured. Then, in July 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 
an attempt to annex Somali-inhabited land. The Kremlin, which was 
courting the Marxist regime, was furious. Aided by some 18,000 Cuban 
soldiers, advisors, and technicians, the Soviet Union threw its full weight 
to Ethiopia. The OAU, which viewed Ethiopia as the victim of Somali 
aggression, ignored Siad Barre’s appeals for assistance. Although it offi-
cially distanced itself from Somali aggression in 1977, the United States 
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covertly supported Mogadishu’s war effort through third parties, mobi-
lizing military aid through a consortium of allies led by Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Egypt, and France. Unable to sustain the war without more sub-
stantial external support, Somalia was forced to withdraw from Ethiopia 
in 1978. Washington became a mainstay of the Siad Barre regime after 
its retreat. Between 1979 and 1986, the United States provided Somalia 
with $500 million in military aid, making it one of the largest recipients 
of US military assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.5 Somalia had effectively 
switched sides in the Cold War.
 US aid notwithstanding, Somalia was in dire straits by the mid-
1980s. The Ethiopian war, corruption, and mismanagement had run the 
economy into the ground, dissipating the development achievements of 
the previous decade. Onerous taxes stimulated rural unrest, which was 
brutally repressed. Determined to crush all political opposition, Siad 
Barre imprisoned or killed his critics or drafted them into the Somali 
army while collectively punishing their clan members. Encouraging clan 
rivalry to disrupt his opponents and strengthen his hold on power, his 
regime was increasingly dominated by his Darod clan family members 
and their allies.6
 By 1989, clans that had suffered from harassment or discrimination, 
and Islamists, who had been repressed by the dictatorship, were united 
in their hatred of the Siad Barre regime. In the north, where a large num-
ber of war refugees had been resettled on Isaaq clan land and government 
policies threatened Isaaq economic interests, the Ethiopian-backed Somali 
National Movement instigated an insurgency. Somali military planes, 
piloted by white South African and former Rhodesian mercenaries, 
bombed the northern city of Hargeisa, and government forces killed tens 
of thousands of Isaaq clan members. In the south, Islamist opposition 
was spearheaded by a Salafist study group, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (Islamic 
Union). Many of the group’s leaders had worked or studied in Saudi Ara-
bia, Pakistan, or Kuwait, where they had been exposed to fundamentalist 
teachings. Most of the members were students or faculty from Somali 
secondary schools and colleges, or from the Somali National University. 
The massacre of 450 Islamist protesters in the capital city of Mogadishu 
in July 1989 prompted the transformation of al-Itihaad from a nonviolent 
association calling people to the faith into a jihadist organization whose 
goal was to establish an Islamic state in Greater Somalia. The new agenda 
attracted Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, who played a major 
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role in al-Itihaad’s metamorphosis. With their knowledge of military 
strategy and their training in guerrilla and terror tactics, the war veterans 
recast al-Itihaad as Somalia’s most powerful military force following the 
breakdown of the central government in 1991.
Collapse of the Dictatorship, Rise of Warlords,  
and Foreign Intervention (1991–95)
While Somalia faltered, the Cold War also took a new turn. In the late 
1980s the Soviet Union faced a severe political and economic crisis, and 
the alliance with Somalia was no longer critical to the United States. 
After the 1989 Mogadishu massacre, the George H. W. Bush adminis-
tration expressed newfound concern about Siad Barre’s human rights 
abuses, and Congress suspended military and economic aid. Without US 
support, the Siad Barre government was an easy target. In January 1991, 
the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General Mohammed Farah 
Aidid and dominated by the Hawiye clan family, overthrew the regime, 
and the USC’s Ali Mahdi Mohamed was elected interim president. After 
the central government failed, personal, clan, and other rivalries split the 
opposition.7 A war between the Aidid and Ali Mahdi factions destroyed 
much of Mogadishu in 1991–92. The formal economy ceased to function, 
and southern Somalia disintegrated into fiefdoms ruled by rival warlords 
and their militias. Followers were mobilized and opponents objectified 
through clan-based hate narratives. Clan cleansing, although instigated 
by Siad Barre, became a defining instrument of warlord control.8
 As the fighting intensified in 1991, war-induced famine, compounded 
by drought, threatened the lives of 60 percent of the population, primar-
ily in the southern and central regions.9 Massive population displace-
ment, the theft of food and livestock by marauding soldiers and militia 
members, and crop failure put 4.5 million people at risk of starvation. 
Mogadishu’s port and airport were controlled by warlords who confis-
cated food aid and manipulated food supplies to reward their supporters, 
punish their opponents, and finance the purchase of weapons. By late 
1992, some 300,000 Somalis had died from starvation and war-related 
disease and violence, and 2 million people had fled their homes.
 The failure of the UN to respond to the crisis was criticized by many 
Somalis and international NGOs. Largely absent in 1991, the UN took a 
more active role in 1992 under the leadership of the new secretary-general, 
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Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a onetime supporter of Siad 
Barre who was deeply hostile to Aidid and determined to undermine his 
power. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo in January 1992, 
which prohibited the delivery of any weapons or military equipment to 
Somalia. In April, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 
I) was established with a Chapter VI mandate to monitor a ceasefire 
signed in March and to escort and protect aid convoys. It was authorized 
to include 50 unarmed observers and 500 armed guards. Boutros-Ghali 
appointed Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun both as his special rep-
resentative in Somalia and as the head of UNOSOM. Intent on procuring 
a lasting political solution, Sahnoun mediated a series of negotiations 
that included warlords, patrilineage leaders, and community elders, 
as well as intellectuals, merchants, women, and youth. In July, the UN 
secretary-general brought attention to the humanitarian crisis when he 
charged that the Security Council was “fighting a rich man’s war in Yu-
goslavia while not lifting a finger to save Somalia from disintegration.”10
 If the UN was slow to act, divisions within the US government also 
hindered a rapid American response. In December 1991, Andrew Nat-
sios, a high-level official in the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), called Somalia “the worst humanitarian crisis 
today” and advocated American action.11 In the State Department, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, the East Africa 
Desk, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs also 
called for a strong US response. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Colin Powell, who was under mounting pressure to demonstrate 
US leadership in response to humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Somalia, 
believed that a limited military operation in Somalia, although not desir-
able, would be more manageable than one in the Balkans. Those opposed 
to US military engagement included Assistant Secretary of State for In-
ternational Organization Affairs John Bolton, who argued that Somalia 
was not strategic to US interests and thus did not warrant US help, and 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who worried about the lack 
of an exit strategy. Leading officials in the Defense Department and in 
the US Central Command (CENTCOM), along with experienced am-
bassadors in the region, also warned against hasty military involvement 
without a clear plan or objective.12
 These concerns notwithstanding, a major humanitarian disaster so 
close to the US presidential elections could not be ignored. In July 1992, 
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the United States agreed to fund and transport 500 Pakistani troops to 
guard humanitarian shipments as part of the UNOSOM I mission. In 
August, while awaiting the Somali principals’ acceptance of the UN force, 
President Bush announced the launch of a unilateral US military airlift. 
Operation Provide Relief supplied the equivalent of 12 million meals 
to Somalia between August and November. By October, the rains had 
begun and death rates were declining. Although highly effective in the 
short run, the operation also had drawbacks. Insecurity had not abated, 
and in some places it had grown more dire than previously. The massive 
increase in food supplies provided new opportunities for warlords and 
bandits to weaponize food, and in some ways it contributed to a widen-
ing of the conflict. Similarly, the introduction of foreign military forces 
generated hostility in some quarters and rendered a political solution 
more difficult.
 Among the strongest critics of the use of military force was UN Spe-
cial Representative Sahnoun. Although he credited the US airlift with 
saving lives, he opposed further militarization of the UN operation. Po-
litical negotiations were making progress, even if they were slowed by 
painstaking attention to local sensitivities. Faction leaders and commu-
nity elders from all regions had endorsed the idea of a national conference 
to discuss national reconciliation. Aidid, Ali Mahdi, and other powerful 
faction leaders had agreed to permit 500 UN peacekeepers to deploy in 
Mogadishu; the port had been reopened, and food distribution had com-
menced. Alternatives to military intervention, including mediation by 
subregional bodies and the application of sanctions, had not been fully 
explored, and military intervention would undermine these delicate pro-
cesses. Sahnoun publicly criticized the provision of military supplies and 
money to Ali Mahdi’s forces in a UN plane, which contributed to Aidid’s 
mounting distrust of the UN; Sahnoun also opposed the increase of the 
UNOSOM I force to 3,500 troops, authorized in August without warn-
ing to Sahnoun or consultation with Somali leaders. Irked by Sahnoun’s 
public criticisms and his willingness to work with Aidid, Boutros-Ghali 
dismissed his special representative in late October. Sahnoun’s successors 
failed to garner the same degree of trust among Somalis, and efforts to 
thwart the rising tensions between the Ali Mahdi and Aidid factions fell 
apart, as did agreements that allowed the safe passage of relief shipments.
 Although Sahnoun’s removal undermined the prospects for a politi-
cal solution, the matter was not yet settled. The Western NGO community 
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debated whether enhanced UN military involvement would exacerbate 
or ameliorate the situation. Some opposed foreign military presence of 
any kind; others resisted the use of troops beyond those needed to pro-
tect relief agencies and their supplies; still others called for a full-blown 
military intervention. Within the US government, leading officials con-
tinued to urge caution. By late November, increased media attention 
along with urging from bipartisan forces in Congress, president-elect 
Bill Clinton, and a growing chorus of NGOs tipped the balance toward 
action. Those who stressed the need to “do something”—with an eye to 
political and publicity concerns—held sway over those who endorsed 
prudence. Boutros-Ghali outlined several possible courses of action, in-
cluding one that would allow a member state to undertake a military en-
forcement operation with UN Security Council authorization. The Bush 
administration informed the UN secretary-general that the United States 
was willing to lead such an intervention.
 In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the establish-
ment of a US-led multinational military task force, officially called Uni-
fied Task Force (UNITAF) and unofficially dubbed Operation Restore 
Hope. The military force would include nearly 26,000 US troops plus 
11,000 more from two dozen other countries. UNITAF was granted a 
Chapter VII mandate to work with UNOSOM I to secure ports, air-
ports, warehouses, feeding centers, and roads so that humanitarian re-
lief could be delivered. It was not authorized to disarm or demobilize 
warring parties, confiscate heavy weapons, or intervene to stop fighting 
between rival groups. Its mandate was solely to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian relief to the civilian population. The original charge con-
tinued to be the public face of the mission even after the US role had 
changed substantially.
 The authorizations for UNITAF and UNOSOM I expired in May 
1993, when UNOSOM II, also led by the United States, took over. Com-
posed of 18,000 peacekeepers, including 4,200 Americans, UNOSOM II 
operated under a broader mandate than its predecessor, and one that was 
far removed from UNOSOM I’s original peacekeeping role. Arguing that 
mass starvation could be averted only if local militias were neutralized, 
the UN Security Council prescribed a Chapter VII mandate and a course 
of action that included the forcible disarmament of Somali militias, par-
ticularly that of Mohammed Farah Aidid, whom the UN leadership was 
now determined to exclude from power.
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 Tension between the UN and Aidid broke to the surface on June 5, 
when Aidid’s militia ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peace-
keepers who were attempting to inspect his radio station and weapons 
depots. The Security Council quickly expanded UNOSOM II’s man-
date, authorizing UN forces to arrest, detain, try, and punish those re-
sponsible for the killings. Having moved from the original mission of 
protecting aid convoys and relief workers to capturing, disarming, and 
punishing one faction in the fighting, the UN crossed the line from hu-
manitarian intervention to choosing sides in a deadly conflict. As the 
mission’s chief advocate and leader, the United States was now deeply 
embroiled in Somalia’s civil war. Because US support had been key to 
Siad Barre’s survival, many Somalis were already hostile to the United 
States and distrustful of its motives. In their view, the United States and 
its UN partner had declared war; their soldiers were now perceived as 
an occupation force.
 On June 11–17, 1993, US military forces in AC-130 Spectre gunships 
and Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters attacked Aidid’s radio station and 
a number of Mogadishu compounds believed to hold weapons caches. 
UN troops fired on the angry civilians who poured into the streets, kill-
ing and maiming a large number. In July, a similar airborne assault on 
Photo 4.1. US Marines participate in UNITAF search for General Mohammed Farah 
Aidid’s weapons, Mogadishu, January 7, 1993. Photo by PHCM Terry C. Mitchell.
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elders, clan and religious leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen, who 
were meeting to consider a UN peace initiative, killed sixteen prominent 
members of Aidid’s party and dozens of others. The massacre intensified 
anti-UN and anti-American sentiment among the civilian population. 
Violent retaliation was directed at all foreigners, causing numerous relief 
organizations to withdraw from Somalia. US troops, in turn, regarded 
Somali civilians with growing disdain.
 Although the delivery of food aid was the priority of the US mili-
tary in early 1993, it was not the objective eight months later. From late 
August to early October, the US armed forces were bent on capturing or 
killing Aidid and his top lieutenants. The final raid took place on Oc-
tober 3, 1993, when 120 elite US Army Rangers and Delta Force troops 
attempted to capture key leaders of Aidid’s militia in one of Mogadishu’s 
most dangerous neighborhoods. By this time, al-Itihaad had formed an 
alliance of convenience with Aidid’s militia. Both groups included mem-
bers who had been trained and armed by al-Qaeda operatives who had 
fought in the Soviet-Afghan War and who were charged with expelling 
US and UN forces from Somalia. During the October 3 operation, Aid-
id’s forces, assisted by al-Itihaad, shot down two Black Hawk helicop-
ters, which crashed into children in the streets below.13 Angry crowds 
attacked the surviving soldiers and those who came to rescue them. In 
Photo 4.2. Children walk past graffiti criticizing Jonathan Howe, the UN special 
envoy sent to Somalia to oppose Aidid, Mogadishu, June 30, 1993. Photo by Eric 
Cabanis/AFP/Getty Images.
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the fighting that ensued, eighteen US soldiers and some one thousand 
Somali men, women, and children were killed. Eighty percent of the 
dead were civilians.
 Within days of the debacle, President Bill Clinton announced that all 
US troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. 
Without US backing, the UN could not impose a political settlement that 
excluded Aidid. Although the crisis had not been resolved, the UN pulled 
out of Somalia in early 1995, declaring that UNOSOM II was over.
Islamism, Jihad, and Insurgency (1994–2017)
While the UN and the United States were preoccupied with the secular 
warlords, Somali Islamists were also building their base. Like many of 
its secular predecessors, al-Itihaad promoted irredentist claims with the 
goal of uniting ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and So-
malia in a single nation. However, in contrast to secular leaders, those 
in al-Itihaad envisioned Greater Somalia as an Islamic state. Perceiving 
opportunity in the chaos, al-Qaeda determined that Somalia was ripe 
for a jihadist insurgency that could serve as a launching pad for similar 
uprisings in Eritrea, Yemen, and the Muslim holy land of Saudi Arabia. 
By late 1993, Sudan, Iran, and al-Qaeda were supplying al-Itihaad with 
money, weapons, military training, and personnel to counter US influ-
ence in the region.
 As the security situation deteriorated and Western aid organizations 
withdrew, Muslim charities supported by wealthy patrons in Saudi Ara-
bia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait filled the void. In a country 
with virtually no functioning infrastructure or social services, al-Itihaad 
provided assistance to the poor and established Qur’anic schools, Islamic 
courts, and militias to perform police duties. It invested in banking, 
telecommunications, export-import, and transportation, using business 
proceeds to finance social services and religious and political endeavors. 
Through the application of shari’a (Islamic law), the Islamic courts pro-
vided a justice system in a society buffeted by lawlessness and violence, 
where warlords and their gunmen raped, robbed, kidnapped, and killed 
at will. Desperate for law and order, a working economy, and basic social 
services, the Somali public generally supported al-Itihaad’s efforts, while 
Somali business owners endorsed the courts and financed their law en-
forcement activities.
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 Instability in Somalia precipitated a new crisis with Ethiopia. In 1994, 
al-Itihaad established a military presence near the borders with Kenya 
and Ethiopia and launched numerous attacks inside Ethiopia, especially 
in the Somali-inhabited regions. By 1996, Ethiopia was making regular 
incursions into Somalia to challenge al-Itihaad and build alliances with 
Somali warlords. In 2000, a group of Ethiopian-backed warlords formed 
the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), led by Ab-
dullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who would become president of Somalia in 2004 
as a member of the foreign-backed Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), and by Hussein Mohammed Aidid, who had succeeded his fa-
ther, Mohammed Farah Aidid, as head of the powerful USC militia.
 Instability in Somalia also inspired new US concerns. US counterter-
rorism experts warned that Somalia had become a haven for al-Qaeda—
including operatives responsible for bombing the US Embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998. These fears escalated after the September 2001 
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. In October 2001, 
the UN included al-Itihaad on a list of organizations associated with al-
Qaeda, and in December the United States placed al-Itihaad on the 2001 
USA Patriot Act’s “Terrorist Exclusion List.” Businesses with purported 
ties to al-Itihaad were also targeted. Among these was Somalia’s largest 
employer, al-Barakat, a money transfer company with telecommunica-
tions, internet, and other holdings that had assumed significant banking 
functions after the collapse of the country’s banking system in the early 
1990s. Al-Barakat had operations in forty countries, transferred some 
$140 million annually, and served as a lifeline for many Somalis, who 
depended on remittances from family members abroad to sustain them. 
In November 2001, the George W. Bush administration, claiming that 
al-Barakat served as a conduit for funds to al-Qaeda, closed its offices, 
froze its US assets, and pressured the UN Security Council to impose 
sanctions.14 These actions effectively terminated al-Barakat’s operations, 
jeopardizing the well-being of Somali citizens and generating increased 
animosity toward the United States.15 Washington also sought common 
cause with Ethiopia, Somalia’s regional rival, which for centuries had 
been dominated by Christian elites. In 2006, the US government referred 
to Ethiopia as “the linchpin to stability in the Horn of Africa and the 
Global War on Terrorism.”16
 Instability in Somalia also worried other external powers. The UN, 
the AU, the EU, the Arab League, and IGAD intensified their diplomatic 
84  |  Somalia
involvement. In 2004, they helped broker an agreement to establish a 
central government in Somalia—the fourteenth attempt since Siad Barre 
was ousted in 1991. The resulting Transitional Federal Government was 
backed by these external entities, and by the United States and Ethio-
pia. However, the TFG had very little support inside Somalia. The nego-
tiations had been deeply influenced by SRRC warlords who aspired to 
establish a clan-based federal system that would consolidate their own 
power. Although presented as a government of national unity, the TFG 
was dominated by the Mijerteen clan/Darod clan family of its presi-
dent, SRRC warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. It marginalized many of 
the Hawiye clans that had long controlled Mogadishu, and it purged the 
parliament of opposition members. Unable to enter Mogadishu’s hos-
tile environs, the TFG established its capital in Baidoa, 150 miles away, 
where it was protected by Ethiopian troops. It controlled little territory 
outside that city. Rife with nepotism and cronyism, the TFG was incom-
petent and corrupt. The salaries of senior army, police, and intelligence 
officers, as well as government ministers and parliamentarians, were 
paid by foreign donors, and government officials were not accountable 
to the Somali people. President Yusuf, the SRRC men he appointed to top 
positions, and his prime minister, Ali Mohamed Ghedi, were all closely 
linked to Ethiopia. As a result, many Somalis considered the TFG to be 
an Ethiopian puppet regime.
 Supported by the United States, President Yusuf opposed all forms 
of political Islam and resisted the inclusion of Islamists in his govern-
ment. As a result, the powerful Islamic courts and their proponents re-
fused to support the TFG. President Yusuf ’s reliance on Ethiopian troops 
and his anti-Islamist actions helped rally support for the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU), which had formed in 2000 to consolidate the power of 
the Islamic courts and improve their effectiveness. Courts affiliated with 
al-Itihaad promoted a strict, Salafist interpretation of Islamic law, while 
others interpreted the law according to the more tolerant Sufi traditions 
that most Somalis embraced.17 
 Disregarding popular support for the ICU, external powers were de-
termined to undermine it. In early 2006, the CIA encouraged a group of 
clan militia leaders, businessmen, and warlords—including four TFG cabi-
net ministers—to join forces against the growing Islamist movement. The 
result was the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT). Violating the 1992 UN arms embargo, the CIA provided the 
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ARPCT with weapons and financed its militias. In return, the alliance 
became an accessory to the US war on terror—capturing and render-
ing to the United States suspected al-Qaeda operatives, specifically those 
believed to be involved in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania and the 2002 attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel and airliner in 
Kenya. Fighting between the ARPCT and the ICU broke out in February 
2006. In May, warlord attacks on ICU militias in Mogadishu instigated 
some of the worst street fighting in the capital since Siad Barre’s govern-
ment fell apart in 1991. The TFG appealed for foreign military assistance 
and the United States, Ethiopia, Italy, and Yemen complied, again violat-
ing the UN arms embargo. Eritrea, in turn, provided weapons to the ICU 
militias to counter the influence of Ethiopia, its regional nemesis. In early 
June, ICU militias seized control of Mogadishu and ousted the warlords 
who had controlled the capital for fifteen years.
 By July 2006, ICU militias had gained ascendancy over most of 
southern and central Somalia, including the key ports and airfields. In 
Mogadishu, the courts began to rebuild basic government services, es-
tablishing committees on sanitation, reconstruction, education, and 
justice. They cracked down on criminals, armed youth, and warlord 
Photo 4.3. Ethiopian troops participate in AMISOM patrol in Baidoa, Somalia, 
March 27, 2014. Photo by Abdi Dagane/AU UN IST.
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militias, bringing a semblance of security to the capital city. Mogadishu’s 
port and international airport, which had been closed for more than a 
decade, reopened. The ICU garnered immense popular support, even 
from secular Somalis who welcomed the implementation of Islamic law 
as way to stem crime and violence. François Lonseny Fall, at that time 
the UN special representative to Somalia, acknowledged that the ICU 
had “achieved great things in Mogadishu,” while other human rights 
groups claimed that with Islam as a unifying factor, the ICU had been 
more successful than any previous government in uniting and disarm-
ing Somali clans.18
 The ICU victory was precisely the opposite of what the CIA had 
hoped for when it backed the warlord alliance. In fact, foreign meddling 
had triggered a backlash that strengthened radical factions. In June 2006, 
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a Salafi and former al-Itihaad leader, was 
appointed chair of the ICU consultative council, challenging the leader-
ship of the executive council chair, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a mod-
erate Sufi cleric. A Somali national army colonel under Siad Barre and 
onetime member of Aidid’s militia, Aweys had joined the al-Itihaad mili-
tia in the early 1990s and helped establish Islamic courts in Mogadishu at 
the end of that decade. Although Aweys hoped to implement Islamic law 
throughout Somalia, some analysts considered him to be a mitigating in-
fluence vis-à-vis extremists in al-Shabaab, the ICU’s youth militia, which 
aspired to establish an Islamic state beyond Somalia’s borders.
 External support for the warlords and the TFG strengthened the po-
sition of radicals in the ICU. In early July 2006, Osama bin Laden called 
on Muslims worldwide to wage jihad in Somalia and warned that Mus-
lim fighters would challenge all foreign troops, including UN and AU 
peacekeepers, if they intervened to support the TFG. Three weeks later, 
when ICU forces threatened the transitional government’s headquar-
ters in Baidoa, hundreds of Ethiopian soldiers, supported by tanks and 
helicopters, arrived to protect the government’s position. In the weeks 
that followed, some 5,000 Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia, while more 
amassed on the border. ICU hardliners began to mobilize for confron-
tation with Ethiopia, appealing both to Somali irredentist claims and to 
religious sentiment against the predominantly Christian regime that sus-
tained the warlords and propped up the TFG.
 Although most Somalis did not support the jihadist agenda of the 
hardliners, and few wanted another war with Ethiopia—which still 
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claimed one of the largest, most sophisticated armies in sub-Saharan 
Africa—the presence of Ethiopian troops in Baidoa and persistent 
Ethiopian incursions across Somalia’s borders rallied the population be-
hind the radicals. Moderates in the ICU, who previously had discussed 
elections and power sharing, also began talking war. Departing from his 
earlier position, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys urged Somalis to prepare 
for jihad against Ethiopia. In late July and early August 2006, some forty 
senior government officials, including a number of cabinet ministers, 
abandoned the TFG. Some defected to the ICU, taking their own militias 
with them.
 The fallout from foreign intervention rapidly transformed the So-
mali conflict into a regional conflagration. In October, the UN reported 
that ten nations were supplying arms to various Somali factions in vio-
lation of the UN embargo. Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria were supporting the ICU, while Ethiopia, Uganda, and 
Yemen were furnishing weapons to the TFG. In November, as ICU mi-
litias routed TFG forces in the north, President Yusuf appealed for fur-
ther external assistance. The United States responded, pushing through 
a UN Security Council resolution on December 6, 2006, that described 
the Somali situation as “a threat to international peace and security in 
the region” and authorized the AU and IGAD to establish a military force 
to protect the TFG and to train its security forces.19 The resolution also 
created a loophole in the UN arms embargo that allowed the African 
peacekeeping forces—and implicitly, Ethiopian soldiers protecting the 
TFG—to be supplied with weapons, while continuing to deny arms to 
the ICU.
 On December 14, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Jendayi Frazer referred to ICU leaders as “extremists to the core” who 
were “controlled by al-Qaeda.”20 Ethiopia took this high-level US con-
demnation as a green light for a full-scale invasion. Six days later, as ICU 
militias attempted to capture Baidoa, Ethiopian warplanes buttressed 
by thousands of Ethiopian and TFG soldiers struck back, decimating 
the poorly armed ICU militias. On December 24, 2006, after months 
of military buildup, some 8,000 Ethiopian troops, supported by tanks 
and attack helicopters, advanced on Mogadishu, bombing Somalia’s two 
main airports along the way. The UN Security Council was silent. Its 
failure to condemn the Ethiopian invasion confirmed Somali views that 
the international body was not a neutral broker of peace, but a partisan 
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force that had sanctioned foreign intervention to bolster a client regime 
that had virtually no internal support.
 While the UN tacitly condoned the Ethiopian offensive, the United 
States actively supported it. The State Department referred to the inva-
sion as a legitimate response to aggression by Somali Muslim extremists. 
Convinced that the al-Qaeda militants who had planned the 1998 and 
2002 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were hiding in southern Somalia 
under ICU protection, US intelligence officials were determined to root 
them out. The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 
a Djibouti-based counterterrorism entity comprising nearly 2,000 US 
military and civilian personnel, provided satellite photos and other in-
telligence to the Ethiopian army to help it locate ICU fighters. Planes 
piloted by US Special Operations Forces took off from bases in Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, and Kenya and joined Ethiopian aircraft in bombing ICU 
strongholds. As the invasion progressed, US Special Operations Forces, 
functioning from a secret airfield in Ethiopia, entered Somalia alongside 
the Ethiopian army, purportedly to track down the al-Qaeda suspects.21 
US ground troops helped Ethiopian soldiers gather evidence, while the 
US Navy patrolled the Somali coast and intercepted ships to search for 
al-Qaeda operatives. Fearing massive bloodshed and the destruction of 
Mogadishu, business and clan leaders urged the ICU to disband and to 
abandon the capital without resistance. The ICU militias complied and 
retreated toward the Kenyan border, pursued by intelligence and security 
forces from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and the United States. In a rendi-
tion program run by Ethiopia, the United States, and the TFG, militants 
were rounded up and deported to secret detention facilities in Ethiopia. 
On January 8, 2007, TFG President Yusuf entered the capital for the first 
time since taking office in 2004.
 The joint Ethiopian-US operation resulted in an increase, rather 
than a decrease, in chaos and violence. Within weeks of the foreign inva-
sion, a homegrown insurgency had begun, rallying al-Shabaab and other 
ICU militias, clans that had been marginalized by the TFG, and a wide 
range of groups that benefited from anarchy, including warlord militias, 
hired gunmen, arms and drug traffickers, smugglers, and profiteers. The 
Somali insurgents were joined by fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and the Arabian Peninsula who responded to the call to wage jihad 
against Ethiopia. Warlord and clan militias set up roadblocks and shook 
down residents. Banditry and extortion, which had been suppressed by 
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the ICU, returned with a vengeance. Using weapons left over from the 
Cold War, including AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled 
grenades, insurgents attacked TFG and Ethiopian troops, government 
buildings, and infrastructure. Employing techniques developed by Iraqi 
resisters after the 2003 US invasion, they discharged landmines, suicide 
bombs, and improvised explosive devices, and they targeted TFG offi-
cials for assassination. In mid-January 2007, the TFG parliament de-
clared a state of emergency and granted the president broad powers to 
enforce security.
 Foreign involvement assumed a new dimension in February, when 
the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was slated to deploy 8,000 
African peacekeepers of diverse nationalities to replace the Ethiopian 
soldiers shoring up the TFG. Funded by the UN and the EU, the AU force 
appeared to many Somalis as yet another case of unwanted foreign in-
trusion. The fact that most of the troops came from the predominantly 
Christian countries of Uganda and Burundi augmented public hostility. 
Moreover, the AU force was slow to arrive—only 2,600 soldiers were in 
place by August 2008. As a result, Ethiopian soldiers would remain on 
Somali soil until early 2009. 
 In March 2007, the Ethiopian military launched an offensive on 
Mogadishu to capture key locations from insurgents who had held parts 
of the capital since the ICU’s departure in January. Assisted by TFG 
police, Ethiopian soldiers cracked down on Hawiye neighborhoods 
and closed ports and airfields belonging to Hawiye businessmen, 
charging that the clan was supporting the insurgency. Widespread ar-
rests, assaults, looting, and rape—perpetrated both by Ethiopian soldiers 
and by TFG police who were trained and paid by the UN Development 
Programme—intensified popular support for the insurgency.
 The ensuing two-month-long battle for Mogadishu precipitated the 
most destructive fighting in a decade and a half. By the end of April, some 
1,300 Mogadishu residents had been killed, and more than 400,000 had 
fled their homes. Human rights organizations accused participants on all 
sides of war crimes. They charged that Ethiopian forces had engaged in 
widespread and indiscriminate bombing of densely populated areas as 
well as the collective punishment of civilians, including mass arrests and 
summary executions. They also claimed that the Ethiopian military had 
intentionally shelled hospitals, pillaged medical equipment, and blocked 
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the flow of humanitarian assistance, and that Ethiopian and TFG sol-
diers had raped, plundered, and killed with impunity. Human rights 
groups asserted that insurgents had also engaged in assassinations and 
summary executions and that they had demonstrated disregard for ci-
vilian lives by mounting attacks from densely populated neighborhoods, 
which then bore the brunt of Ethiopian and TFG retaliation.
 Violence continued to escalate throughout 2007. Badly weakened by 
infighting and defections, the TFG was on the verge of collapse. By Janu-
ary 2008, al-Shabaab, other ICU militias, and their allies had recovered 
much of the territory they had lost a year earlier. Al-Shabaab garnered 
some civilian support, especially in southern Somalia, where it estab-
lished a semblance of law and order and a justice system that followed 
years of abuse by warlord militias and government police. In March 
2008, the US State Department designated al-Shabaab a “foreign terrorist 
organization.”22 Critics warned that the label could enhance al-Shabaab’s 
popularity and at the same time render negotiations with the organiza-
tion nearly impossible. Matters were further complicated in May, when a 
targeted US missile strike killed Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, al-Shabaab top’s 
leader, who had fought in the Soviet-Afghan War. Prior to Ayro’s killing, 
al-Shabaab had focused its attacks on Ethiopian and TFG soldiers. How-
ever, US actions redirected al-Shabaab’s attention to the West. Declaring 
war on all foreigners, al-Shabaab began to target Western aid workers, 
journalists, and Somalis working with foreign organizations. As a result, 
a number of externally based organizations withdrew their personnel, 
and humanitarian operations were dramatically curtailed.
 By mid-2008, insurgent forces controlled most of southern and cen-
tral Somalia as well as most of Mogadishu. The TFG-Ethiopian alliance 
held only a few blocks of the capital, including the port, airport, and 
presidential palace. The support base for extremists was much larger 
and more radical than it had been before the Ethiopian invasion, and 
terrorist threats were far more serious. Even Western diplomats recog-
nized that Islamists had to be included in negotiations for any future 
government that had a chance of success. In June, moderates in the TFG 
and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), an opposition 
coalition composed of both Islamist and secular groups, met in Dji-
bouti to negotiate terms for peace. Al-Shabaab, which controlled much 
of southern Somalia, opposed collaboration with the secular parties and 
refused to participate.
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 The ensuing Djibouti Agreement, backed by the UN, the AU, the EU, 
and the United States, resulted in a number of changes on the ground. In 
January 2009, the Somali parliament was enlarged to include moderate 
Islamists, representatives of citizens’ groups, and Somalis from the di-
aspora. The parliament elected a new president, selecting Sheikh Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed, an ARS leader and Sufi moderate who had led the ICU 
executive council before the foreign invasion. By the end of the month, 
Ethiopia had withdrawn its troops from Somalia. In April the new parlia-
ment voted to make Islamic law the basis of the Somali legal system. The 
insurgents’ rallying points were severely weakened. The foreign occupier 
had withdrawn, an Islamist had been elected president, and Islamic law 
was being implemented throughout the country. A number of Muslim 
factions that had opposed the TFG agreed to lay down arms. Ahlu Sun-
nah Wal Jama’a (Followers of the Prophetic Way and Consensus), an alli-
ance of Sufi militias backed by local clans, agreed to resist al-Shabaab and 
to back the Sheikh Sharif government. However, other factions persisted. 
In February 2009, an alliance of Muslim insurgent organizations that 
had rejected the Djibouti Agreement established Hizbul Islam (Islamic 
Party) under the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, erstwhile 
ICU consultative council leader, onetime Sheikh Sharif ally, and subse-
quent ally of al-Shabaab. In May, Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab conducted 
a joint operation against TFG forces in Mogadishu, where AMISOM 
forces saved the government from destruction.
 Despite the reforms mandated by the Djibouti Agreement, the TFG 
remained weak and unpopular. It was corrupt, unrepresentative of the 
popular majority, and beholden to outsiders. Determined to retain a mo-
nopoly on power and resources, it refused to engage with local politi-
cal and military forces that might threaten its position. It failed to build 
state institutions and relied on foreign backers to uphold its power. In 
the northwest (Somaliland) and the northeast (Puntland), autonomous 
regional governments exercised de facto authority without Mogadishu’s 
approval or support. Some TFG-allied militias, including Ahlu Sunnah 
Wal Jama’a, joined Ethiopian soldiers in targeting civilians and were 
roundly condemned by human rights organizations.
 Although the departure of Ethiopian troops was widely applauded 
inside Somalia, the AMISOM force also generated intense hostility, even 
among those who opposed al-Shabaab. AMISOM’s heavy shelling of 
urban neighborhoods, like the Ethiopian attacks, had resulted in large 
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numbers of civilian deaths. Many Somalis also chafed at the presence 
of thousands of troops from neighboring countries where the regimes 
in power were dominated by Christians and where Muslims faced re-
pression and discrimination. Al-Shabaab played on these sentiments and 
characterized AMISOM as a Christian invading force. Nor was AMISOM 
particularly effective. Al-Shabaab retained a strong presence in Somalia, 
and on AMISOM’s watch it expanded its operations into neighboring 
countries. In July 2010, al-Shabaab engaged in its first cross-border op-
eration, setting off coordinated bombs in Kampala, Uganda, that killed 
seventy-six people in retaliation for Uganda’s central role in AMISOM. 
Although AMISOM expelled al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 
2011, the insurgent organization continued to control most of the coun-
try’s southern and central regions.
 Al-Shabaab’s tenacity sparked a new episode of foreign military in-
tervention in 2011. In October, some 2,000 Kenyan troops, followed by 
hundreds of Ethiopian troops in November, crossed Somalia’s south-
ern border to attack al-Shabaab and establish a buffer between the two 
countries. The civilian death toll provoked animosity toward the Kenyan 
government, and al-Shabaab vowed to retaliate. Although Kenya claimed 
to be acting at the invitation of the TFG, the UN Security Council had 
tasked AMISOM with peacekeeping in Somalia. No other foreign entity 
was authorized to intervene militarily in Somali affairs. Nonetheless, the 
UN Security Council condoned Nairobi’s unilateral action, and in July 
2012 AMISOM formally assumed authority over the Kenyan occupation 
force, giving it a veneer of legitimacy. Responding to the escalated inter-
national response and hoping to boost its image and fighting capacity, 
al-Shabaab formally merged with al-Qaeda in February 2012.
 The year 2012 marked the end of the eight-year transitional govern-
ment, but not an end to the Somali crisis. The new political dispensation—
complete with constitution, parliament, and president—was once again 
the product of outside forces. It was mediated by the UN, backed by the 
international community, and disavowed by large segments of Somali 
civil society, which had had little input into the process. The new presi-
dent, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was a moderate Islamist with links to the 
Islamic Courts Union and Somalia’s Muslim Brotherhood. He was also an 
educator and longtime civil society activist who had worked with the UN 
in various capacities. However, his ability to effect change was limited, 
and foreign troops continued to battle al-Shabaab on Somali soil.
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 In late September, Kenyan AMISOM soldiers, assisted by Somali 
government troops and militias, weakened al-Shabaab’s economic base 
when they gained control of the strategic southern port of Kismayo. A 
key transit point for foreign fighters, weapons, and supplies entering So-
malia, and for the export of sugar, livestock, charcoal, and khat, the port 
hosted an illegal trade that generated hundreds of millions of dollars a 
year for al-Shabaab and its collaborators in the local Somali administra-
tion, as well as for the Kenya Defence Forces and Kenyan government. 
Although Somalia and Kenya officially sought an end to the turmoil, the 
enormous profits engendered by a lawless society served as an incentive 
for many to continue the conflict.
 By 2012 al-Shabaab was diminished, but not defeated. As it lost ter-
ritory and revenues, the organization changed tactics, focusing increas-
ingly on unprotected soft targets, including government offices, schools, 
hotels, and restaurants. As it was ousted from towns and cities and 
pushed to Somalia’s southern border, al-Shabaab targeted rural popula-
tions in Kenya’s North Eastern Province. Distrusted and neglected by the 
Nairobi government, the predominantly Somali population of this area 
was especially vulnerable. While these killings provoked little interna-
tional response, world attention was captured by al-Shabaab’s Septem-
ber 2013 attack on an exclusive Nairobi shopping mall that claimed the 
lives of sixty-seven people, including many foreign nationals. AMISOM 
forces, led by Kenyan soldiers, responded with an aerial offensive that 
killed some 300 al-Shabaab militants. In 2014, AMISOM forces were bol-
stered with more than 4,000 Ethiopian troops. Critics warned that the 
reengagement of the Ethiopian military would serve as a rallying cry for 
al-Shabaab.
 Meanwhile, the United States escalated its low-intensity war against 
al-Shabaab operatives, deploying both private contractors and US Spe-
cial Operations Forces, who trained and advised African partners, par-
ticipated in raids, and interrogated prisoners. During 2014–16, US attacks 
killed Ahmed Abdi Godane, al-Shabaab’s leader since Ayro’s death in 
2008; the organization’s intelligence chief; the official who purportedly 
planned the 2013 Nairobi mall attack; and some 150 militants in an al-
Shabaab training camp. However, middle-level commanders quickly 
replaced assassinated leaders, and the insurgents continued to attack 
AMISOM and Somali troops, government officials, and civilians. The 
defection of a high-level al-Shabaab commander to the Islamic State in 
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October 2015 and the formation of two new organizations, the Islamic 
State in Somalia and the Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, resulted in even more brutality on the ground. Meanwhile, 
AMISOM forces were weakened. In 2016, the EU reduced its funding. 
The AU announced that AMISOM would begin to withdraw in 2018 after 
transferring authority to the Somali national army, which remained cor-
rupt and ineffective. US covert operations in Somalia escalated in 2017, 
and the number of Special Operations troops on the ground peaked at 
nearly 500. At the year’s end it was clear that the external response to 
instability had transformed the conflict, but it had not brought peace.
Conclusion
Recent conflicts in Somalia have deep historical roots. Their causes are 
complex, including both internal and external factors. Justifications for 
intervention have been equally complicated: they have varied from actor 
to actor and changed over time. Spurred initially by regional instability 
and the responsibility to protect, foreign powers were increasingly galva-
nized by the war on terror. The results were mixed. Although the imme-
diate humanitarian crisis—widespread starvation—was to some extent 
averted, the long-term effects were largely negative. Foreign interven-
tion provoked a terrorist insurgency that consumed civilian lives and in-
creased regional instability. Externally brokered peace initiatives failed to 
end the conflict. Large segments of Somali civil society were not invited 
to the bargaining table, grassroots peace-building and nation-building 
efforts were ignored, and the interests of outsiders and Somali elites pre-
vailed over those of ordinary Somali citizens. As a result, the ensuing 
agreements garnered little internal support, and a succession of weak 
Somali governments failed to provide services and security to citizens. 
Similar practices marked the course of foreign intervention in Sudan and 
South Sudan, to the west of Somalia, which is the subject of chapter 5.
Suggested Reading
For overviews of Somali history and society, three surveys are especially 
recommended. Lee V. Cassanelli’s pathbreaking work, The Shaping of So-
mali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), explores the 
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precolonial foundations of modern Somali society. I. M. Lewis, A Mod-
ern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, 4th ed. 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), is regarded as a seminal study of 
Somali politics and society from ancient times through the early 1990s. 
However, Lewis’s characterization of Somali political identity as one 
largely based on clans and their segments—rather than one that em-
braces a fluid assortment of genealogical, language, religious, cultural, 
and economic factors—has been challenged by more recent scholarship. 
See, for instance, Abdi I. Samatar, “Debating Somali Identity in a Brit-
ish Tribunal: The Case of the BBC Somali Service,” Bildhaan: An Inter-
national Journal of Somali Studies 10 (2010), article 8. Finally, David D. 
Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1987), considers the precolonial and colonial peri-
ods and focuses especially on events since independence.
 The early independence period is examined in two significant stud-
ies. Abdi I. Samatar, Africa’s First Democrats: Somalia’s Aden A. Osman 
and Abdirazak H. Hussen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 
focuses on the democratic political organizations that led the struggle for 
independence, the leaders who shaped the first democratically elected 
governments, and their opponents who were engaged in sectarian and pa-
tronage networks. Hannah Whittaker, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict, c. 1963–1968 (Leiden: Brill, 
2015), explores the dynamics of a secessionist war in northern Kenya, a 
region heavily populated by ethnic Somalis, where government coun-
terinsurgency tactics alienated the Somali minority and exacerbated 
tensions between the Kenyan and Somali states.
 Other historical studies explore the emergence of social and eco-
nomic hierarchies in Somali society. Abdi I. Samatar, The State and Rural 
Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884–1986 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), investigates class formation and economic his-
tory in modern Somalia. Catherine Lowe Besteman, Unraveling Soma-
lia: Race, Violence, and the Legacy of Slavery (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), examines the historical development of hier-
archies based on race, class, status, region, language, and occupation and 
the implications of these hierarchies after the breakdown of Somalia’s 
central government. Three recommended works provide insight into the 
origins of the Somali Bantu as an ethnic group and the violence perpe-
trated against its members after the central government failed: Mohamed 
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Eno, The Bantu-Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Af-
rica (London: Adonis and Abbey, 2008); Catherine Besteman, Making 
Refuge: Somali Bantu Refugees and Lewiston, Maine (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2016); and Ken Menkhaus, “The Question of Ethnic-
ity in Somali Studies: The Case of Somali Bantu Identity,” in Milk and 
Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics, ed. Markus 
V. Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst, 2010), 87–104.
 A number of studies focus on Somalia during the Cold War. Lai-
tin and Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (mentioned pre-
viously), and Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality 
(London: Zed Books, 1988), examine Somalia under the Siad Barre re-
gime. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia 
and Somalia, 1953–1991 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 
uses declassified government documents and interviews to examine US 
relations with Somalia and Ethiopia over four decades, focusing espe-
cially on the massive influx of weaponry and its societal impact. Marina 
Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York: 
Praeger, 1982), focuses on the role of the Soviet Union and the United 
States in both countries. Louise Woodroofe, “Buried in the Sands of the 
Ogaden”: The United States, the Horn of Africa, and the Demise of Détente 
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2013), and Nancy Mitchell, 
Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2016), provide important new insights into Cold War 
dynamics in the Horn and US and Soviet involvement in the Ogaden 
war. For a brief overview of foreign intervention in the Horn during the 
Cold War, see Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From 
the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), chap. 6.
 Several works that examine Somalia since the dissolution of the Siad 
Barre regime focus on the origins of conflict and difference in Somali 
society. Grounded in sources that reveal grassroots perspectives, Lid-
wien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), shows how Siad 
Barre promoted conflict and competition among clans in order to es-
tablish and protect his neopatrimonial state, and how the political elites, 
warlords, and rebels who succeeded him used similar strategies of clan 
mobilization and clan cleansing to obtain and maintain power. Afyare 
Abdi Elmi, Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Islam and 
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Peacebuilding (London: Pluto Press, 2010), takes a different view, argu-
ing that clan identity is deeply rooted, rather than a tool manipulated by 
elites, and that it must be considered if a political settlement is to endure. 
Contributors to Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli, eds., The 
Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1996), investigate contests over land and resources 
as stimuli for violent conflict. Besteman, Unraveling Somalia (mentioned 
previously), examines the ways in which war and violence have dispro-
portionately affected rural southerners. M. J. Fox, The Roots of Somali Po-
litical Culture (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), analyzes the source of 
divergent political cultures in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland. Mark 
Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008), explores political developments in the autonomous northern re-
gion that declared itself an independent state in 1991.
 US and UN interventions in Somalia in the 1990s are the subject 
of several studies. John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid 
in Somalia, 1990–1994 (Geneva: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), investi-
gates the dynamics of the humanitarian crisis that led to foreign military 
intervention, as well as debates within NGO and governmental circles 
about the merits of such actions. Rakiya Omaar, Alexander de Waal, 
and African Rights, Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Na-
tions Forces (London: African Rights, 1993), documents human rights 
violations by UN forces in Somalia in the months before the October 
1993 US encounter with Somali militias and civilians. UN Special Rep-
resentative Mohamed Sahnoun’s account, Somalia: The Missed Opportu-
nities (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994), provides 
an insider’s view that is critical of the UN mission. John L. Hirsch and 
Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, 1995), offers other insider perspectives. As US special envoy, 
Oakley led the humanitarian phase of the mission and was sharply criti-
cal of the military venture that followed. Hirsch served as political advi-
sor to the relief effort. Written by a humanitarian aid worker in Somalia 
during the US-UN intervention, Kenneth R. Rutherford, Humanitar-
ianism Under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia (Sterling, 
VA: Kumarian Press, 2008), examines the motivations for and legacy 
of that operation. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern 
War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), provides an account of 
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the US Army Ranger–Delta Force intervention in Mogadishu from the 
perspective of an investigative journalist.
 The influence of Islamism in Somali society is explored in a num-
ber of works. The history of the Islamic courts movement is examined 
in Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s 
Islamic Courts,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 
151–60. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Ter-
rorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), explores how Islamic 
courts, regional authorities, and municipalities governed in the absence 
of a central government and considers the relationship of Somali jihadist 
organizations to international terrorism. Contributors to Alex de Waal, 
ed., Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 2004), focus on Islamist organizations that pro-
vided health and education services in the region and the impact on local 
struggles of the US-led war on terror.
 The Horn as a battleground in the war on terror is the focus of several 
works. Robert I. Rotberg’s collection, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Af-
rica (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press/World Peace Founda-
tion, 2005), considers the Horn as a frontline in the US war on terror and 
explores the ways in which regional powers have been used to promote US 
interests. Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Bur-
lington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), investigates US relations with Islamism in the 
Horn of Africa, using Somalia as a case study. Gregory A. Pirio, African 
Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 
2007), offers a detailed narrative of the evolving relationship between some 
Somali jihadist organizations and al-Qaeda. Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), traces al-Shabaab’s origins, evo-
lution, and resilience and explores the impact of AU and US military ac-
tions on the organization’s tactics and strategies, including its newer focus 
on East African countries that contribute to AU forces. Anneli Botha and 
Mahdi Abdile, Radicalisation and al-Shabaab Recruitment in Somalia, ISS 
Paper 266 (Institute for Security Studies, 2014), is based on interviews with 
former al-Shabaab fighters. It explores the reasons recruits were attracted 
to the organization, focusing on religion, politics, education, employment, 
and the search for collective identity and belonging.
 The perspectives of ordinary Somalis are highlighted in several 
studies. Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War, and Hope in 
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a Shattered State (London: Zed Books, 2012), argues that viewing post-
1991 Somalia through the lens of al-Qaeda and the war on terror distorts 
a more complex reality. In the face of state failure, Somalis developed 
new forms of local politics, justice, business, and education that contrib-
uted to a thriving society. Highlighting Somali voices and perspectives, 
the book is especially useful for its insights into state collapse, Islamism, 
piracy, and foreign intervention. Similarly, Peter Little, Somalia: The 
Stateless Economy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), fo-
cuses on the ways in which Somalis developed a functioning economy in 
the absence of a central state. Jonny Steinberg explores the experiences 
of Somali displacement and exile in A Man of Good Hope: A Refugee’s 
Tale (New York: Vintage, 2015), the biography of a Somali immigrant in a 
Cape Town slum. The book’s protagonist escaped poverty and violence in 
Somalia only to face similar traumas in South Africa, where xenophobic 
hatred has had deadly consequences for Africans of other nationalities.
 The novels of Somali author Nuruddin Farah offer critical insights 
into Somali experiences and perspectives after the failure of the central 
government in 1991. Links (New York: Riverhead Books, 2004) details the 
journey of a longtime exile who returns home after the departure of US 
troops in 1994 to find a devastated capital city controlled by warlords and 
youth gangs. Knots (New York: Riverhead Books, 2007) follows the path 
of a woman who escapes a failed marriage in the United States to pursue 
a new life in the fractured country where she was born. Crossbones (New 
York: Riverhead Books, 2011) focuses on another return by the Links 
protagonist, who faces Islamist governance and an Ethiopian invasion 
as he attempts to locate a relative who was recruited into the jihadist in-
surgency. Hiding in Plain Sight (New York: Penguin, 2015) continues the 
theme of exile and displacement, focusing on the lives of a Nairobi-based 
Somali UN worker, who was killed in an al-Shabaab attack on UN offices 
in Mogadishu, and his sister who lived in Rome.




Sudan and South Sudan
Conflicting interests and inadequate Solutions (1991–2017)
this chapter develops four case studies to illuminate the impact 
of foreign political and military intervention in Sudan from 1991 through 
2017, and in South Sudan after its establishment in 2011. Civil war, ethnic 
cleansing, and terrorist networks caused instability in both countries and 
also in neighboring states. Outside intervention was mobilized at various 
times in response to instability, to protect civilians, and to counter a ter-
rorist threat. In contrast to neighboring Somalia, foreign troops in Sudan 
did not become key players in internal conflicts. External interests did not 
threaten the central government or attempt to establish a new one, but 
instead negotiated with the regime in power. The results of intervention 
were decidedly mixed. Some critics charged that more aggressive mea-
sures would have produced more desirable outcomes. Others contended 
that using greater force to address complex political, economic, and social 
problems would likely have sparked further violence and instability.
 The first case study focuses on the period 1991 to 1996, when Osama 
bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network were headquartered in Sudan and 
the war on terror paradigm framed US policy. Washington, with the help 
of Saudi Arabia and the UN Security Council, successfully pressured 
Khartoum to expel bin Laden and his organization and to cooperate with 
the CIA in counterterrorism efforts. However, Sudan’s north-south civil 
war (1983–2005), which was viewed as pitting Muslims against Chris-
tians, inhibited a close relationship between the two countries.
 The second case study examines the north-south civil war and inter-
national response from 1991 to 2017. Although some of Sudan’s neighbors 
supported rival factions and promoted their own interests in the war, the 
response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm shaped broader 
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international policy toward Sudan during this period. The UN, the United 
States, European countries, and the East African subregional organiza-
tion IGAD mediated a peace accord that officially ended the war and was 
deemed a success by the international community. However, the settlement 
left key issues unresolved, and the flawed agreement laid the foundations 
for future strife that again implicated neighboring countries. A separate 
UN force with a narrow mandate was sent to the fledgling state of South 
Sudan in 2011, but it was unable to establish a lasting peace, and IGAD’s 
efforts were hampered by its members’ support for opposing camps.
 The third case study investigates the internal and regional roots of the 
Darfur conflict in western Sudan from 2003 to 2006, and the fourth case 
study considers the international community’s response to that conflict 
from 2003 to 2017. Once again, the response to instability/responsibility 
to protect paradigm was used to justify political and military intervention, 
and once more foreign intervention had mixed results. The AU and the 
UN staged limited peacekeeping inventions to prevent ethnic cleansing, 
but they failed to sustain the operations until peace was restored.
Setting the Stage: The Colonial and Cold War Context (1820–1991)
Until July 2011, Sudan and South Sudan were a single country, Sudan, 
which straddled the continent’s north-south divide. The northern region 
of Sudan was largely covered by the Sahara Desert and semi-arid land, 
with population concentrated in the Nile River Valley, especially in the 
capital of Khartoum. The more fertile southern region was geographi-
cally part of sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions were multiethnic, but the 
north was predominantly Muslim and Arab while the south was inhab-
ited primarily by practitioners of Christianity and indigenous religions. 
 Fragmented by race, religion, and language, Sudan was torn by violent 
conflict in the decades after independence, including two civil wars 
between the northern and southern regions. The first of these wars, 
sparked by a mutiny in 1955, lasted until 1972. The second took place 
from 1983 to 2005, culminating in an externally brokered peace agree-
ment that led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. However, 
South Sudan was also fractured by debilitating rivalries, which pro-
voked renewed warfare in December 2013. Parts of northern Sudan 
were similarly torn by strife and rebellion. The most serious of these 
conflicts, in Darfur, began in 2003 and was ongoing in 2017. Rich oil 
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resources were a complicating factor. They financed Sudan’s multiple 
wars and stimulated new conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, as 
well as fighting within South Sudan. The desire for access to the region’s 
oil reserves also motivated outside powers like China and the United 
States to search for a lasting peace.
 Conflict in contemporary Sudan is rooted in unequal power rela-
tions, which both predated and outlasted colonialism. The dominant 
political and scholarly narrative characterizes the disparity as one that 
pitted an Arabized Muslim north against a non-Muslim African south.1 
Critics have charged, however, that the north-south/Arab-African para-
digm fails to account for other internal conflicts and that it collapses into 
a single Arab identity qualities that pertain only to the ruling elite. An 
alternative, more nuanced hypothesis posits that the fundamental prob-
lems in Sudan are the dominance of the center—the ruling elites of Khar-
toum and the Nile Valley—over the rest of the country and the instability 
of ruling factions, which engage in a permanent competition for power 
and resources. Insecure political elites, in ever-changing configurations, 
do not possess the capacity to make peace or to sustain political and eco-
nomic structures that serve the needs of the country’s diverse popula-
tions. They have maintained power by constructing patronage networks 
to dispense largess to supporters and by mobilizing ethnically based 
militias that terrorize and subdue civilians and plunder their resources, 
including land, livestock, and oil. Often, their interest in perpetuating 
war is greater than their desire to promote peace. External powers, by 
supporting rival factions both inside and outside the government, have 
helped sustain this dynamic.
 Foreign intervention in Sudan has a long history. Throughout most 
of the nineteenth century, the territory, composed of northern sultanates 
and the southern periphery, was under Ottoman-Egyptian rule. In 1820 
Egyptian forces invaded Sudan and incorporated it into Egypt, then a 
semi-autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire. In 1885, under the lead-
ership of the Sufi sheikh Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah—commonly 
known as al-Mahdi, or the Messiah—Sudanese nationalists and Islamic 
reformers based in Darfur drove the Ottomans and their British advisors 
from Khartoum. A decade later, the British toppled the Mahdist state and 
established the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which lasted from 1899 
until independence in 1956. During the Cold War, Sudan, like Somalia, 
was first a Soviet and then a US ally. However, Sudan was never a Western 
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proxy. Although Washington used Khartoum to counter Moscow’s influ-
ence in Ethiopia, Khartoum also courted conservative Arab governments, 
Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya, and, after the Cold War, al-Qaeda. 
 Proponents of the north-south paradigm often trace its origins to the 
period of Ottoman-Egyptian rule, when the Arabized Muslim north—
in reality an amalgam of Arab and African cultures—plundered the 
non-Muslim south for ivory and slaves. Although the UK had outlawed 
slavery throughout its empire in 1833, its Southern Policy in Sudan contin-
ued the exploitative relationship between the territory’s northern center 
and southern periphery. To inhibit both the slave trade and the spread of 
Islam, the colonial administration regulated the flow of northerners to 
the south and prohibited marriages between northerners and southern-
ers. Economic and educational resources were concentrated in the north, 
particularly in Khartoum and its environs. The lower ranks of the colo-
nial civil service were staffed by educated northerners, while southerners 
were forcibly conscripted into the colonial army. Although purportedly 
established to protect the south from northern domination, the Southern 
Policy in fact stunted the southern region’s development and produced a 
population with little in the way of education, resources, or power.
 After Sudan’s independence in 1956, northern Muslims, particularly 
Arabs from the Nile Valley region around Khartoum, dominated the na-
tion’s public spheres. The unequal development of the colonial era contin-
ued, causing serious conflicts between the center and the periphery. In 
the south, northerners replaced the British in the civil service, army, and 
police. Following a military coup in November 1958, the government ex-
pelled foreign Christian missionaries from the south, took over missionary 
schools, introduced Arabic as a medium of instruction, and pressed non-
believers to convert to Islam. A southern secessionist movement engaged 
in armed struggle from 1963 to 1972, when a peace accord granted some 
autonomy to the southern region. In 1969, after a brief return to civilian 
rule, the Sudanese military again seized power, this time under the lead-
ership of Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri. A proponent of pan-Arab nationalism, 
socialism, and secularism, President Nimeiri opposed Sudanese Islamists, 
allied himself with the Sudanese Communist Party, and maintained close 
ties with the Soviet Union.2 In 1972, Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood, an out-
growth of the Egyptian organization, and the Darfur-based Ansar (Follow-
ers of the Mahdi) began an armed uprising to establish an Islamic state. 
The Ansar insurgents were trained by the Islamic Pan-African Legion, 
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a paramilitary force organized by Libyan ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi, 
whose goal was to build a vast Islamic empire in Africa that incorporated 
Libya, Chad, and the Darfur region of western Sudan.3
 After the installation of a Marxist government in Ethiopia in 1974, 
the United States sought a regional ally to serve as a counterweight to 
Soviet influence in the east and Libyan influence in the west. US interests 
aligned with those of President Nimeiri, who worried about Moscow’s 
aims in the Horn and Qaddafi’s designs on Sudan amid a growing eco-
nomic crisis and mounting external debt. In 1976, Nimeiri shifted his 
allegiance to the United States and expelled his Soviet advisors. To re-
inforce his domestic base, he reconciled with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
filled the Sudanese military with Islamists, and sought alliances with 
conservative Arab governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. During the 
Carter and Reagan administrations, Sudan was the largest beneficiary of 
US aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The Reagan administration made Sudan 
an important base for the CIA’s covert campaign against Qaddafi and a 
regional center of operations during the Cold War.
 Having reconciled with conservative Muslim interests, Nimeiri 
imposed his own version of Islamic law throughout Sudan in 1983. His 
Photo 5.1. Armed children in southern Sudan during the civil war, March 8, 1971. 
Photo by John Downing/Getty Images. 
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actions violated the 1972 peace agreement, which had granted regional 
autonomy to the south. The implementation of Islamic law in the south, 
which was home to some 4 million Christians and practitioners of indige-
nous religions, ignited the second civil war. Spearheaded by the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its army, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), the southern resistance called for an end to 
northern Muslim dominance. It also demanded greater control over 
the wealth produced in south, which possessed most of the country’s 
gold, arable land, and oil resources. Appealing to oppressed minorities 
throughout the country, the SPLA, under the leadership of John Garang, 
found support in all regions for a more equitable Sudan.4 The Soviet 
Union, Cuba, and Ethiopia supported the rebel cause, hoping to weaken 
the Khartoum regime.
 Military pressures exacerbated Sudan’s ongoing economic crisis. In 
1985, the country was devastated by a regional drought and famine that 
led to rising food and fuel prices. The effects of an IMF austerity program 
and a related series of currency devaluations compounded the crisis. The 
government’s paralysis and mounting civil unrest led to Nimeiri’s ouster 
in a military coup in April of that year. A return to civilian rule in 1986 and 
the election of Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Sufi Umma Party, as prime 
minister increased the influence of Islamists in the political arena.5 The 
Mahdi government sought rapprochement with Libya and embarked on a 
new southern strategy. Employing Arab and other ethnic militias to fight 
alongside army regulars, Khartoum waged a scorched earth campaign 
against the southern populations. Khalil Ibrahim, who organized some 
of the militias, would later spearhead the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), an Islamist rebel movement in Darfur, where a different Khar-
toum government would use similar tactics against civilians in 2003.
Foreign Intervention after the Cold War (1991–2017)
Political and military intervention in Sudan after the Cold War assumed 
diverse forms and served a variety of interests. The complexities can best 
be understood if the narrative is broken into four case studies. The first, 
“Al-Qaeda and the United States,” focuses on the period 1991 to 1996, 
with reflections on the period following the 2001 attacks on the United 
States. The second, “The North, the South, and the International Com-
munity,” concentrates on the years 1991 to 2017. The third, “Internal and 
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Regional Roots of the Darfur Conflict,” examines the struggle in Sudan’s 
western region from 2003 to 2006. The fourth, “Darfur and the Interna-
tional Community,” considers the same conflict from 2003 to 2017. 
 Some generalizations can be made about all four case studies. In the 
1990s, foreign intervention in Sudan was limited. Concerns about terror 
and pressure from domestic constituencies framed Western policies. The 
north-south civil war and the establishment of al-Qaeda’s headquarters 
in Sudan led to increased external involvement, but scant attention was 
paid to the growing conflict in Darfur, which was exacerbated by popula-
tion movements driven by climate change and war in neighboring Chad. 
External interest grew after the turn of the millennium, motivated in 
large part by the responsibility to protect. Foreign powers helped broker 
peace agreements that officially ended the war between north and south 
and also the Darfur conflict. However, fundamental weaknesses in both 
agreements, which failed to redistribute power and resources from center 
to periphery, ensured that violence and destabilization would continue. 
Multilateral peacekeeping forces were sent to both regions, but govern-
ment and rebel forces were considerably stronger, and they continued to 
promote disorder to protect their interests. The presence of petroleum 
resources complicated the issue, as oil became both an object of struggle 
and a means of perpetuating the violence.
Case Study 1: Al-Qaeda and the United States (1991–96)
In June 1989, when the prospect of a peace accord with the south threat-
ened the nationwide status of Islamic law, Colonel Omar al-Bashir staged 
a coup that toppled the civilian government. Although Bashir was the 
titular ruler, the power behind the throne was Hassan al-Turabi, a lead-
ing Islamist politician who had helped establish Sudan’s Muslim Brother-
hood, spearheaded the institution of Islamic law throughout the country, 
and advocated the establishment of an Islamic state. Turabi’s influence 
was immediately apparent. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, 
Bashir announced that Sudan would join Egypt and Saudi Arabia in sup-
porting Kuwaiti sovereignty. However, Turabi perceived an opportunity 
to undermine the anti-Islamist Gulf monarchies that had lined up be-
hind Kuwait, and his position ultimately held sway. In the Gulf War that 
ensued, Sudan threw its support to Iraq and opened its doors to militants 
from across the Muslim world. Among them was Osama bin Laden and 
his al-Qaeda organization. With Soviet-Afghan War veterans from North 
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and East Africa, the Middle East, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Chechnya 
as his base, bin Laden established al-Qaeda training camps in Sudan and 
a network of cells and allied organizations in the Greater Horn.
 US relations with Sudan deteriorated rapidly as the war on terror 
paradigm shaped its political and economic response. In August 1993, 
the State Department designated Sudan a “state sponsor of terrorism,” 
resulting in an arms embargo and the suspension of nonhumanitarian 
aid.6 Khartoum turned to Muslim banks, charities, and businesses to fill 
the funding gap. These organizations augmented the influence of fun-
damentalist strains of Islam, which challenged the more tolerant Sufi 
traditions practiced in much of the country. The perceived threat to US 
interests and allies deepened. In 1996, after the attempted assassination of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by Sudan-based militants, Washing-
ton withdrew its diplomatic mission from Sudan and supported a series 
of UN sanctions.
 Terrorism, like communism, provoked disputes within the US State 
Department. During the Cold War, some officials argued that the con-
fusion of radical nationalism with communism, and the consequent iso-
lation of radical regimes, actually pushed some independent actors and 
governments into the communist camp. In the 1990s, another cohort 
contended that Washington’s alliances with corrupt, secular regimes in 
the Middle East, which tended to categorize all Islamists as terrorists, 
stimulated rather than discouraged radicalism. These officials advocated 
negotiation, rather than isolation, as a mechanism for ending Khartoum’s 
support for terrorism. A series of inconsistent US actions followed, their 
nature determined by which factions held sway at the time. When the 
United States vacated its embassy in Sudan in early 1996, for instance, 
departing Ambassador Timothy Carney urged Washington to accept an 
olive branch—Khartoum’s offer to provide information about bin Lad-
en’s finances, contacts, and support for terrorism in Africa.7 Khartoum 
hoped for the lifting of sanctions in return. Hardliners in the Clinton 
administration, however, opposed a quid pro quo and showed no interest 
in Khartoum’s offer. Madeleine Albright, who became secretary of state 
in 1997, and Susan Rice, who served as senior director for African affairs 
in the National Security Council, joined other officials from the State 
Department and CIA in rejecting Khartoum’s advances. Their position, 
that Sudan should expel bin Laden without a concomitant US promise 
to revoke sanctions, prevailed. In May 1996, under pressure from the 
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United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UN Security Council, Sudan ex-
pelled bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. Any hope that bin Laden’s 
ejection would lead to the end of economic restrictions was quashed by 
CIA reports that Sudan continued to support international terrorism—
an assessment that was contested by the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research. Instead, the Clinton administration intensi-
fied Sudan’s isolation, imposing a comprehensive trade embargo in 1997 
and freezing all Sudanese government assets in the United States.
 US relations with Khartoum deteriorated further in 1998. In August, 
al-Qaeda operatives bombed the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Some 224 people were killed and thousands more were injured. Most 
of the victims were Kenyans and Tanzanians. In response, the Clinton 
administration ordered a cruise missile attack on a factory outside Khar-
toum, which, it alleged, manufactured chemical weapons components 
and was linked to Osama bin Laden. Independent investigators found no 
credible evidence to support either charge. Instead, they found that the 
factory made pharmaceuticals and had produced approximately half of 
Sudan’s medications. The factory’s destruction, combined with obstacles 
posed by economic sanctions, may have resulted in thousands of Suda-
nese deaths from otherwise treatable diseases.
 Increasingly isolated at home and abroad, Bashir was desperate for 
allies and foreign investors to develop Sudan’s oil industry and to al-
leviate the country’s $22 billion debt. Toward this end, he sidelined a 
number of Islamist associates in late 1999 and early 2000, including Has-
san al-Turabi, whom Bashir perceived as a threat to his own power. In 
late 2000, Washington and Khartoum began to cooperate on counterter-
rorism matters, and after the al-Qaeda attacks in September 2001, their 
collaboration deepened. During the George W. Bush administration, the 
CIA reopened its station in Khartoum and began to work with Sudanese 
intelligence. At Washington’s request, the Bashir regime arrested foreign 
militants who were transiting through Sudan and delivered them to the 
United States. The rapprochement allowed US Special Operations Forces 
to hunt down presumed Saudi terrorists on Sudanese soil and helped 
Washington locate alleged al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia. Still, Wash-
ington refused to remove Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terror-
ism or to lift sanctions. Khartoum’s ongoing atrocities against civilians in 
southern Sudan, and from 2003 in Darfur, impeded closer political and 
economic ties.
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Case Study 2: The North, the South,  
and the International Community (1991–2017)
If the war on terror shaped US policy during al-Qaeda’s Sudan years, Su-
dan’s brutal civil war and its aftermath framed international actions more 
broadly from 1991 to 2017, when the response to instability/responsibility 
to protect paradigm prevailed. By the 1990s, the ongoing drought and 
war-induced famine threatened the health and well-being of up to 3 mil-
lion Sudanese civilians. Both government and rebel forces used food as 
a weapon, destroying crops, blocking humanitarian relief efforts, and 
stealing food to feed fighters rather than civilians. The UN and other 
international relief agencies became reluctant collaborators: they paid off 
warlords to allow food to reach civilians in need and exchanged hard 
currency at half the commercial rate, knowing that the profits would be 
used to finance the war. Neighboring states also got involved. Threatened 
by Khartoum’s support for radical Muslims and terrorist organizations, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda provided weapons to the 
SPLA. However, the four East African countries, worried about regional 
instability, also initiated peace talks under IGAD auspices. This initiative 
led to the 1994 Declaration of Principles, which identified underlying 
problems that needed to be resolved to ensure a lasting peace. Among 
the central issues were the distribution of the country’s wealth and 
power, the right of the south to self-determination, and the relationship 
between religion and the state. Khartoum signed the declaration in 1997 
following significant military losses to the SPLA, and the principles were 
incorporated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (CPA).
 The civil war had begun with disputes over central versus regional 
power and over religious and cultural domination. However, by the late 
1990s, economic interests had become the dominant driver. After 1999, 
when crude oil was first exported from Sudan, control of the south’s sig-
nificant oil supplies became a primary objective of the war, as well as the 
main means of financing it. In 2001, the Sudanese government generated 
$580 million in oil revenues, 60 percent of which went to the military. 
With the oil proceeds, Khartoum acquired sophisticated weapons that 
it used to expel hundreds of thousands of southern farmers and herders 
from their oil-rich lands.
 The United States found itself in an awkward position. Khartoum 
had become a US ally in the war on terror, and US companies were 
heavily invested in Sudanese oil. Yet from the American perspective, 
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northern Muslims were enslaving and killing southern Christians in a 
devastating war that had cost 2.5 million lives and displaced 85 percent of 
the southern population. Driven by political and economic interests and 
in response to pressure from its conservative Christian base, the George 
W. Bush administration joined IGAD, the UK, Norway, and Italy to push 
for a negotiated settlement.8 All parties justified their intervention as a 
response to instability that was costing civilian lives.
 In 2002, Khartoum and the SPLM/SPLA signed the Machakos Pro-
tocol, which embraced the north-south paradigm and recognized the 
south’s right to self-determination. In January 2005, the CPA ended the 
civil war and provided for democratic elections, power sharing between 
north and south, and equitable distribution between regions of the nation’s 
wealth. The accord stipulated that the south, represented by the SPLM, 
would join the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in a Khartoum-based 
coalition government for six years. It would also have its own autono-
mous government based in the southern city of Juba. A referendum in 
2011 would determine whether the south would remain a part of Sudan 
or secede to form an independent nation-state. However, many in the in-
ternational community hoped that the efforts of the transitional govern-
ment would make continued unity appealing. The agreement would be 
monitored by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), a force of 
some 10,000 military and 715 civilian personnel who were authorized to 
observe and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, help 
establish disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, and 
assist in related nation-building and peace-building tasks.
 The CPA was problematic from the outset. The product of a top-
down process pushed through by foreign governments and institutions, 
it was essentially an agreement between two military organizations that 
excluded everyone but the ruling NCP and the SPLM. Civil society, the 
democratic opposition, and parties to the Darfur conflict were not part 
of the process. Nor were other aggrieved parties, such as those in South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile States, whose identities did not conform to the 
north-south paradigm. The agreement did little to shift power and re-
sources from the center to the marginalized populations in Sudan’s mul-
tiple peripheries. It failed to address local issues, such as disputes over 
land, which were at the root of many tensions. For leaders such as John 
Garang, who had envisioned a democratic, secular, and unitary coun-
try with a more equitable distribution of power and resources, the CPA 
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was an imperfect compromise imposed under duress. Because it catered 
to the interests of the central power elites rather than the marginalized 
populations of the periphery, it risked perpetuating rather than resolving 
regional conflicts and instability.
 The CPA faced major obstacles to implementation. Important pro-
visions were ignored as the UN and the four Western nations pushed 
IGAD to the side. With key issues unresolved, continued conflicts 
were inevitable. Although 80 percent of Sudan’s oil reserves were lo-
cated in the south, most of the country’s economic development and 
heavy infrastructure—including oil refineries, pipelines, and the major 
port—were in the north. The two sides rapidly reached an impasse over 
the determination of the north-south border, with the north demanding 
more oil-rich territory in its domain, and over division of the country’s 
enormous oil revenues. Neither side disarmed, and both strengthened 
their militaries in the disputed areas, particularly in the Abyei region, 
which contained most of Sudan’s oil wealth. In 2008, violence broke out 
and thousands of civilians were again caught in the crossfire. The April 
2010 national elections, stipulated by the CPA, were boycotted by opposi-
tion parties that protested widespread fraud, bribery, and violence in the 
lead-up to the elections. 
 A power shift in the south also weakened the prospects for peace. 
Following the death of John Garang in July 2005, his vision of a more 
equitable but unitary country was replaced by the agenda of Salva Kiir, 
who replaced Garang as the south’s vice president in the coalition gov-
ernment. Kiir was a committed secessionist. During the transitional 
period, he mobilized a vast patronage network funded by oil resources 
to achieve his goal. In January 2011, the population of southern Sudan 
voted to secede. On July 9, 2011, the independent state of South Sudan 
was established before agreements had been reached on boundaries in 
contested regions and on the apportionment of oil wealth. In one stroke, 
Sudan lost three-quarters of its oil production and half of its revenues. 
With the dispute over profit sharing unresolved, South Sudan shut down 
its oil fields from January 2012 to September 2013. The closure had a dev-
astating impact on both countries’ economies.
 Once again, violence flared, not only in contested regions such as 
Abyei, but in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, where 
issues unaddressed by the CPA continued to fester. Diverse populations 
in these areas, many of which had supported the south in the civil war, 
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resisted Khartoum’s continued control of their natural resources and the 
imposition of Islam as the state religion, shari’a as the source of law, and 
Arabic as the official language. In November 2011, former SPLA fight-
ers from these regions regrouped under the banner of SPLM-North and 
joined the major Darfur rebel organizations to form the Sudan Revo-
lutionary Front (SRF), which was supported by South Sudan.9 The SRF 
argued that each region’s concerns were part of a larger national problem 
that could be resolved only through regime change in Khartoum, the 
decentralization of political authority, an equitable distribution of re-
sources, and an inclusive national identity. None of these issues had been 
adequately addressed by the externally brokered CPA.
 Meanwhile, in South Sudan, Salva Kiir’s Juba government was beset 
by corruption and mismanagement as Kiir governed through patronage 
networks rather than strong institutions. Loyalties were cemented by the 
distribution of oil wealth, which constituted 98 percent of government 
revenue, and the regime repressed political dissent. The security system 
expanded rapidly, growing from 40,000 employees in 2005 to more than 
300,000 in 2011. Military, police, and militia commanders mobilized their 
families and ethnic groups to make claims on the central state and to 
target other communities. At the same time, the general population suf-
fered from a severe absence of government services and infrastructure, 
increased food insecurity, and mounting violence. As the oil wealth dis-
appeared and the government deficit grew, the patronage system began 
to collapse. No longer able to buy the loyalty of political rivals, Kiir began 
to oust them from government.
 A power struggle within the ruling SPLM came to a head in July 2013 
when President Salva Kiir fired his longtime political rival, Vice Presi-
dent Riek Machar, who had announced his plan to run for president. Kiir 
also dissolved the cabinet. Tensions between Kiir and Machar dated to 
an earlier struggle during the north-south civil war, when Machar, after 
failing to oust John Garang as head of the SPLM, split from the move-
ment and mobilized his largely Nuer splinter group against the Dinka, an 
ethnic group whose members included both Garang and Kiir. In the Bor 
Massacre of November 1991, Machar’s Nuer militias slaughtered some 
2,000 Dinka civilians, leading to a seven-year conflict during which both 
sides committed atrocities, thousands of Dinka and Nuer civilians were 
killed, and tens of thousands starved to death as a result of war-related 
famine. Political struggles within the SPLM were not halted by the end of 
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the north-south war, nor by the independence of South Sudan. After in-
dependence, continued economic marginalization and climate change–
induced drought also exacerbated longstanding competition for grazing 
land and water.
 In December 2013, a cluster of former cabinet ministers who had been 
fired in July accused President Kiir of abusing his power. The president in 
turn charged Machar, the dismissed vice president, with spearheading a 
coup attempt. The national army, cobbled together from the SPLA and 
undisciplined ethnic militias, broke down. As Dinka soldiers loyal to Kiir 
slaughtered Nuer civilians in the capital, Nuer soldiers defected to Mach-
ar’s side. Machar’s SPLA in Opposition, which also included non-Nuer 
dissidents, led mutinies in the oil-rich Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile 
States, where it took control of the oil fields and retaliated against Dinka 
civilians and others seen as sympathetic to the Juba government. Uganda, 
an ally of the SPLM during the north-south civil war, and JEM rebels from 
Darfur sent soldiers to fight alongside the national army and protect the 
oil fields. Weapons from China, Russia, and Israel also strengthened the 
government side. Meanwhile, Khartoum supplied weapons to the rebels 
who challenged the Juba government. The United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS), authorized the day before South Sudan’s inde-
pendence to safeguard regional peace and security, failed to protect the 
civilian population from either government or rebel forces.
 Although the dispute between Kiir and Machar was primarily per-
sonal and political—aimed at consolidating wealth and position—both 
men mobilized ethnic communities to achieve these ends. The impact 
was devastating. Between December 2013 and December 2017, more than 
50,000 civilians were killed, 2.4 million were displaced internally, and 2 
million more fled to neighboring countries. By 2017, food insecurity was 
widespread and 5.5 million people were threatened by famine. UN inves-
tigators found that all parties to the conflict had engaged in mass killings 
and rape and had deliberately targeted civilians, and more than 16,000 
children had been conscripted to fight.
 Once again, IGAD intervened, motivated primarily by the threat to 
regional stability. In May 2014, Kiir and Machar signed an IGAD-mediated 
peace accord that called for a ceasefire, the formation of a transitional 
government, and the drafting of a new constitution followed by elections. 
Like the CPA of 2005, the 2014 agreement was based on unrealistic hopes 
rather than the reality on the ground. The only commonality between 
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Kiir and Machar was mutual distrust and a determination to retain the 
power that enabled them to control the country’s resources. The vio-
lence continued as both sides fought to take charge of important towns 
and oil installations in order to shore up their bargaining positions. 
Like the CPA, the 2014 agreement was also the result of a top-down 
process that ignored key players. Independent ethnic militias and other 
armed groups, including those fighting on both sides of the Sudan–South 
Sudan border, were excluded from the IGAD process and continued to 
wreak havoc.
 Not only was the 2014 agreement deficient, but IGAD had no means 
to enforce it or to hold warring parties accountable for their atrocities. 
The organization’s efforts were weakened by internal divisions, including 
longstanding tensions between Uganda and Sudan, and by competition 
between Uganda and Ethiopia for dominance on matters relating to re-
gional security. IGAD’s members were also interested parties to the con-
flict. Uganda had provided military support to the Kiir regime. Sudan 
had supported Kiir by keeping the oil pipelines open, while simultane-
ously supplying Machar’s rebel insurgency. Finally, Uganda and Kenya 
possessed substantial economic interests in South Sudan.
 While IGAD’s response was inadequate, other multinational bodies 
either resisted involvement or acted with little effect. The AU ignored the 
regional rivalries that undermined IGAD’s efforts, and the UN Security 
Council refused to impose an arms embargo or economic sanctions that 
would prevent the country’s oil wealth from financing the war. The Inter-
national Conference on the Great Lakes Region weighed in to support the 
IGAD endeavor, but critics contested the neutrality of both organizations, 
noting the questionable involvement of member states Uganda and Sudan.
 The expanded IGAD-Plus mediated another peace agreement in Au-
gust 2015.10 President Kiir reluctantly signed the new deal under intense 
pressure from IGAD, the UN, and the United States, which weighed in 
as South Sudan’s largest foreign donor. Both Kiir and Machar repeatedly 
undermined the agreement and stalled on its implementation, while Kiir 
also proved adept at exploiting his benefactors’ rivalries. Shifting alli-
ances and the splintering of rebel groups not included in the accord fur-
ther diminished its prospects for success.
 Despite the distance that divided them, the government and rebel 
forces were united in their desire to preclude political dissidents and civil 
society representatives from the negotiation framework. Civil society 
116  |  Sudan and South Sudan
organizations led by women, youth, religious practitioners, and other 
community members criticized the August 2015 agreement as yet an-
other accord that focused on power sharing at the top rather than on 
the grievances at the root of the conflict. They charged that the latest 
peace pact did nothing to promote justice for the conflicts’ victims or 
accountability for the perpetrators of violence. It simply turned back the 
clock to the precarious status quo of December 2013 when the conflict 
erupted. Critics argued that a lasting peace could only be achieved in a 
more inclusive South Sudan that empowered civil society groups whose 
rights and interests were recognized in a new constitution.
Case Study 3: Internal and Regional Roots of the Darfur Conflict (2003–6)
If foreign engagement in Sudan and South Sudan was justified as a re-
sponse to instability and the desire to protect civilian lives, external re-
action to strife in Darfur was rooted in similar concerns. This case study 
explores the internal and regional sources of the conflict. It also consid-
ers the impact of intervention by Sudan’s neighbors—Libya, Chad, and 
Eritrea—which supported various rebel factions in order to promote 
their own interests.
 Typically characterized as a struggle between Arabs and Africans, the 
Darfur conflict, like those in northern and southern Sudan, emerged from 
unequal power relations that pitted a dominant center against multiple 
peripheries. In Darfur, as elsewhere in Sudan, the term “Arab,” commonly 
associated with the political and economic elites at the nation’s center, ob-
scures the enormous diversity of populations marked by historical, regional, 
socioeconomic, and ethnic differences. The Arab-African paradigm, like 
the north-south paradigm, smooths over shifting identities and alliances 
and ignores important political and economic factors.
 The onset of the Darfur conflict in 2003 coincided with the denoue-
ment of the north-south civil war. Khartoum had been under enormous 
pressure from the UN, the United States, and other external powers to 
end the war with the south. Never enthusiastic about the elements of the 
2005 peace accord, Bashir nonetheless believed that if he bent to inter-
national demands, the UN and Washington would normalize relations, 
facilitate IMF and World Bank loans, encourage investments, and put 
an end to Sudan’s international isolation. These hopes were dashed by 
the conflict in Darfur. Located in western Sudan on the fringes of the 
Sahara Desert, Darfur had been the seat of the Fur sultanate (1596–1916), 
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a powerful state that embraced Islam as the official religion and Arabic as 
the language of faith and government. For hundreds of years, camel cara-
vans passed through the region en route to and from the Atlantic coast, 
thousands of miles away. Darfur became a rich melting pot domi-
nated by a Fur-speaking elite and inhabited by scores of ethnic groups 
and clans who converted to Islam, conducted business with one another, 
and intermarried. Ethnic identities were fluid, and categorizations were 
largely based on livelihood and self-identification.
 Following the sultan’s defeat by British forces in 1916, Darfur was 
absorbed into Sudan under the authority of the Anglo-Egyptian Condo-
minium. As was frequently the case elsewhere, ethnic identities became 
more rigid under colonialism and new hierarchies were established. 
Under Anglo-Egyptian rule, the diverse populations of Darfur were gen-
erally categorized as either Arab or African—classifications that most 
Darfuris reject today, but that continue to dominate political and media 
analyses. The ancestors of contemporary Darfuri Arabs hailed from such 
disparate places as West Africa and southern Sudan and intermarried 
with local lineages. Although sub-Saharan in origin, they speak Arabic 
as their mother tongue. Historically, Darfuri Arabs have tended to be no-
madic herders. They include the Baggara, cattle herders who live primar-
ily in the southern savanna and who have access to land, and the Abbala, 
landless camel herders who largely inhabit the Sahel and who are among 
Darfur’s poorest, most marginalized people. Populations characterized 
as African, such as the Fur and the Masalit, have generally engaged in 
sedentary agriculture, while some, like the Zaghawa, have combined 
farming and semi-nomadic herding.
 Competition for land and water was at the root of the conflict that 
began in 2003. Neither the competition nor the violence was new. How-
ever, the extent of the killing and the pivotal involvement of the central 
government were unique. For thousands of years, periodic droughts have 
ravaged Sudan and other countries in the Greater Horn. The devastating 
effects of cyclical droughts have been exacerbated in recent decades by 
desertification associated with climate change. In the past, camel-herding 
nomads from the drier northern reaches of Darfur brought their herds to 
the wetter southern region during the dry season, returning to the north 
when the rains began. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, horrific 
droughts and famines afflicted large sections of northern and eastern Af-
rica. Water holes and seasonal rivers dried up. The encroaching desert, 
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as well as land degradation resulting from the government’s intensive ag-
ricultural policies, left many Darfuri Arabs impoverished. They began 
to establish permanent villages in the south, where farmers controlled 
much of the land. To protect their crops and pastures—and to reassert 
their claim to the land—farmers built a network of fences, closing mi-
gration routes and grazing lands to nomadic herders. The drought also 
pushed Zaghawa farmer-herders southward from the Chad-Sudan fron-
tier onto land long occupied by Baggara cattle herders. Abbala Arabs who 
lost their camels sought work as farm laborers. When those jobs dried 
up, desperate former nomads joined militias and gangs that engaged in 
banditry. Peoples who previously had traded now fought one another for 
the resources necessary to survive. Local communities formed vigilante 
groups to protect themselves and to raid their foes.
 The environmental crisis in Darfur coincided with the introduction 
of new ideas that stoked hostilities between Arabs and Africans. During 
the 1970s, Libya had emerged as the center of Arab nationalism in the 
Sahel, and Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi embarked on a cam-
paign to build a transnational Arab Islamic state. In Darfur, he helped 
establish the Arab Gathering, an organization of militants closely associ-
ated with Qaddafi’s paramilitary Islamic Pan-African Legion, which pro-
moted an ideology of Arab supremacy that defined “Arab” broadly but 
made sharp distinctions between “Arab” and “African” Muslims. While 
the notion of Muslim Arab superiority vis-à-vis Christians/practitioners 
of indigenous religions/Africans had long been present in the conflicts 
between north and south, the new ideology in Darfur was not linked to 
Arab elites in Khartoum, but rather to Qaddafi’s Libya across the Sahara.
 The combined impact of the environmental crisis and the potent 
new racist ideology was compounded by the effects of a decades-long 
civil war in Chad (1966–87) that had involved several external powers. 
Military intervention in Chad by Libya, France, and the United States, 
and the consequent profusion of modern weaponry, had destabilized the 
entire region. As the war intensified, hundreds of thousands of Chadian 
refugees poured into Darfur, putting new pressures on land and water 
supplies. Semi-automatic weapons also filtered into Darfur, where they 
increasingly were used to commit acts of banditry and to settle local dis-
putes. Along with the refugees came Chadian rebels who displaced Fur 
villagers and set up armed camps. The Fur, in turn, sought weapons and 
support from the Chadian government. They built fences, obstructed 
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livestock routes, and burned pastures, threatening the Arab population’s 
livelihood. Growing enclaves of Chadian Arabs swung the regional de-
mographic balance in favor of the Arabs. With their survival at stake, 
they sought common cause with Darfuri Arabs, promoting the notion of 
a common Arab identity and the need to defend their interests against 
those of non-Arabs.
 These tensions escalated into the Arab-Fur War of 1987–89, which 
destroyed hundreds of villages and killed thousands of people. The war 
was, at root, a conflict between those with land and those without. Fur 
farmers and Baggara Arab cattle herders possessed officially recognized 
homelands (dar), established during British rule, while Abbala camel 
herders and Chadian refugees did not. Following the 1989 military coup, 
which increased Islamist influence in Khartoum, the Abbala appealed to 
central government officials as fellow Arabs, offering political support 
in exchange for a homeland. When Khartoum granted land to Abbala 
nomads in Fur areas, it took sides in a deadly local conflict.
 By February 2003, the strife in Darfur had been transformed into a 
rebellion against the central government. Initially, the rebellion was led 
by two distinct movements. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) emerged 
from Fur self-defense militias that had fought Libya’s Islamic Pan-African 
Legion and Darfur Arab militias during the Arab-Fur War. Some of the 
organization’s top leaders, however, were Zaghawa. The SLA manifesto 
focused on the region’s political and economic marginalization, de-
manded the decentralization of power and a secular government, and in-
sisted that Darfur and its concerns be included in the north-south peace 
negotiations then under way. The ideas presented in the SLA manifesto 
resonated with those of southern Sudan’s SPLA, which provided the 
Darfur movement with weapons and military training.
 The Justice and Equality Movement, in contrast, was Islamist in ori-
entation. Its origins lay in Bashir’s purge of Islamists from the central 
government in 1999 and 2000. After sidelining Hassan al-Turabi, Bashir 
had expelled Turabi’s most vociferous supporters from the ruling party—
including many Zaghawas from Darfur. In the wake of the ousters, Dar-
furi Islamists living in Khartoum produced a document that criticized 
the ruling elites who privileged the center and neglected the regions in 
the periphery. JEM emerged from this group. Controlled by members 
of the Kobe Zaghawa subgroup, who lived in Chad in greater number 
than in Darfur, JEM was led by Khalil Ibrahim, who previously had held 
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high-level positions in Sudan’s regional and central governments. As 
minister of health in North Darfur in 1993–94, Ibrahim had organized 
ethnic militias that were used against civilians in southern Sudan, burn-
ing villages, killing civilians, and enslaving children. Like Qaddafi, Ibra-
him had expansionist aspirations. He hoped to unite Chad, Egypt, Libya, 
and Sudan in a single Islamic state, and he was prepared to mobilize the 
Muslim Africans of Darfur to realize his goal. Already under immense 
international pressure to make concessions to the south and to end the 
civil war, President Bashir perceived JEM and its expansionist agenda as 
a political threat.
 Although JEM and the SLA promoted opposing sides in the north-
south civil war, in Darfur they were united in their opposition to the 
Khartoum regime. The Darfur rebels also benefited from external sup-
port. The military dictatorship in Chad, threatened by a Sudan-backed 
insurgency, funneled weapons to JEM and the SLA in the hope of rally-
ing Zaghawas on both sides of the border. Aspiring to a greater regional 
profile, Eritrea also armed both rebel movements.
 Khartoum raised local militias to counter the rebels, initially arm-
ing Arab, Fur, and Tunjur men. However, after Fur and Tunjur recruits 
defected to the SLA with their weapons, the regime armed only Arabs, 
promising schools, clinics, water pumps, and animal vaccines in return 
Photo 5.2. JEM rebels in Darfur, Sudan, 2007. Photo by Kalou Kaka.
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for their services. Most Arab militiamen were enlisted from among the 
landless Abbala camel herders, rather than from the Baggara cattle herd-
ers who had been given homelands under the old colonial dispensation. 
The militias included unemployed young men, demobilized Sudanese 
soldiers, followers of the racist Arab Gathering, bandits, and some 20,000 
displaced Chadians. Their victims referred to the militiamen as Jan-
jaweed or “devils on horseback”—an insulting Arabic term for bandits 
who roam the desert robbing Arabs and non-Arabs, herders and farmers 
alike.11 Although Khartoum recruited and unleashed the militias, it did 
not control them. Paid only a nominal amount by the government, the 
Janjaweed were expected to live off the land; in effect, they were given 
license to loot livestock and provisions in order to survive. Laying waste 
to vast areas, the Janjaweed terrorized the civilian population, raping, 
killing, plundering, and burning.
 If the Janjaweed became the face of destruction in Darfur, they 
were not solely responsible for the devastation. The World Health Or-
ganization found that during 2003 and 2004, thousands of Darfuri ci-
vilians were killed by the Sudanese army and rebel fighters, as well by 
the Arab militias. By September 2004, some 1.8 million people had been 
driven from their homes and were dying at the rate of 10,000 per month 
from war-related hunger, malnutrition, and disease. By 2006, when the 
death toll reached 200,000, disease, rather than violence, was deemed the 
major cause.
Case Study 4: Darfur and the International Community (2003–17)
The atrocities committed in Darfur in 2003–4 generated widespread sup-
port for an international response, motivated by the threat to regional 
stability and the destruction of human life. In the West, proponents of 
military intervention, in both governmental and nongovernmental sec-
tors, declared that the killings in Darfur constituted genocide and thus 
warranted immediate international action. Opponents of military inter-
vention disputed that characterization and warned of unforeseen con-
sequences, pointing to the negative fallout that had followed military 
intervention in other parts of the continent.
 The United States was among the countries that hesitated. Torn 
by internal disagreements and wary of its predecessors’ mistakes, the 
George W. Bush administration dithered. The October 1993 fiasco in So-
malia, where eighteen US soldiers were killed, had had serious domestic 
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repercussions. When the mass slaughter of civilians began in Rwanda 
just six months later, the Clinton administration had refused to describe 
the situation as a genocide and pushed the UN Security Council to follow 
suit. Other nations had also failed to act, and the international commu-
nity had stood by as an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed. Some 
Bush administration insiders warned of a similar catastrophe in Darfur 
and argued that, under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 
international community had both a moral obligation and a legal right to 
intervene. Opponents of intervention offered a range of objections. Some 
cautioned against involvement in a complex situation with deep domes-
tic and regional roots and no easy solutions. Others noted that US armed 
forces were already overextended in Afghanistan and Iraq and that in-
tervention in Darfur might jeopardize Sudan’s north-south negotiations 
that were critical to a broader regional peace. Still others observed that 
Khartoum was cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism 
measures and had become an important, if controversial, regional ally. 
Finally, there was the question of Sudanese oil. As war and instability 
consumed the Middle East, Washington was averse to alienating a coun-
try that was a major alternative source of petroleum. In the final analysis, 
the dominant voices in the George W. Bush administration were pre-
pared to use strong words but unwilling to engage in strong actions.
 Beyond the Bush administration, a growing US constituency called 
for a concerted response. In 2004, an election year for Congress and the 
presidency, both branches of government were under pressure. In Con-
gress, an eclectic group of evangelical Christians, liberals, and members 
of the Congressional Black Caucus—all of whom supported the south in 
Sudan’s north-south war—pressed the Bush administration to act against 
the Bashir regime. Outside the government, the Save Darfur Coalition, 
a broad-based grassroots network modeled on the antiapartheid move-
ment of the 1980s, pushed the administration to label the Darfur crisis 
a genocide and to support international intervention to stop it. When 
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry addressed the NAACP 
national convention in July 2004, he referred to the situation in Darfur 
as a genocide.12 One week later, a resolution decrying genocide in Darfur 
unanimously passed both houses of Congress.
 By September, the Bush administration felt compelled to respond. In 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell referred to the Darfur killings as a genocide, and the 
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Bush administration urged the UN Security Council to establish a com-
mission of inquiry. While the commission’s report, released in January 
2005, found that Khartoum was not pursuing a “genocidal policy”—the 
intentional extermination of an entire group of people—it stated that the 
crimes carried out in Darfur “may be no less serious and heinous than 
genocide.”13 The commission found evidence that the Sudanese govern-
ment and allied militias had perpetrated war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and that rebel forces had also engaged in war crimes. The Se-
curity Council subsequently referred the Darfur case to the International 
Criminal Court in The Hague, recommending criminal investigation 
and possible prosecution.
 Although the Darfur solidarity movement, strengthened by the sup-
port of high-profile celebrities, continued to argue that the atrocities in 
Darfur constituted genocide, the situation on the ground had changed. 
Whereas the vast majority of war-related deaths in 2003–4 were the re-
sult of Sudanese army, air force, and Janjaweed attacks on civilians, a 
few years later diarrhea and malaria were the largest killers, and most 
violent deaths stemmed from fighting between rebel groups, contests be-
tween Arab militias for pasture land, and banditry. Moreover, the eclectic 
rebel movement had fractured. By 2005, the SLA and JEM had splintered 
into more than twenty factions, each largely identified with a particular 
ethnic group, clan, or village. All sides attacked humanitarian aid work-
ers and AU peacekeepers and engaged in banditry. Two years into the 
conflict, Darfur increasingly resembled Somalia during the same period, 
with warlords vying for territorial dominance and bandit gangs raping, 
robbing, and killing civilians. In both cases, instability had opened the 
door to outside involvement. In Darfur, neighboring Chad, Eritrea, and 
Libya supported various factions to promote their own political agendas. 
Many advocates for foreign intervention refused to address these com-
plexities, fearing that they would weaken the case for concerted interna-
tional action.
 Meanwhile, Sudan’s north-south negotiations had reached a critical 
stage. The UN, the AU, and the United States pushed for an end to the 
Darfur conflict, which they feared would undermine a north-south peace 
accord, which had even greater regional implications. International me-
diators resisted dealing with Sudan’s problems holistically, refusing to ad-
dress underlying political and economic grievances in northern regions 
in the same peace agreement. The simplistic north-south bifurcation 
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virtually ensured the continuation of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordo-
fan, Blue Nile, and other northern areas.
 Under strong external pressure, Khartoum and the Darfur rebel or-
ganizations signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement in April 2004 that 
would allow relief workers and supplies into the conflict area. The AU 
agreed to send observers to monitor the ceasefire and soldiers to protect 
them. The resultant African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), launched 
in July 2004, would eventually number 7,200 people. Staffed by troops 
from African countries and financed by the United States and the EU, 
the AU force was mandated to protect unarmed military observers and 
civilian police who were monitoring the ceasefire, but it had no authority 
to enforce the ceasefire or to protect civilians. The ceasefire broke down 
almost immediately. Western countries, which had pledged to fund the 
operation, failed to fulfill their promises, leaving AMIS soldiers stranded 
in war zones without pay or equipment. Understaffed, underequipped, 
and underfunded, the peacekeeping force was ineffective and was deeply 
resented by the civilians it failed to protect.
 As the AU force foundered, the UN was urged to intervene. Under 
pressure from diverse constituencies, the international body made an 
unprecedented move. In September 2005, the General Assembly adopted 
the R2P resolution that held states responsible for protecting their citizens 
from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity” and granted the international community the right to intervene 
militarily if states failed to meet their “responsibility to protect.”14 The 
AU was among those entities that urged the UN to take forceful action 
in Darfur. In January 2006, frustrated by its limited mandate and bro-
ken promises for external assistance, the AU asked the UN to assume 
responsibility for the peacekeeping mission. The United States and the 
EU, which had failed to fulfill their pledges, criticized AMIS’s poor per-
formance and joined the call for the UN to exert control. In February, 
the Security Council unanimously approved an US motion to deploy UN 
peacekeepers to Darfur to “protect civilians and enforce the cease-fire.”15 
Characterizing UN intervention as an attempt by the West to recolonize 
the country, the government of Sudan vowed that UN forces would be 
perceived as enemy invaders and treated accordingly. The Sudanese gov-
ernment’s opposition brought the situation to a stalemate. Without the 
government’s consent or a “peace to keep,” the UN was unwilling to de-
ploy troops, despite the passage of the R2P resolution.
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 In May 2006, sixteen months after the adoption of the north-south 
peace accord, Khartoum and several Darfur rebel organizations signed 
the AU-mediated Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Written largely by out-
siders, the pact was dysfunctional from the outset. Darfuri Arabs were 
not represented at the talks, on the premise that they were simply doing 
the government’s bidding. Fearing that their interests would be subordi-
nated to those of Khartoum, Darfuri Arab groups repudiated the accord. 
The largest rebel groups, including JEM and Abdel Wahid al-Nur’s SLA 
faction (SLA-AW), refused to sign the document because it failed to meet 
their basic demands—which included, first and foremost, autonomy for 
Darfur. Darfuri civil society organizations, which had been excluded from 
the negotiations, also rejected it. The United States publicly backed Minni 
Minawi’s SLA splinter group (SLA-MM) and was instrumental in obtain-
ing his signature.16 However, by the time the DPA was signed, Minawi had 
lost most of his popular support, which had never extended beyond a few 
Zaghawa clans. Bolstered by his new authority as the only rebel signatory 
to the accord, Minawi eliminated rivals who contested the agreement and 
collectively punished civilians in the territories under his control. Notori-
ous for looting, raping, and killing Arabs and Africans alike, the Minawi 
faction was referred to locally as “Janjaweed 2.”17 AU forces further under-
mined their own legitimacy by colluding with Minawi, providing techni-
cal and logistical assistance to his faction because it had signed the DPA. 
Having positioned themselves on one side of an ongoing war, AU troops, 
like government soldiers, became targets of rebel attacks.
 It was on the basis of the DPA—a peace agreement in name only—
that Washington justified its push for a UN peacekeeping force in Dar-
fur. In August 2006, claiming that there was now a peace to keep, the 
Security Council risked Bashir’s wrath and expanded UNMIS’s mandate 
to include Darfur. Operating under a Chapter VII mandate, the strength-
ened UN mission was slated to include some 17,300 soldiers, 3,300 ci-
vilian police personnel, and 16 Formed Police Units. The UN operation 
would replace or subsume the 7,200-person AU force by the end of the 
year. Fearing a ploy by Western powers to effect regime change, Bashir 
rejected the UN mission as a violation of Sudanese sovereignty.
 External powers continued to apply pressure. In 2006, the Bush ad-
ministration imposed sanctions that prevented the Sudanese government 
and rebel forces from owning property in the United States and banned 
US citizens from doing business with Sudan’s oil industry. The next year 
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Washington imposed financial restrictions on two senior government 
officials and on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, who had refused to sign the 
DPA. However, the Bush administration rejected the imposition of an oil 
embargo, which would have threatened Sudan’s main source of income 
but also hurt the United States and its allies. China, a major oil investor, 
weapons supplier, and ally of the Khartoum government, departed from 
its usual practice of noninterference in host country affairs to encourage 
the president to accept the international peacekeeping force.
 Pressed by friends and foes alike, Bashir reluctantly agreed to a 
hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission, provided that the majority of 
soldiers were African. Khartoum’s acquiescence opened the door to 
the establishment of the African Union–United Nations Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) in July 2007, which would deploy up to 25,987 
peacekeepers—including 19,555 military personnel—in what would 
become the world’s largest peacekeeping force to date. Unlike the AU 
peacekeepers, the hybrid group was authorized to use force to protect 
civilians, humanitarian relief workers, and UN personnel, facilities, and 
equipment, as well as to monitor and enforce the DPA. In reality, there 
was still no peace to keep. Only a minority of the warring parties had 
signed the peace agreement, and even they were not prepared to accept 
the unilateral imposition of a ceasefire by an external power. Bashir con-
sidered the AU-UN operation to be a lightly camouflaged US operation 
designed to oust him from power. Al-Qaeda denounced the enterprise 
as another United States intervention in Muslim lands, and Osama bin 
Laden called for jihad against UN “crusader invaders” in Darfur.18
 Meanwhile, the Darfur lobby continued to exert pressure. A growing 
number of celebrities added their voices to the chorus of those urging out-
side military intervention—frustrating humanitarian relief workers who 
argued that an external military presence would inflame passions, turn 
NGO workers into targets, and obstruct their ability to deliver relief to 
those in need. Although the solidarity movement focused world attention 
on crimes committed in a remote region without oil or strategic interest, 
many members also reduced the conflict to a clear-cut struggle between 
good and evil and refused to recognize Arab grievances or rebel atrocities. 
The movement’s promotion of a military fix for complex political and eco-
nomic problems distracted attention from sustainable long-term solutions.
 The controversy over foreign intervention escalated in March 2009, 
when the ICC ordered President Bashir’s arrest on charges of perpetrating 
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war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.19 The backlash in Sudan 
was immediate. Bashir responded to the initial indictment by shutting 
down thirteen Western humanitarian aid organizations, accusing them of 
collaborating with the ICC. JEM, which had signed a preliminary peace 
accord with Khartoum the preceding month, announced that it would ne-
gotiate no further with an alleged war criminal. While many in the West 
applauded the ICC action as past due, critics, including the AU, the Arab 
League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, argued that the arrest warrant could provoke further violence, 
jeopardize peace negotiations, and seriously undermine humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations. Other critics worried about the implications for 
African sovereignty, noting that since its establishment in 2002, the ICC 
had indicted and prosecuted only African political and military figures.
 As international actors debated the proper approach to Sudan, con-
troversy also erupted within the US foreign policy establishment. The 
Barack Obama administration, which took office in January 2009, was 
deeply divided over Sudan and had failed to establish a consensus about 
the nature of the violence in Darfur. The new UN ambassador, Susan 
Rice, referred to the killings in Darfur as ongoing genocide, while re-
tired Air Force Major General J. Scott Gration, the president’s special 
envoy to Sudan, characterized the situation as the “remnants of geno-
cide” and argued that Sudan should be removed from the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.20 In October, the Obama administration shifted 
its policy focus from the responsibility to protect to regional stability and 
the war on terror, announcing that henceforth it would emphasize dia-
logue with Khartoum rather than isolation. The new policy was premised 
on the belief that if the CPA failed, a major regional crisis could ensue 
and Sudan could again become a haven for international terrorists. As 
a result, Washington prioritized the implementation of the north-south 
peace agreement rather than seeking a holistic resolution to the Sudan 
crisis that would include Darfur and other marginalized regions. Presi-
dent Obama hinted that there would be incentives for progress on the 
implementation of the CPA, for headway toward peace in Darfur, and 
for cooperation in fighting international terrorism. Alternatively, there 
would be “tough sanctions” and increased pressure if Khartoum fell 
short. However, he did not remove Sudan from the State Department’s 
list of state sponsors of terrorism, and he referred to “gross human rights 
abuses and genocide in Darfur” as ongoing practices.21
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 While the Obama administration struggled over its Sudan policy, 
the peace process in Darfur foundered. The ill-conceived DPA had had 
little positive effect. In June 2008, the AU and the UN had convened a 
new round of negotiations in Doha, Qatar, under UNAMID auspices. 
As the negotiations dragged on, UNAMID pressed a number of frag-
mented rebel groups to form a single organization, which resulted in the 
establishment of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) in Febru-
ary 2010. From that time on, only rebel movements belonging to the LJM 
or JEM were permitted to participate in the Doha discussions. Although 
the LJM included several SLA factions as well as other rebel groups, it 
had failed to attract Abdel Wahid al-Nur’s SLA-AW, which had refused to 
participate in any negotiations after its rejection of the DPA. The absence 
of the SLA-AW meant that the interests of the Fur—Darfur’s largest 
ethnic group, which had also suffered the greatest population displace-
ment—were not represented at Doha by a strong rebel movement.22
 The new round of negotiations culminated in the Doha Document 
for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), signed by Khartoum and the LJM on July 
14, 2011—five days after South Sudan’s independence. The DDPD, like its 
predecessor, was highly problematic. It had failed to gain the support of 
the most significant rebel movements. JEM, the strongest rebel organi-
zation in terms of military capacity, refused to endorse the accord. Al-
though many Western power brokers favored the LJM for its non-Islamist 
orientation, it was by far the weakest of the rebel movements. Moreover, 
even as the DDPD was signed, the eclectic coalition had begun to dis-
integrate, with some Zaghawa and Masalit groups severing ties. Like its 
predecessor, the 2011 agreement was weakened by the lack of input from 
civil society organizations. Treating the LJM as a stand-in for Darfuri 
civilians, the mediators had refused to grant civil society groups nego-
tiating status. Although civil society members were invited to partici-
pate in the final round of discussions, they constituted only 250 of the 
600 participants, and internally displaced Fur and Abbala Arabs—two 
groups whose support was critical to an enduring peace—were not rep-
resented at all. Civil society delegates did not review or endorse the final 
document. Yet UNAMID mediators expected them to embrace the ac-
cord and to mobilize their constituents to do likewise. Although many 
Darfuris considered the DDPD to be no more than a draft agreement, 
UNAMID and Khartoum viewed it as a conclusive pact and threatened 
sanctions against parties that failed to implement it.
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 The defective agreement did not bring peace, and in some instances 
its terms exacerbated existing problems. For instance, the Doha Docu-
ment opened the door to Darfur’s reconfiguration as a series of ethnically 
divided states, which could contain the seeds of future conflict.23 Some 
LJM leaders were appointed to official positions, a Special Court for Dar-
fur was established to prosecute gross violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, and a general amnesty (excluding war 
crimes) was promulgated. However, neither the government of Sudan 
nor foreign governments and institutions provided the resources nec-
essary to fund these complex undertakings. LJM soldiers, who had not 
been integrated into the national army as promised, were restless. Arab 
militias, initially armed by Khartoum to fight the rebels, were no longer 
under government control, and fighting between militias continued to 
displace large numbers of civilians. Meanwhile, in November 2011, Dar-
fur’s main rebel organizations—JEM, SLA-AW, and SLA-MM—joined 
the Sudan Revolutionary Front, uniting with insurgents in other parts of 
Sudan to promote a national agenda.
 UN mediators continued to treat Sudan’s regional conflicts in isola-
tion, even as the internal opposition rallied to the view that the country’s 
problems could be resolved only with an end to the center’s dominance 
and a more equitable distribution of power and resources. Determined 
to safeguard the 2005 agreement between north and south, UNAMID 
had pushed to finalize the DDPD before South Sudan’s independence in 
July 2011, despite its failings. Although the mission was a joint AU-UN 
endeavor, the UN had dominated the process, sidelining other AU initia-
tives that judged the crises in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile to 
be part of a larger problem that required a democratic transition and the 
reallocation of resources throughout Sudan. In 2017, the Darfur crisis, 
which had cost some 300,000 lives and displaced more than 2 million 
people, was far from resolved. The externally mediated peace accord had 
failed to incorporate key constituencies and to address underlying prob-
lems. The violence and insecurity continued.
Conclusion
Foreign political and military intervention in Sudan after the Cold War, 
characterized by conflicting interests and inadequate solutions, met 
few of its stated objectives. The expulsion of Osama bin Laden and his 
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al-Qaeda network in 1996 did not thwart the spread of terror; nor did 
it end Sudan’s isolation in the international community. The externally 
imposed peace agreements that were intended to terminate the north-
south civil war in 2005 and the Darfur conflict in 2011 left many issues 
unresolved. As a result, in 2017, Sudan was still beset by violence in the 
western region of Darfur, in the southern states of South Kordofan and 
Blue Nile, and in the contested region of Abyei on the Sudan–South 
Sudan border. Hostility toward the central government in Khartoum 
and a determination to bring about a more equitable distribution of the 
country’s power and resources united diverse rebel movements against 
a common enemy, but with devastating consequences for the civilian 
population. Meanwhile, in the new nation-state of South Sudan, civilians 
were caught in the crossfire as rival leaders mobilized ethnically based 
constituencies to strengthen their hold on power and resources. Foreign 
countries and international bodies intervened in Sudan in response to 
instability, to protect civilian lives, and to counter a terrorist threat. How-
ever, they failed to address serious underlying grievances; they sidelined 
representatives of Sudanese civil society; and they did not sustain their 
political initiatives until viable peace agreements were achieved. Chapter 
6 examines a contrasting case, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where the 
international community refused to intervene to protect civilian lives. 
In that case, the failure to respond produced a multinational crisis that 
exacerbated regional instability.
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mies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); 
and Gregory A. Pirio, African Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of 
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genocide and the Failure to respond (1991–94)
in the early 1990s, as the Somali state collapsed and Sudan was torn 
by civil war, Rwanda moved from ethnic and political violence to genocide. 
During three and a half months in 1994, some 800,000 Rwandans were 
slaughtered. The victims included Hutu and Tutsi opponents of the Rwan-
dan regime and three-quarters of the Tutsi minority population. Tens of 
thousands of women were raped, and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans 
fled into exile. Major players in the international community stood by—
ignoring the threat to regional stability and failing to protect civilian lives. 
France, the United States, and the United Kingdom took the lead in oppos-
ing United Nations action to stop the violence, and France supported the 
extremist regime that perpetrated the carnage. The UN’s belated response 
proved to be too little, too late. After a Tutsi rebel force backed by neigh-
boring Uganda halted the genocide and ousted the government, more than 
a million Rwandans poured into neighboring Zaire, and another million 
refugees fled to Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania.1 Although the vast major-
ity of refugees were Hutu civilians who were not implicated in the killings, 
genocide perpetrators also sought refuge in neighboring countries and 
prepared for a return to power. The failure of the international community 
to stop the genocide, the violent retribution against Hutu civilians, and the 
extremist aggression from adjacent states contributed to the destabiliza-
tion of the Great Lakes region in the ensuing decades. The failure to act 
had especially devastating consequences for Zaire, the subject of chapter 7.
 This chapter investigates the intervention of foreign entities and pow-
ers in the Rwandan genocide, as well as their failure to intervene. France, 
which continued to play a central role in postcolonial francophone Af-
rica, supported the regime that directed the genocide.2 Neighboring 
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Uganda backed the rebel movement that overthrew that regime. In the 
UN, powerful members of the Security Council terminated a peacekeep-
ing operation that might have saved lives, and they approved an inter-
vention force led by France—a party to the conflict—only after most of 
the killing was done. External actors that favored intervention generally 
emphasized the need for regional security, although some claimed that 
it was the obligation of the international community to protect civilians 
whose government was complicit in destroying them. The responsibility to 
protect paradigm emerged after the Rwandan genocide, stimulated in part 
by the international community’s failure to stop the killings and the regret 
expressed by world leaders for their inaction. In the decades that followed, 
the new regime in Kigali became a strong US ally in a critical but unstable 
region. Having gained widespread international sympathy for halting the 
genocide, it was permitted to act with impunity in neighboring countries, 
especially Zaire, where it sowed the seeds of further conflict.
Setting the Stage:  
The Precolonial to Postcolonial Context (1860–1989)
The 1994 Rwandan genocide was preceded by centuries of political, eco-
nomic, and social interaction among people of varied backgrounds, a pe-
riod of intense political violence and consolidation of state power by the 
Rwandan kingdom (1860–95), six decades of colonial rule (1898–1962), and 
three decades of independence punctuated by waves of interethnic vio-
lence and massive population displacement. The categorization of people 
according to socially constructed ethnic groups is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon in Rwanda. Until the late nineteenth century, Rwandans tended 
to identify themselves by patrilineage or clan. Diverse peoples spoke the 
same language, engaged in commercial activities, and intermarried. Herd-
ing, farming, and hunting and gathering were the primary means of subsis-
tence, and most populations engaged in various combinations of the three.
 After the consolidation of state power during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, wealthy cattle holders associated with the Rwandan 
central court and monarchy increasingly became known as Tutsis—a ref-
erent that was later extended to pastoralists more generally. Sedentary ag-
riculturalists without political connections or substantial cattle herds came 
to be known as Hutus. Hutus served as clients to Tutsi elites, laboring on 
their land, providing them with crops, and caring for their cattle. The small 
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population of hunter-gatherers were referred to as Twa. Although hier-
archical, Rwandan society was not static. Hutu families that established 
political connections—often through marriage to Tutsi women—and 
obtained substantial herds of cattle could, over the course of generations, 
come to be regarded as Tutsis. The reverse was also possible: Tutsis who 
lost power, status, and cattle could, over time, come to be viewed as Hutus. 
However, because Hutus alone performed unpaid manual labor for Tutsi 
chiefs, distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi identities became increasingly 
rigid and hierarchical. On the eve of colonial conquest, exploited Hutus re-
volted against their Tutsi overlords on numerous occasions. The European 
colonizers thus adapted and intensified a preexisting social, economic, and 
political system—which they erroneously attributed to racial differences.
 Colonized in 1898 as a component of German East Africa, Rwanda 
was transferred to Belgium after World War I and administered as part of 
the League of Nations mandate of Ruanda-Urundi. By 1930, people iden-
tified as Hutus composed approximately 84 percent of the population, 
Tutsis constituted 15 percent, and Twas made up the remaining 1 percent. 
European administrators took advantage of the stratified society and im-
plemented a system of indirect rule in which the Tutsi monarch, chiefs, 
and deputies extracted labor, collected taxes, and oversaw local justice on 
behalf of the imperial power. Tutsi chiefs benefited from increased con-
trol over land, labor, and cattle. The prerogatives of the Tutsi aristocracy 
as a whole were enhanced through an expanded system of patron-client 
relationships. The status system, which had been somewhat malleable 
until the late nineteenth century, hardened into an entrenched ethnic 
divide. In the census of 1933–34, Belgian administrators used perceived 
physical traits to define ethnic identities, which were then inscribed on 
identity cards. It was no longer possible for families to transition over 
time from one identity to another.
 Although status differences predated colonialism, it was Belgian 
colonial rulers who introduced the myth of superior and inferior races, 
using similarity to European phenotypes as the measure of superior-
ity. They endorsed the “Hamitic myth,” popularized by the nineteenth- 
century British explorer John Hanning Speke, who hypothesized that 
the descendants of Noah’s son, Ham, brought civilization from Ethiopia 
to central Africa, which at that time was purportedly inhabited by less 
intelligent, more primitive races. The Belgians defined taller, thinner, 
lighter-skinned people with aquiline noses as Tutsis, who were deemed 
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superior, and shorter, stockier, darker-skinned people with broader noses 
as Hutus, who were considered inferior. Pseudo-scientific theories aside, 
centuries of intermarriage had undermined the validity of any categori-
zation by phenotype. However, it was on the basis of these crude stereo-
types that a minority of the population was granted access to privilege and 
resources and the majority of the population was denied them. Belgian 
Catholic missionaries welcomed Tutsi children into their schools, and 
Tutsis staffed the lower echelons of the colonial military and civil service, 
while Hutus were subjected to the most grueling forms of forced labor. 
According to the 1956 census, conducted six years before independence, 
Tutsis owned nearly all of Rwanda’s cattle—historically, the main store of 
wealth—and controlled virtually all positions of power and prestige.
 The corporate identity of Hutus was strengthened by their sense of 
shared oppression under both Tutsi and European rule. Hutu political 
consciousness began to emerge after World War II, influenced not only 
by their double oppression under Tutsi and Belgian authority, but also 
by the actions of Flemish priests who had migrated to the territory after 
the war. Because Belgium’s Dutch-speaking Flemish majority had been 
dominated politically by the French-speaking Walloon minority, many 
priests identified with the Hutus’ plight. They recruited Hutu children 
into mission schools, and by the late 1950s a new generation of Hutu 
intellectuals, supported by the Catholic Church that had spurned their 
ancestors, demanded majority rule and mobilized Hutu followers to 
overthrow the Tutsi aristocracy.
 Under pressure to implement reforms in the territory, which became 
a UN trust in 1946, the Belgian colonial administration began to favor 
the Hutu majority. In the name of democracy, Belgian officials backed 
the Party for Hutu Emancipation (PARMEHUTU), which embraced the 
Hamitic myth that characterized Tutsis as foreign invaders, and advo-
cated a transfer of power to the Hutu majority.3 With the colonial admin-
istration and the Catholic Church in their camp, Hutu extremists began 
to employ ethnic violence to attain political power. During the Hutu 
Revolution of 1959–61, targeted killings focused on Tutsi power holders, 
primarily chiefs and subchiefs. The Tutsi monarchy was abolished, and 
some 10,000 Tutsis fled into exile. Over the next decade, armed invasions 
by Tutsi exiles provoked retaliatory massacres and new waves of refu-
gees that drove hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis into Burundi, 
Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire.
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 When Rwanda obtained independence in July 1962, PARMEHUTU’s 
Grégoire Kayibanda, a southern Hutu, became president. The domina-
tion of one group by another continued, this time with the Hutus on top. 
A rigid system of ethnic quotas allotted Tutsis only a tiny percentage of 
the positions in schools and government and excluded them from the 
military. Exiled Tutsi insurgents organized armed attacks on Rwanda, and 
Hutu “self-defense” units retaliated against Tutsi civilians, killing more 
than 10,000 people in December 1963 alone. In July 1973, Major General 
Juvénal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu, seized power in a military coup. 
Manipulating both ethnicity and regionalism in his bid for power, Hab-
yarimana brutally oppressed Tutsis and southern and central Hutus. He 
presided over a patronage system that staffed the government and military 
bureaucracies with loyalists from top to bottom. Political opponents— 
primarily Hutus—and civil society critics were imprisoned and killed.
 By the late 1980s, political and economic crises threatened Habyari-
mana’s hold on power. As the Cold War wound down, Western powers 
no longer needed loyal strongmen and regional policemen. Instead, they 
pressured African clients to open their countries to multiparty democ-
racy and to improve human rights practices. In June 1990, French Presi-
dent François Mitterrand outlined a new Africa policy that linked French 
development aid to progress in these areas. To protect their relationships 
with France, Habyarimana and other African dictators made superfi-
cial reforms that suggested movement toward multiparty democracy, 
but which catered to the interests of political elites. The modifications 
failed to address the urgent needs of ordinary citizens, who suffered from 
growing poverty, landlessness, unemployment, and food insecurity—a 
serious shortcoming that later would be exploited by Hutu extremists. 
Nonetheless, the reforms opened the door to restive civil society organi-
zations that increasingly agitated for fundamental structural change.
 Rwanda’s political tensions were compounded by an economic cri-
sis that had roots both in the colonial past and in the neoliberal re-
forms of the late twentieth century. Like many former colonies, Rwanda 
was an overwhelmingly agrarian society that depended on agriculture 
for local sustenance and government revenue. Established to serve the 
needs of the metropole, Rwanda exported primary products and im-
ported manufactured goods. As a result, its economy was deeply af-
fected by the worldwide depression in commodity prices that began in 
the late 1970s, by concurrent droughts and famines, and by the impact 
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of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment mandates that followed 
in their wake.
 When coffee and tea prices plummeted in the mid-1980s and tin 
production was halted because of declining profits, Rwanda turned to 
international financial institutions for assistance. In November 1990, the 
IMF directed Rwanda to devalue its currency by 50 percent in order to 
strengthen its export market. The result was a dramatic increase in the 
cost of imported food, fuel, and other essential goods. A shortage of im-
ported medicines led to the collapse of the health system, accompanied 
by a dramatic rise in malnutrition and preventable diseases. Reduced 
purchasing power led to business failures and escalating unemployment. 
Other externally imposed free market practices led to the removal of 
gasoline subsidies and to the imposition of new fees for health care, 
schooling, and even water.
 Rising economic inequality widened the gulf between the haves and 
have-nots. Tens of thousands of young Rwandan men were landless, un-
educated, unemployed, and without hope for marriage and social adult-
hood. Power elites faced growing insecurity as economic and political 
crises threatened the patronage system. In this context, Hutu extrem-
ists found fertile ground for their proselytizing. Tutsis were maligned 
as wealthy foreigners who had invaded Rwanda to take what rightfully 
belonged to the indigenous Hutu population. As such, they became con-
venient scapegoats for the country’s problems.
Invasion and Civil War (1990–93)
By 1990, an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 Rwandan Tutsis were living 
in exile in neighboring countries, about half of them in Uganda, where 
they had been persecuted by successive dictatorial regimes. During the 
1978–79 Uganda-Tanzania War, Rwandan Tutsis had joined Ugandan 
rebel leader Yoweri Museveni, whose units had fought alongside the 
Tanzanian army when it invaded Uganda and overthrew the Idi Amin 
regime. Tutsis had joined Museveni again during the 1981–86 Ugandan 
Bush War, when his National Resistance Army challenged the dicta-
torship of Milton Obote. When Museveni took power in January 1986, 
many of his top officers and 20 to 30 percent of his 14,000-man fighting 
force were Tutsis whose parents had fled Rwanda two and a half decades 
earlier. While some officers had come to Uganda as children, many of 
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the rank and file had been born in Uganda. In 1990, the Ugandan na-
tional army included some 8,000 Rwandan Tutsis and their descendants; 
some 200,000 Rwandan Tutsis and their offspring were domiciled in 
Uganda, and most considered Uganda their permanent home. During 
the economically troubled times of the late 1980s, a growing number of 
Ugandans resented Rwandan Tutsis’ proximity to power and began to 
complain about foreigners occupying influential and lucrative positions.
 Under pressure to leave Uganda, Rwandan Tutsis also felt the pull 
of their parents’ homeland. In December 1987, the descendants of earlier 
waves of refugees established the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a po-
litical and military organization whose goal was to repatriate Rwandan 
Tutsis and to share in political power. Two thousand RPF fighters crossed 
the border into Rwanda on October 1, 1990. Led by some of Museveni’s key 
military commanders, the RPF force was composed mainly of Rwandan 
Tutsis who had absconded from the Ugandan army with their weapons. 
Most of the fighters had been born in Uganda and spoke English rather 
than French. Few had had any experience in contemporary Rwanda, but 
they nonetheless assumed that they would be welcomed as liberators. In 
actuality, Tutsi civilians feared the reprisals that invariably followed in 
the wake of cross-border operations, and the RPF found little local sup-
port. Tutsi and Hutu civilians fled the conflict zones, and uprooted popu-
lations were weakened by hunger and starvation. By 1993, the number of 
internally displaced persons approached 1 million. Thousands of young 
Hutu men sought refuge in the capital city of Kigali, where they joined 
the ranks of homeless, unemployed, and alienated youth who would be 
ready recruits for extremist militias.
 External powers were embroiled in the new Rwandan conflict from 
the outset. Hoping that RPF success would lead to an exodus of Rwandan 
Tutsis, Ugandan President Museveni backed the RPF invasion to allevi-
ate domestic tensions, and the Ugandan army covertly supplied its former 
members. The French government, which had trained, equipped, and fi-
nanced Habyarimana’s army, presidential guard, and allied militias, char-
acterized the RPF operation as external aggression. Paris considered the 
RPF and its Ugandan backers to be part of an anglophone conspiracy to 
oust France from its longstanding sphere of influence in Central Africa. 
Zaire, a French ally and beneficiary, sent troops to support the Rwandan re-
gime. France also intervened militarily. Three days after the RPF invasion, 
600 French paratroopers landed in Rwanda in a venture called Operation 
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Noroît. Although the mission was publicly presented as an effort to protect 
French lives and evacuate French citizens, Paris was determined to thwart 
an RPF victory. French helicopter gunships inhibited the RPF advance, 
French soldiers directed artillery and assisted with communications, and a 
French officer served as the effective head of the Rwandan army.
 Just as Rwandan civilians had feared, the RPF invasion provoked 
massive reprisals against the Tutsi population—which, until then, had 
not been specifically targeted by the Habyarimana regime. Regime pro-
pagandists portrayed resident Tutsis as a traitorous fifth column and 
stoked fears that Tutsi “foreigners” would usurp the land of Hutu farm-
ers, who already suffered from acute land shortages and food insecurity. 
Between 1990 and 1993, Rwandan security forces and their civilian ac-
complices killed some 2,000 Tutsi civilians.
 The invasion also halted the government’s gestures toward reform 
and stimulated a crackdown on domestic opponents. The nascent pro-
democracy movement came under fire. Using the invasion as a pretext, 
security forces arrested an estimated 10,000 people during October and 
November 1990—including both Tutsis and Hutus who opposed Hab-
yarimana’s abusive practices. With French assistance, the Rwandan army 
grew from 5,000 in October 1990 to 40,000 a few years later, finding 
ready recruits among unemployed Hutu youth. Meanwhile, weapons left 
over from the Cold War flooded into Rwanda and were absorbed by the 
security forces, militias, and civilian population. The elements for a vio-
lent confrontation between state and society were now in place.
The Arusha Accords (1993)
Concerned that violence in Rwanda might destabilize the region, neigh-
boring countries, France, the United States, and the OAU sponsored a 
series of peace talks in 1992 and 1993 that were intended to find common 
ground between the government and the RPF. Habyarimana came under 
enormous pressure at home and abroad. Domestically, he was besieged 
by Hutu moderates, who called for an inclusive multiparty democracy 
that would entail power sharing with the RPF, and by Hutu extrem-
ists, who were determined to retain a monopoly on power and privi-
lege. While the extremists rejected any accommodation, France asserted 
that compromise was a precondition for further bilateral assistance. The 
World Bank, Belgium, the United States, and other important donors 
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concurred: if a peace agreement were not signed, there would be no fur-
ther funds. Under duress, the Rwandan government joined the RPF in 
signing the Arusha Accords in August 1993.
 The accords called for the establishment of a broad-based transi-
tional government, followed by multiparty elections. Bargaining from a 
position of strength, the RPF successfully excluded the Hutu extremist 
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) from the power-sharing ar-
rangement and obtained for the Tutsi minority a disproportionate share 
of government and military positions. The ruling National Republican 
Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) and the RPF 
would each fill five seats in the council of ministers and eleven seats in 
the Transitional National Assembly. RPF soldiers would be integrated 
into the Rwandan national army, which would include equal numbers of 
Hutu and Tutsi troops and officers. This arrangement meant that more 
than two-thirds of the Hutu soldiers and a large number of Hutu offi-
cers then serving faced demobilization and unemployment. Reference 
to ethnic groups would be eliminated from official documents, and Tutsi 
refugees and their descendants would be permitted to return to Rwanda. 
Their claims to ancestral land, although limited by the accords, nonethe-
less provoked anxiety in the densely populated rural areas, where inhab-
itants were already menaced by land shortages. Hutu extremists rejected 
the accords and claimed that Habyarimana had sold out. A virulent anti- 
Tutsi propaganda campaign ensued.
 Aware of the agreement’s fragility, the Arusha signatories called for 
a UN force to monitor and implement it and to provide security, assist 
with demilitarization, and aid in the integration of the armed forces. The 
RPF insisted that French troops, who were partial to the Habyarimana 
government, be removed and replaced by a neutral body. On October 3, as 
the UN Security Council deliberated about Rwanda, eighteen US soldiers 
were killed in Somalia during the ill-conceived mission that had begun as 
a UN effort to avert mass starvation. As the soldiers’ bodies were dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu, the United States balked at the pros-
pect of another fiasco and opposed a substantial commitment in Rwanda. 
France, in contrast, pushed for a UN force that could protect the Habyari-
mana government from RPF advances. The result was a compromise: a 
peacekeeping mission with a weak mandate and insufficient personnel.
 On October 5, the Security Council established the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a multinational peacekeeping 
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force that would replace the French Operation Noroît. Canadian Briga-
dier General Roméo Dallaire was named commander. UNAMIR, which 
operated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, was empowered to moni-
tor and assist in implementing the peace agreement, but not to impose 
peace in the context of war. Peacekeepers could use their weapons only 
if attacked or directly threatened with attack. They were not authorized to 
protect civilians. If war resumed, the UN mission would be terminated—
unless the mandate were changed. The Security Council had refused to au-
thorize action under Chapter VII, which would have permitted UN troops 
to use force to counter threats to the peace and to act without the consent 
of all parties involved. It disregarded the Arusha Accords, which called for a 
force that could confiscate illegal weapons and guarantee security through-
out Rwanda. Instead, it declined to let the peacekeepers seize arms and 
confined them to Kigali and its environs. Only 2,548 peacekeepers were au-
thorized, although the UNAMIR commander had lobbied for three times 
as many.4 The mission did not have an intelligence unit, possessed only a 
small civilian police force, and did not include a human rights cell.
 Although the Arusha Accords had established a veneer of peace, the 
conflict was far from over. The weak UN force arrived in a country still 
in the throes of civil war. The transitional government had not been es-
tablished, Rwandan soldiers and rebels had not been demobilized, and 
illegal arms were flooding into the capital. Hutu extremists, whose party 
had been excluded from the power-sharing agreement, were determined 
to seize power by other means.
Hutu Extremism: Prelude to Genocide
The institutionalization of Hutu extremism through exclusive sociopolitical 
organizations, political parties, militias, and media laid the groundwork 
for the 1994 genocide. In the late 1980s, First Lady Agathe Kanziga Hab-
yarimana established Akazu (Little House or Inner Circle), an organiza-
tion composed of her close relatives and high-level government, military, 
and police officials. By the early 1990s, Akazu’s hold on wealth and power 
was threatened both by the internal prodemocracy movement and by 
the externally backed Arusha Accords. Akazu responded by organiz-
ing death squads that targeted government opponents and by obstruct-
ing the settlement’s implementation. During the interlude between the 
RPF invasion in 1990 and the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993, 
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thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in attacks planned 
by Akazu and executed by the French-trained presidential guard and 
army, as well as by youth militias linked to extremist parties. The most 
notorious of these militias were the MRNDD-associated Interahamwe 
(Those Who Stay Together) and the CDR-associated Impuzamugambi 
(Those Who Share the Same Aim). Although organized by Hutu elites, 
the militias were made up of impoverished, unemployed Hutu youth 
with little schooling, who were trained by the national army and who 
killed on command. Radio stations run by Akazu or by the state became 
the leading propagandists for “Hutu Power,” playing on economic griev-
ances, spreading ethnic hatred, and rallying the Hutu populace against 
Tutsis, government opponents, and the Arusha Accords.
 Events in neighboring Burundi also stoked the flames. Burundi, like 
Rwanda, had been a component of German East Africa; together they 
formed the western region of Ruanda-Urundi. After Germany’s defeat in 
World War I, the territory was administered by Belgium as a League of 
Nations mandate and later as a UN trust territory. Rwanda and Burundi 
separated at independence in 1962. Burundi’s population also comprised a 
Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. However, in Burundi, the Tutsi elite 
retained power after independence. Tutsi dominance was challenged by a 
series of Hutu revolts that led to massacres and reprisals that claimed some 
250,000 lives between 1965 and 1993. The vast majority of those killed were 
Hutus. In the early 1990s, Burundi, like other African countries, came under 
pressure from both domestic and international forces to democratize. A 
new constitution, followed by multiparty elections in June 1993, resulted in 
a parliament dominated by the largely Hutu Front for Democracy in Bu-
rundi and the first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye. In October 1993, 
extremists in the Tutsi-dominated army assassinated the president along 
with seven government ministers, sparking a Hutu uprising. The rebellion 
was violently suppressed by the army, and a cascade of interethnic revenge 
killings ensued, leaving some 100,000 civilians dead. More than 400,000 
refugees poured into Rwanda, while almost as many sought safety in Zaire 
and Tanzania. The mass killing of Hutus in Burundi and the influence of 
Hutu refugees in Rwanda led to intensified propaganda against Rwandan 
Tutsis. Hutu refugees from Burundi, trained by Hutu extremists in Rwanda, 
would become active participants in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
 Within a month of the assassinations in Burundi, plans for mass 
killings in Rwanda were under way. In November 1993, hundreds of 
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thousands of imported Chinese machetes appeared in Kigali, and diplo-
mats and human rights workers warned that Hutu civilians and militias 
were arming themselves. In January 1994, UNAMIR commander Roméo 
Dallaire cabled the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
in New York, alerting headquarters to reported plans to exterminate all 
Tutsis in Kigali, along with the Hutu political opposition. Tutsis were 
being registered, hit lists compiled, and death squads assembled. The 
DPKO replied that UNAMIR must adhere to its mandate, maintaining 
strict neutrality and operating with all parties’ consent. Fearing a repeat 
of the Somalia debacle, the DPKO ordered Dallaire to abandon plans to 
raid the militias’ weapons caches. Instead, he was instructed to report his 
findings to the Rwandan government and to the French, US, and Bel-
gian embassies in Kigali—despite the fact that the Rwandan regime was 
complicit in the militias’ activities. The DPKO did not transmit Dallaire’s 
dire warnings nor his appeals for more troops to the Security Council. 
The UN’s failure to respond convinced Hutu extremists that they could 
proceed without fear of UN intervention.
 Meanwhile, the implementation of the Arusha Accords had stalled. 
The United States blamed the Habyarimana regime for failing to establish 
a transitional government and argued that the Security Council should 
consider terminating the peacekeeping mission. As the Security Council 
deliberated on April 5, 1994, Habyarimana flew to a summit of regional 
leaders in Arusha, where he was roundly criticized for his government’s 
intransigence and for the flood of refugees that threatened to destabilize 
the region. Menaced with sanctions, Habyarimana agreed to form the 
long-delayed transitional government. In New York, the Security Coun-
cil extended the UNAMIR mandate until July 29.
The Genocide (April–July 1994)
On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down as it returned from 
the Arusha summit. The French-piloted aircraft also carried Burundi’s 
new Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and several high-level Rwan-
dan officials. Kigali and Paris immediately blamed the RPF for the attack, 
while Belgian military intelligence officials, the US State Department’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the CIA concluded that the 
plane had been shot down by the presidential guard or other elements in 
the Rwandan military who felt that Habyarimana had sold out.5
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 Targeted killings by Hutu extremists began immediately. In less than 
an hour, the presidential guard and the Interahamwe erected road blocks. 
Hutu Power militants seized control of the government, and Akazu death 
squads began killing from preexisting lists. They turned first to moder-
ate Hutu politicians who opposed the government’s extremist policies 
and supported the Arusha Accords, and then proceeded to human rights 
activists, journalists, and other citizens who were educated or prosper-
ous. Over the next few days, the targets were extended to include Tutsis 
of all backgrounds. The Akazu- and state-owned radio stations rallied 
the population against anyone who opposed the extremist agenda. The 
killings were directed by the army and militias and urged on by local 
government officials and power brokers, including teachers, doctors, and 
Catholic priests and nuns. Hutus who would not join in killing their Tutsi 
neighbors or family members were themselves killed. Between April 6 
and July 18, some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered. 
Seventy-five percent of Rwanda’s Tutsi population was slaughtered, and 
tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped in a systematic attempt to 
further terrorize and destroy the Tutsi community. Hundreds of thou-
sands of refugees poured across the borders into Burundi and Tanzania.
 When the killings began, the UNAMIR force included 2,548 poorly 
equipped peacekeepers whose sole mandate was to monitor and assist 
in implementing the Arusha agreement. The peacekeepers were imme-
diately ordered to protect moderate Hutu politicians who supported the 
Arusha Accords. However, they were not permitted to fire their weapons 
unless directly targeted. On April 7, ten Belgian peacekeepers attempted 
to escort Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, to 
the state-run radio station to appeal for calm. The group was confronted 
by the presidential guard, who disarmed and killed the peacekeepers 
before assassinating the prime minister. The next day, Belgium warned 
that it would withdraw its soldiers unless the UNAMIR mandate were 
expanded and the multinational force bolstered with troops from other 
countries. The Belgian peacekeepers, tasked with security in the capital, 
constituted the backbone of the UN force. The Security Council refused 
both requests, and Belgium withdrew from UNAMIR. Bangladesh fol-
lowed suit, leaving troops from Ghana and Tunisia to take up the slack.
 As the Security Council dithered, RPF soldiers poured across the 
Uganda-Rwanda border, and the civil war resumed. Although there was 
no longer a ceasefire to monitor or a peace to keep, the Security Council 
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could have strengthened the UNAMIR mandate, transforming its mis-
sion from peacekeeping (Chapter VI) to peace enforcement (Chapter 
VII). A Chapter VII mandate would have permitted UNAMIR soldiers to 
protect civilians, to operate without the consent of the Hutu Power gov-
ernment, and to use force where warranted. Instead, the Security Council 
focused its energy and resources on the evacuation of foreign nationals. 
France took the lead, mounting a paramilitary action—code-named Op-
eration Amaryllis—to evacuate 1,238 foreigners, high-level members of 
the Habyarimana regime, other Hutu extremists, and their families. Italy 
and Belgium also flew foreign nationals to safety, while a US convoy trans-
ported US citizens across the border into Burundi. UNAMIR personnel 
helped coordinate these evacuations, but they were not permitted to as-
sist Rwandan civilians. Tutsi employees of foreign embassies, offices, and 
homes were abandoned as their employers fled. By the time the evacua-
tions ended, most of Rwanda’s political opposition had been eliminated.
 Powerful interests in the UN thwarted a more forceful UN inter-
vention that might have stopped the slaughter. UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian diplomat, Sorbonne-trained law-
yer, and close ally of France and the Habyarimana regime, embraced the 
French position that the killings were the result of longstanding ethnic 
hatreds and the product of spontaneous violence in an ongoing civil war. 
He contended that the problem was a weak state that had failed to im-
plement the peace accords—rather than ethnic cleansing or a genocide 
orchestrated by the state itself. In the face of mounting evidence of geno-
cide, Boutros-Ghali continued to deny its existence until early May. In 
the meantime, he refused to transmit to the Security Council informa-
tion provided by Dallaire and others that might have bolstered the case 
for intervention.
 The Security Council was divided in its assessment of the Rwandan 
situation and split over how to resolve it. The five permanent members, 
who wield veto power over any proposal or resolution, were unanimous 
in their opposition to stronger UN action. Both France and the United 
States characterized the violence as a civil war between armed opponents 
rather than the victimization of unarmed civilians by the government 
and its allies. France argued that the Rwandan government and military 
should be strengthened, which would enable them to restore order, and 
insisted that the government, now dominated by Hutu Power elements, 
be allowed to participate in any future negotiations. The United States, 
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fresh from its humiliation in Somalia, had no desire to intervene in a 
country where it had no immediate strategic or economic interests. The 
Clinton administration argued that the situation in Rwanda was not a 
threat to international peace and security, and since there was no lon-
ger a ceasefire to monitor or a peace to keep, the UNAMIR operation 
should be terminated. Lawyers in the US State Department cautioned 
administration officials against using the term “genocide,” which might 
compel the United States to act under the 1948 Genocide Convention.6 
The United Kingdom joined the other Western members in supporting 
UN withdrawal, as did Russia and China—the latter because it opposed 
intervening in other countries’ domestic affairs.
 The ten nonpermanent members of the Security Council, elected 
by the General Assembly to two-year terms, showed no such consen-
sus. Rwanda had joined the Security Council in January 1994. During 
the genocide, Rwanda’s UN ambassador, Jean Damascène Bizimana, 
represented the Hutu Power government. He participated in all Secu-
rity Council deliberations and communicated sensitive information to 
Kigali. From his influential position, he discouraged concerted UN ac-
tion to stop the massacres and assured his superiors in Kigali that the 
UN would not interfere. Other nonpermanent members, notably New 
Zealand, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Argentina, urged the Security 
Council to strengthen the UNAMIR mandate so that peacekeepers could 
protect Rwandan civilians. These measures were also supported by many 
African UN member states that were not represented on the council.
 The noninterventionists carried the day. On April 21, the Security 
Council voted to withdraw all but a few hundred peacekeepers.7 The new 
resolution authorized the remaining peacekeepers to negotiate a cease-
fire, assist in the provision of humanitarian assistance, and monitor the 
safety and security of civilians who sought UNAMIR protection. How-
ever, it did not permit the peacekeepers to protect those civilians. When 
New Zealand attempted to include reference to genocide in a UN docu-
ment on April 29, the United States successfully opposed it.
 By early May, the RPF had reached the outskirts of the capital. On 
May 4, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who remained hopeful 
that an RPF takeover could be thwarted, called the mass killings a geno-
cide for the first time. On May 13 he recommended an expansion of the 
UNAMIR mandate, arguing that Rwanda was in the midst of a “major 
humanitarian crisis,” with nearly 2 million people displaced internally 
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and another 400,000 living as refugees in neighboring states.8 On May 17, 
the Security Council increased the number of UNAMIR troops to 5,500 
and adjusted the mission’s mandate. Although France had pushed for a 
Chapter VII mandate to enable the UN force to halt the RPF advance, the 
council determined that UNAMIR II would continue to operate under 
Chapter VI as a deterrent rather than an enforcement body. However, the 
expanded UN operation would be authorized to protect vulnerable civil-
ians, to establish secure humanitarian areas, and to provide security for 
relief operations. The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on both 
the Kigali government and the RPF. Successful implementation required 
a ceasefire, a sufficient body of troops, and adequate equipment, none 
of which was forthcoming. The Security Council’s delayed action was 
quickly overtaken by events. Poised for military victory and distrustful of 
the UN, the RPF ignored appeals for a ceasefire. On May 21, rebel forces 
took the Kigali airport.
 On June 8, two months after the mass killings began, the Security 
Council finally concluded that the situation in Rwanda was indeed a 
genocide. However, its members disagreed about what should be done 
and by whom. With the UNAMIR II deployment still months away, 
France requested permission to lead a multilateral intervention force 
with a Chapter VII mandate to protect Rwandan civilians in the interim. 
France would stand down once the UNAMIR force was fully operational. 
On June 22, the Security Council authorized Operation Turquoise, a 
French-led military action that was to last no longer than sixty days. The 
United States and the UK were happy to let France carry the burden. 
Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan demonstrated their 
ambivalence by abstaining. Outside the Security Council, critics accused 
France of using the UN for its own ends, which included saving the Hutu 
regime and stopping the RPF advance. The OAU and a number of inter-
national NGOs publicly opposed Operation Turquoise, while the UNAMIR 
commander, General Dallaire, argued that French intervention would 
endanger UNAMIR forces. The RPF had vowed to fight any military op-
eration that included French soldiers.
 Having readied its troops in advance, France launched Operation 
Turquoise on June 23. The 2,362-man force, financed primarily by France, 
was composed almost exclusively of French troops, with thirty-two Sene-
galese soldiers representing the only multinational component. Zaire, 
an important French ally and a staunch supporter of the Habyarimana 
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regime, served as the main base of operations, and soldiers, support staff, 
and equipment transited through that country. The mission included re-
connaissance and ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, helicopters, 
and more than one hundred armored vehicles. However, no trucks were 
provided to transport displaced civilians. The operation seemed pre-
pared for a military rather than a humanitarian mission.
 Despite French efforts, the RPF ousted the Hutu extremist regime 
from Kigali on July 4. Five days later, the UN established a safe humani-
tarian zone under French control in southwestern Rwanda. As the RPF 
advanced, hundreds of thousands of Hutu civilians fled toward the safe 
zone. High-level government officials, military and militia commanders, 
and other perpetrators of the genocide also found shelter in the protected 
area. Focused on thwarting the RPF and its anglophone backers, France 
did not disarm or arrest suspected war criminals or turn them over to 
UNAMIR forces. Instead, Operation Turquoise personnel helped per-
petrators escape with their weapons into Zaire and the Central African 
Republic, where many trained for a return to power in Rwanda. Some 
Hutu Power officials eventually established residence in France and other 
European countries, where they lived covertly in order to evade prosecu-
tion for war crimes.
Photo 6.1. French soldiers in Operation Turquoise pass Hutu Rwandan army troops 
near Gisenyi, Rwanda, June 27, 1994. Photo by Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images.
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 On July 18, the victorious RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire. The 
genocide, which had claimed the lives of some 800,000 people, was over. 
However, the devastating aftermath had only begun. Nearly 40 percent 
of Rwanda’s 7.6 million people had been driven into exile or killed. Three 
million people were internally displaced, and another 2 million were 
stranded in squalid refugee camps in neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zaire, where tens of thousands of refugees succumbed 
to cholera, dysentery, and other diseases. Although widely praised for 
halting the genocide, the RPF was also responsible for egregious human 
rights abuses. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees documented 
widespread and systematic killings of Hutu civilians by RPF forces, esti-
mating that 25,000 to 45,000 Hutus were slaughtered between April and 
August 1994.9
 On July 19, 1994, the RPF established a national unity government 
that included members from five political parties but excluded repre-
sentatives from the MRNDD and the CDR. Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu 
moderate, was sworn in as president. However, the real power lay with 
the RPF commander Paul Kagame, who was named vice president and 
minister of defense. Hutus and Tutsis filled other cabinet positions. 
Photo 6.2. Children orphaned or displaced during the Rwandan genocide search 
for food near Goma, Zaire (now the DRC), July 15, 1994. Photo by Dario Mitidieri/
Getty Images.
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Within days, the new government was recognized by the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Belgium. France, however, refused to send an 
ambassador and determined that Rwanda, with so many English speak-
ers in high-profile positions, was no longer part of la francophonie.
Conclusion
The failure of the international community to halt the genocide in 
Rwanda, and its refusal to hold the perpetrators to account, contrib-
uted to the destabilization of the Great Lakes region. After the genocide, 
more than a million Rwandan civilians, 30,000 former soldiers, and tens 
of thousands of Hutu militia members flooded into Zaire. Hutu Power 
leaders, including former government officials, military officers, and mi-
litia leaders, asserted control over the UN-administered refugee camps 
and used them as a base for recruitment, training, and, they hoped, an 
eventual return to power in Rwanda. Their attacks on both sides of the 
border, and the failure of UN member states to thwart them, sparked 
two new wars that devastated eastern Zaire and ultimately involved most 
countries in the Great Lakes region. These wars and the international 
community’s response are the subject of chapter 7.
Suggested Reading
The mass killings in Rwanda in 1994 and their violent aftermath continue 
to affect the lives of millions of people in the region. Scholarly debates con-
cerning causes, consequences, and responsibility remain contentious. Two 
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occurred and conflate Tutsi civilians with the RPF elites, and those who 
demonize Hutus as a group and dispute claims that they, too, were victims. 
In the middle are scholars who produce complex, nuanced, empirically 
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Studies Review 41, no. 1 (April 1998): 73–97.
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riod, examine the evolution of ethnic politics during the colonial period, 
and establish a historical framework for understanding mass killings and 
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parallels, differences, and the influence of events in one country on the 
other. David Newbury, “Canonical Conventions in Rwanda: Four Myths 
of Recent Historiography in Central Africa,” History in Africa 39 (2012): 
41–76, challenges several common myths about Rwanda’s past that hin-
der a proper understanding of recent historical events.
 Other empirically based studies provide insight into the motivations 
behind and the organization of the genocide. They argue that the geno-
cide was not rooted in ethnic hatred, but rather was motivated by a po-
litical agenda and was organized and implemented by political elites. See, 
especially, Alison Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide 
in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), a highly accessible, 
authoritative study that explores the historical background and events 
leading to the genocide, its organization and unfolding, the key players 
and their motivations, and the role of the international community. Scott 
Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), examines the extremist regime that 
orchestrated the killings, the indifference of the international commu-
nity, and recent constructions of difference that cast all Tutsis as a threat 
to be extinguished. Lee Ann Fujii, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in 
Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), also offers a nu-
anced assessment of the complex group dynamics and social ties that led 
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neighbors to kill neighbors. Jennie Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women, 
Memory and Silence in Rwanda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2012), focuses on Tutsi and Hutu women’s experiences during the geno-
cide, their agency in postgenocide reconstruction and peace building, 
the politicization of survivorship, and the impact of official policies that 
consider only Tutsis to be victims.
 A number of works focus on the political, economic, and environ-
mental factors that laid the groundwork for the genocide. Johan Pot-
tier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the 
Late Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
considers the impact of the collapse of world coffee prices and of the 
IMF-mandated structural adjustment program, externally imposed po-
litical reforms, elite manipulation of ethnicity to gain and maintain ac-
cess to power, the RPF invasion, and events in neighboring countries. 
André Guichaoua, From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 
1990–1994, trans. Don E. Webster (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2015), and David Newbury, “Ecology and the Politics of Genocide: 
Rwanda 1994,” Cultural Survival 22, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 32–35, examine 
background to the genocide, including economic and social inequali-
ties, environmental degradation, famine, corruption, internal regional 
rivalries, the 1990–94 civil war, and events in neighboring Uganda and 
Burundi. Isaac A. Kamola, “The Global Coffee Economy and the Pro-
duction of Genocide in Rwanda,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2007): 
571–92, investigates coffee production and export as a source of growing 
landlessness, inequality, and food insecurity that had regional and eth-
nic components. The article also shows how the economic crisis led to 
mounting political unrest that divided ruling elites, threatened the re-
gime, and led to mobilization for mass violence.
 Other studies provide insight into particular aspects of the genocide. 
Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), is especially useful for its examination 
of the RPF’s origins and evolution in Museveni’s Uganda, the role of the 
1990 invasion in creating a class of alienated Hutu youth who were re-
cruited into extremist militias, and the ways in which France bolstered 
the Hutu extremist regime. Prunier also considers how the genocide 
and the international community’s failure to respond laid the founda-
tions for a new state that was permitted to act with impunity both inside 
Rwanda and in neighboring Zaire. Criticized for downplaying the RPF’s 
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included an additional chapter in the 1997 edition that permits a more 
balanced assessment of all the players. Mahmood Mamdani, When Vic-
tims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), exposes the precarious 
situation of Rwandan Tutsis in Uganda that led to the formation of the 
RPF and the decision to return to Rwanda as a rebel force. More conten-
tious are his claims that the colonial-era ideology describing Tutsis as ra-
cially superior alien settlers and Hutus as racially inferior natives was the 
cornerstone of the 1994 genocide. Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular 
Genocide: Perfect Storm (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016), explores the 
ways in which local political, social, and economic factors contributed 
to grassroots alienation and facilitated mobilization for genocide. The 
author, a senior advisor in the Kagame government, challenges the of-
ficial position that precolonial Rwanda was characterized by peaceful 
coexistence and that ethnicity was solely a construct of colonial rule. 
Timothy Longman, Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), investigates the history of Christi-
anity in Rwanda and explores the power struggles that led to Christian 
participation in the genocide.
 Journalists have provided highly readable investigative accounts. 
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (New York: 
Verso, 2006), provides a compelling document- and interview-based 
narrative that focuses on the elites who planned and instigated the geno-
cide. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will 
Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1998), offers a powerful collection of personal stories 
that highlight Rwandan voices and the moral failure of the international 
community. Gourevitch’s work, which influenced the Clinton adminis-
tration’s postgenocide Rwandan policies, has been criticized for focusing 
primarily on ethnic considerations, for minimizing political and eco-
nomic factors, and for presenting the RPF and its leader, Paul Kagame, 
relatively uncritically.
 Powerful firsthand accounts include Paul Rusesabagina with Tom 
Zoellner, An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography (New York: Viking, 2006), 
which explores how Rusesabagina, a hotel manager, protected more than 
1,000 Rwandans from slaughter. In Guns Over Kigali (Accra: Woeli, 1997), 
a Ghanaian military officer and UNAMIR deputy force commander, 
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Henry Kwami Anyidoho, examines victimization and atrocities on both 
sides and provides insights into the RPF’s concerns about the French- 
operated safe humanitarian zone. The United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum website includes links to important primary source material 
on the Rwandan genocide, including official documents, eyewitness ac-
counts, photographs, and other resources compiled in partnership with 
the National Security Archive at George Washington University (https://
www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/rwanda).
 The responsibility of outsiders for the magnitude of the killings is 
the subject of several studies, including two firsthand accounts. Roméo 
Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda 
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), an insider account by the UNAMIR 
commander, exposes the UN’s failure to respond to warnings about the 
impending genocide. Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The 
United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 
by a staff member of the US Mission to the UN, explains the reasons the 
organization failed to act. Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role 
of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000), criticizes 
the UN Security Council for its failure to respond and considers France 
especially culpable. (See also Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, mentioned 
previously.) An OAU investigation resulted in Rwanda: The Preventable 
Genocide, report of the Organization of African Unity International Panel 
of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and 
the Surrounding Events, July 7, 2000. The report, which included Cana-
dian scholar Gerald Caplan among its lead authors, faults the UN Secu-
rity Council, France, Belgium, and the United States for failing to prevent 
the genocide—and for failing to hold the RPF, as well as Hutu extremists, 
accountable for widespread slaughter.
 Other critiques of the French role can be found in Prunier, The 
Rwanda Crisis (mentioned previously); Daniela Kroslak, The French 
Betrayal of Rwanda (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); and 
Andrew Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the 
Rwandan Genocide (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006). Paris’s controversial 
relationship with the Habyarimana regime is further revealed in French 
government documents available in Arnaud Siad, ed., The Rwandan 
Crisis Seen through the Eyes of France, part 1, “Leadup to the Genocide,” 
trans. Christina Graubert, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 
Book no. 461, March 20, 2014.
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 The role of the Rwandan genocide in generating wider conflicts 
in the Great Lakes region is explored in a number of important works. 
See, especially, Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., The Path of a 
Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1999); Christian P. Scherrer, Genocide and Crisis in Central 
Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2002); Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Re-
ality (London: Zed Books, 2007); René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Vi-
olence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2009); Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Geno-
cide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo 
and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse 
of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); 
and Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., Remaking Rwanda: State Build-
ing and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 2011). Marie Béatrice Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The 
Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire, trans. Julie Emerson (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), is a firsthand account by a Rwan-
dan Hutu who survived retaliatory killings by the RPF and its supporters 
in Rwanda and the mass slaughter of Hutu refugees in Zaire/DRC by 
Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian, and Zairian/DRC forces.
 A number of studies are critical of the RPF regime in postgenocide 
Rwanda. Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda (mentioned previously), argues 
that the exile-dominated RPF government had little concern for those 
who had remained in Rwanda. It explores the ways in which RPF power 
holders shaped Western media, government, and NGO understanding 
of Rwanda and of the postgenocide conflict in Zaire/DRC—masking the 
RPF’s role in mass killings in both countries and rewriting precolonial 
history and practices to justify policies that served the interests of the 
new power elites. Lars Waldorf, “Instrumentalizing Genocide: The RPF’s 
Campaign against ‘Genocide Ideology,’” in Straus and Waldorf, Remaking 
Rwanda (mentioned previously), 48–66, examines postgenocide Rwan-
dan laws that outlaw “genocide ideology” and implicitly cast only Tutsis 
as genocide victims and all Hutus as complicit. Waldorf argues that the 
laws are used to repress political dissent and civil society voices and to 
strengthen the RPF’s hold on power. Guichaoua, From War to Genocide 
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(mentioned previously), challenges the RPF’s official story concerning 
the causes, developments, and ramifications of the genocide and argues 
that the underlying issues that culminated in genocide continue to influ-
ence political, judicial, and diplomatic actions in contemporary Rwanda. 
Judy Rever, In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(Toronto: Random House Canada, 2018), uses interviews and official docu-
ments to expose RPF abuses during and after the genocide, as well as 
the US coverup. Two articles fault a human rights NGO, African Rights, 
for uncritically accepting the RPF narrative and promoting an interna-
tional response that failed to hold the RPF accountable for human rights 
abuses. See, especially, the self-critical assessment by African Rights co-
founder Alex de Waal, “Writing Human Rights and Getting It Wrong,” 
Boston Review, June 6, 2016. See also Luc Reydoms, “NGO Justice: Af-
rican Rights as Pseudo-Prosecutor of the Rwandan Genocide,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 38, no. 3 (August 2016): 547–88.
 Some sources argue that a genocide did not occur or, alternatively, 
that it involved conspiracies with foreign actors. These works have 
generated significant controversy, and several have been challenged 
by longtime scholars of Rwanda. Edward S. Herman and David Peter-
son, The Politics of Genocide (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010), 
charges that there was no genocide against Rwandan Tutsis, but rather, 
that the victims were Hutus killed by invading RPF forces intent on 
seizing state power. Claims of genocide, the authors argue, were the 
rationale for a US plan to gain a foothold in the region and direct ac-
cess to mineral-rich Zaire. Peter Erlinder, The Accidental . . . Genocide 
(St. Paul, MN: International Humanitarian Law Institute, 2013), written 
by the lead defense counsel for the UN International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, claims that the RPF was a creation of the US Defense 
Department. Christian Davenport and Allan C. Stam, “What Really 
Happened in Rwanda?,” Miller-McCune 2, no. 6 (November/December 
2009): 60–69, significantly reduces the estimated number of Tutsi in-
habitants of Rwanda prior to the killings, as well as the number of Tutsi 
victims, and argues that the majority of victims were Hutu. Critics have 
found fault with the authors’ research methodology and the accuracy 
of their statistics. See, for instance, Marijke Verpoorten, “Rwanda: Why 
Claim that 200,000 Tutsi Died in the Genocide Is Wrong,” African Ar-





















































The Democratic Republic of Congo
outside interests and africa’s World War (1994–2017)
fallout from the Rwandan genocide spilled into neighboring Zaire 
(later, the Democratic Republic of Congo), where more than a million 
Rwandans sought refuge and Hutu extremists prepared for a return to 
power.1 Cross-border attacks by Hutu Power elements and the response 
of neighboring countries triggered a lengthy multinational conflict that 
some observers called “Africa’s world war.”2 Often conceived as the First 
Congo War (1996–97) and the Second Congo War (1998–2002), the strife 
attracted foreign armies and their local proxies, who continued to fight 
over the nation’s political future and mineral wealth after peace accords 
were signed. Strategic minerals in Zaire/DRC, like oil in Sudan and 
South Sudan, were both an object of struggle and the means of perpetu-
ating the violence. Attempts by the UN, the AU, and African subregional 
bodies to establish stability and a framework for a new political order 
were fraught with weaknesses and failures. ICGLR and SADC, the subre-
gional organizations charged with brokering peace agreements, included 
members who were parties to the conflict. Rwanda played a particularly 
problematic role, waging war in Zaire/DRC with its national army and 
through local proxies, committing atrocities against civilian populations, 
and plundering the country’s mineral wealth. Having ignored the Rwan-
dan genocide until it was too late, the Security Council was reluctant to 
hold the new Rwandan regime accountable.
 This chapter explores political and military intervention in Zaire/
DRC by neighboring countries to promote their own political and eco-
nomic agendas; it also examines UN intervention in response to insta-
bility and to protect civilian lives, and efforts by the UN, the AU, and 
subregional bodies to broker peace. The multilateral peacekeeping efforts 
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resulted in a diminution of violence, but regional stability was not re-
stored, civilians were not protected, and interested parties persisted in 
promoting their own interests rather than those of the Congolese people. 
Externally imposed peace accords, designed by political and economic 
elites, failed to address Zaire/DRC’s deep structural inequalities, and for-
eign interests continued to exploit local divisions for their own ends.
Setting the Stage:  
The Postcolonial and Cold War Context (1960–97)
Bordering nine countries in a mineral-rich, strategic region, Zaire, a 
former Belgian colony, was the largest and most populous country in 
francophone Africa. The immediate impetus for external intervention 
in the 1990s was the presence of Hutu extremists who had perpetrated 
genocide in Rwanda and who continued to threaten that country. How-
ever, Zaire’s vulnerability was rooted in inequalities and practices that 
dated to the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods. During the 
Cold War, Zaire had served as a regional policeman for both the United 
States and France, which along with Belgium were Zaire’s primary pillars 
of financial support. For more than three decades, Zaire was subjected 
to the authoritarian rule of Mobutu Sésé Seko (originally, Joseph-Désiré 
Mobutu), who assumed political power through military coups staged in 
September 1960 and November 1965.3 An important CIA protégé, Mobutu 
allowed the United States to train and supply anticommunist Angolan 
rebels on Zairian territory and helped keep a lid on radical movements 
throughout the region. In return, Washington provided Zaire with more 
than $1 billion in military and economic aid between 1961 and 1990 and 
pressured the IMF and World Bank to favor the country with loans, re-
scheduled debts, and relaxed lending conditions. Hoping to expand its 
influence in francophone Africa, France also supplied Zaire with gener-
ous loans, weapons, and military training.
 During his thirty-two-year reign, Mobutu presided over a corrupt 
patronage system. He treated Zaire’s vast mineral resources, parastatal 
companies, central bank, and tax offices as his own, plundering them 
at will for the benefit of family members and loyalists. He amassed a 
personal fortune worth billions of dollars, while Zaire’s economy was 
ravaged by plummeting copper prices, food shortages, inflation, and an 
external debt that had reached $14 billion in 1997. Mobutu’s regime was 
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notorious for its human rights abuses and the repression of political dis-
sent. Nonetheless, it received strong military and economic support from 
Belgium, the United States, France, and Israel, which feared a communist 
takeover of the mineral-rich region without a strongman at the helm. 
The “Mobutu or chaos” argument guaranteed their backing until the end 
of the Cold War.4
 As the Cold War waned in the late 1980s, Zaire, like many other Afri-
can countries, was faced with a devastating economic crisis and mount-
ing political unrest. Mobutu’s strategic value had diminished, and by 
the early 1990s the Zairian dictator had been abandoned by key foreign 
sponsors. Belgium ceased all military and economic assistance in 1990, 
and France unveiled a new Africa policy that linked French development 
aid to human rights and democratic practices. Mobutu and other fran-
cophone autocrats implemented superficial reforms that would protect 
their relationships with France but preserve their power. During the 
same period, internal prodemocracy forces exerted enormous domestic 
pressure. In August 1991, Mobutu was forced to consider fundamental 
political change, convening a national conference where political oppo-
nents and civil society activists pushed for new governing institutions 
and multiparty democracy. In September, erratically paid soldiers rioted, 
civil unrest ensued, and 1,500 French and Belgian paratroopers arrived 
to evacuate 20,000 foreign nationals. In October, Mobutu appointed a 
transitional administration headed by opposition leader Étienne Tshise-
kedi, who was dismissed a week later for refusing to follow orders. By 
the end of the year, France and the United States had suspended their aid 
programs, the IMF had barred Zaire from further loans, and the World 
Bank had ended support for development projects. The following year 
was punctuated by demonstrations, violent crackdowns, and periodic 
closures of the national conference, as Mobutu obstructed any attempt at 
real reform.
 Although domestic forces continued to mobilize for democracy, 
it was an externally backed insurgency and regional war that finally 
drove Mobutu from power. The insurrection and its aftermath were in-
timately linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. A longtime supporter of 
the Habyarimana regime, Mobutu had opened Zaire’s borders to more 
than 1 million Rwandan Hutu refugees, as well as former government 
soldiers and militia members who had fled the advancing RPF. When 
genocide perpetrators asserted their dominance over the refugee camps, 
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controlling the distribution of food, medicine, and other humanitarian 
aid, Mobutu turned a blind eye. Camp leaders trafficked in arms, con-
scripted and trained military cadres, conducted raids into RPF-governed 
Rwanda with impunity, and obtained millions of dollars in weapons 
from the UK, China, and South Africa. Zairian soldiers joined Rwandan 
Hutu extremists in ethnically cleansing eastern Zaire, displacing tens of 
thousands of indigenous Tutsis and killing thousands more. Some Tutsis, 
known as the Banyamulenge, had local roots that extended to the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, when their ancestors had settled there. 
Others had been brought to the region by Belgian colonizers to serve 
as cheap labor on settler ranches and plantations. Still others had fled 
from ethnic violence in Rwanda during the early independence period. 
After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the citizenship of Zairian Tutsis was 
called into question. Tutsis became convenient scapegoats for the prob-
lems plaguing Zairian civilians, who found common cause with Rwan-
dan Hutu extremists. Concerned by the extremist activities and angered 
by the treatment of Zairian Tutsis, Rwanda warned that it would invade 
Zaire if the militants were not restrained. Mobutu declined to sanction 
his allies, the United States resisted military engagement where it had no 
interests, and France refused to support Rwanda’s RPF regime. Inhibited 
by powerful members, the UN Security Council did nothing.
 The UN’s failure to respond ultimately led to two wars that would 
embroil most countries in the surrounding area. In 1997, a rebel army 
backed by Rwanda and Uganda drove Mobutu from power. As indigenous 
and external forces rushed to fill the power vacuum, Zaire was propelled 
into more than two decades of chaos, violent conflict, and civil war. Be-
tween 1998 and 2007 alone, war claimed some 5.4 million lives—primarily 
from hunger, disease, and malnutrition resulting from massive displace-
ment and economic collapse. UNICEF estimated that during this period, 
tens of thousands of children were abducted by government soldiers, 
local militias, and rebels and forced to work as fighters, miners, cooks, 
porters, and sex slaves.5 In addition, Human Rights Watch found that 
more than 200,000 women and girls were raped or otherwise sexually 
brutalized in a country where sexual violence had become a primary 
weapon of war.
 The decades-long turmoil involved, at various times, countries from 
three of Africa’s five subregions. Rwanda and Uganda were deeply in-
volved in the First Congo War, while the Second Congo War drew in 
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most of the Great Lakes countries and others from East, Central, and 
Southern Africa.6 A problematic peace agreement signed in December 
2002 led to an elected government that continued many of the abusive 
practices of the past. Meanwhile, the conflict continued in the east, as 
neighboring states and local militias plundered the country’s mineral 
wealth. A UN peacekeeping force, first deployed in 2000, did little to 
protect the civilian population and indeed was often party to the abuses. 
Peace remained elusive, and in March 2017 the Security Council renewed 
the peacekeeping mandate for another year.
The First Congo War (1996–97)
Foreign intervention in Zaire after the Cold War sparked the First Congo 
War. On its face an indigenous rebel insurgency, the war was in reality a 
continuation of the Rwandan civil war that had begun in 1990 and cul-
minated in the 1994 genocide and the seizure of power by the RPF. In 
October 1996, after the international community ignored RPF appeals 
to halt extremist attacks, the Rwandan army launched a raid into Zaire 
to destroy Hutu refugee camps and to encourage Zairian Tutsis to rebel. 
A rebel army called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was established a few weeks later. A creation of 
the Rwandan government, the AFDL operated under the authority of 
Colonel James Kabarebe, commander of Rwanda’s presidential guard. It 
was staffed with Zairian exiles, including Zairian Tutsis who had joined 
the RPF in their struggle against the Habyarimana regime and who were 
anxious to avenge the deaths of family members in Zaire. Rebel sol-
diers—including some 10,000 unemployed youths and street children—
were trained, equipped, and led by the Rwandan army. The organization’s 
spokesman, Zairian warlord Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was handpicked by 
the Kigali regime.
 A rebel leader during antigovernment insurrections in the 1960s, 
Kabila had established a personal fiefdom in Zaire’s eastern region, 
which served as a base for extensive smuggling operations. In the de-
cades after independence, Kabila grew rich from trafficking in gold, 
diamonds, ivory, and leopard skins and divided his time between luxury 
homes in Tanzania and Uganda. Entering Zaire with the Rwandan army 
in October 1996, he focused his operation on three geographic areas: the 
food- and gold-producing provinces of eastern Zaire; the copper- and 
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cobalt-rich Shaba Province; and the diamond-rich East Kasai Province.7 
Along with their enormous wealth, these regions had a long history of 
rebellion against the central government.
 By November, the AFDL and its Rwandan backers controlled the 
Zairian borderlands from Uganda to Burundi. Killing thousands of ci-
vilians in the east, where Tutsis had been persecuted, the rebel soldiers 
plundered everywhere they went. They quickly defeated Zaire’s undis-
ciplined army, which raped, looted, and killed as it retreated, and they 
emptied the refugee camps, forcing as many as 700,000 Hutus back into 
Rwanda. Another 300,000 to 600,000 Hutus and tens of thousands of 
Zairians fled westward into the rainforest, pursued by the AFDL and 
Rwandan forces. The rebels and their Rwandan backers slaughtered 
men, women, and children, making no distinction between former Hutu 
Power soldiers, government officials, and militia members, on the one 
hand, and innocent Hutu civilians on the other. Tens of thousands of 
people were killed outright, while tens of thousands more died of dys-
entery, cholera, malaria, and starvation. The response from the interna-
tional community was muted. While aid organizations tried to cope with 
the humanitarian disaster, the UN Security Council remained on the 
sidelines. France called for humanitarian and military intervention, but 
its claim to humanitarian concern was weakened by its support for the 
Hutu Power regime during the genocide and its preoccupation with the 
dominance of anglophone countries. The United States and the United 
Kingdom, embarrassed by their failure to act in 1994, refused to counte-
nance criticism of the RPF.
 The Zairian war quickly became a regional one. As Kabila’s rebel 
forces pushed north and west, the Ugandan army moved in to assist 
them. As they approached Angola, antigovernment rebels from the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), who 
were longtime Mobutu allies, joined Zairian soldiers in the fight. UNITA’s 
involvement brought the Angolan government into the war on the side 
of the AFDL. The Luanda government permitted Kabila’s soldiers to 
enter Zaire from Angolan territory and provided Angolan army aux-
iliaries to supplement their ranks. Zaire’s third-largest city, Kisangani, 
which was poorly defended by Zairian soldiers and French and Serbian 
mercenaries, fell to the rebels in March 1997. A few days later, the rebels 
took Mbuji-Mayi, the capital of East Kasai. During the second week of 
April, the AFDL arrived in Lubumbashi, Zaire’s second-largest city and 
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the capital of Shaba Province. Foreign mining interests—including South 
Africa’s De Beers and Anglo American and Canada’s America Mineral 
Fields—initiated contacts with the AFDL and began to discuss future 
investments. Zambia allowed the AFDL to attack the mining town of 
Kolwezi from Zambian territory, while Zimbabwe provided the rebels 
with military equipment. By the middle of April 1997, Kabila, his army, 
and his foreign backers controlled all of Zaire’s major sources of revenue 
and foreign exchange.
 As the rebels and their external supporters swept one thousand 
miles across Zaire toward the nation’s capital, Mobutu’s Western allies 
abandoned him; only France supported the regime to the bitter end. 
US officials established contact with Kabila’s top political and military 
aides even before the AFDL took Kinshasa. In the Security Council, 
Washington blocked French initiatives for humanitarian intervention, 
which might have stopped the rebellion’s progress, and in the final weeks 
the Clinton administration urged Mobutu to step down. Having “lost” 
Rwanda to anglophone interests, France was desperate to save Zaire for 
la francophonie. Determined to thwart Kabila, whom it viewed as a Ugan-
dan proxy and promoter of US interests in the region, Paris initiated a 
covert operation shortly after the RPF invasion that provided Mobutu 
Photo 7.1. Rwandan Hutu refugees on the jungle track from Kisangani to Ubundu, 
DRC, June 8, 1997. Photo by Derek Hudson/Getty Images. 
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with combat aircraft, pilots, mechanics, and hundreds of French, Bel-
gian, Serbian, Ukrainian, and South African mercenaries.
 As Zaire’s neighbors teamed up on opposing sides, South Africa as-
sumed the role of mediator. In early May 1997, President Nelson Mandela 
hosted talks between Kabila and Mobutu. In a last-ditch attempt to cling 
to power, Mobutu proposed a transitional government followed by elec-
tions. Kabila, however, was not interested in democracy. He demanded 
instead that Mobutu hand over the reins of government or face the con-
sequences. On May 17, Mobutu fled into exile. To avoid a bloodbath in 
the capital, the Zairian national army stood down, and the AFDL took 
Kinshasa without a fight. Kabila immediately declared himself president 
and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. Refusing 
to work with the internal democratic opposition that had mobilized 
against the Mobutu regime, he rejected the notion of a broad-based 
coalition government. Like Mobutu, Kabila outlawed opposition parties, 
imprisoned political opponents and human rights activists, and ruled 
by decree. Opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi was imprisoned and 
then sent into internal exile, while Mobutu loyalists were rehabilitated 
and incorporated into the government. Kabila, like his predecessor, ad-
ministered the country through relatives and cronies, dividing the spoils 
among them. Accepting Kabila as the lesser evil, Washington blocked 
Security Council condemnation of his regime.
The Second Congo War (1998–2002)
Kabila rose to power as Rwanda’s and Uganda’s proxy, but the honey-
moon did not last. Kabila pursued his own agenda. Instead of destroy-
ing the remnants of the Hutu Power army, he used them to build his 
own fighting force, and his patrons quickly turned against him. The 
Second Congo War began in August 1998 when Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Burundi teamed up to oust the Kabila regime. Most Great Lakes 
countries entered the fray, along with some from East, Central, and 
Southern Africa. On Kabila’s side were Angola and Zimbabwe, which 
had supported the AFDL during the First Congo War, along with Na-
mibia, Chad, and Sudan—as well as 15,000 to 25,000 Hutu fighters from 
Rwanda and Burundi.
 The movement toward war began in February 1998, when Rwan-
dans in the AFDL leadership began to plot Kabila’s removal. In July, 
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suspecting disloyalty in the Congolese army, Kabila dismissed several 
high-level Rwandan commanders, including James Kabarebe, former 
head of Rwanda’s presidential guard who served as the Congolese army’s 
chief of staff. Kabila also launched an anti-Tutsi campaign in Kinshasa, 
where civilians had been humiliated and abused by Rwandan soldiers. 
The government’s actions triggered new unrest in the capital and in the 
east, where Rwandan officers in the Congolese army instigated a rebel-
lion. Blaming Rwanda for the strife, Kabila ordered all Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops to leave the DRC. Without its external backers, the 
Congolese army quickly disintegrated. When the Second Congo War 
erupted in August, James Kabarebe led the Rwandan operation.
 Once again, Rwanda and Uganda enlisted indigenous proxies to 
promote their agendas. The disparate rebel factions, which had little 
popular support, included Congolese Tutsis linked to the Rwandan gov-
ernment, Mobutu cronies who hoped to return to power, disappointed 
office seekers denied positions in Kabila’s government, and leftist intel-
lectuals disenchanted with Kabila’s corrupt personal rule. The largest 
rebel organization was the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Like 
the AFDL, the RCD was an instrument of the Kigali government. Rwan-
dan army officers commanded the RCD military organization; its inef-
fectual political organization comprised an eclectic group of Mobutu 
loyalists and military officers, corrupt opportunists, and disillusioned 
intellectuals. Rife with internal rivalries, in 1999 the RCD broke into 
two. Rwanda threw its support to RCD-Goma, which was dominated 
by young Congolese Tutsis who sought land, citizenship, and opportu-
nity in a country where they had suffered violence and discrimination. 
Uganda favored RCD-Kisangani, which was led by leftist intellectuals. 
Uganda also sponsored the Movement for the Liberation of Congo 
(MLC), led by multimillionaire Jean-Pierre Bemba—one of the DRC’s 
wealthiest men and son of a close Mobutu associate. The MLC’s mili-
tary leadership included numerous veterans of Mobutu’s army, many 
of whom had been trained in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
China, or Morocco. Uganda eventually forced a merger of the two or-
ganizations, establishing the Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLC) 
under Bemba’s leadership.
 The war shredded the country’s social fabric. In the eastern 
DRC, Rwanda replaced indigenous chiefs with local administrations 
staffed by Congolese Tutsis and established militias and police forces 
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to further its interests. Hoping to protect themselves from the depre-
dations of Rwandan soldiers and their proxies, eastern communities 
formed self-defense forces known as Mai-Mai.8 However, these armed 
groups also wreaked havoc in the countryside. Alienated, unemployed 
youths saw opportunities for enrichment through pillaging and bribes. 
Personal quarrels, land disputes, and clan and ethnic rivalries grew in-
creasingly politicized and violent. Killings spurred retaliatory blood-
shed, instigating spirals of violence. All sides systematically employed 
rape as a weapon of war to humiliate and terrorize the Congolese 
population.
 As Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi undermined Kabila, other coun-
tries came to his rescue. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia cited the 
SADC security pact as the basis for their intervention, while Chad sent 
troops to bolster French and francophone influence, and Sudan sought 
to undermine Uganda in retaliation for its support for the SPLA insur-
gency. Zimbabwe’s involvement was the most significant. Harare sent 
12,000 soldiers to Kabila’s aid, funding its war effort with the DRC’s own 
resources. Although Zimbabwe had no legitimate security claims in the 
DRC, it did have economic interests. Kabila owed Zimbabwe for mili-
tary equipment and supplies delivered during the 1996–97 war, and Zim-
babwe was anxious for repayment. Moreover, Robert Mugabe’s regime 
hoped that unfettered access to the DRC’s riches would appease powerful 
domestic constituencies in Zimbabwe that might otherwise protest their 
own government’s failed policies. Mugabe therefore gave Zimbabwean 
political, economic, and military elites free rein to plunder Katanga’s 
copper and cobalt and to loot diamonds from East Kasai.
 If Zimbabwe did not have legitimate security concerns in the DRC, 
Angola did. The Luanda government was anxious to protect Angola’s oil 
and diamond regions, especially the oil-rich Cabinda Enclave, which was 
separated from the bulk of Angola by a wedge of Congolese territory. It 
was troubled by the presence of UNITA supply routes in the western 
DRC, the threat of renewed attacks from Congolese soil, and UNITA’s 
illegal mining of Congolese diamonds to finance its war against the An-
golan government. Beyond these immediate considerations, Luanda was 
disturbed by the growing power of Uganda and Rwanda in the Central 
African region and their support for rebel forces that included Mobutu 
stalwarts. Angola entered the war in the hope of shoring up the weak 
Kabila regime.
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 Namibia’s concerns dovetailed with those of both Angola and Zim-
babwe. Like Angola, Namibia was anxious to weaken UNITA, which 
supported a secessionist movement in the Caprivi Strip, while Namibian 
elites, like those in Zimbabwe, had developed extensive mining interests 
in the DRC.
 Like Western powers in the twentieth century, the DRC’s African 
neighbors bled the country dry. A 2001 UN Security Council report 
charged Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi with the systematic looting of 
the DRC and also implicated Zimbabwe. These countries stole Congo-
lese diamonds, gold, coltan, cobalt, copper, tin, timber, and cash crops 
worth billions of dollars, which they used to finance their own develop-
ment. Other sources indicate that from 1996 to 2009, Rwanda dominated 
the mineral-rich provinces of North and South Kivu and effectively 
integrated them into its domestic economy. Rwanda’s internationally 
acclaimed economic growth, achieved since the 1994 genocide, was actu-
alized with the DRC’s stolen wealth. Meanwhile, Ugandan soldiers took 
control of gold-bearing regions in North Kivu and Orientale Provinces, 
where they forced locals to extract the gold for Ugandan interests. After 
peace accords were signed in 2002, Rwanda and Uganda continued to 
support rebel proxies who plundered on their behalf.
Peace Accords and Continuing Crisis (2000–2008)
While neighboring states fought over the DRC’s resources, other entities, 
led by South Africa and the OAU, attempted to mediate a lasting peace. 
A series of talks held in Zambia in 1999 resulted in a ceasefire and the 
establishment of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which included repre-
sentatives of the Congolese government, rebel forces, the internal politi-
cal opposition, and civil society organizations. In February 2000, the UN 
Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Or-
ganization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
with a Chapter VII mandate that allowed it to monitor the ceasefire and to 
protect UN personnel and facilities as well as Congolese civilians. How-
ever, the conflict continued as all parties violated the ceasefire agreement. 
After a devastating battlefield defeat in December 2000 and signals from 
Zimbabwe and Angola that they could no longer support his failing war, 
Kabila was forced to consider concessions. A new chapter began in January 
2001, when Laurent Kabila was assassinated by a disgruntled bodyguard, 
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and Joseph Kabila, a major-general in the Congolese army and onetime 
protégé of James Kabarebe, succeeded his father as president.
 The younger Kabila initiated abrupt changes to many of his father’s 
policies and reopened the stalled peace negotiations. A series of accords 
signed in 2002 were intended to conclude the Second Congo War. They 
provided the framework for multiparty elections, a transitional govern-
ment, and the withdrawal of all 30,000 Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
from Congolese territory. A new national army was to be constituted, 
composed of government and rebel soldiers and former militia mem-
bers. The entities that had devastated the DRC would henceforth be en-
trusted with protecting it.
 The peace accords notwithstanding, violence in the DRC persisted. 
In May 2003, following the departure of Ugandan troops from Orientale 
Province, ethnic militias fighting for control of the region slaughtered 
hundreds of civilians. In response, the Security Council authorized the 
Interim Emergency Multinational Force, a peace enforcement mission 
with a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians, infrastructure, and UN 
personnel and facilities in the region. Codenamed Operation Artemis, 
the enterprise was led by France and staffed primarily by French sol-
diers, and it promoted France’s agenda of maintaining a strong presence 
in francophone Africa. In July, the Security Council strengthened 
MONUC’s mandate, allowing it to use greater force in Orientale and 
North and South Kivu Provinces; it also imposed an arms embargo on 
rebel groups and militias.
 In July 2003, while violence continued in the east, the transitional 
government took office in Kinshasa. Joseph Kabila remained at the 
helm, where he supervised four vice presidents representing various 
regions and constituencies. Members of the internal political oppo-
sition, prodemocracy movement, and other civil society bodies were 
notably absent. Two of the vice presidents were former rebel leaders. 
MLC/FLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba was vice president in charge of 
the Economic and Finance Commission. Under his leadership, the 
FLC had stolen millions of dollars’ worth of gold, timber, and cus-
toms revenues from territories under its control. Bemba’s new position 
allowed him to oversee the continued plunder of Congolese riches. 
Azarias Ruberwa Manywa, secretary-general of RCD-Goma, assumed 
the vice presidency in charge of the Politics, Defence and Security 
Commission, which gave him authority over former rebels, militias, 
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and the national army. Outside the government, Kabila loyalists, one-
time rebel leaders, and local militiamen continued to control their re-
spective fiefdoms.
 The transitional period officially concluded in 2006 with the adop-
tion of a new constitution, followed by presidential and parliamentary 
elections. The July 2006 elections were fraught with controversy. Several 
key opposition parties boycotted the vote, charging that Kabila, former 
warlords, and other contenders were using militias to intimidate the ci-
vilian population. Election Day was marred by violence and allegations 
of fraud. None of the presidential candidates won a majority. A runoff 
election was held in October, and Joseph Kabila was declared the win-
ner. While international observers claimed that the October election 
was basically free and fair, runner-up Jean-Pierre Bemba disputed the 
results and refused to disband his militia. Fighting between the presi-
dential guard and Bemba’s militia in March 2007 resulted in 300 deaths 
and a warrant for Bemba’s arrest on charges of high treason. Bemba fled 
into exile.9
Photo 7.2. Young soldiers of the Rwandan-backed Union of Congolese Patriots 
militia in Bule, DRC, 2003. Photo by Marcus Bleasdale/Human Rights Watch.
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 Meanwhile, war in the eastern DRC continued. The Kigali regime, 
frequently working through Congolese Tutsis, was deeply implicated. 
Some collaborators had served in the Rwandan army, led Rwanda-backed 
rebel forces, and passed through the revolving door of Congolese rebel 
and army regulars in the wake of the peace accords. Many were engaged 
in minerals trafficking or other illicit activities. General Laurent Nkunda 
was emblematic of this trend. As a Congolese Tutsi living in Uganda, 
Nkunda had joined the RPF and served as an intelligence officer during 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide. He returned to Zaire with the AFDL forces 
that ousted Mobutu. During the Second Congo War, Nkunda led the 
Rwanda-backed RCD-Goma and was implicated in the mass slaughter of 
Hutu civilians. Following the 2002 peace accords, he joined the Congo-
lese army. Two years later, he returned to the bush to fight for control of 
the eastern DRC, where his criminal network terrorized the local popu-
lation and taxed the gold, coltan, tin ore, and agricultural products that 
passed through the region.
 By 2007, Nkunda’s movement, which he called the National Con-
gress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), had some 4,000 members. 
Photo 7.3. Child gold miner in Watsa, northeastern DRC, 2004. Photo by Marcus 
Bleasdale/Human Rights Watch.
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Trained, equipped, and financed by the Rwandan army, the CNDP in-
cluded former rebels and militia members who had been slated for 
integration into the new national army, but instead had languished in 
filthy, overcrowded camps. Others were child soldiers, many of whom 
had been recruited by force. Still others had been seconded from the 
Rwandan army—with the complicity of the Kigali regime. Outgunned 
and outmaneuvered, the poorly trained, ill-equipped Congolese national 
army allied with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR), a Rwandan Hutu militia with links to the 1994 genocide.
 In January 2008, following mediation by the AU, the EU, and the 
United States, the Kabila government, the CNDP, and twenty-one other 
rebel groups and militias signed a ceasefire and peace agreement. Like 
the 2002 accord, the 2008 agreement stipulated that thousands of reb-
els and militia members would be integrated into the national army. In 
August, however, the agreement collapsed. Nkunda charged the govern-
ment with violating the terms of the ceasefire and, once again, returned 
to the bush to fight. At the end of October, Nkunda’s forces, led by Jean 
Bosco Ntaganda, routed the Congolese army near Goma, the capital of 
North Kivu Province, where they burned homes, raped women and girls, 
executed men and boys, and press-ganged children. Neither the UN 
peacekeepers nor the retreating Congolese army intervened to protect 
the civilians.
Peace Accords and Continuing Crisis (2009–17)
Concerned that a third Congo war might be imminent, the international 
community pushed for further negotiations. In January 2009, the Kin-
shasa and Kigali governments signed a secret deal that was intended to 
end the conflict and strengthen the position of both presidents in their 
respective countries. Kabila agreed to allow 4,000 Rwandan soldiers to 
return to the DRC to disarm thousands of FDLR members, while Rwan-
dan President Paul Kagame forced Nkunda out of the CNDP and arrested 
him when he fled to Rwanda. The CNDP’s new leader was Jean Bosco 
Ntaganda, a Rwandan-Congolese Tutsi whom the ICC had charged with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.10 Ntaganda announced that he 
would give up the rebellion, integrate his forces into the Congolese na-
tional army, where he would assume the rank of general, and help the 
army destroy the Hutu militias.
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 The CNDP was officially brought into the process through an agree-
ment signed on March 23 that was deeply flawed. The new accord met 
the rebels’ central demands. CNDP political prisoners would be released, 
and amnesty would be granted in accordance with international law. For-
mer rebels would be integrated into the DRC’s military and police struc-
tures, and their organization would be transformed into a political party 
that would be permitted to participate in DRC political life. However, the 
accord also returned to Kigali some of the ground it had conceded in the 
secret January deal. Since 1996, Rwanda had sponsored numerous rebel-
lions in the eastern DRC, and its desire to harness the region’s mineral 
wealth to its own development had not diminished. The incorporation 
of CNDP cadres into the DRC’s security forces provided Kigali with a 
proxy force inside the Congolese national army—one that had a veneer 
of legitimacy. In addition, the March 23 agreement failed to address other 
critical issues. Like its predecessors, the new accord ignored the internal 
causes of the Congolese conflict: competition for land and resources, the 
impunity of armed groups and their external backers, and the absence 
of responsive government, rule of law, and a security sector that could 
protect the civilian population. In short, the chances for a lasting peace 
remained slim.
 The continued impunity of human rights abusers was immediately 
apparent. In January and February 2009, the DRC and Rwanda con-
ducted a joint action against FDLR militias, followed by a DRC-MONUC 
operation that lasted through December. The DRC-Rwanda venture was 
marred by serious abuses against Congolese civilians. When MONUC 
replaced Rwanda as the DRC’s partner, it did not impose preconditions 
or require the removal of human rights abusers from positions of au-
thority. Jean Bosco Ntaganda served as deputy commander of the new 
enterprise, which included 60,000 Congolese army soldiers. MONUC 
helped plan the operation and supplied logistical and operations sup-
port, including trucks, attack helicopters, and weapons, as well as $1 
million per month in daily rations, fuel, and other services. The United 
States, which provided one-quarter of the MONUC budget, assisted the 
Congolese army with intelligence gathering. In April, the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs warned that UN peacekeepers could not legally participate 
in operations that included Ntaganda, who was had been accused of seri-
ous human rights violations. The UN Policy Committee, which includes 
the heads of all UN agencies, asserted in June that MONUC could not 
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engage in joint combat operations with Congolese forces if there were 
risks of human rights abuses. Despite these cautions, the joint mission 
proceeded as planned.
 The ten-month-long DRC-MONUC operation took a horrific toll 
on the civilian population. More than 1,000 civilians were killed, and 1 
million were displaced. Thousands of men, women, and children were 
press-ganged as porters for army or militia forces. The military campaign 
also worsened the DRC’s rape epidemic. Between January and Septem-
ber 2009, the number of reported rapes tripled; the vast majority were 
committed by government soldiers. UN military commanders admitted 
that many of the 13,500 former rebels and militia members who recently 
had been integrated into the Congolese national army were looting, rap-
ing, and killing civilians. Yet it was not until November that MONUC 
suspended aid to Congolese army units that had been implicated in the 
abuses. The UN forces not only had failed to protect the civilians they 
were mandated to protect, but they had partnered with the army that 
actively abused them.
 Anxious to shift the focus, Kabila charged the UN with violating 
Congolese sovereignty and insisted that MONUC forces begin to with-
draw by June 2010, the fiftieth anniversary of Congolese independence. 
In May 2010, the Security Council authorized a reduction of military 
personnel in more secure areas but refused to sanction a complete with-
drawal. To appease Kabila, it changed the name of the UN operation to 
the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), suggesting that the UN peace-
keepers were supporting the Congolese government rather than usurp-
ing its authority.
 Assured of continued international backing, Kabila refused to ad-
dress the DRC’s deep structural problems and continued to consolidate 
his own power. Using bribery and coercion to thwart challenges to his 
authority, he curtailed the powers of parliament and the judiciary. An 
electoral commission staffed by Kabila loyalists declared him the winner 
of presidential elections in 2011 that were widely viewed as corrupt. Nei-
ther MONUSCO, which provided technical and logistical support for 
the elections, nor the EU and the UK, both of which helped to finance 
them, thwarted Kabila’s attempts to assert control.
 It was in this context that Kabila decided to sideline Ntaganda, who 
was wanted by the ICC on charges of war crimes. Ntaganda’s removal 
178  |  The Democratic Republic of Congo
would serve three purposes. First, it would appease international donors 
who were concerned about Ntaganda’s involvement in human rights 
abuses. Second, it would weaken the CNDP’s parallel structures within 
the national army, which threatened Kabila’s authority. Third, it would 
offer the president an opportunity to rally the Congolese population 
against an external enemy (Rwanda), while diverting attention from his 
own deficiencies.
 Kabila’s move against Ntaganda was the last straw for former CNDP 
members who had joined the national army after the March 23, 2009, 
peace agreement. In April 2012, Congolese Tutsi soldiers, led by Nta-
ganda, defected from the national army, charging that the government 
had failed to fulfill the obligations delineated in the accords.11 The March 
23 Movement (M23) made common cause with local militias that were 
hostile to the central government and quickly asserted control over key 
parts of the eastern region. Once again, Rwanda and Uganda provided 
seasoned troops, weapons, logistical support, and tactical advice—in 
violation of a 2003 UN arms embargo. Routed in battle after battle, hu-
miliated government soldiers raped, killed, and looted as they fled. As 
M23 gained strength, the DRC army teamed up with criminals and reju-
venated its alliance with Hutu extremists in the FDLR.
 The international community was under pressure to respond. The 
United States and several EU member states reduced or temporarily 
suspended aid to Rwanda. However, they refused to impose sanctions 
and continued to ignore links between Rwanda’s rapid economic devel-
opment and its looting of Congolese resources. The question of Rwanda 
divided the US State Department. Two senior officials, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson as well as R. Barrie Walk-
ley, special advisor for the Great Lakes and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, insisted that Rwanda must cease its support for M23. In contrast, 
UN Ambassador Susan Rice claimed that there was no conclusive evi-
dence linking Rwanda to the rebel organization, and she used her influ-
ence to shield Rwanda and Uganda from criticism in the UN Security 
Council.12
 While the EU and the United States stood by, the UN, AU, ICGLR, 
and SADC initiated another round of peace negotiations. In Febru-
ary 2013, eleven ICGLR and SADC member states, including Rwanda, 
Uganda, and the DRC, signed a regional peace and security framework 
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in which they agreed not to support armed groups against their neigh-
bors or otherwise interfere in their affairs. The DRC also promised, 
once again, to reform its army and government, establish its authority 
in the eastern region, and promote reconciliation and democratization 
throughout the country. The UN, AU, ICGLR, and SADC were autho-
rized to oversee implementation of the accord, while the EU, France, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States were assigned sup-
porting roles.
 The 2013 agreement, like its predecessors, was a top-down affair con-
ceptualized by outsiders that failed to address key underlying problems. 
Instability in the eastern DRC grew from local conflicts over land, min-
erals, power, and identity. None of the international efforts—including 
billions of dollars spent on UN peacekeepers—had addressed these is-
sues. The 2013 framework was vaguely worded, and the mechanisms for 
enforcement were unclear. Two of the signatories, Rwanda and Uganda, 
had supported Congolese rebel insurgencies since 1996 and had profited 
enormously from the illicit minerals trade. They had little incentive to 
comply with the most recent endeavor. Rwanda was a mainstay of the 
AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, and Uganda had taken the lead 
in the AU effort against al-Shabaab in Somalia. As significant players in 
African peacekeeping efforts and in the war on terror, both countries 
were confident of continued Western support, no matter what they did in 
the DRC. As long as instability prevailed across their borders, they were 
unlikely to refrain from intervention.
 The regional peace initiative was followed by a UN effort to exert 
greater force against the Congolese rebels. In March 2013, the Security 
Council authorized the Force Intervention Brigade—the UN’s first of-
fensive combat formation—which would be permitted to disarm and 
neutralize rebel soldiers, monitor the UN arms embargo, and report 
on the flow of military personnel, arms, and equipment across in-
ternational boundaries. The UN combat force, which included 3,069 
soldiers from SADC member states South Africa, Malawi, and Tan-
zania, tipped the balance in favor of the DRC government. Following 
a string of defeats and significant loss of territory, M23 ended its in-
surgency in November and signed a peace accord in December. With 
M23 neutralized, the UN brigade was tasked with confronting other 
armed groups in the east, in particular the FDLR. In 2014 and 2015, it 
180  |  The Democratic Republic of Congo
successfully disarmed fighters from other organizations but did little 
to weaken the Hutu extremist force at the heart of Rwanda’s concern. 
By 2017, the UN intervention brigade was widely deemed to have been 
ineffective. It had failed to hold the ground taken or to protect civil-
ians under its care.
 Once again, external military intervention brought short-term suc-
cess, but no long-term solution. The prospects for peace in the DRC 
remained bleak. In 2016 Kabila completed his second and final term 
as president, but he refused to hold elections for a successor. Scores of 
people were killed and hundreds arrested when they protested the con-
stitutional violation. New violence flared in Kasai and Kasai Central 
Provinces, where more than 5,000 people were killed and 1.5 million dis-
placed between August 2016 and December 2017. Civilians in the eastern 
region continued to be preyed upon by armed groups and DRC security 
forces, which were incapable of neutralizing armed opponents and un-
interested in protecting civilians.
Photo 7.4. Congolese army and MONUSCO reinforce their presence in and 
around Goma, DRC, after clashes with M23 rebels, May 21, 2013. Photo by Clara 
Padovan/MONUSCO.
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Conclusion
Instability in the DRC was the product of both internal and external 
factors. Longstanding political, economic, and social inequalities, the 
legacies of colonial and Cold War practices, and the determination of 
political and economic elites to protect their power and wealth led to 
numerous domestic conflicts that foreign interests were able to exploit. 
Although the presence of Rwandan genocide perpetrators served as 
the immediate justification for intervention in the 1990s, this rationale 
masked many others. The DRC’s mineral riches attracted the attention of 
outsiders, who pillaged the country’s wealth to build their own. Plunder 
became both the object of war and the means of fueling it. Although the 
UN, the AU, and African subregional bodies sponsored plans to estab-
lish stability and a framework for a new political order, their efforts were 
hindered by the competing interests of their members and the failure to 
address underlying causes of local conflicts.
 Local conflicts and resources exploited by outsiders, deficient 
agreements negotiated by political elites, and peacekeeping forces that 
failed to protect civilian lives also plagued the West African countries 
of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Civil war and foreign intervention in those 
countries ultimately brought the UN, African subregional bodies, and 
former colonial powers to the scene. These conflicts are the subject of 
chapter 8.
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A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1998), offers a compelling overview of colonial con-
quest, exploitation, and contemporary human rights protests that altered 
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Congo policy. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, 
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2002), examines the role of the UN, Western powers, and Cuba in the 
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uses declassified Belgian government documents and interviews to ex-
pose the Belgian government role in Lumumba’s death. Emmanuel Ge-
rard and Bruce Kuklick, Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), includes new findings 
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Lumumba’s murder.
 Several recommended books focus on Mobutu’s Zaire. Crawford 
Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), examines the transfor-
mation of the Belgian colonial bureaucracy into a corrupt, personalized, 
neopatrimonial state. Two books by Michael G. Schatzberg are also rec-
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Michela Wrong’s In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Di-
saster in the Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001) provides a nuanced 
and highly readable account of the making of the Mobutu dictatorship 
and its support by Western powers.
 The regional dynamics of the First and Second Congo Wars are ex-
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and Memory, ed. René Lemarchand (Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2011), 20–36. Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the 
Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), examines the international in-
tervention in 2003–6 that neglected to address local grievances and thus 
failed to end the conflict. Philip Roessler, Ethnic Politics and State Power 
in Africa: The Logic of the Coup–Civil War Trap (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), examines the tempestuous balance between po-
litical factions, ethnic alliances, and external powers in the DRC con-
flict. Philip Roessler and Harry Verhoeven, Why Comrades Go to War: 
Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa’s Deadliest Conflict (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), explains the regional war as an out-
growth of the failure to prioritize institution and nation building after 
Mobutu’s ouster.
 Several works focus on Rwandan actions in Zaire/DRC and the re-
fusal of the international community to hold the RPF government ac-
countable. Beyond the works mentioned in the previous paragraph, see, 
especially, two essays in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., Remaking 
Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2011): Filip Reyntjens, “Waging (Civil) 
War Abroad: Rwanda and the DRC,” 132–51, and Jason Stearns and Fed-
erico Borello, “Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan Crimes in the 
Congo,” 152–69. Marie Béatrice Umutesi, Surviving the Slaughter: The 
Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire, trans. Julie Emerson (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), is a valuable account by a Rwandan 
Hutu who survived the mass slaughter of Hutu refugees in Zaire/DRC by 
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Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late 
Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), de-
scribed in Suggested Reading for chapter 6, explores the ways in which 
RPF power holders manipulated Western media, government, and NGO 
understandings of Rwanda and of the conflict in Zaire/DRC. In contrast, 
Philip Gourevitch sometimes blurs the distinction between Hutu civilian 
refugees from violence and genocide perpetrators. Critics have accused 
him of portraying RPF actions against Rwandan Hutu and Congolese 
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Liberia and Sierra Leone
regional War and license to plunder (1990–2003)
in west africa, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, post–Cold 
War conflicts pitted neighbor against neighbor and attracted the atten-
tion of international bodies and extracontinental powers. By the turn of 
the twenty-first century, war had engulfed West Africa’s Mano River re-
gion, including full-scale hostilities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte 
d’Ivoire. The fighting also impinged on Guinea, which was overwhelmed 
by hundreds of thousands of refugees and subjected to relentless attacks 
on its own population.1 These wars consumed more than 250,000 lives 
between 1990 and 2003 and scattered millions of refugees to half a dozen 
neighboring countries. Weaponry flooded the region, with new stocks 
augmenting those left over from the Cold War. African countries orches-
trated the most significant interventions—sometimes unilaterally, some-
times under the auspices of ECOWAS with UN or other extracontinental 
backing. Former colonial powers also played notable roles: the United 
Kingdom in the case of Sierra Leone, and France in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire. The failure of the United States to take action in Liberia, which 
in many ways had been a quasi-colony, was an exception to the general 
practice. The predominant rationale for intervention was the desire to 
reestablish stability and to protect civilian lives. Although terrorist orga-
nizations had financial interests in the region and supported rebel fac-
tions that promoted their concerns, the war on terror was not a factor in 
foreign intervention during this period.
 Although the response to instability/responsibility to protect para-
digm encapsulates the prevailing justifications for intervention, once 
again, the reality was more complicated. The African subregional body 
ECOWAS interceded in all three conflicts—officially, to reestablish peace 
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and security. Some member states played important mediation and 
peacekeeping roles. However, some states took advantage of the turmoil 
to further their own political and economic interests. Several ECOWAS 
members backed rebel groups and strongmen in their attempts to over-
throw neighboring states; others supported the governments in power 
but allowed their soldiers to plunder with impunity. Mercenaries, private 
military companies, and international arms merchants, in search of new 
opportunities at the end of the Cold War, scoured the region for new 
outlets for their wares and services. Terrorist organizations, anxious to 
launder their finances, were eager to invest in the region’s diamonds and 
offered rebel movements sophisticated weapons in return. In Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, diamonds, like strategic minerals in the DRC and oil in 
Sudan and South Sudan, became both an object of struggle and a means 
of perpetuating the violence.
 This chapter examines foreign intervention in wars that engulfed 
Liberia (1990–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002) and affected neigh-
boring countries. Chapter 9 examines external involvement in the war 
in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–11), which was influenced by regional strife and 
began as the other wars were winding down. All three cases illustrate 
the complexities and mixed consequences of external involvement. In 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, unilateral intervention by neighboring coun-
tries exacerbated tensions and intensified violence. The engagement of 
multinational entities, although problematic, ultimately helped end the 
violence and establish new political orders. However, inadequate means 
for rebuilding the nations, aggravated by externally imposed structural 
adjustment programs, ensured that poverty, social tensions, and compe-
tition for power and resources would continue. The unresolved struc-
tural problems that lay at the root of the earlier wars thus remained a 
threat to regional peace and security.
Setting the Stage in Liberia:  
US Colony and Cold War Ally (1817–1985)
Liberia was the first of the Mano River countries to descend into war in 
the post–Cold War era. Founded by freed American slaves in the early 
nineteenth century, Liberia, like Mobutu’s Zaire, was a vital US ally. For 
133 years, Americo-Liberian settlers and their descendants, who consti-
tuted some 5 percent of the population, monopolized wealth and power 
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in a system that oppressed the indigenous population. The United States 
provided a succession of Americo-Liberian dictators with substantial 
military and economic support in exchange for access to strategic re-
sources and services as regional policemen. The Liberia-US alliance 
reached its apogee during the Cold War. As East-West tensions waned, 
Liberian strongmen provoked ethnic violence to maintain their hold on 
power, and the country was beset by a series of conflicts that ultimately 
engulfed the entire Mano River region.
 The Liberian civil war of 1990–2003 was preceded by a century and a 
half of corrupt and repressive rule. The saga began with the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade, which removed millions of men, women, and children from 
West Africa over the course of more than 300 years. Although human 
trade across the Atlantic was effectively outlawed in 1807, it continued 
illegally throughout much of the nineteenth century.2 Slavery itself was 
not banned in the United States until 1865. During the intervening years, 
many in the American power elite worried that the growing number of 
free people of African descent might encourage a large-scale slave revolt. 
Slave holders and their sympathizers therefore advocated the return of 
free blacks to Africa. At the same time, many free blacks and white abo-
litionists believed that resettlement in Africa might lead to happier, more 
productive lives for people of color. In 1817, the American Colonization 
Society was established to facilitate the back-to-Africa movement. The 
society purchased a strip of land on the West African coast and named 
its colony Liberia—the “land of freedom.” In 1847 the colony became an 
independent state under the authority of Americo-Liberian settlers who, 
like their Euro-American contemporaries, considered Africans unfit to 
govern themselves.
 During much of the twentieth century, Liberia was an American col-
ony in all but name. The US government and American businesses had 
enormous influence over the country’s affairs. In the early 1920s, US over-
seas investments in critical raw materials expanded rapidly, and rubber- 
rich Liberia was the focus of considerable interest. Tire tycoon Harvey 
Firestone obtained a 1 million acre concession in Liberia to develop what 
would become the world’s largest rubber plantation. To guarantee the 
Firestone investment, a commission that included a US government advi-
sor took charge of Liberia’s finances. For the next three decades, Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company virtually controlled the Liberian economy and 
retained Liberian government officials on the company payroll.
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 Liberian governmental corruption and repression peaked during 
the regime of President William Tubman, an Americo-Liberian who 
ruled the country from 1944 to 1971. Tubman built a powerful network of 
secret police and regarded the public treasury as his private bank. During 
the Cold War, he was a staunch US ally, and his regime was rewarded 
with massive military and economic support. During Tubman’s reign, 
the United States built or enhanced a number of important facilities 
in Liberia: a Voice of America relay station, which broadcast US pro-
paganda throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; the 
Omega navigation station, which facilitated shipping along the West Af-
rican coast; a critical CIA listening post; and Roberts Field, where US 
military planes landed and refueled on twenty-four hours’ notice.
 During the presidency of William R. Tolbert Jr. (1971–80), the global 
economic crisis, plummeting prices for iron ore and rubber exports, and 
deteriorating conditions in Liberia culminated in the rice riots of 1979. 
Following a major increase in the price of the dietary staple, unarmed 
protesters took to the streets. Police opened fire, killing at least forty 
people and injuring hundreds more. Under duress, Tolbert legalized op-
position parties, but within months he again resorted to repression and 
arrested political rivals. In April 1980, dissidents in the Liberian army 
overthrew the Tolbert regime, killing the president and ending nearly a 
century and a half of Americo-Liberian rule.
 The Liberian army was a US creation that was led by Americo- 
Liberian officers. However, the army’s lower echelons were staffed 
by enlisted men drawn from the poorest strata of Liberian society— 
impoverished farmers, school dropouts, and hardened urban toughs, 
most of whom were members of the indigenous population. Their mea-
ger wages, if paid at all, were supplemented by an unofficial license to 
plunder. The 1980 coup leader was Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, a mem-
ber of the Krahn ethnic group who had been trained by US Army Special 
Forces.3 Doe’s second-in-command, Thomas Quiwonkpa, was a member 
of the Gio ethnic group. The mutinous soldiers captured, tortured, and 
killed President Tolbert. Thirteen members of Tolbert’s cabinet were exe-
cuted by firing squad, and hundreds of other government officials and 
supporters were also slaughtered. Described as a strike against repressive 
Americo-Liberian rule, the coup d’état was initially applauded by many 
in Liberia and elsewhere. The new president promised to redistribute the 
nation’s wealth and return the country to civilian rule. However, in short 
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order, President Doe suspended the constitution, declared martial law, 
banned political activities, and imprisoned or executed his rivals. Bur-
dened by a foreign debt totaling nearly three times the annual budget, he 
imposed an austerity program that ended rice subsidies and increased 
taxes in exchange for US aid and IMF loans. During his decade in power, 
Doe continued his predecessors’ corrupt practices as he and his associ-
ates stole some $300 million from public coffers.
 Under Doe, Liberia remained one of Washington’s most important 
African allies. Although President Jimmy Carter, like earlier US presi-
dents, had given significant support to an Americo-Liberian regime, his 
administration quickly embraced the new military government. During 
the Reagan administration, Liberia served as a staging ground for a CIA 
task force that targeted Qaddafi’s Libya, which in 1979 had been included 
on Washington’s state sponsors of terrorism list. The United States up-
graded Roberts Field, which, along with air bases in Zaire, served as a 
key transit point for covert US aid to the rebel movement UNITA, which 
opposed Angola’s Marxist government. In return, the Doe regime re-
ceived significant financial support. In 1982, Liberia was the largest per 
capita recipient of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa. It garnered $500 million 
in military and economic aid from 1980 to 1989, a sum equivalent to one-
third of the regime’s operating budget.
 When Doe assumed power, he promised that Liberia would return 
to civilian rule by 1985. Elections were duly held in October of that year; 
however, they were marred by intimidation and corruption. During the 
pre-election period, Doe banned opposition parties, outlawed criticism 
of his regime, and beat and imprisoned his opponents. During the vote, 
government operatives burned ballots and stuffed ballot boxes. The elec-
toral commission that supervised the elections was stacked with Doe 
supporters. While international human rights groups condemned the 
electoral fraud, the United States accepted the elections as free and fair 
and endorsed the outcome.
 Less than a month after the elections, Thomas Quiwonkpa, who had 
fallen out with Doe and lost his position as head of the Liberian armed 
forces, attempted to overthrow the Doe regime. Doe and his Krahn sup-
porters responded with a brutal crackdown on members of the Gio eth-
nic group and on related Mano populations. Gio soldiers were purged 
from the Liberian armed forces, and reprisals were carried out in heavily 
Gio-populated Nimba County near the Côte d’Ivoire border. When the 
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killing was over, Quiwonkpa and 3,000 others were dead. As these events 
unfolded, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester 
Crocker testified to Congress that democracy was dawning in Liberia.
The Liberian Civil War (1990–2003)
With Washington standing behind Doe and all moderate opposition 
quashed, warlords seized on popular anger. The most notorious strong-
man was Charles Taylor, a US-educated member of the Americo-Liberian 
elite. Although his father was a prominent Americo-Liberian, Taylor had 
ties to indigenous ethnic groups through his mother, a Gola woman, and 
his wife, who was both Gio and Thomas Quiwonkpa’s niece. When Doe 
came to power, Taylor had obtained a coveted position as director of the 
General Services Agency. Tasked with procuring and distributing gov-
ernment property, Taylor was able to amass a sizable, but illicit, personal 
fortune. Perceiving Taylor as a threat to his own position, Doe accused 
him of embezzlement, and Taylor fled to the United States. Arrested in 
1984 at the request of the Doe regime, Taylor escaped from jail in Massa-
chusetts while awaiting extradition—under circumstances that have not 
been fully explained.
 By early 1987, Taylor had established residency in Burkina Faso, 
where a cluster of Liberian exiles solicited support for military action 
against the Doe regime. In October, they helped Blaise Compaoré, a 
former army officer who served as a minister in the Burkinabe govern-
ment, seize power in a coup that killed President Thomas Sankara. With 
Compaoré’s assistance, Taylor made contact with Muammar Qaddafi, 
whose country had become an important hub for militants from Africa 
and other parts of the world. At Qaddafi’s World Revolutionary Head-
quarters near Benghazi, Taylor received military training and devel-
oped important connections with other rebel leaders. From his Libyan 
base, he organized the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which 
included Liberian army deserters, Nigerian and Ghanaian dissidents, 
Gambians who had been involved in a 1981 coup attempt, and Chadians 
loyal to Idriss Déby, onetime head of the Chadian armed forces who 
had fled to Libya and would topple the Hissène Habré regime in 1990. 
Equipped with Libyan-supplied weapons, Taylor sought regional allies 
who would permit him to launch invasions from their territories. When 
President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone refused to back him, Taylor 
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teamed up with Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Sierra Leonean 
army whom he had met in Libya. Together they organized the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel organization that would wreak 
havoc in Sierra Leone in the 1990s.
 If President Momoh rejected Taylor’s appeals, other heads of state 
were willing to help. President Compaoré of Burkina Faso provided po-
litical, economic, and military support, and Côte d’Ivoire’s President Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny quickly emerged as Taylor’s most important foreign 
backer. In December 1989, the NPFL launched an attack from Côte 
d’Ivoire into Nimba County, Liberia. Exploiting the rage of brutalized 
Gio and Mano civilians, Taylor distributed weapons to alienated, un-
employed young men and to hundreds of boys whose parents had been 
killed in government raids. The latter formed the first Small Boy Units—
child soldiers, emboldened by drugs, who were urged to seek revenge 
against the Krahn and Mandingo populations.4 While Krahn soldiers 
had been responsible for many of the anti-Gio and Mano atrocities, 
Mandingos—who were primarily traders and small-scale entrepre-
neurs—were targeted for having prospered under the Doe regime. Taylor 
stoked religious as well as ethnic hatred. Although the majority of Libe-
rians were Christian, 20 percent were Muslim, and most Muslims were 
Mandingo. A scripture-quoting Baptist lay preacher, Taylor encouraged 
Christians to attack Muslims, and by extension, all Mandingos. His cru-
sade attracted high-profile support from leaders of the US religious right, 
including the Reverend Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian Broad-
casting Network and host of the network’s cardinal television program 
The 700 Club.
 Samuel Doe’s US-trained army responded to the NPFL invasion with 
a brutal counterinsurgency campaign against Gio and Mano civilians in 
both Nimba County and Monrovia, the capital. US ships staffed with more 
than 2,000 Marines evacuated US citizens and other foreigners but refused 
to intervene to stop the slaughter, describing the killings as an internal Li-
berian affair. Six months into the rebellion, the NPFL began to splinter, 
broken apart by warlords determined to consolidate their personal wealth 
and power. Prince Johnson, a former Liberian soldier who had served 
as Quiwonkpa’s aide-de-camp, led a breakaway faction that beat Taylor’s 
forces to Monrovia. However, Taylor gained control of Roberts Field, en-
abling him to import military supplies from Burkina Faso, and on July 27, 
1990, a triumphant Taylor declared himself president of Liberia.
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 While the US armed forces stood by, neighboring countries entered 
the fray, driven by diverse motives. As members of ECOWAS, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia were united in their desire 
for regional stability. Specific national interests were also at stake. A re-
gional powerhouse with enormous oil wealth, Nigeria was under pres-
sure from neighboring states with large Muslim populations to protect 
Liberian Muslims. As the linchpin of the West African economic com-
munity, Nigeria demonstrated its dominance by leading the ECOWAS 
intervention, while Ghana intensified its involvement to counter Nige-
rian influence. Guinea was worried about the fate of Liberian Muslims, 
many of whom had Guinean family and business ties. Sierra Leone and 
Gambia were troubled by Taylor’s recruitment and training of their own 
dissidents, whom he had incorporated into his rebel forces. In August 
1990, ECOWAS sent troops to Monrovia to effect a ceasefire. Operating 
under the name Economic Community of West African States Moni-
toring Group (ECOMOG), the 4,000-man force—which grew to 16,000 
three years later—was led by Nigeria and included important contribu-
tions from Ghana, Guinea, and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone and Gam-
bia. Contributing nations shouldered some of the expenses, with Nigeria 
paying the lion’s share. The United States also supported the ECOMOG 
intervention with significant financial and diplomatic resources.
 The prominent roles played by the United States and English-speaking 
African countries contributed to a new set of problems. France considered 
the ECOMOG operation further proof of anglophone attempts to encroach 
on its proclaimed sphere of influence in West Africa. French protégés in 
the region were hostile to US influence in Liberia and felt threatened by 
Nigeria’s growing power. Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire countered an-
glophone dominance by supporting Taylor’s rebel movement.5 Burkina 
Faso’s President Compaoré, whose 1987 coup had been supported by 
Côte d’Ivoire—and allegedly, by the French secret services—helped 
equip Taylor’s NPFL and allowed it to traverse his country when transit-
ing between Liberia and Libya. He also sent Burkinabe soldiers to fight 
alongside Taylor’s men. Côte d’Ivoire’s President Houphouët-Boigny al-
lowed NPFL forces to use his country as a rear base and transfer point for 
weapons sent from Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Ivoirian nationals joined 
the NPFL, and Ivoirian businessmen and government officials made 
enormous profits by supplying Taylor with weapons and facilitating the 
Photo 8.1. An ECOMOG soldier from Nigeria provides security for ECOMOG 
personnel from Mali as they disembark a US military aircraft at Roberts Field, 
Monrovia, February 20, 1997. Photo by SSgt. Paul R. Caron/US Air Force.
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illicit export of diamonds, gold, iron ore, timber, and rubber to finance 
his war effort.
 Although presented as a stabilizing force, ECOMOG quickly be-
came part of the problem. Rather than keeping the peace, ECOMOG 
soldiers sucked the country dry, absconding with railway cars, mining 
equipment, trucks, and natural resources—anything they could sell 
abroad. With wry gallows humor, Monrovians quipped that ECOMOG 
stood for “Every Car or Moving Object Gone.”6 Unable to beat Taylor 
outright, the international force encouraged the formation of new rebel 
groups to oppose the NPFL and provided them with arms in exchange 
for booty. Since they profited from prolongation of the war, ECOWAS 
members could not be counted on to end it. On September 9, 1990, the 
forces of Prince Johnson, who had broken from the NPFL, captured, 
tortured, and killed Samuel Doe. By the end of the month, Taylor was 
fighting Johnson’s troops north of Monrovia and ECOMOG soldiers in 
the eastern suburbs.
 In March 1991, as the peacekeeping operation foundered, Taylor 
further internationalized the war by opening a second front in Sierra 
Leone, where Joseph Momoh’s government threatened his supply route. 
To undermine Momoh, Taylor helped organize, train, and equip the Si-
erra Leonean rebel organization, the Revolutionary United Front. Led 
by Taylor’s Libyan-trained ally and protégé, Corporal Foday Sankoh, the 
RUF modeled its strategy and tactics on those of the NPFL. Sankoh’s 
rebels press-ganged boys and girls into RUF forces, where they were used 
as soldiers, porters, miners, cooks, and sex slaves. Brutalized RUF re-
cruits were taught to abduct, rape, amputate, and kill, terrorizing the rural 
populace. They especially targeted chiefs, elders, traders, and agricultural 
development workers—anyone who was prosperous or associated with 
the Sierra Leonean government. Taylor’s subversion in Sierra Leone led 
to Momoh’s meddling in Liberia, where the Sierra Leonean government 
joined ECOMOG in financing and training a number of anti-Taylor 
rebel groups. The most important of these was the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), which was founded by 
exiled Doe officials, soldiers, and supporters. By 1994 ULIMO had splin-
tered, with Krahns and Mandingos gravitating toward different organi-
zations. ULIMO-K (primarily Mandingo) was led by Alhaji Kromah, and 
ULIMO-J (primarily Krahn) was led by Roosevelt Johnson. Both leaders 
had held offices in the Doe regime.
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 By the early 1990s, the Liberian war had become a free-for-all be-
tween warlords, their personal followers, and their external backers, 
with plunder as its primary goal. Although ethnic rivalries were often 
cited as motivations for the conflict, the real competition was for natural 
resources, land, and power. Ethnicity was manipulated to achieve these 
ends. For the remainder of the decade, Liberia was run by warlords and 
criminal gangs who controlled the country’s vast deposits of diamonds, 
gold, and iron ore, as well as its timber and rubber supplies, and who ex-
tracted its wealth through brutal regimes of forced labor. Presiding over 
an extensive criminal network with ties to foreign firms, Taylor amassed 
a fortune worth nearly half a billion dollars. He spent most of it on his 
effort to establish a powerful state that would expand its reach to the 
diamond-rich regions of Guinea and Sierra Leone.
 Other countries and private interests also joined the resource rush. 
To thwart Taylor’s state-building plan, Guinea backed ULIMO-K, which 
seized diamond mines on both sides of the Liberia-Guinea border. 
Guinean government officials enriched themselves through diamond 
and arms trafficking, profiting from strong ties between Guinean and 
Liberian Mandingo traders who smuggled Liberian diamonds and for-
eign weapons across the porous frontier.7 Various Nigerian interests sup-
ported ULIMO-J, which took control of diamond mines northwest of the 
capital, while former Doe officials appropriated the state-owned rubber 
plantation outside the port city of Buchanan. European, American, and 
Japanese businesses bribed Taylor for the right to exploit resources in his 
domain. French firms were especially active, their interests advanced by 
Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of French President François Mitter-
rand and head of the government’s Africa Cell from 1986 to 1992.8 In 1991, 
NPFL-controlled areas served as France’s third-largest source of tropical 
timber. Taylor also allowed a French company to run the world’s largest 
iron mine, which was located along the Liberia-Guinea border.
 Although Taylor’s forces dominated much of the Liberian hinterland 
by the early 1990s, Nigerian-led ECOMOG presided over the capital city. 
Concluding that he could not rule Liberia without Nigerian support, 
Taylor agreed to participate in peace talks in Abuja and signed an accord 
in August 1995. The agreement provided for executive leadership by a 
Council of State composed of the former warring factions and a transi-
tional period followed by elections. As the strongest of the rebel leaders, 
Taylor became Liberia’s de facto ruler. When presidential elections were 
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held in July 1997, the majority of voters cast their ballots for Taylor—
many fearing that his defeat would result in a return to war. Taylor used 
his new position to establish a neopatrimonial state that continued to 
plunder Liberian and Sierra Leonean resources.
 Just as the elections did not establish democracy, the Taylor presi-
dency did not bring peace. By the late 1990s, at least seven rebel factions 
were operating in Liberia. All had external backers. Some foreign patrons 
were ECOWAS members that were simultaneously providing soldiers 
to the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces. All parties were violating a UN 
arms embargo imposed in November 1992. Guinea supported Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in response to at-
tacks on its territory by NPFL forces and Guinean insurgents. The Krahn- 
dominated Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) received 
arms and militia fighters from Côte d’Ivoire after President Laurent 
Gbagbo, who assumed power in 2000, ended that country’s decade-long 
support for Charles Taylor.9 Other rebel factions were led by former 
NPFL commanders who had broken from the parent organization, pri-
marily for political and financial gain. All of the factions mimicked the 
NPFL in both methods and objectives, abusing civilian populations as 
they plundered the country’s riches.
Photo 8.2. Unidentified rebel fighters during the Liberian civil war, ca. 2003. 
Photo courtesy of James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe/US Marine Corps.
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 Having delegated to ECOWAS the maintenance of peace and secu-
rity in the subregion, the UN Security Council responded only incremen-
tally to the threats posed by instability in Liberia and Taylor’s aggression 
against Sierra Leone. The Security Council banned arms sales to Liberia 
in 1992, the purchase of Liberian diamonds in 2001, and the acquisition 
of Liberian timber in May 2003. These actions inhibited, but did not halt, 
Taylor’s ability to procure weapons and did nothing to stem the flow of 
arms to rebel forces.
 By April 2003, foreign-backed rebels had seized control of 60 percent 
of Liberia’s territory, including most of the diamond mining areas. In 
June, LURD’s onslaught reached the capital. During the siege of Mon-
rovia in July and August, hundreds of civilians were killed and more than 
2,000 were injured. The international community, including UN officials, 
African heads of state, and European diplomats, urged the United States, 
as the de facto but unofficial former imperial power, to take the lead in 
ending the crisis. The George W. Bush administration resisted, arguing 
that no direct American interests were at stake and that US forces were 
already spread thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sweeping aside the 
history of US support for a succession of Liberian regimes, the White 
House embraced the post-Somalia prescription of “African solutions for 
African problems,” maintaining that responsibility for resolving the con-
flict lay with Liberia, its neighbors, and the UN—not the United States.10 
As the battle for Liberia wound down, Washington remained largely on 
the sidelines, although it did help facilitate Taylor’s resignation on Au-
gust 11 and his subsequent exile to Nigeria.
 On August 18, LURD, MODEL, the remnants of Taylor’s govern-
ment, and Liberian political parties and civil society organizations signed 
an ECOWAS-mediated peace accord in Accra, Ghana. The agreement 
provided for an interim government, elections, and a new national army 
that would incorporate both rebel and government soldiers. ECOWAS 
was authorized to establish a 3,500-person multinational peacekeeping 
force—once again led by Nigeria—to secure a ceasefire, keep the fac-
tions separate, and enable the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
The ceasefire would be supervised and monitored by a Joint Monitoring 
Committee comprising representatives from ECOWAS, the UN, the AU, 
other members of the International Contact Group on Liberia, and sig-
natories to the peace accord.11 On September 19, the Security Council au-
thorized the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which would 
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incorporate the ECOWAS force and include up to 15,000 peacekeepers to 
help maintain law and order and prepare for elections.
 The Liberian war was over, but the cost had been enormous. In 
violence that had consumed the country since the NPFL invasion in De-
cember 1989, an estimated 200,000 people had died, another 1.5 million 
had been displaced, and tens of thousands of women and girls had been 
raped. The country’s infrastructure and economy had been devastated, 
and food insecurity was rampant. Liberia’s $3.7 billion debt, much of it 
incurred by the Doe and Taylor regimes, was worth almost eight times 
the value of the country’s annual gross domestic product. With poverty 
and underdevelopment rooted in nearly two hundred years authoritar-
ian rule by a small elite, recovery would be difficult.
 As the second postwar decade began, it was clear that some progress 
had been made. Presidential and legislative elections held in 2005 and 
2011 were deemed by international observers to have been largely free 
and fair. They brought to power President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who 
had been a government finance minister and an official of the World 
Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Africa’s 
first democratically elected female head of state, Sirleaf received the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her work on behalf of women’s rights. As 
president, she mandated free and compulsory primary education and 
launched a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate crimes 
committed during the civil war. Based on testimony from Liberians of all 
backgrounds, the commission concluded that the main causes of the war 
included poverty, corruption, unemployment, disputes over land and 
identity, and political, economic, and social inequalities. Sirleaf initiated 
a national dialogue on peace and reconciliation to address these un-
derlying problems. Presidential elections in December 2017 peacefully 
transferred power to George Weah, who ran on a populist platform and 
took office in January 2018. 
 These hopeful signs masked a dire picture on the ground. Critics 
charged that the truth and reconciliation process sacrificed justice for 
peace, allowing war criminals to escape punishment, and that the Sirleaf 
government contributed to endemic corruption and nepotism rather than 
eradicating it. In 2017, Liberia continued to rely on foreign aid to stay afloat 
and on UNMIL to maintain security. Economic growth was stymied by a 
steep decline in iron ore and rubber prices, along with currency devalua-
tion, inflation, and budget cuts. Liberia ranked 177 of 188 countries on the 
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UNDP Human Development Index for 2016. Life expectancy hovered at 
sixty-one years, and 84 percent of the population earned less than $1.25 per 
day. Nine in ten Liberian households lacked running water, and almost half 
had no toilet facilities. Few Liberians had access to electricity: the power 
grid served only the capital city, and just 10 percent of the city’s population 
was connected to it. The thirteen-year civil war had prevented a genera-
tion of young people from acquiring basic education, and most had little 
hope of gainful employment. Moreover, the war’s long-term consequences 
continued to emerge. The country’s feeble rural health care infrastructure 
had been destroyed both by the war and by IMF structural adjustment 
programs that had reduced governmental spending and imposed user 
fees. More than a decade after the war ended, Liberia lacked clean water 
and sanitation facilities, rural clinics and hospitals, medicines, and medi-
cal supplies and equipment, and the imposition of fees made basic health 
services unaffordable for most Liberians. These conditions left the country 
extremely vulnerable. When the Ebola virus swept the country in 2014–15, 
it infected at least 10,600 people and killed more than 4,800.
 In Liberia, as elsewhere, foreign military intervention had helped 
end a brutal war but failed to address the fundamental problems that 
had caused it. Governmental corruption and disputes over land and re-
sources continued to undermine the country’s stability, which in turn 
posed an ongoing threat to regional peace and security. A similar pattern 
was evident in neighboring Sierra Leone.
Setting the Stage in Sierra Leone:  
British Territory and the Neopatrimonial State (1808–1990)
The conflict in Liberia led to a proxy war in Sierra Leone, where instabil-
ity provoked intervention by the UN, ECOWAS, neighboring countries, 
foreign mercenaries, and the UK. Outside forces ignited the conflagra-
tion, but it was fueled by local grievances embedded in the political, eco-
nomic, and social inequalities of the colonial and postcolonial past. Like 
Liberia, Sierra Leone was established in the early nineteenth century as 
a colony for freed slaves. The UK administered the coastal settlement of 
Freetown as a crown colony from 1808, while the hinterland was added 
as a protectorate in 1896. The freed slaves and their descendants, known 
as Creoles, constituted a small, prosperous elite. Like their Americo- 
Liberian counterparts, they benefited disproportionately from the 
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country’s resources and from Western education provided by Christian 
missionaries.
 After independence in 1961, Sierra Leone was ruled by corrupt dic-
tators who presided over neopatrimonial regimes that undermined the 
official bureaucracy and treated the country’s rich diamond deposits as 
their own. High-level government officials, military officers, and their 
foreign collaborators ran shadow states based on illicit economies that 
generated enormous wealth for the few. Meanwhile, the majority of the 
population was mired in poverty, especially in the rural areas, where eco-
nomic development was virtually nonexistent. When Major-General Jo-
seph Momoh, commander of the Sierra Leonean armed forces, assumed 
the presidency in 1985, the country’s economy was in deep distress. 
Popular discontent was exacerbated by IMF and World Bank austerity 
programs that removed subsidies and price controls from essential con-
sumer goods, forced massive layoffs of public employees, and imposed 
debt repayment programs that siphoned resources from public services. 
The external mandates also strengthened the position of regime loyalists, 
who benefited from privatization programs that rendered public assets 
into private hands.
The Sierra Leone Proxy War (1991–2002)
Sierra Leone’s war began in March 1991, when the Revolutionary United 
Front launched an attack from Liberia. Although funded, trained, and 
equipped by Charles Taylor as an adjunct to the Liberian war, and 
reinforced by mercenaries and weapons from Burkina Faso, the RUF 
claimed to be championing the rights of rural people who were domi-
nated by a venal urban elite. While corruption, tyranny, and poverty were 
real issues, the RUF made no attempt to win hearts and minds during its 
eleven-year war. Instead, it conducted a reign of terror against the rural 
population. Recruited from among alienated, unemployed youths and 
press-ganged children, RUF rebels hacked off limbs, raped women, de-
stroyed the rural infrastructure, and killed civilians at will. Thousands of 
children were abducted during the war—the girls turned into cooks and 
sex slaves and the boys into brutal killers on the model of Charles Taylor’s 
Small Boy Units.
 Although the war did not begin over diamonds, control of Sierra 
Leone’s enormous diamond wealth quickly became the main objective of 
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RUF leaders, Charles Taylor, and diverse foreign interests. International 
smuggling operations that specialized in money laundering and traffick-
ing in diamonds, guns, and drugs took control of the Sierra Leonean 
mines. Enormous quantities of diamonds were spirited across the Libe-
rian border and sold to willing buyers in Belgium, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, 
Russia, and the United States. British and South African mercenaries and 
militant organizations like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda purchased diamonds 
as a means of laundering illicit wealth. Taylor received a large percentage 
from every diamond sale and used the proceeds to finance both the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars.
 The Momoh government responded to the NPFL-RUF invasion by 
assembling a counter force from among the 250,000 Liberian refugees 
Photo 8.3. RUF victim Abu Bakarr Kargbo, assisted by his son Abu, Freetown, No-
vember 13, 2005. Photo by Yannis Kontos/Polaris.
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and former Doe officials, soldiers, and supporters resident in Sierra 
Leone. Forming the core of what would become ULIMO, the Liberian 
recruits fought alongside the Sierra Leonean army from March 1991 and 
launched their first attack into Liberia in September. Like the RUF, the 
Momoh regime press-ganged children into the army and recruited un-
employed youths in the border region, some of whom sought revenge for 
their families’ deaths at the hands of RUF and NPFL rebels. The govern-
ment forces were assisted by some 1,500 ECOMOG soldiers from Guinea 
and Nigeria, whose mission was to protect the peacekeeping force in 
Liberia from NPFL attacks originating in Sierra Leone. Corruption was 
rampant in this arena as well. ECOMOG officers and soldiers in the dia-
mond regions were deeply engaged in illicit mining, sometimes working 
in close proximity to RUF prospectors.
 In April 1992, a group of young Sierra Leonean army officers, disen-
chanted with wartime conditions and abysmal pay, toppled the Momoh 
regime and installed Captain Valentine Strasser as head of state. Al-
though Strasser promised to end the war, improve the economy, and 
institute multiparty democracy, little changed. Strasser’s entourage, like 
Momoh’s, engaged in illicit diamond mining and other corrupt practices 
and recruited alienated youths and political thugs, who raped, pillaged, 
and killed throughout the war zone. To many rural dwellers, the army 
and the RUF were indistinguishable; they dubbed the new predators “so-
bels”—shorthand for “soldier-rebels.” As the well-financed RUF gained 
the upper hand, the Sierra Leonean government mobilized Mende civil-
ian defense forces along the Liberian border. Commonly referred to as 
the Kamajors (hunters), the militias were made up of local hunters and 
youths who were far more knowledgeable about the local terrain than 
RUF recruits and far more effective than the national army. The RUF 
retaliated with a campaign of terror against the civilian population, am-
putating arms, legs, hands, ears, noses, and genitals.
 Foreign intervention assumed a new form in May 1995, when Execu-
tive Outcomes (EO) arrived to assist the Sierra Leonean government. 
Established in South Africa in 1989, EO was among the first of the private 
military companies that emerged at the end of the Cold War to supple-
ment the work of national armies and police forces. Although they es-
chewed the label “mercenary,” private military companies were, to many 
Africans, simply a new embodiment of an old phenomenon—white men 
with guns who were hired to do dirty jobs on the African continent.12 
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Most EO recruits were former South African Defence Force (SADF) op-
eratives who lost their jobs when the South African wars in Namibia and 
Angola ended in the late 1980s and apartheid crumbled in 1994. Willing 
to work for anyone who would pay, EO helped Angola’s Marxist govern-
ment fight UNITA rebels in the 1990s, even though EO personnel, as 
SADF members, had waged an earlier campaign with UNITA to over-
throw the same government. In Sierra Leone, EO trained the national 
army in counterinsurgency tactics, provided helicopter air support, 
transported troops and equipment, and helped locate RUF camps.
 Strasser’s military regime eventually returned the country to civil-
ian rule, but even with EO support, it failed to end the war. Presidential 
elections were held in February and March 1996, and Strasser handed 
over power to the winner, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a civil servant who had 
held various posts in Sierra Leone but who had spent most of the pre-
ceding two decades working for the UNDP abroad. The RUF, which had 
not participated in the elections, did not recognize the new regime. Al-
though the war continued, the RUF agreed to talk.
 Mediation by the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth, and 
Côte d’Ivoire led to the Abidjan Accord, signed in November 1996.13 The 
agreement required EO to withdraw from Sierra Leone, leaving state 
security in the hands of the national army and the Kamajor militias. The 
RUF, in turn, was to disarm in exchange for amnesty and reintegration 
into Sierra Leonean society. While EO did depart, the rebels fractured, 
and some continued to fight. Those who profited most from the war, in-
cluding RUF leader Foday Sankoh, refused to lay down arms. In March 
1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria and RUF members who supported 
the peace process announced his ouster. In Sierra Leone, an RUF field 
commander and Taylor protégé, Colonel Sam Bockarie, took charge of 
the faction that wanted war. Kabbah’s government was toppled in May 
by mutinous soldiers who feared that the peace accords would result in 
demobilization and a halt to their illicit mining activities. Recognizing 
their common interests, the coup leaders invited the RUF to join them 
in a coalition government led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. RUF com-
batants entered the capital, plundering, raping, and killing, and launched 
a campaign of pillage and terror in the countryside dubbed “Operation 
Pay Yourself.”
 President Kabbah sought refuge in neighboring Guinea, from which 
he mobilized international support for a return to power and appealed to 
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the UN and ECOWAS to intervene. In October 1997, the Security Coun-
cil imposed an oil and weapons embargo on Sierra Leone and authorized 
ECOWAS to enforce implementation with ECOMOG troops.14 In March 
1998, a Nigerian-led ECOMOG force, assisted by the Kamajors, ousted 
the Koroma junta and reinstated the Kabbah government. The Security 
Council then established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL), which authorized unarmed UN military observers, 
protected by ECOMOG troops, to monitor Sierra Leone’s security situa-
tion, the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, and respect 
for international humanitarian law. Although the RUF and the renegade 
soldiers had been expelled from Freetown, the capital, they dominated 
eastern Sierra Leone and its rich diamond fields. By December, rebel 
forces, strengthened by new recruits, controlled more than half the coun-
try. They were bolstered by South African mercenaries, whose SADF tac-
tics and training overwhelmed the capabilities of the ECOMOG force.
 In January 1999, rebel forces composed primarily of former Sierra 
Leonean army soldiers again overran Freetown. As they approached, 
the UN observers were evacuated. In an offensive dubbed “Operation 
No Living Thing,” rebels rampaged through the capital, raping, mutilat-
ing, and slaughtering thousands. Hundreds of children were abducted, 
and 100,000 people were driven from their homes. Nigerian ECOMOG 
troops counterattacked, targeting rebels in densely populated areas with 
heavy artillery and bombs. By the time ECOMOG regained the capital 
three weeks later, some 3,500 civilians had died at the hands of either 
rebel or ECOMOG forces.
 Western governments, led by the United States, pressured Kabbah 
to enter into yet another negotiated settlement with the RUF, endorsing 
a plan that was staunchly opposed by international human rights groups 
and by civil society organizations in Sierra Leone. Assured that the UN 
would send a peacekeeping mission once there was a peace to keep, Kab-
bah reluctantly agreed. In July 1999, the Sierra Leonean government and 
the RUF signed the Lomé Accord, which called for an end to hostilities, 
disarmament and demobilization of rebel combatants, and the forma-
tion of a government of national unity in which the RUF would assume 
senior positions. The RUF would be granted amnesty for crimes com-
mitted during the war, including the mass atrocities carried out in Free-
town in January. The UN refused to endorse the amnesty clause, leaving 
open the possibility that international bodies might prosecute alleged 
Regional War and License to Plunder (1990–2003)  |  207
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as 
well as other violations of international humanitarian law.
 Foisted on Sierra Leone from outside and without input from sig-
nificant parties, the Lomé Accord was deeply flawed. Representatives of 
the mutinous former soldiers did not sign the agreement. Foday Sankoh, 
who had been convicted of high treason in October 1998, was released 
from prison, installed as vice president, and placed in charge of Sierra 
Leone’s gold and diamond mines as well as other strategic minerals. Illicit 
mining, controlled by Sankoh’s Black Guards, increased dramatically. 
Sankoh signed sales agreements with US, Belgian, and South African 
merchants that brought him enormous personal gain, while Nigerian 
peacekeepers also profited from the illegal diamond trade.
 In October 1999, the Security Council authorized the establish-
ment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a 
6,000-member peacekeeping force that would replace the ECOMOG 
troops. Including personnel from Guinea, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and 
Zambia, UNAMSIL was authorized to monitor the peace agreement, 
to oversee the disarmament and demobilization of rebel and militia 
forces, and to ensure compliance with international human rights law. 
It was a complex mission for which the peacekeepers were ill prepared. 
UNAMSIL’s authority was immediately challenged. RUF leader Sam 
Bockarie, who opposed the peace agreement, broke with Sankoh and 
returned to the bush to fight. In May 2000, RUF rebels who objected to 
UN deployment in the diamond region renounced the ceasefire, took 
more than 500 UN peacekeepers hostage, and absconded with UN weap-
ons and vehicles. The peace accord collapsed, and the UK, as the former 
colonial power, took charge. Elite British troops, including paratroopers 
and Royal Marines, assumed protection of Freetown, taking control of 
the port and airport and evacuating foreign nationals.
 The UNAMSIL force was augmented after the May fiasco with a 
well-trained Pakistani contingent of more than 4,000 soldiers.15 British 
troop strength was also expanded, reaching 1,000 in September. How-
ever, the RUF remained a serious threat. From September 2000 through 
April 2001, RUF rebels backed by Charles Taylor conducted a series of 
cross-border raids into Guinea to gain control of diamond mines and 
to harass Sierra Leonean refugees near the border. Hundreds of Guin-
ean and Sierra Leonean civilians were wounded or killed. The incursions 
provoked a new wave of external involvement. Guinea’s armed forces, 
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enhanced by French and US weapons and British intelligence, helped 
train a thousand Kamajor fighters. Joint Guinean-Kamajor operations 
against the RUF in the diamond regions killed scores of Sierra Leonean 
civilians and destroyed numerous villages.
 With UNAMSIL’s backing, the Lomé Accord was slowly imple-
mented. More than 75,000 rebels, militia members, and child soldiers 
were demobilized, and in January 2002, President Kabbah announced 
the war’s end. Over the course of the eleven-year war, some 50,000 peo-
ple had been killed and one-third of the population had been displaced. 
Thousands of women and girls had been raped, and an estimated 10,000 
children had been conscripted as soldiers, porters, cooks, and sex slaves. 
As in Liberia, the war had devastated the country’s social and economic 
infrastructure. Most of Sierra Leone’s schools and health facilities had 
been destroyed. When the war ended, Sierra Leoneans earned on average 
only thirty-eight cents a day; a decade later, 57 percent of the population 
still subsisted on a daily allowance of less than one dollar. As in Liberia, 
recovery would be arduous. In both cases, the nation’s problems were 
rooted not only in a decade-long war, but in two hundred years of au-
thoritarian rule by a small elite.
 Like Liberia, Sierra Leone took promising early steps. Presidential 
elections held in May 2002 resulted in another electoral victory for 
President Kabbah. In 2007 Kabbah was defeated by parliamentary oppo-
sition leader Ernest Bai Koroma in elections deemed free and fair by in-
ternational observers. Koroma was reelected in 2012. President Koroma 
introduced free health care for children under the age of five and for preg-
nant and nursing women—although the absence of funds and trained 
health workers hampered the programs’ effectiveness. He attempted to 
tackle corruption by granting greater investigative and prosecutorial 
powers to the official anticorruption commission and by firing a number 
of government ministers implicated in unethical practices. Sierra Leone 
also made a significant effort to expose abuses perpetrated during the 
war. A government-sponsored Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
collected testimony throughout the country that documented wartime 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. A UN-
backed Special Court for Sierra Leone was established to prosecute those 
“who bear the greatest responsibility” for war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed after the signing of the 1996 Abidjan Accord.16 In 2013, Sierra 
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Leone launched an effort to revise the 1991 constitution with a view to 
strengthening multiparty democracy and governmental transparency. 
The process was still ongoing in 2017.
 As in Liberia, hopeful signs obscured a more problematic situation 
on the ground. A decade and a half after the war’s end, Sierra Leone re-
mained vulnerable on multiple fronts. Like Liberia, Sierra Leone relied 
heavily on foreign aid to sustain basic government services, and in 2016 
the country faced bankruptcy. The collapse of iron ore prices had dimin-
ished the value of its second most important export. The plummeting 
value of its currency, high inflation, and severe youth unemployment 
imposed further burdens on a population that depended on foreign im-
ports for many basic foods. Official corruption and the large-scale theft 
of natural resources exacerbated the economic crisis and contributed to 
citizens’ loss of confidence in government. In 2016 Sierra Leone ranked 
179 of 188 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index, and both 
rural and urban populations experienced widespread poverty. Life ex-
pectancy averaged only fifty-one years. Health care services, especially 
in the rural areas, were few and far between, and those that existed were 
inadequately financed, staffed, and equipped—the consequence of both 
war and IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs. As a result, 
when the Ebola virus arrived in 2014, it quickly reached epidemic pro-
portions, infecting at least 13,000 people and killing nearly 4,000 in less 
than two years.
 In Sierra Leone as in Liberia, external military intervention helped 
end a vicious war. However, the underlying causes continued to fester. 
Governmental corruption and lack of accountability, deep political, eco-
nomic, and social inequalities, and a neocolonial economic system that 
benefited only the few continued to threaten the country’s stability and, 
by extension, that of the wider region.
Conclusion
The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and international response to 
them, underscore the difficulties of weighing the pros and cons of for-
eign intervention and generalizing about the motivations and impact 
of external actors. Foreign intervention in response to instability or to 
protect civilian lives often masks mixed motives and conflicting interests. 
Neighboring states may intervene on legitimate grounds of self-defense, 
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but they may also engage to protect more parochial public and private 
interests. Similarly, subregional multilateral organizations may intercede 
to restore stability in conflicts that impinge on their members’ security. 
However, member states may work at cross purposes as they simultane-
ously pursue their own agendas. Global powers and the organizations 
they dominate tend to engage selectively, responding to instability and the 
threat to civilian lives in some regions but not in others, depending on the 
strength of their interests in those regions. Individuals and interest groups 
at all levels may profit from the chaos and thus have a stake in ensuring its 
perpetuation. Finally, motivations and roles may change over the course 
of a conflict, making it difficult to categorize actors and their interests.
 These complexities also characterized other struggles in the Mano 
River region. When the wars in Liberia and Sierra ended, thousands of 
former rebels roamed the region seeking new battles, which would 
lead to further violence and destabilization. Many turned to Côte 
d’Ivoire, a pivotal sponsor of regional turmoil and a country where 
social discrimination and political and economic inequality provided 
fodder for new conflicts. Once again, neighboring countries, multilat-
eral state-based organizations, and the former colonial power entered 
the fray—with mixed motivations and conflicting interests. The war in 
Côte d’Ivoire is the subject of chapter 9.
Suggested Reading
Several recommended books offer historical background on the Libe-
rian crisis. Tom W. Shick, Behold the Promised Land: A History of Afro- 
American Settlers in Nineteenth-Century Liberia (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1980), examines the founding of Liberia by 
African American settlers, but does not investigate the impact on indige-
nous populations. Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: 
American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945 (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1982), illuminates the role of Firestone Tire and Rubber and 
the US government in twentieth-century Liberia. Reed Kramer, “Libe-
ria: A Casualty of the Cold War’s End,” Africa News Service, July 1, 1995, 
provides a concise historical overview of the US relationship with Liberia 
from its founding in the nineteenth century until 1995.
 The Liberian civil war is the subject of a number of works. Stephen 
Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious 
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Dimension of an African Civil War, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 2006), is especially recommended. It explains the origins 
and evolution of the war, focusing on corruption, the collapse of the state 
bureaucracy and neopatrimonial political system, the manipulation of 
ethnicity by politicians and warlords, and the role of indigenous religious 
belief systems. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), described in the Suggested Reading for 
chapter 2, includes an insightful chapter on Liberian warlord politics. Bill 
Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart 
of Africa (New York: Basic Books, 2001), is a clearly written journalistic 
account that explores the ways in which Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor 
manipulated ethnicity to gain access to power and resources. Berkeley 
pays special attention to the role of the United States in the Liberian cri-
sis. Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 
1998), is a personal memoir of the early years of the Liberian civil war by a 
journalist who was captured by Taylor’s forces. Danny Hoffman, The War 
Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011), investigates the ways in which young 
men who were recruited into violent labor on rubber plantations and in 
diamond mines, community defense organizations, and other militias in 
the mid-1990s became a reservoir of mercenary labor for violent work 
elsewhere after the Sierra Leonean and Liberian wars ended.
 Two recommended books examine the role of ECOMOG and the 
interests of neighboring countries in the Liberian civil war. See Adekeye 
Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in 
West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Karl P. Magyar and 
Earl Conteh-Morgan, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia 
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1998). The regional implications of the Liberian 
war are considered in Global Witness, The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weap-
ons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (London: Global 
Witness, 2003).
 Several books provide insight into the origins of the Sierra Leonean 
crisis and the dynamics of the war. William Reno, Corruption and State 
Politics in Sierra Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
examines the ways in which politicians and warlords collaborated with 
foreign business interests to generate wealth and patronage that under-
mined the bureaucratic state. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States 
(mentioned previously), includes an important chapter on warlord 
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politics in Sierra Leone. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra 
Leone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), investigates the crisis of 
the patronage-based political and economic system and the response of 
those without political, economic, and social prospects. In A Dirty War 
in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 2005), Sierra Leonean journalist and his-
torian Lansana Gberie offers insights into the disintegration of the state, 
the nature of the RUF, the role of Liberia, and the impact of UN and UK 
intervention. In Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), John Hirsch, US ambassador to Si-
erra Leone from 1995 to 1998, examines the decades leading up to the 
war, the social, economic, and historical context of the conflict, and the 
impact of regional and extracontinental powers. Ibrahim Abdullah, Be-
tween Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War (Dakar: CODESRIA, 
2004), explores the origin of the conflict, the roles of internal and external 
actors, and the various efforts to end the war. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, 
and Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds, and 
Human Security (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000), investigates 
the role of resources in the Sierra Leonean war.
 Several works examine the crisis of Sierra Leonean youth and the 
experiences of child soldiers. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: 
War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 
1996), and Krijn Peters, War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), investigate corruption in the 
colonial and postcolonial states, the breakdown of rural societies, and 
the alienation of youth that led them to the RUF. Myriam Denov, Child 
Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), explores the ways in which children were 
initiated into RUF violence and the challenges they faced in the postwar 
period. Hoffman, The War Machines (mentioned previously), focuses on 
young Sierra Leonean men who were recruited into violent labor by di-
verse groups and explores the regional implications after the war’s end. 
Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), is a powerful memoir of a child soldier 
press-ganged into the Sierra Leonean national army.
 The role of outside powers in the Sierra Leonean conflict is the sub-
ject of several books. The impact of Liberian involvement is described 
in the general works on the Sierra Leonean war mentioned previously. 
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Two books focus on the UK. Andrew M. Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: 
British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2009), examines the UK’s engagement in humanitarian intervention and 
its impact on Sierra Leone. Phil Ashby, Against All Odds: Escape from 
Sierra Leone (New York: St. Martin’s, 2003), provides a firsthand account 
by a British major and UN military observer who was held hostage by 
the RUF. Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of 
UNAMSIL (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), examines the successes 
and failures of the UN peacekeeping operation.





Civil War and regime Change (2002–11)
as the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone wound down, another con-
flagration began in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire. Stemming from structural 
inequalities in the political economy, and from regional instability gen-
erated by the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Ivoirian civil war 
lasted from 2002 through 2011 and consumed as many as 13,000 lives. 
External actors again intervened to shape the outcome. Multilateral en-
tities, neighboring countries, and the former colonial power claimed 
that they acted to restore regional stability and protect civilian lives. 
However, in Côte d’Ivoire as elsewhere, they also promoted their own 
political and economic agendas. Some mediated between the warring 
factions but also fanned the flames. Members of ECOWAS, which spon-
sored a peacekeeping force, were far from neutral: Liberia and Burkina 
Faso supported rebel factions, while other members backed the govern-
ment. Roving bands of alienated, impoverished youths, no longer at war 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, sold their services to whoever would pay, 
wreaking havoc and committing serious human rights abuses against the 
civilian population.
 The multilateral actors that intervened in Côte d’Ivoire included 
bodies that were global (the UN), regional (the AU), and subregional 
(ECOWAS). Their actions—or failure to act—were deeply influenced by 
the particular interests of their members. ECOWAS dispatched a peace-
keeping force that became a party to the conflict, while AU mediators 
sent mixed messages that reflected the lack of internal consensus. France, 
the former imperial power, played a dominant role in multilateral inter-
ventions in Côte d’Ivoire and also intervened bilaterally. It deployed a 
large body of troops and staged significant military operations inside the 
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country, siding first with one side, then the other—as both sides accused 
Paris of blocking their victories. The UN established a peacekeeping 
mission once the conflict was officially over and joined French troops in 
military operations after the peace accord collapsed. Deemed by many 
Ivoirians to be representing French interests, the UN, like France, was 
tarred with the brush of neocolonialism.
 This chapter examines foreign intervention in Côte d’Ivoire from 
2002 to 2011. It begins with a discussion of inequalities that originated in 
the colonial and independence periods, which set the stage for the twenty- 
first-century conflict. External intervention was justified on the basis of 
the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm and was 
influenced by increasing international concern for honoring elections 
deemed free and fair by neutral observers. Although the conflict coincided 
with the post–September 2001 war on terror, terrorism was not a moti-
vating factor in this case. As in Liberia and Sierra Leone, foreign actors 
interceded in Côte d’Ivoire with a variety of motives, and their under-
takings had both positive and negative results. Although the conflict was 
eventually quelled, external intervention aggravated tensions over iden-
tity, citizenship rights, and access to resources, and conflicting interests 
within multilateral entities weakened their mandates and undermined 
peace agreements. The externally backed accords had only weak support 
from warring parties and had received little input from civil society or-
ganizations. Underlying grievances lingered, and only the losing side was 
held accountable for abuses perpetrated during the war.
Setting the Stage:  
The Colonial and Postcolonial Context (1893–2002)
Claimed as a French colony in 1893, Côte d’Ivoire gained political inde-
pendence in 1960 but retained close political, economic, and military ties 
to its former ruler. The new country was considered a model for devel-
oping African nations. The first two decades after independence were 
characterized by economic stability and prosperity for the country as a 
whole, although the benefits were unevenly distributed. The so-called 
“Ivoirian miracle” masked sharp divisions between haves and have-nots, 
which were marked by cleavages with regional and religious dimensions. 
The rich cocoa- and coffee-producing south was populated primar-
ily by Christians and adherents of indigenous religions, while the less 
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developed, predominantly Muslim north was forced to export laborers to 
work on the southern plantations. During the colonial period, residents 
of neighboring territories, notably Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and 
to a lesser extent Mali and Guinea, were brought to Côte d’Ivoire to work 
on cocoa and coffee plantations in the southeastern and central regions. 
After independence, many migrants remained, and their descendants 
contributed to growing ethnic and religious diversity in those regions.
 President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled the country from 
1960 to 1993, had exceptionally close ties to France and had served as 
a minister in the French government before independence. A Western- 
educated Christian, Baule chief, and prosperous planter, Houphouët- 
Boigny was among the African elites who had advanced under colonialism. 
During his three decades in power, he continued the economic policies 
of his colonial predecessors. He recruited migrants from other parts of 
Côte d’Ivoire, and from the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Guinea, to work in the plantation economy, particularly on newly 
opened farms in the southwest. Baule farmers, who had originally in-
habited the central region, were among the greatest beneficiaries of the 
southwestern expansion. The president generated strong political sup-
port by granting newcomers land rights in exchange for their labor. As 
a result, immigrants from neighboring countries and their descendants 
often outnumbered the original inhabitants, who frequently constituted 
less than one-third of the local population. Houphouët-Boigny’s Demo-
cratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) also granted voting rights to immi-
grants, thus giving “strangers” control over local politics and bolstering 
the president’s political base.
 When times were good, these policies benefited the south but ne-
glected the north in terms of resources, power, and services. When the 
cash crop economy failed, fallout from the Houphouët-Boigny program 
ignited regional and ethnic conflicts. The turning point came in the mid-
1980s, when Côte d’Ivoire was struck by a severe economic crisis, trig-
gered by worldwide oil price increases and plummeting international 
commodity prices. Cocoa and coffee, the country’s primary exports and 
main sources of revenue, were especially hard hit, and Côte d’Ivoire began 
to accumulate enormous international debts. IMF-mandated austerity 
measures contributed to the crisis. In early 1990, IMF prescriptions led to 
massive pay cuts and layoffs for public employees, which in turn sparked 
protests by students, soldiers, and civil servants. Educated young men 
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who were no longer able to find work in the urban areas began to return 
to their rural homes. Resentful of their diminished status, they made 
scapegoats of immigrant farmers, some of whom had grown wealthy 
while indigenous families had grown poorer. Alienated youths, whose 
numbers surged as the population grew, encouraged their communities 
to reclaim their patrimonial lands.1
 Meanwhile, Ivoirian prodemocracy activists demanded an end to 
Houphouët-Boigny’s autocratic rule, and France applied pressure from 
outside. In June 1990, burdened by commitments to failing economies 
and worried by popular unrest in Côte d’Ivoire, Zaire, and other franco-
phone countries, Paris adopted a new approach to foreign aid. President 
François Mitterrand, a member of the French Socialist Party, informed 
French clients that there could be no development without democracy; 
henceforth, economic assistance would be tied to democratic reforms 
and human rights practices. Longtime dictators embarked on superficial 
reforms to establish a veneer of multiparty democracy that would protect 
their special relationships with France. 
 In October 1990, Côte d’Ivoire held its first multiparty elections since 
independence. Benefiting from the votes of immigrants, Houphouët-Boigny 
overwhelmed his rival, Laurent Gbagbo. A history professor with a doc-
torate from the Sorbonne, Gbagbo was a Christian and a member of the 
Bété ethnic group, which was indigenous to Côte d’Ivoire’s southwestern 
region. He led the socialist Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) and was especially 
popular among students and intellectuals. Although Houphouët-Boigny 
won the presidential elections, he was forced to allow others into his inner 
circle. To shore up his base, he appointed as prime minister Alassane Dra-
mane Ouattara, a Muslim northerner and member of the Jula ethnic group 
whose professional qualifications included a PhD in economics from the 
University of Pennsylvania, a long career at the IMF, and a term as gover-
nor of the Central Bank of West African States.
 Following Houphouët-Boigny’s death in December 1993, Henri 
Konan Bédié, president of the National Assembly and Houphouët-Boigny’s 
protégé in the PDCI, assumed the reins of power. Like his predecessor, 
Bédié was a Christian and a member of the Baule ethnic group. The new 
president’s primary rivals included Prime Minister Ouattara—a fellow 
member of the PDCI who had acted as president during the last nine 
months of Houphouët-Boigny’s life and who had hoped to succeed him—
as well as opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo. Continuing economic 
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decline exacerbated the political tensions. In 1994, France unilaterally 
devalued the African Financial Community (CFA) franc by 50 percent, 
effectively doubling the cost of Ivoirian imports.2 Household income and 
living standards declined precipitously. Bédié boosted his following by 
stirring up ethnic and religious hatred. Blaming the country’s economic 
plight on immigrant farmers and laborers and on northerners who 
shared the immigrants’ ethnic and religious affiliations, he promoted the 
notion of ivoirité, developed by PDCI intellectuals, to distinguish peo-
ple of “authentic” origin (southern) from others (northern and foreign). 
Reviving the ethnic alliances that had brought Houphouët-Boigny to 
power three decades earlier, Bédié recruited followers from among the 
Akan-speaking Baule and Agni peoples. Like the Baule, the Agni were 
predominantly Christian and had been early producers of cocoa and 
coffee. Historically, they had lived in the country’s southeast. Within 
months of Houphouët-Boigny’s death, the PDCI split. The Baule and 
Agni largely remained with Bédié, while northerners and immigrants 
tended to follow Ouattara into the new Rally of Republicans (RDR).
 Rather than attempt to win the northern and immigrant vote, Bédié 
sought to obliterate it. Under his regime, northern candidates were dis-
qualified and large segments of the population were disenfranchised. 
Members of particular ethnic groups were excluded from the definition 
of authentic Ivoirians and thus denied the right to vote. Shortly before the 
October 1995 presidential elections, a hastily passed electoral law prohib-
ited the candidacy of individuals whose parents had been born outside 
Côte d’Ivoire. The law was intended to target Alassane Ouattara, who 
had a strong following among northerners and immigrants and whose 
father was believed to have been born in Burkina Faso. When Ouattara 
was barred from running, the RDR boycotted the elections. Gbagbo’s FPI 
also staged a stay-at-home to defy Bédié’s blatant power grab, and Bédié 
easily won reelection.
 The RDR continued to challenge the dominance of southern Chris-
tians in the political arena. The next major opportunity came with presi-
dential elections scheduled for October 2000. In August 1999, Ouattara, 
who claimed to have documentation that proved his Ivoirian origins, was 
chosen by the RDR as its candidate. Bédié charged that the documents 
were forged and launched an investigation. When Ivoirian courts ruled 
against Ouattara and nullified his nationality certificate, the government 
issued a warrant for his arrest. Outside the country at the time, Ouattara 
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declined to return. On December 23, 1999, Ivoirian soldiers, angered by 
unpaid wages and poor living conditions, mutinied. The next day, middle- 
ranking officers ousted the Bédié regime. General Robert Guéï, a Chris-
tian and a member of the Dan ethnic group from the western region, 
formed the National Committee of Public Salvation. He promised to 
end corruption and return the country to civilian rule in nine months. 
French President Jacques Chirac, part of the Gaullist old guard that had 
favored Houphouët-Boigny’s PDCI, advocated military intervention to 
restore Bédié to power. However, France’s socialist prime minister, Lionel 
Jospin, who favored Gbagbo’s socialist party, opposed intervention. With the 
government divided, France remained on the sidelines for the time being.
 In July 2000, a new constitution designed to strengthen Guéï’s hold 
on power was adopted by a popular referendum in which many north-
erners were not allowed to vote. Article 35 stipulated that candidates for 
the presidency and their parents all be of Ivoirian birth. On October 6, 
the Supreme Court, appointed by President Guéï, barred both Ouattara 
and Bédié from participating in the elections. Ouattara was excluded 
due to continuing questions about his nationality and Bédié for failing 
to submit an acceptable medical certificate. President Guéï and Laurent 
Gbagbo were left as the main contenders. The October 22 elections were 
boycotted by the two largest parties, whose candidates had been pro-
hibited from running. Most of the disgruntled electorate stayed home, 
resulting in a voter turnout of only 37 percent. Although preliminary 
results favored Gbagbo, Guéï declared himself the winner. Protests by 
hundreds of thousands of Gbagbo supporters forced Guéï to flee the 
country, and Gbagbo claimed the presidency.3 Bédié and Ouattara de-
cried the elections as illegitimate and demanded new elections in which 
they would be permitted to run. The UN, OAU, EU, United States, and 
South Africa joined their call, while France, under the influence of Prime 
Minister Jospin and his Socialist Party allies, recognized Gbagbo as the 
new president.4
 Gbagbo’s ties to French political elites were decades in the making. 
Targeted by the Houphouët-Boigny regime for his trade union and political 
activities, Gbagbo had spent much of the 1980s in France, mingling with 
French intellectuals and members of the ruling Socialist Party. After re-
turning to Côte d’Ivoire in 1988, he condemned French control over the 
Ivoirian economy and used rhetoric decrying neocolonialism to mobilize 
unemployed youths, students, and the poor. He was an important figure 
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in the prodemocracy movement, which produced new political parties, 
civil society organizations, and opposition newspapers. Among these was 
the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI), established in April 1990 
to promote students’ interests and advance the cause of multiparty democ-
racy. When FESCI and the teachers’ union mobilized secondary school 
and university students against the Houphouët-Boigny regime, members 
of both organizations were subjected to brutal repression and lengthy peri-
ods in detention. By 1998, FESCI was dominated by a pro-Gbagbo faction 
that met violence with violence, targeting not only the government but 
also members of rival organizations and political parties. Although they 
employed the rhetoric of human rights, FESCI militants increasingly re-
sembled the criminal gangs and poorly paid soldiers who stole from the 
working poor to “pay themselves” what they believed they deserved.5 
 Like his student followers, Gbagbo began with appeals for people’s 
rights. In the end, however, he attempted to ride to power by manipulating 
the fear and resentment of the lower classes, particularly the demographi-
cally overwhelmed and politically disenfranchised original inhabitants 
of the southwest. Over time, his anticolonial, anti-imperialist rhetoric 
was replaced by the language of nativism and xenophobia commonly 
employed by his rival, the former president Bédié. Having declared him-
self president in October 2000, Gbagbo turned his supporters against 
Ouattara’s RDR—and by extension, against all northern and immigrant 
populations. In his native southwestern region, home to a large immi-
grant population, Gbagbo expanded his base by stirring up acrimony 
among the original inhabitants. Challenging them to reclaim the land 
of their forefathers, he directed their anger against the Jula and Malinke 
populations, who had roots in Côte d’Ivoire’s northern savanna and far 
west and in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, and also against the Chris-
tian Baule from the central region, who had settled on choice cocoa and 
coffee lands in the southwest. He mobilized students and unemployed 
urban youths to pillage and destroy Jula shops and dwellings and attack 
purported foreigners and regime opponents. Using names, religious af-
filiations, and ethnic scarifications to determine who was “Ivoirian” and 
who was not, FESCI along with its militia spinoff, the Young Patriots, 
and Gbagbo’s security forces assaulted, raped, and killed hundreds of ci-
vilians with impunity.6
 In January 2002, Gbagbo announced security sector reforms 
that would result in the dissolution of a number of ethnically based 
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paramilitary units and the replacement of northern military command-
ers by southerners. On September 19, as the plan took shape, hundreds of 
disgruntled soldiers who were scheduled for demobilization attempted 
to overthrow the Gbagbo regime. The uprising was put down in Abidjan, 
the country’s largest city and economic capital, but dissident soldiers 
took control in Bouaké, the country’s second-largest city, and in Kor-
hogo, the main city in the north. French troops arrived on September 
22 to evacuate French nationals and other foreigners, while US Special 
Operations Forces came to evacuate Americans.
Foreign Intervention in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–3)
Foreign involvement in the conflict began almost immediately. Over the 
course of the next year, France sent soldiers to protect French citizens, in-
vestments, and the government in power. Burkina Faso’s President Blaise 
Compaoré, worried about the impact of a massive return of Burkinabe 
and their descendants, backed rebel forces that endorsed immigrants’ 
claims to property and citizenship. Liberia, ruled by Charles Taylor, re-
taliated for Côte d’Ivoire’s support of Liberian rebels by backing Ivoirian 
rebel movements. Taylor and his associates also used the conflict as a 
means to continue their plunder of regional resources. ECOWAS and the 
UN contributed peacekeeping forces that were unable to keep the peace 
because the parties to the conflict had little interest in ending the war.
 On September 28, 2002, President Gbagbo appealed for French 
intervention on his regime’s behalf, claiming that the insurgents were 
backed by Burkina Faso and Liberia and that Côte d’Ivoire was the vic-
tim of foreign aggression. Although Paris characterized the war as an 
internal affair, France had a significant stake in the outcome. More than 
20,000 French citizens lived in Côte d’Ivoire, and French interests held 
60 percent of the country’s private investments. France responded with 
its largest intervention in Africa in nearly two decades. Numbering 2,500 
troops at the outset, Operation Licorne ultimately included 5,300 soldiers 
from the French Foreign Legion, special forces, and army. Officially, 
Paris maintained that it had not interceded on behalf of the Gbagbo gov-
ernment; rather, it had sent troops to help keep the peace and to serve 
as a buffer between the opposing sides. In fact, Paris provided logistical 
support to Gbagbo’s forces, and French troops prevented the dissident 
soldiers from advancing on Abidjan—thus favoring the Gbagbo regime.
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 By October, the insurgent soldiers had gained the support of young 
intellectuals of northern origin. Among them was former student 
leader Guillaume Soro, a Christian Senufo who had been secretary- 
general of FESCI from 1995 to 1998, before the pro-Gbagbo faction 
dominated the organization. Under Soro’s leadership, the breakaway 
troops formed the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). Soro 
also mobilized 1,000 Jula hunter-warriors (dozos), about half of whom 
came from Mali, as well as anti-Gbagbo FESCI members. MPCI reb-
els and their allies quickly gained control of much of northern Côte 
d’Ivoire and some of the largest cities in the center. While the dissident 
soldiers had initially demanded financial compensation and reintegra-
tion into the Ivoirian armed forces, MPCI called for the establishment 
of a new political order that would result in Gbagbo’s resignation, free 
and fair elections, and the end of regional and ethnic discrimination. 
Meanwhile, the Gbagbo regime mobilized thousands of southern ci-
vilians into ethnic militias, and FESCI and other pro-Gbagbo student 
organizations recruited some 6,000 southern youths into the Young Pa-
triots, igniting a reign of terror in Abidjan.
 To protect their own interests and to secure advantage, neighbor-
ing countries supported various Ivoirian rebel movements. Hoping to 
thwart a large return of Burkinabe to an already impoverished nation, 
Burkina Faso gave significant assistance to the MPCI. Liberian President 
Charles Taylor played a major role in establishing the Ivoirian Patriotic 
Movement of the Far West (MPIGO) and the much smaller Movement 
for Justice and Peace (MJP), both of which operated along the Liberian 
border and engaged in serious human rights abuses reminiscent of those 
committed during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars.7 Beyond train-
ing, arming, and financing these movements, Taylor sent Sierra Leonean 
warlord Sam Bockarie and the RUF into western Côte d’Ivoire to fight 
alongside the Ivoirian rebels. The RUF joined Liberian renegades in a 
massive looting and killing spree. Gbagbo, in turn, employed European 
mercenaries and other hired soldiers from Liberia, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, and Angola, who sought new wars as their own wound down.
 Even as ECOWAS members threw their support to various factions, 
the West African subregional organization worked with the AU to me-
diate a resolution to the crisis. These efforts led to a ceasefire agreement 
in October 2002 between MPCI and the Gbagbo regime and another in 
January 2003 that included MJP and MPIGO. French troops who had 
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been part of the Operation Licorne deployment were authorized to mon-
itor the ceasefire. In early January 2003, the French contingent was joined 
by 1,200 West African soldiers in the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(ECOMICI), which was funded primarily by France.
 In mid-January, French President Jacques Chirac sponsored a new 
round of peace negotiations in the towns of Linas and Marcoussis near 
Paris. Participating in the talks were the Gbagbo government, several 
Ivoirian political organizations, and the three rebel groups, which had 
united as the New Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (or Forces Nouvelles) under 
the leadership of Guillaume Soro. On January 24, these groups signed 
the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which was intended to resolve ques-
tions of citizenship, land ownership, and eligibility for electoral office. 
It also provided for the disarmament and demobilization of rebel forces 
and integration of the diverse fighting forces into a reformed security 
sector. The signatories agreed to respect the country’s territorial integ-
rity and to establish a Government of National Reconciliation that would 
Photo 9.1. Rebel soldiers on patrol near the Liberian and Guinean borders in 
western Côte d’Ivoire, May 17, 2003. Photo by Luc Gnago/Reuters. 
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include representatives of all parties to the agreement. While Gbagbo 
would remain as the interim president, his dominance would be checked 
by a consensus prime minister who would wield substantial powers, and 
the important defense and interior ministries would be led by members 
of the opposition. The interim government would organize free and fair 
elections, originally scheduled for October 2005. Article 35 of the con-
stitution would be abrogated and the policy of ivoirité disavowed. De-
spite these measures, deep problems remained. The legal requirements 
for Ivoirian citizenship continued to discriminate against northern eth-
nic groups, and the onerous specifications for documentation precluded 
many from asserting their birthright.
 Having mediated the ceasefire and peace negotiations, the inter-
national community also monitored the ensuing accord. On January 
26, 2003, France and neighboring African states endorsed the Linas- 
Marcoussis Agreement. The UN Security Council followed suit and on 
February 4 gave ex post facto approval to the French and ECOWAS 
military interventions and strengthened their mandate to include the 
protection of civilians and humanitarian organizations in their oper-
ating zones. ECOWAS agreed to contribute 2,000 more troops to its 
mission. The Security Council deepened its involvement on May 13, 
when it established the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(MINUCI), a peacekeeping mission with both civilian and military 
components, which was authorized to assist French and ECOWAS 
troops in monitoring and enforcing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. 
In May and June, the international forces established a confidence zone 
where armed Ivoirian groups were prohibited and which served as a 
buffer between the north and south.
Precarious Peace and Postponed Elections (2003–10)
Endorsed by warring parties at the highest levels and monitored by 
ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN, the Linas-Marcoussis accord failed to bring 
peace. Treating deeply rooted political, economic, and social problems 
as technical ones, the mediators presumed that all parties had a stake in 
abiding by the agreement and established no penalties for noncompli-
ance. However, actors on both sides had reasons to perpetuate the vio-
lence. Pressured by France to sign, President Gbagbo complained that 
the accord was the product of French neocolonial meddling and charged 
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that it undermined the legitimate Ivoirian government. Cognizant that 
implementation could result in his electoral defeat, he incited ethnic mi-
litias to continue their attacks in government-controlled territory and 
played on divisions within New Forces ranks. Other powerful individ-
uals also profited from the absence of peace. Government officials, loy-
alist businessmen, and militia leaders enriched themselves from state 
resources—particularly coffee, cocoa, and oil revenues—as well as from 
illegal gold mining, rubber tapping, and timber cutting, the alienation 
of land from “foreigners,” and money-laundering networks linked to 
drug and weapons trafficking. New Forces leaders trafficked guns and 
diamonds, controlled important cotton and cocoa resources, and levied 
taxes on trade and transport. Soldiers, militia members, and rebels used 
their powers of coercion to shake down civilians. None of these parties 
was anxious to see the return of law and order.
 Opposed to a peace that might put an end to their plunder, Gbagbo 
and his associates encouraged Young Patriots and allied militias to wage 
bloody street battles, attacking northerners, foreigners, opposition party 
members, and others whom they blamed for the country’s problems. 
Death squads made up of soldiers, police, and armed civilians conducted 
targeted assassinations for the Gbagbo regime. Although a peace ac-
cord had been signed, massacres of civilians continued, especially in the 
far west along the Guinean and Liberian frontiers, where government 
troops, progovernment militias and mercenaries, and rebels carried on 
the fight. In September 2003, New Forces charged that Gbagbo had re-
tained all real power in his hands and those of his associates; New Forces 
members had not received their share of ministerial positions, and they 
had been sidelined from the government. Distrusting Gbagbo’s commit-
ment to the accord, rebels refused to disarm, and New Forces ministers 
withdrew from the government.
 In April 2004, as the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement broke down, the 
UN Security Council transferred the ceasefire monitoring and enforce-
ment powers of ECOWAS and MINUCI to the United Nations Oper-
ation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), a peacekeeping force with a Chapter 
VII mandate. UNOCI was designed to deploy as many as 6,240 mili-
tary personnel to observe and monitor the ceasefire and implementation 
of the agreement and to investigate perceived violations. The new UN 
force would also assist the Ivoirian government in disarming, demobi-
lizing, and reintegrating combatants, monitoring territorial borders, and 
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organizing elections. While ECOWAS was expected to cede authority to 
the new UN force, Paris was not. As a result, France remained deeply 
involved in Côte d’Ivoire on its own terms. The French-run Operation 
Licorne provided the new UN mission with a rapid reaction force and 
more than two dozen French officers. Paris also retained its own con-
tingent of some 4,000 troops under French command—and continued 
to protect French citizens, property, and national interests as it saw fit, 
just as it had in Rwanda. Seen by many Ivoirians as an occupying force 
that supported the rebellion, the French troops fueled considerable 
anti-French sentiment.
 In early November 2004, the Gbagbo regime openly defied the Linas- 
Marcoussis Agreement by launching Operation Dignity, a military ven-
ture aimed at reconquering the north. Three days into the campaign, 
Ivoirian bombs hit a French military base in Bouaké, killing nine French 
soldiers and wounding thirty-seven. French planes destroyed most of the 
Ivoirian air force in retaliation. Decrying what he described as French 
neocolonialism, Gbagbo rallied the Young Patriots and other supporters 
in Abidjan. When pro-Gbagbo mobs attacked French citizens and prop-
erty, some 8,000 French citizens and other foreigners left the country. As 
South African President Thabo Mbeki attempted to mediate under AU 
auspices, French troops fired on pro-Gbagbo demonstrators, killing doz-
ens. On November 15, the UN Security Council imposed an arms em-
bargo on Côte d’Ivoire, with exceptions made for UN and French troops. 
It also imposed sanctions on individuals deemed responsible for human 
rights abuses, war crimes, and obstructing the peace process. Gbagbo 
supporters charged that the UN, France, and the AU were not neutral 
parties, but rather, had sided with the former rebels and with Burkina 
Faso, which had been the rebels’ primary backer.
 International pressure led to some positive developments—although 
these measures failed to compensate for other failings. Shortly after the 
imposition of UN sanctions, the Ivoirian legislature passed bills aimed at 
resolving citizenship and land ownership issues. In April 2005, Gbagbo 
issued a presidential decree that suspended Article 35 of the constitution, 
as mandated by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, permitting Ouattara 
to run for president in elections scheduled for October 2005. However, 
the elections were postponed at the eleventh hour. Neither Gbagbo’s mi-
litias nor the New Forces rebels had disarmed. The rebels refused to dis-
arm before Gbagbo left power, and they demanded his departure as a 
228  |  Côte d’Ivoire
precondition for elections. Gbagbo refused to hold elections before the 
rebels disarmed, and he declared that he would remain in office until 
elections took place. The UN and the AU supported Gbagbo’s position 
and extended his term until the end of 2006. However, little progress 
was made in 2006, the presidential elections scheduled for October were 
postponed for yet another year, and the UN, AU, and ECOWAS again 
agreed to let Gbagbo remain in power in the interim.
 As the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement foundered, African leaders ini-
tiated new rounds of discussions. When the South African–led AU me-
diation failed to resolve the crisis, Burkina Faso’s President Compaoré, 
the acting president of ECOWAS, stepped in despite his questionable 
neutrality. In March 2007, following talks held in Burkina Faso’s capital, 
Gbagbo and Soros signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), 
which was substantially similar to the Linas-Marcoussis accord and did 
not resolve the longstanding issues that had precipitated the conflict, in-
cluding the contentious definition of Ivoirian citizenship. However, pro-
visions were made to facilitate proof of citizenship for those who met the 
existing criteria but lacked the requisite documentation.
 In contrast to previous agreements, the Ouagadougou process was led 
by the key Ivoirian players, who had concluded that neither side could win 
on the battlefield. Although a long-term solution remained elusive, partici-
pants in the talks hoped to stop the violence in the short term. The OPA in-
cluded immediate benefits for the leaders of the warring parties—with the 
balance tipped in Gbagbo’s favor. Gbagbo’s presidential powers were guar-
anteed until such time as elections were held. Soro was made prime min-
ister but was prohibited from running for president. The FPI continued to 
dominate the government, but New Forces members were appointed to 
the transitional cabinet. FPI ministers retained the powerful interior and 
defense portfolios, while New Forces appointees were awarded justice, 
tourism, and communications. Some leaders from other political parties 
were assigned to the cabinet, but once again civil society members were 
left largely on the sidelines. Once more, hopeful signs were overshadowed 
by harsh realities. Presidential elections, postponed again in 2007, were re-
scheduled for early 2008. However, those elections were put off until No-
vember 2009, and then until March 2010, as a result of continued delays in 
disarmament and ongoing disputes over citizenship and voter registration. 
In February 2010, Gbagbo dissolved both the government and the Inde-
pendent Electoral Commission and delayed the elections one more time. 
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Contested Elections and Foreign Intervention (2010–11)
The long-delayed presidential elections, which had been postponed six 
times, finally took place in October and November 2010. By that time, 
Gbagbo had remained in office for five years beyond his original term—
with the sanction of the international community. The incumbent led in 
the October polling, receiving 38.3 percent of the vote in elections that 
were viewed by outside observers as flawed, but for the most part free 
and fair. Ouattara received 32.1 percent of the vote, followed by Bédié, 
who won 25.2 percent. Because no candidate received a majority, a runoff 
election was required. Gbagbo’s support was primarily in the south and 
among urban youth, while Ouattara’s stronghold was in the north. Bédié, 
a former head of state with control over the powerful PDCI political 
machine that had run the country for four decades after independence, 
found followers in the southern and central regions. Both Ouattara and 
Bédié had significant backing in the rural areas, where half the voting 
population lived. Determined to defeat Gbagbo, Ouattara and Bédié had 
agreed to rally behind the stronger candidate in the event of a runoff. As a 
result, Bédié, the PDCI, and a number of smaller parties threw their sup-
port to Ouattara in the second round of elections, held in November 2010.
 In December, the reconstituted Independent Electoral Commission 
determined that Ouattara had won 54 percent of the vote, while Gbagbo 
had won 46 percent. The UN representative in Côte d’Ivoire confirmed 
the results. On Gbagbo’s instructions, Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional 
Council overruled the electoral commission’s findings and annulled the 
results in nine northern precincts, which had yielded hundreds of thou-
sands of votes. The revised tally granted 51 percent to Gbagbo and 49 
percent to Ouattara. Gbagbo refused to relinquish the presidency, and 
both candidates had themselves sworn in to office. The UN, EU, AU, 
ECOWAS, France, and the United States recognized Ouattara’s victory 
and urged Gbagbo to step down. However, official positions masked dis-
sention within the ranks. In the UN Security Council, Russia and China, 
which routinely distanced themselves from Western members on mat-
ters of foreign intervention and human rights, criticized the UN’s Ouat-
tara endorsement. In the AU, member states that supported Gbagbo’s 
continued claim to the presidency included Gambia, Libya, Maurita-
nia, and Zimbabwe, whose incumbent presidents had come to power 
through military coups or fraudulent elections. South Africa, which 
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had played a significant role in mediating earlier agreements, suggested 
a power-sharing arrangement that would allow Gbagbo to retain some 
control, a position also endorsed by Angola. Other AU members recog-
nized Ouattara’s victory or remained neutral. In France, Gbagbo found 
support among those who opposed President Nicolas Sarkozy and his 
center-right Union for a Popular Movement, which resulted in the para-
dox of the left-leaning Socialist Party and the right-wing National Front 
promoting the same side.
 Although most international power holders acknowledged Ouattara 
as the new president, Gbagbo controlled the state media and an army 
of 9,000 men. On Gbagbo’s orders, Ivoirian borders were sealed, trans-
missions from international radio and television stations were blocked, 
and opposition newspapers were banned. The state-run media broadcast 
xenophobic messages and incited ethnically based violence—reminis-
cent of Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. In neighborhoods that had 
supported Ouattara, people were beaten and killed by Ivoirian secu-
rity forces, and women who had mobilized voters were gang-raped by 
Gbagbo’s soldiers and militias. Ouattara sought refuge in the Hotel du 
Golf, where he was guarded by 800 UN peacekeepers. On December 18, 
following attacks on UN peacekeepers by Ivoirian security forces and 
Young Patriots, Gbagbo ordered all UN and French troops to leave the 
country. Although the UN refused to decamp, its 9,000 peacekeepers 
failed to protect civilians against Gbagbo’s forces. In the months that fol-
lowed, at least 3,000 people were killed and as many as 1 million people 
were displaced as the country spiraled back into war. More than 100,000 
Ivoirians fled into Liberia, and thousands of migrant laborers returned to 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea.
 By March 2011, the most significant African and extracontinental 
bodies had rallied to Ouattara’s side. The AU affirmed its binding rec-
ognition of Ouattara as the duly elected president, and ECOWAS called 
on the UN Security Council to strengthen its mandate in Côte d’Ivoire. 
The consensus of key African organizations was critical to the passage 
of a tough Security Council resolution on March 30 that allowed French 
and UN forces to protect Ivoirian civilians from sophisticated weapons 
in Gbagbo’s arsenal. When the international forces destroyed the heavy 
weapons that protected Gbagbo’s residence, they tipped the balance in 
favor of his opponents. New Forces combatants, reconstituted as the 
pro-Ouattara Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), arrived in 
Civil War and Regime Change (2002–11)  |  231
Abidjan on March 31, 2011, and some 50,000 members of Gbagbo’s mili-
tary and security forces defected to join them.
 With its focus on Gbagbo and his supporters, the Security Coun-
cil resolution failed to protect civilians from Ouattara’s forces. Human 
Rights Watch charged that in their campaign to take power, Ouattara 
followers collectively punished populations regarded as Gbagbo pro-
ponents—raping, pillaging, and executing some 1,000 civilians in the 
far west, then destroying their villages and food supplies. Victims 
were targeted on the basis of ethnicity, place of residence, or age. The 
pro-Ouattara forces quickly took control of most of the country, and 
when they reached Abidjan, members of ethnic groups perceived to be 
aligned with Gbagbo were again targeted. Although Gbagbo remained 
in the presidential palace, Ouattara gained command of the state-run 
television station. French troops and UN peacekeepers took Abidjan’s 
airport, allowing airplanes to land and foreigners to be evacuated. On 
April 4, following attacks on the UN compound by pro-Gbagbo par-
tisans, French and UN forces conducted military strikes on Gbagbo’s 
home, offices, and military bases and engaged in ground operations in 
Abidjan. Paris claimed that its objective was to neutralize weapons that 
Photo 9.2. Anti-Gbagbo protester carries a sign that reads, “Gbagbo—too much 
blood was spilled because of you.” Abobo neighborhood, Abidjan, March 3, 2011. 
Photo by Luc Gnago/Reuters.
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had been used against civilians, which was covered by its UN mandate, 
rather than regime change, which was not.
 If regime change was not the stated objective of the French-UN 
mission, it was the underlying goal. On April 5, when Gbagbo’s gen-
erals ordered their soldiers to cease fighting and to surrender their 
weapons to UN forces, France demanded that Gbagbo officially rec-
ognize Ouattara as the country’s legitimate president. When Gbagbo 
refused, French and UN forces continued their assault on the presidential 
residence. On April 11, Ouattara’s forces arrested Gbagbo and his wife 
Simone, as French helicopters hovered overhead. The unofficial objec-
tive had been achieved.
  President Alassane Ouattara took office on May 21, 2011, and was 
elected to a second term in 2015. During his tenure, Côte d’Ivoire, like its 
neighbors, took important steps toward establishing a new order. Trans-
parent multiparty elections were instituted. Presidential and legislative 
elections, held in 2015 and 2016, were deemed free and fair by interna-
tional observers. A new constitution, which removed the controversial 
Article 35 nationality clause, was adopted by popular referendum, and 
the National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation for Vic-
tims identified 316,000 victims of political violence since 1990 who might 
be eligible for reparations.
 However, once again, significant grievances were not addressed and 
serious problems remained. Local conflicts over land and identity con-
tinued to fester, provoking new cycles of violence. Those with power con-
tinued to act with impunity. While former president Laurent Gbagbo, 
Young Patriots leader Charles Blé Goudé, and other high-level associ-
ates were prosecuted for war crimes and human rights abuses, President 
Ouattara refused to hold his own loyalists accountable. By the end of 
2017, no pro-Ouattara leaders had been charged for abuses committed 
during the 2002–3 civil war. Although national courts had indicted some 
pro-Ouattara military commanders for crimes committed in 2010–11, 
none had been brought to trial, and several retained important positions 
in the armed forces. Little progress had been made in security sector 
reform. Although the heads of the army, police, and paramilitary gen-
darmes had been replaced, high-level commanders and the rank and file 
continued to abuse their powers. The security forces trafficked in cocoa, 
diamonds, and other natural resources and extorted money from civilians 
at illegal checkpoints and through unofficial “taxation.” Gender violence 
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remained widespread and unprosecuted. Despite these ominous signs, 
in 2017 UNOCI closed up shop and returned home, concluding that its 
mission had been accomplished.
Conclusion
In Côte d’Ivoire, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, outsiders intervened 
with mixed motives, and their ventures had mixed results. Most exter-
nal actors justified their involvement as a response to instability. Some 
were inspired by the responsibility to protect civilians and the sanctity of 
free and fair elections; others were driven by the desire for resources and 
power. In some instances, foreign intervention exacerbated tensions over 
identity, citizenship rights, and access to resources. This was especially 
true in the case of bilateral intervention, when the interests of external 
powers came to the fore. In other instances, foreign intervention served 
to lessen the conflict, which was more often the case when multilateral 
peacekeeping forces were involved. However, the effectiveness of peace-
keeping missions was undermined by conflicting interests among con-
stituent members, which resulted in inadequate mandates and continued 
support for warring parties that sabotaged peace agreements.
 Peace accords were the product of struggle that reflected the interests 
of outside powers as much as those of internal entities. In Côte d’Ivoire, 
as elsewhere, civil society organizations were sidelined from the peace 
process. The final agreements were often signed under duress by parties 
that had no interest in implementing them. From 2003 to 2010, France, 
ECOWAS, and the UN failed to convince warring sides to implement 
the accords they had signed. For many contestants, the continuation of 
war meant a license to plunder, while peace imposed limits on access to 
power and wealth. With regional peace and security in jeopardy, France 
and the UN facilitated regime change in 2011, helping President-elect 
Ouattara remove his recalcitrant predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo, from 
power.
 As Côte d’Ivoire struggled to build peace and democracy, other 
prodemocracy forces were gathering force north of the Sahara, and a 
number of conflicts ensued. Foreign intervention in North Africa during 
the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath (2011–17) shaped the out-
comes in important ways. Chapter 10 focuses on external involvement in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya during this period.
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anti-Gbagbo mobilization and the role of external forces. See Richard 
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The Arab Spring in North Africa
popular resistance, backlash,  
and the Struggle for the Future (2011–17)
as côte d’ivoire moved haltingly toward national reconstruction 
and democracy, popular anger against entrenched dictatorships erupted 
in the Arab world. In January 2011, civil discontent led to mass uprisings 
across North Africa and the Middle East. Spearheaded by disenchanted 
students and other youth, who were joined by labor, professional, and 
women’s organizations, the protests also attracted Islamist groups that 
had been victims of governmental repression.1 First in Tunisia, then in 
Egypt, the protests toppled longstanding regimes in a matter of weeks. 
The Libyan insurgency, assisted by external military intervention, 
brought down the dictatorship within several months. Inspired by these 
successes, protests spread across the region in an awakening that became 
known as the Arab Spring.2
 Among the Arab regimes in North Africa, only those in Morocco 
and Algeria were able to contain the protests. In Morocco, tens of thou-
sands of citizens joined the demonstrations. However, King Mohammed 
VI offered superficial political reforms that divided the opposition and 
thwarted a major uprising. In Algeria, where prodemocracy protests had 
erupted in the late 1980s, fear of the consequences of instability and the 
inevitable government crackdown led many to keep their distance. The 
Algerian Awakening of 1988–90 had culminated in massive governmen-
tal repression and a bloody civil war (1991–2002), which deeply influ-
enced popular and official responses to the 2011 movement.
 Although the dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were quickly 
overthrown, the implementation of fundamental political, economic, 
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Transformations of society from the bottom up are protracted pro-
cesses that require years, if not generations, of struggle. In the interim, 
societies undergoing transformation are often wracked by instability and 
violence, and the inevitable backlash from remnants of the old regime 
and their external supporters serves as a check on progress. Eclectic op-
position coalitions, no longer bound by their common struggle, often 
fracture, with some factions turning against others. In Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, for instance, Islamist organizations that had been banned under 
the old regimes assumed powerful roles after their fall. In all three 
countries, secular liberals and leftists who had allied with the Islam- 
ists now opposed them, sometimes joining forces with the old order 
to counter the Islamists’ burgeoning power. The growing presence of 
Islamist organizations—and, even more so, their violent spinoffs—was 
an important justification for external intervention during this period.
 This chapter focuses on the Arab Spring (2011–13) and its aftermath 
(2013–17) in North Africa. The cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are high-
lighted, but the discussion also touches on Algeria and Morocco, where 
the protests dissipated quickly and did not instigate significant change. 
Foreign governments and entities intervened politically in Tunisia and 
Egypt and militarily in Libya in response to instability and, in the case of 
Libya, to protect civilian lives. Although never officially acknowledged, 
regime change was also an objective in Libya. As the conflicts deepened 
and international terrorist networks joined the fray, the war on terror 
served to justify further foreign engagement. France, the United States, 
NATO, the EU, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were 
the most significant external actors. Whereas Western powers generally 
embraced the status quo during the Arab Spring and only reluctantly 
supported the democratic opposition, Qatar provided substantial re-
sources to Islamist rivals of the old regimes. Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates backed the dictators in Tunisia and Egypt and allied with 
the West in supporting regime change in Libya. In Tunisia and Egypt, 
France and the United States were reluctant to abandon the autocrats 
who protected their economic and strategic interests. When the Tunisian 
dictatorship fell, France, joined by the EU, attempted to influence the 
new order in its former colonial protectorate. The United States focused 
its attention on Egypt, which together with Israel was the linchpin of its 
Middle East policy. In both cases, Western powers attempted to mini-
mize the influence of Islamist parties that had come to power through 
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democratic elections, and they supported efforts to oust them. In the 
case of Libya, an exception to the norm, France rallied NATO to insti-
gate UN-sanctioned airstrikes to protect civilian lives. The United States 
played a critical role in the air campaign, which ultimately resulted in 
regime change. When the government fell, secular liberals and moderate 
Islamists were pushed aside as old regime loyalists, local militias, and 
jihadis competed to fill the power vacuum.
 In all three countries, the prospects for universally respected civil 
and human rights dissipated as old regime holdovers and secular lib-
erals united in their opposition to Muslim fundamentalists—targeting 
moderate Islamists who were willing to work within the system as well 
as violent extremists. Some Western powers and their Middle Eastern 
allies supported the anti-Islamist actions in word and deed, while other 
powers supported the Islamist opposition. In Tunisia, the democratically 
elected Islamist-led coalition government was pressured to step aside to 
avoid further bloodshed. In Egypt, the military, backed by secular lib-
erals, overthrew the democratically elected Islamist regime and insti-
gated the bloody repression of all forms of opposition. Meanwhile, Libya 
descended into civil war as disparate forces fought to establish a new 
order that would promote their values and interests. In each case, out-
side powers intervened in the local conflicts in an attempt to shape their 
outcome. In Egypt and Libya, especially, foreign intervention after the 
Arab Spring intensified the violence and instability. The ouster of demo-
cratically elected Islamist governments and the repression of moderates 
strengthened the appeal of violent extremists; al-Qaeda and Islamic State 
forces soon flourished where none had been before.
Setting the Stage: Foreign Interests in North Africa (1960–2017)
In the decades preceding the Arab Spring uprisings, North Africa and the 
Middle East were dominated by neopatrimonial states. Power was concen-
trated in the hands of autocrats who distributed positions and resources 
to family members and associates and treated state assets as their own. 
Some states were ruled by monarchs, while others were run by secular 
presidential regimes—the so-called Arab republics—that had overthrown 
monarchies and embraced Arab nationalism during the periods of de-
colonization and the Cold War. Like the monarchies they had cast aside, 
the Arab republics had become bastions of personal rule characterized by 
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nepotism, corruption, and political repression.3 Fraudulent elections and 
the banning or repression of the political opposition belied their claims to 
republican status. Most regimes of both types had strong ties to the West, 
which offered political, economic, and military benefits in exchange for 
oil, natural gas, and participation in Western-led counterterrorism efforts.
 In North Africa, as in the sub-Saharan region, France developed 
close relationships with leaders who assumed power after political in-
dependence, signing partnership agreements that protected French eco-
nomic, strategic, and security interests. After Algeria’s independence in 
1962, French Arab policy supported secular nationalism in North Africa 
and the Middle East. The perceived anglophone menace loomed large in 
these regions, as it did in sub-Saharan Africa. France hoped to displace 
British dominance in its historical spheres of operation and to forestall 
the growth of US influence. During the 1990s, however, French relations 
with the Arab world deteriorated. France had joined the US-led coali-
tion against Iraq in the First Gulf War (1990–91), and during the Alge-
rian Civil War (1991–2002) France had maintained close ties to President 
Liamine Zéroual, a former general whose army brutally suppressed the 
Islamist opposition and was responsible for tens of thousands of civilian 
deaths. A series of bombings in France in 1995 by the Algerian-based 
Armed Islamic Group, followed by al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United 
States in September 2001, prompted France to join the US war on terror, 
which deepened French ties to dictatorships that repressed Islamists.
 As French influence in North Africa weakened, France sought 
support from other EU countries that shared its interest in promoting 
stable, pro-Western governments in the Mediterranean basin. In 2008, 
Paris spearheaded the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean, 
which eventually included all EU member states, other European coun-
tries, and the North African nations of Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Mo-
rocco, and Tunisia. Although the Union embraced a broader mission, the 
goals of ensuring European access to North African natural gas, com-
batting terrorism, and stanching the flow of African migrants to Europe 
were among the European members’ primary considerations.
 Concerns about terrorism and energy resources also shaped US poli-
cies toward North Africa. During the periods of decolonization and the 
Cold War, the United States had supported corrupt dictators in North 
Africa and the Middle East who safeguarded US oil interests but whose 
policies led to widespread poverty, unemployment, and injustice in their 
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countries. To maintain their hold on power, US-backed strongmen em-
ployed harsh security measures and manipulated regional, ethnic, and 
clan differences. They co-opted or destroyed institutions and organiza-
tions that might serve as alternative power bases; many were especially 
ruthless toward Islamists. Equally hostile to Islamist movements, the US 
government ignored its allies’ human rights abuses and provided them 
with weapons and funding. Just as some US officials had confounded 
radical nationalists with communists during the Cold War, many in its 
aftermath failed to distinguish between organizations that promoted Is-
lamic values in government and the minority that employed terrorism to 
accomplish their goals. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the 
United States and the ensuing war on terror exacerbated this tendency.
 For many in the Muslim world, the US war on terror appeared to be 
a war against Islam. The words and actions of President George W. Bush 
seemed to confirm their suspicions. Five days after the 2001 attacks, the 
US president evoked images of Christian knights battling Saracens in 
the Holy Land when he cautioned, “This crusade, this war on terrorism 
is going to take a while.”4 A few days later, he warned, “Every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you 
are with the terrorists.”5 Under the auspices of the war on terror, the Bush 
administration launched wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, 
which had devastating consequences for citizens of those countries and 
for their neighbors. These wars also led to the expansion of al-Qaeda into 
new territories and to the emergence of the Islamic State.
 Critics hoped that US policies toward the Muslim world would 
change under the leadership of Barack Obama, the first US president of 
African descent and one whose family members included Muslims. Four 
months after taking office, President Obama traveled to Egypt, where he 
acknowledged that the conflict between the Muslim and Western worlds 
had been “fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to 
many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries 
were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations.”6 
However, the Obama administration was soon consumed by its own war 
on terror. Although the administration withdrew US forces from Iraq in 
2011, it oversaw a major troop surge in Afghanistan in 2009–12, devastat-
ing drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, and the introduction of Special 
Operations Forces into many predominantly Muslim countries. More-
over, the Obama administration continued the longstanding US practice 
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of promoting the interests of Israel over the UN-sanctioned right of Pal-
estinians to an independent state. All of these factors continued to de-
grade the reputation of the United States in largely Muslim countries.
 When the Arab Spring erupted in 2011, the Obama administration 
struggled to balance US strategic and economic interests with rhetorical 
support for democracy. Its response to the uprisings was cautious and 
inconsistent. The administration gave verbal encouragement to the Tu-
nisian protesters only after they had driven the long-reigning dictator 
from power, and it was slow to embrace the prodemocracy movement 
in Egypt. The United States eventually supported military action against 
the Qaddafi regime in Libya, but it continued to back autocratic rulers 
in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and it kept the disparate Syrian 
opposition movement at arm’s length.
 The United States and other Western powers thus faced a conun-
drum that pitted their democratic values against their antipathy toward 
the people’s choice. This tension was especially evident in North Africa. 
In the Arab Spring’s aftermath, Islamist parties dominated popular elec-
tions in Tunisia and Egypt, and their members assumed powerful roles 
in Libya. The Islamist parties were opposed by secular forces, which had 
joined them in confronting the old regimes, and by remnants of the pre-
vious orders. The ability of Islamists to win elections after years of ban-
ning and repression by Western-backed governments seemed to belie the 
common view that adherents of political Islam could not attain power by 
working within the system. However, a series of events—the ouster of 
the Islamist government in Egypt by a military coup (2013), the pressures 
placed on the Islamist-led government in Tunisia that resulted in its 
abdication (2014), and the disintegration of Libya into warring factions 
that set Islamists against Qaddafi loyalists and other secular forces— 
reinforced the earlier consensus. Renewed repression and marginaliza-
tion of Islamists after the Arab Spring, and the tacit or open support of 
these measures by Western powers, resulted in new cycles of radicaliza-
tion, violence, and anti-Western sentiment.
 Western concerns conformed with those of the majority of Arab 
Gulf states, which tended to view the Arab Spring uprisings as a chal-
lenge to their authority. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates had long supported fundamentalist Islamic movements to 
counter Arab nationalism and other opponents of the ruling regimes.7 In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries had opened their doors to Egyptian 
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Muslim Brotherhood members who fled repression under Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Arab nationalist government. Educated and upwardly mobile, 
many of these Egyptians achieved important positions in Saudi and Emi-
rati educational, judicial, and private sectors, where a large number grew 
extremely wealthy. As economic inequality deepened in both countries, 
however, and Muslim Brothers harnessed that discontent, the two mon-
archies began to view the organization as a threat on par with violent 
extremists. During the Arab Spring, when Brotherhood-affiliated parties 
dominated popular elections in several North African countries, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported old regime remnants 
against moderate Islamists with significant popular followings. Both 
states provided substantial resources to anti-Islamist forces in Egypt and 
Libya, which became battlegrounds for intra-Gulf rivalries that opposed 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Qatar.
 An exception among the Gulf states, Qatar provided substantial sup-
port to participants in the Arab Spring revolts, particularly to moderate 
Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Like Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates, Qatar had offered refuge to Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood members in the 1950s and 1960s. In subsequent 
years, it had offered safe haven to a variety of Islamists and dissidents 
from many parts of the Muslim world, and in the 1990s it replaced Saudi 
Arabia as the Muslim Brotherhood’s primary sponsor.
 A small emirate, rich in oil and liquefied natural gas, Qatar had lev-
eraged its wealth and strategic location into significant regional influence 
from the early 1990s onward. Having supported the US-led coalition during 
the First Gulf War (1990–91), Qatar joined in US counterterrorism efforts 
after September 2001, and in 2003 it replaced Saudi Arabia as the forward 
headquarters of the US military’s Central Command (CENTCOM). The 
same year, a new constitution placed international mediation at the cen-
ter of Qatar’s foreign policy priorities. In the three years that preceded the 
Arab Spring, Qatar mediated talks concerning conflicts in Yemen, Leba-
non, and Darfur, as well as disputes between Sudan and Chad and between 
Djibouti and Eritrea. In 2011–12, Qatar assumed the presidency of the Arab 
League. Having established itself as a regional leader with an increasingly 
global reach, Qatar viewed the 2011 uprisings as an opportunity to further 
augment its influence. In Tunisia and Egypt, the emirate used its vast fi-
nancial resources and powerful Al Jazeera media network to support Is-
lamist opposition movements. In Libya, Qatar allied with the West and 
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mobilized Arab support for the NATO-led ouster of the Qaddafi regime. 
During the civil war that ensued, Qatar supported Islamist rebels that 
opposed remnants of the old regime that had joined the coalition backed 
by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the West.
Tunisia, Part 1:  
Popular Uprising and the End of a Dictatorship (2011–13)
The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, where a popular revolt overthrew a 
dictatorship backed by Western powers and established a democratically 
elected coalition government dominated by a once-banned Islamist party. 
In December 2010, urban workers, small business owners, professionals, 
and human rights activists—led by trade union, student, professional, and 
women’s organizations—instigated massive street protests and general 
strikes against the regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, a French-
trained army officer who had seized power in 1987. Enraged by the coun-
try’s endemic poverty, unemployment, and governmental corruption, and 
a regime that engaged in torture, rape, and murder, thousands of protesters 
took to the streets. On January 14, 2011, after twenty-nine days of demonstra-
tions, Ben Ali ceded power and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. The United 
States and France, which had regarded the Ben Ali regime as a bulwark 
against radical Islam and the guarantor of their economic interests, with-
held even verbal support for the demonstrators until after Ben Ali’s ouster.
 In October 2011, Tunisian citizens elected a National Constituent As-
sembly that was charged with drafting a new constitution and appoint-
ing a transitional government. With more than 90 percent of Tunisia’s 
registered voters participating, Ennahda, an Islamist party influenced by 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, won a plurality of seats nationwide and 
in nearly every district. In response to its banning and repression under 
Ben Ali, Ennahda embraced human rights, democratic pluralism, and an 
inclusive, tolerant form of Islamism. Although Islamists had not played 
a significant role in the uprising, after Ben Ali’s ouster Ennahda estab-
lished a solid organizational base throughout the country, finding sup-
port among professionals, office workers, and small entrepreneurs, and 
building alliances with secular prodemocracy parties, trade unionists, 
and civil society activists. Its efforts were bolstered by financial support 
from Qatar and media access through Qatar’s Al Jazeera network. The 
October elections resulted in the formation of an Ennahda-led coalition 
government that included two secular center-left parties.
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 In the two years following the fall of the old regime, Tunisian civil 
society was vibrant, but unemployment continued to rise, with youth 
unemployment reaching 30 percent. Regional inequalities remained, 
and the security situation was fragile. Under pressure from diverse 
constituencies, the National Constituent Assembly deadlocked and 
constitution writing stalled. Dissatisfied with the pace of change, many 
Tunisians decried the lack of justice for victims of the Ben Ali regime 
and the government’s failure to hold the perpetrators accountable. Tak-
ing advantage of the paralysis, Ansar al-Shari’a (Followers of Islamic 
Law) in Tunisia, a local insurgency group associated with al-Qaeda, 
and other extremist groups engaged in a number of violent actions. 
In September 2012, hundreds of protesters attacked the US Embassy 
in Tunis to assail a US-made video that denigrated the Prophet Mu-
hammad. Ansar al-Shari’a endorsed the attack, while the Ennahda 
government condemned it. In 2013, Ansar al-Shari’a was linked to the 
assassination of two leftist opposition leaders. Although the assassins 
had no connection to Ennahda, secular parties accused Ennahda of 
being soft on violent Muslim extremists.
10.1. Tunisians protest the Ben Ali regime, Kasbah Square, Tunis, January 28, 2011. 
Photo by Leomaros.
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Tunisia, Part 2: Internal Unrest,  
Foreign Pressure, and Political Compromise (2013–17)
By mid-2013, Tunisia’s transitional government established after the 
October 2011 elections had begun to crumble. In July, sixty-five oppo-
sition members withdrew from the National Constituent Assembly, 
which led to the suspension of Tunisia’s only elected body. Civil society 
organizations representing labor, employers, lawyers, and human rights 
groups moved into the breach. The so-called National Dialogue Quartet 
mediated months of discussions that resulted in Ennahda’s agreement to 
step aside in January 2014 in favor of an unelected caretaker government 
dominated by secular parties that would lead the country through parlia-
mentary and presidential elections in October through December of that 
year.8 The move was hailed by secular organizations at home and abroad 
as a peaceful solution formulated by indigenous civil society organiza-
tions, in contrast to a violent dispensation imposed by external inter-
vention or a military coup. However, Islamists and other critics decried 
the forced resignation of an elected Islamist-led government and charged 
that it was further evidence that Islamists stood little chance of winning 
and retaining power through peaceful means. Some of the marginalized 
concluded that violent extremism was the only remaining option.
 Before relinquishing power, the Ennahda government signed into 
law a compromise constitution drafted and approved by the National 
Constituent Assembly. The product of two years of struggle and debate, 
the constitution laid the foundations for a secular state featuring separa-
tion of powers, an independent judiciary, and respect for universal rights 
and freedoms, including the rights of women. While freedom of belief, 
conscience, and expression were guaranteed, Tunisia’s Arab identity was 
acknowledged, and Islam was accepted as the state religion. Under pres-
sure from Western powers and Tunisia’s secular civil society organiza-
tions, Ennahda had made broad concessions and eliminated reference 
to the establishment of an Islamic state under shari’a law. Having wit-
nessed the overthrow of Egypt’s elected president in July 2013, after his 
Islamist-dominated government pushed through a constitution that was 
widely opposed by secular forces, Ennahda was determined to find com-
mon ground that would forestall a return to dictatorship or descent into 
civil war. Although the overwhelming majority of legislators approved 
the constitution, Ennahda’s compromises exacerbated divisions within 
the party and among Islamists more broadly.
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 During this period of internal turmoil, elements of the old regime 
resurfaced, hoping to manipulate popular discontent and fear of terror-
ism to facilitate a return to power. Under the new caretaker government, 
most Ben Ali government officials imprisoned after the Arab Spring were 
released—including the interior minister, who had been in charge of the 
police, and also the head of the presidential security service. Meanwhile, 
military tribunals reduced the sentences of police and soldiers who had 
been found guilty of killing and wounding protesters during the upris-
ing. Several political parties were established by former Ben Ali officials 
to field candidates in the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Critics warned that prodemocracy and human rights activists were being 
shunted aside as partisans of the former dictator and violent Muslim ex-
tremists struggled for dominance.
 These concerns were not allayed by the election results, which pro-
moted the forces of law and order and highlighted the country’s regional 
and class divisions. Nidaa Tounes, a secular party founded in June 2012 to 
oppose Ennahda, brought together diverse constituents who shared a com-
mon opposition to Islamism. It rallied former members of Ben Ali’s ruling 
party as well as secular liberals. Its supporters included the Tunisian Gen-
eral Labor Union—the liberal trade union federation that had spearheaded 
the Arab Spring uprising—and the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, 
Trade and Handicrafts, the most important employers’ association. Both 
organizations had played key roles in the National Dialogue Quartet, which 
undercut the Islamists’ power, and neither favored policies that would result 
in fundamental political, economic, and social change. Instead, they sought 
greater economic benefits for members of their own groups.
 Nidaa Tounes won heavily among the secular middle classes, espe-
cially in the northern coastal cities, while Ennahda was favored by poorer 
marginalized populations, especially in the largely rural south near the 
Algerian and Libyan borders. Nidaa Tounes won a plurality of votes 
in the parliamentary elections, with Ennahda taking second place and 
smaller parties collecting the rest. More than half the new parliamentari-
ans had been members of Ben Ali’s party. In the presidential runoff elec-
tions, Nidaa Tounes founder Beji Caid Essebsi, who had served in the 
Ben Ali government and as interim prime minister after the Arab Spring, 
beat human rights activist and physician Moncef Marzouki, who had 
held the position of interim president since December 2011. A founder of 
the center-left secular party Congress for the Republic, Marzouki drew 
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support from poorer marginalized populations, especially in the south. 
Habib Essid, a US-trained agricultural economist who had served both 
in the Ben Ali regime and in the Ennahda-led coalition government, was 
selected by parliament to serve as prime minister. His initial attempt to 
form a government that excluded Ennahda failed in a no-confidence 
vote. A second attempt resulted in a government that included Nidaa 
Tounes, Ennahda, and three smaller parties. Although it was the second- 
largest parliamentary party, Ennahda was awarded only one of the 
twenty-four ministerial positions. In January 2016, Ennahda again be-
came the largest parliamentary party following mass resignations from 
Nidaa Tounes to protest President Essebsi’s tightening grip on power 
and the appointment of his son as party head. Nonetheless, the Nidaa 
Tounes–led ruling coalition remained at the helm.
 Poverty, repression, and marginalization led to the rise of violent Mus-
lim extremism in Tunisia, as it did elsewhere. The Ben Ali regime had tor-
tured and imprisoned large numbers of Islamists and forced many more 
into exile. Prison and exile provided fertile breeding grounds for extremist 
ideologies. Hundreds of Tunisians fought against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, and thousands joined the jihadi insurgency after Soviet with-
drawal. Many rose through the ranks of al-Qaeda. After Ben Ali’s ouster, 
significant numbers of Islamists and Muslim extremists were released from 
prison and returned from abroad. Many extremists gravitated toward the 
southern border regions near Algeria and Libya, where gun runners, drug 
traffickers, and jihadi cells were often interlinked. Local insurgents made 
contact with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the mountainous region 
along the Algerian border and also with Libyan jihadis who, by 2014 and 
2015, had pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.
 Veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War played a key role in the Tunisian 
jihadi insurgency, just as they had in Somalia and Sudan. Among the most 
prominent was Seifallah Ben Hussein (alias, Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi), who had 
risen through the ranks of al-Qaeda and who founded Ansar al-Shari’a in 
Tunisia in April 2011. Although the local insurgency group established links 
with al-Qaeda, some members later pledged allegiance to the leader of the 
Islamic State. The new Arab Spring freedoms permitted Ansar al-Shari’a 
extremists to preach and recruit among alienated, unemployed youths of all 
socioeconomic classes. By 2012, some 30,000 to 40,000 young people had 
joined the organization. In 2013, in the wake of the US Embassy attack and 
the assassination of Tunisian political leaders, the Ennahda-led government 
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banned Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia and declared it a terrorist organization. 
Thousands of members left the country to avoid arrest. Some 1,500 Ansar 
al-Shari’a exiles joined extremist groups in Libya. Others moved on to Mali 
and Yemen, and an estimated 4,000 joined the insurgency in Syria, where 
most pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. 
 In Tunisia, Ansar al-Shari’a continued to operate underground, 
while new organizations emerged from its remnants. Intent on un-
dermining the secular state, these organizations sought to destroy the 
tourism industry—a critical component of the national economy and 
the primary source of foreign currency. Attacks on Tunisian politicians 
persisted, but foreign nationals also became targets. In March 2015, gun-
men attacked the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, killing twenty-one 
British, French, and Italian tourists and a Tunisian policeman. Jund al- 
Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Tunisia, which had trained in 
Libya and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State, claimed 
responsibility. In June, a Tunisian student fired on European tourists at a 
beach resort in Sousse, killing thirty-eight people and wounding dozens 
more. That shooter was also reputed to have links to Jund al-Khilafah.
 The escalation of terrorist attacks following the installation of the 
Nidaa Tounes–led government exposed deep differences over methods 
for combatting violent Muslim extremism. Secularists in the government, 
many of whom had ties to the Ben Ali dictatorship, advocated strict con-
trol of mosques and preachers. Ennahda appointees to the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs were removed from their positions, even though they 
had condemned the terrorist attacks and the organizations that spon-
sored them. The ministry’s monitoring commission was abandoned, and 
its previous responsibility for overseeing mosques was transferred to the 
police. Mainstream Muslims warned that such actions would make it 
more difficult for moderates to counter extremist views.
 Civil liberties, the fruit of the Arab Spring, were quickly eroded. In 
early July 2015, the government declared a state of emergency, which per-
mitted suspension of the freedom of assembly and the right to strike. 
Eighty mosques were shut down and investigated for links to extremists, 
and two preachers were banned—although neither the preachers nor the 
closed mosques had connections to the gunmen involved in the recent 
attacks. Parts of the border with Algeria were sealed off as military zones, 
and the government announced plans to construct a 100-mile-long wall 
along the border with Libya, where those implicated in the attacks had 
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trained. On July 25, parliament passed a counterterrorism bill over the 
protests of Tunisian civil society organizations, including human rights 
groups, the bar association, and the journalists’ union. The new law gave 
police enhanced monitoring and surveillance powers; it permitted sus-
pects to be held without charge or legal assistance for fifteen days, and 
it provided for closed hearings in which witnesses could remain anon-
ymous. Individuals who damaged property or caused disorder during 
demonstrations could be charged with terrorism, and freedom of speech 
was curtailed by clauses that defined public praise for terrorism as a 
criminal offense that could incur up to five years’ imprisonment. Within 
months of the law’s enactment, Amnesty International warned of grow-
ing evidence of arbitrary arrests, torture, sexual violence, and deaths in 
detention, reminiscent of the Ben Ali regime.
 The toppling of Tunisia’s Western-backed dictator had opened the 
door to violent extremist as well as democratic forces. Extremist activity, 
in turn, paved the way for further foreign intervention. European coun-
tries worried about the growing influence of Libyan-based Islamic State 
groups in Tunisia and cautioned that Tunisia could become a beachhead 
for future assaults on Europe. Following the 2015 museum and beach at-
tacks, the EU expanded assistance to a Tunisian counterterrorism and 
security sector reform program and promised increased trade, along 
with social and economic development aid, in the hope of countering 
extremist recruitment. The United Kingdom, which lost thirty citizens 
in the beach attack, provided the Tunisian army with fifty Special Forces 
trainers, while France and Germany sent military advisors. The United 
States, which had already sent Special Operations troops to train Tuni-
sian soldiers in counterterrorism tactics, launched surveillance drones 
from Tunisian bases to monitor Islamic State activity in Libya and in-
cluded Tunisia’s government in its eleven-country Trans-Sahara Counter-
terrorism Partnership (TSCTP).9
Egypt, Part 1: Popular Uprising, Military Intervention,  
and the Struggle for a New Order (2011–13)
Inspired by prodemocracy demonstrators in Tunisia and seven years of 
strike actions in their own country, Egyptians also took to the streets 
to protest a deepening economic crisis, governmental corruption, and 
political repression that resulted from decades of authoritarian rule. The 
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target of their anger was President Hosni Mubarak, a former air force 
commander who took office in 1981 and presided over a police state with 
a widely feared security and intelligence apparatus. During Mubarak’s 
tenure, the military amassed political and economic privileges while the 
civilian population suffered from rising unemployment, economic hard-
ship, and political maltreatment. Fraudulent elections in November and 
December 2010 had returned the ruling party to power and decimated 
the opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which lost eighty-
seven of the eighty-eight seats it previously had held. On January 25, 
2011, eleven days after Ben Ali’s ouster in Tunisia, tens of thousands of 
Egyptian protesters took to the streets, demanding an end to Mubarak’s 
three-decade reign. Their ranks quickly reached hundreds of thousands, 
including many striking workers. Riot police cracked down, attacking 
the demonstrators with water cannons, rubber bullets, tear gas, and con-
cussion grenades.
 In Egypt as in Tunisia, foreign powers had sustained the dicta-
torship. For more than three decades, the United States had served as 
the country’s primary source of military aid and a major source of de-
velopment assistance. Egypt had been the linchpin of US Middle East 
policy since 1979, when President Anwar al-Sadat (1970–81) signed a US- 
brokered peace treaty with Israel that ended more than thirty years of 
strife between the two countries—but left unresolved the claims of other 
Arab nations and the Palestinian people, who had not been included in 
the negotiations.10 The Egyptian military played a key role in sustaining 
the treaty, and the United States considered the Mubarak regime (1981–
2011) to be critical to the containment of Iran, to the war against al-Qaeda, 
and to promoting the regional stability that would ensure the security of 
Israel. Egypt also protected broader strategic and economic interests. The 
US Air Force routinely flew through Egyptian airspace. Egypt controlled 
the vital Suez Canal transit route; US Navy vessels passed through the 
canal as they journeyed to and from the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, 
and Indian Ocean, and 8 percent of the world’s maritime shipping tra-
versed the canal annually. Because of this special relationship, the United 
States had provided Egypt with $1.3 billion in military aid each year since 
1987, monies that were used to purchase US-made weapons systems, to 
pay for US training of the Egyptian officer corps, and to hire the services 
of US defense contractors. It was an army trained and equipped by the 
United States that ultimately forced Mubarak to relinquish power.
Photo 10.2. A woman protesting the Mubarak government carries a sign that 
reads, “Mubarak is the worst one in Egypt. Get out Mubarak.” Cairo, January 30, 
2011. Photo by Floris Van Cauwelaert.
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 On February 11, 2011, following eighteen days of protests in which 
some 840 Egyptians were killed, Mubarak stepped down—his hand 
forced by his own military. While riot police and loyalist militias bat-
tled the demonstrators, the army refused to attack them. Determined to 
protect its status, privileges, and business interests, the army pressured 
the increasingly isolated president to surrender his authority to the Su-
preme Council of the Armed Forces. Outside Egypt, many of Mubarak’s 
allies withheld support for the prodemocracy forces until it was certain 
that the president would not survive—at which point they celebrated his 
departure. Among those with an eleventh-hour change of heart was US 
President Barack Obama. Rejecting the counsel of his vice president, na-
tional security advisor, and secretaries of state and defense, all of whom 
cautioned that Mubarak’s Egypt was the mainstay of regional stability, 
Obama urged the strongman to step aside. On February 11, Obama wel-
comed the resignation of America’s longtime ally, proclaiming, “Egyp-
tians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will 
carry the day.”11
 Egyptian Islamists did not lead the popular uprising, but like their 
counterparts in Tunisia, they benefited from the freedoms that resulted. 
The Muslim Brotherhood played a cautious but supporting role in the 
protests, concerned that failure could result in repression against the 
movement. Founded in 1928 and banned in 1954, the Brotherhood had 
been ruthlessly suppressed by President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–70), 
who viewed Islamists as a threat to his power. Under his authority, thou-
sands of Brotherhood members were arrested and subjected to torture 
and long prison terms or execution. After Nasser’s death, President Sadat 
released Brotherhood members from prison and allowed them to func-
tion openly—although the organization technically remained illegal. 
Using the Brotherhood to counter the liberal-leftist opposition as well 
as jihadi extremists, Mubarak permitted Brotherhood members to run 
for parliament as independents. Dominating Egyptian professional and 
student associations and using wealth earned in exile to provide social 
services no longer furnished by the state, the Brotherhood built a strong 
base of popular support. By 2005, Brotherhood members constituted the 
largest parliamentary opposition bloc; the regime responded to the new 
threat with renewed repression. After Mubarak’s fall, the Brotherhood’s 
political machine, solidly grounded in both urban and rural areas, far 
surpassed that of its rivals. Like Ennahda in Tunisia, Egypt’s Muslim 
Photo 10.3. An Egyptian protester mounts a bronze lion at the entrance to Qasr 
al-Nil Bridge, Cairo, February 1, 2011. Photo by Zeinab Mohamed.
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Brotherhood also benefited from Qatar’s financial support and from ac-
cess to Al Jazeera media. The combination of these factors meant that Is-
lamists were poised to influence, if not dominate, any new political order.
 The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which had ridden to 
power on the back of the prodemocracy movement, announced that it 
would remain in place until presidential elections could be held. In the 
interim, the council would appoint a prime minister and cabinet, oversee 
a subordinate parliament, and influence the making of a new constitu-
tion. The military’s incremental approach to democracy was endorsed 
by the United States and by many Egyptian liberals and secularists, who 
worried that early elections would be swept by the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
newly established Freedom and Justice Party. Indeed, a coalition led by 
that party won a plurality of seats in the November 2011 parliamentary 
elections and dominated the parliament-appointed constituent assembly 
charged with writing the constitution.
 Egypt’s judiciary, which was staffed with Mubarak appointees, and 
Egypt’s privileged military were determined to keep the Islamists at bay. 
In April 2012, an administrative court suspended the constituent assem-
bly on the grounds that it had been improperly formed. On June 13, mar-
tial law, which had been in effect from 1981 through May 31, 2012, was 
effectively reinstituted as security forces were granted the power to arrest 
civilians and try them in military courts. The next day, the Supreme Con-
stitutional Court ruled that one-third of the lower house of parliament 
had been illegally elected, and it ordered that body’s dissolution—effec-
tively nullifying elections in which 30 million Egyptians had voted. The 
military council appointed a new handpicked constituent assembly and 
issued a constitutional declaration on June 17 that reduced the president 
to a figurehead, arrogating to itself the final determination on the forma-
tion and dissolution of governments and the enactment of legislation.
 The military’s effective seizure of power on June 17, 2012, coincided 
with the election of Dr. Mohamed Morsi, a US-trained engineer and leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Egyptian presidency with 51.7 percent 
of the vote. On June 30, Morsi was sworn in as Egypt’s first democrati-
cally elected president. In July he struggled with Mubarak holdovers in the 
state bureaucracy and failed in his attempt to reconvene parliament. On 
August 12, Morsi reclaimed the power seized by the military by voiding 
the constitutional declaration that had gutted presidential authority. He 
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also forced his defense minister, army chief of staff, and other generals to 
resign. Many Egyptians, from Islamists to liberal secularists, applauded his 
move. Returning the military to the barracks, however incomplete, was 
widely considered an important achievement for the Morsi presidency.
 Challenges to Morsi’s authority characterized the months that fol-
lowed. The second constituent assembly quickly deadlocked, with the 
liberal and leftist minority opposing the positions taken by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafi majority. As the secular opposition threatened 
to boycott the proceedings, demonstrators again took to the streets, this 
time protesting a growing economic crisis and the lack of movement to-
ward a new political, economic, and social order. The courts, still replete 
with Mubarak-era judges, obstructed the constitution-writing process 
and did little to hold accountable Mubarak, his police, and his associ-
ates for corruption and human rights abuses. Frustrated by the courts’ 
obstructionism, Morsi issued a decree temporarily exempting himself 
from judicial oversight in cases of presidential “acts of sovereignty” and 
matters relating to the protection of the constituent assembly and other 
elected bodies.12 Unable to assert control over the military, police, intel-
ligence services, judiciary, state bureaucracy, and political party that had 
wielded power for more than three decades, Morsi claimed that these 
measures were needed to guarantee the transition to constitutional de-
mocracy. He promised that the presidential powers would be returned 
to the status quo ante once a new constitution was in place and a new 
parliament elected. Fearing an Islamist coup, liberal and leftist secularists 
joined members of the old regime in organizing mass demonstrations 
that demanded Morsi’s resignation.
 At the end of November, the constituent assembly approved a draft 
constitution, authored primarily by Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi rep-
resentatives and opposed by secular parties and the Coptic Christian 
Church. The proposed constitution did not grant religion a greater legal 
role than it had held under Mubarak. Nonetheless, some critics objected 
to the growing Islamist influence, while others were concerned that 
individual rights were not protected from future erosion and that the 
military retained its exemption from legal and parliamentary oversight. 
The opposition called for a boycott of the constitutional referendum held 
in December 2012, and only 30 percent of the electorate participated. 
Of those who cast their ballots, 64 percent approved the constitution: 
in other words, the constitution was favored by less than 20 percent of 
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eligible voters. The opposition decried the constitution as illegitimate 
and urged the populace to prevent its implementation. During the first 
half of 2013, popular discontent intensified. Demonstrations demanding 
political reforms and strikes over poor wages and working conditions 
became increasingly frequent.
 On June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of President Morsi’s inaugura-
tion, millions of demonstrators took to the streets to protest the country’s 
continuing political and economic crisis and to call for the president’s 
removal. Egyptian police—holdovers from the Mubarak era who re-
sented being governed by the Muslim Brotherhood members they once 
had imprisoned—refused to protect Brotherhood offices and supporters. 
Some even joined the anti-Morsi demonstrations. On July 1, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces demanded that Morsi meet the public’s de-
mands or face military intervention. Two days later, the army ousted the 
president in a coup d’état and took him into custody. The Supreme Coun-
cil arrested dozens of senior Brotherhood leaders, suspended the consti-
tution, and installed an interim government led by Adly Mansour, chief 
justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court and a Mubarak appointee. 
The Brotherhood’s media were shut down, and Morsi was held incom-
municado in an undisclosed location. Prominent liberals, Muslim and 
Christian clerics, and even the Salafist al-Nour Party, which felt sidelined 
by the Morsi government, endorsed the military takeover.
 In the end, the faceoff was one between “democrats who are not liber-
als and liberals who are not democrats.”13 The Muslim Brotherhood sup-
ported the democratic electoral process that had brought it to power, but 
not democratic pluralism or the protection of minority rights. Liberals and 
leftists, in contrast, defended minority rights, personal freedoms, and civil 
liberties, but not the elections that had brought Islamists to power. Rather 
than mobilizing the population to defeat Morsi in the next election, they 
called on the army to topple a democratically elected president. In the pro-
cess, the old regime was restored and strengthened, and repression grew 
even more brutal than it had been in the Mubarak era.
Egypt, Part 2: Counterrevolution  
and the Return to Military Rule (2013–17)
Western powers, which had supported the Mubarak regime, stood by 
as remnants of the Mubarak military reasserted control. The Obama 
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administration had advance notice of the coup. After President Morsi re-
jected an American plea that he accept a new prime minister and cabinet 
chosen by someone else, National Security Advisor Susan Rice warned 
his foreign policy advisor that the military takeover was about to begin. 
After the army seized power, President Obama called on the Egyptian 
armed forces “to return full authority back to a democratically elected ci-
vilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transpar-
ent process.”14 However, he pointedly did not demand the reinstatement 
of the democratically elected Morsi government. Nor did he characterize 
the military action as a coup, a label that would have prevented the an-
nual transfer of $1.3 billion in US military aid.15 The EU also remained 
on the sidelines. Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign affairs and security 
policy chief, expressed sentiments similar to those of the US president. 
Her views were echoed by the UK, France, and Germany. After the coup, 
a dozen EU member states continued their role as Egypt’s primary sup-
pliers of military and police equipment.
 With internal and external forces lined up against them, tens of thou-
sands of Morsi supporters took to the streets, demanding the president’s 
return to office. In the month that followed, nearly 300 Morsi propo-
nents were killed by soldiers, police, and political opponents. Hundreds 
of Brotherhood members were arrested for sedition or for inciting vio-
lence, while Morsi adversaries acted with impunity. As the clampdown 
intensified, US officials continued to work with Mubarak holdovers and 
urged Morsi supporters to accept regime change as a fait accompli.
 A new cabinet without Muslim Brotherhood representation was 
sworn in to office on July 16, 2013. Coup leader General Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi, who had spent a year at the US Army War College and served as 
commander in chief of the Egyptian armed forces and defense minister 
in the Morsi government, remained the power behind the civilian gov-
ernment. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians responded to Sisi’s ap-
peal to combat the Muslim Brotherhood’s “terrorism” and took to the 
streets in support of the military government. On August 14, Egyptian 
security forces launched a twelve-hour assault on two Islamist encamp-
ments in Cairo, where tens of thousands of Morsi supporters continued 
to demand his reinstatement. More than 600 people were killed in Cairo 
and elsewhere as pro-Morsi protests swept the country. Within days, the 
death toll had reached more than 1,000. As the violence escalated, the 
government declared a state of emergency, suspended the right to trial or 
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due process, and imposed measures tantamount to martial law. In Sep-
tember, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned and its assets confiscated. 
In December it was designated a terrorist organization, a classification 
that would lead to the closure of more than 1,000 Brotherhood-linked 
charities and NGOs that provided health care and other services to mil-
lions of low-income Egyptians.
 External response to the repression ranged from mildly critical to 
openly supportive. The Obama administration signaled its disapproval 
of the regime’s tactics by canceling joint military exercises scheduled for 
September 2013, and in October it placed a hold on some weapons and 
equipment sales. However, it continued to fund programs that advanced 
Egyptian counterterrorism initiatives, trained Egyptian military officers 
in the United States, and provided spare weapons parts. The EU halted 
arms sales but continued its security assistance programs, which were 
part of a €5 billion aid package. Neighboring autocracies with close ties 
to Europe and the United States stepped into the breach. Saudi Arabia 
publicly backed the military actions and vowed to compensate Egypt 
for any aid reduction. The United Arab Emirates and Israel also pledged 
their support and lobbied the West on the regime’s behalf. Fearing the 
rise to power of both Islamists and secular liberals, three Arab Gulf states 
offered a combined total of $12 billion in assistance. Saudi Arabia, which 
had cut off aid to the Morsi government, promised $5 billion, Kuwait 
pledged $4 billion, and the United Arab Emirates provided a $1 billion 
grant and a $2 billion interest-free loan. By 2016, Gulf states had commit-
ted some $30 billion to Egypt in aid and investments, with Saudi Arabia 
contributing more than $25 billion. Only Qatar continued to support the 
deposed Morsi government and its Islamist backers.
 Assistance from wealthy Gulf states that had withheld aid from the 
Morsi government, along with the end of obstruction by Mubarak hold-
overs in the bureaucracy, strengthened the position of the Sisi regime. 
The economic crisis and energy shortages that had sparked massive anti- 
Morsi protests began to dissipate. There were no more lines for gasoline 
and no more electricity outages. The police, who had been absent from 
the streets during the Morsi presidency, were again directing traffic and 
fighting crime—as well as attacking pro-Morsi demonstrators.
 The suppression of government opponents continued into the new 
year. In January 2014, a new constitution that increased military and po-
lice powers—written in secret after the military coup—was approved by 
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a popular referendum in which only 38 percent of the electorate par-
ticipated. Massive preemptive arrests of government critics, including 
Islamist lawyers and parliamentarians, secular liberals, and leftists, had 
preceded the vote. The courts, still dominated by Mubarak appointees, 
handed down harsh sentences in mass trials that lacked due process.16 
In May, Sisi won presidential elections with 97 percent of the vote in a 
process that EU and US observers claimed was neither free nor fair. By 
2015 more than 40,000 regime opponents had been detained, and a new 
counterterrorism law granted the state even more sweeping powers. In-
dividuals who were deemed to “disturb public order and social peace,” 
disrupt “national unity,” or harm the economy could be investigated for 
terrorism and tried by special courts relying on questionable evidence.17 
Critics warned that the squelching of moderates and the closing of 
peaceful channels of dissent would inevitably increase support for vio-
lent extremists.
 In its efforts to quash Islamism, the Sisi regime purposefully con-
flated moderates in the Muslim Brotherhood with violent Muslim ex-
tremists in the Sinai Peninsula. Like many twenty-first-century conflict 
zones, Sinai was a marginalized region where life was hard and oppor-
tunities few. Although it shared a border with Israel, was strategically 
located near the Suez Canal, and included the city of El Arish—a termi-
nus of the El Arish–Ashkelon natural gas pipeline—Sinai was impover-
ished and underdeveloped. Lacking other options, the largely Bedouin 
population often resorted to smuggling, which had become the corner-
stone of the local economy.
 After Mubarak’s ouster in 2011, residents of northern Sinai expelled 
the Egyptian security forces, and grassroots insurgency groups filled the 
power vacuum. The most visible was Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters 
of the Holy House), a Muslim extremist group that opposed the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s nonviolent tactics as ineffective. A local organization 
with a domestic focus, Ansar Beit did not initially espouse global jihad. 
Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician who succeeded Osama bin 
Laden as al-Qaeda’s leader, had offered his organization’s support, but 
the local insurgency group’s links to al-Qaeda remained informal. Ansar 
Beit’s activities intensified in the wake of the 2013 military coup and sti-
fling of Islamists. Focusing their efforts in northern Sinai, with forays 
into Cairo and the Nile Valley, Ansar Beit militants launched hundreds 
of attacks, targeting military and police forces, government officials, 
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and foreign tourists. They also bombed the El Arish–Ashkelon pipeline, 
which provided Israel with 40 percent of its natural gas. Despite Ansar 
Beit’s rejection of moderate Islamism, the Sisi regime charged that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was behind the Sinai insurgency, and the govern-
ment used the violence to justify its anti-Islamist campaign. In Sinai, 
where the Egyptian military engaged in summary execution and whole-
sale destruction of homes and villages, antigovernment sentiment grew 
stronger.
 As the counterinsurgency campaign in Sinai intensified, Ansar Beit’s 
orientation began to shift and its membership splintered. In November 
2014, Ansar Beit militants in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the 
Islamic State and changed the organization’s name to Islamic State–Sinai 
Province, while members in the Nile Valley retained ties to al-Qaeda. 
Having provoked the emergence of the Islamic State in Sinai, Sisi ap-
pealed to his allies for assistance. In February 2015, France announced 
that it would sell Cairo $6 billion worth of military equipment, including 
Rafale fighter jets and a naval frigate. In March, the Obama administra-
tion lifted its hold on arms and equipment sales to Egypt, opening the 
door to the delivery of F-16 fighter planes, Apache helicopters, Harpoon 
missiles, and shells and parts for M1A1 Abrams tanks. When it suspended 
the sales eighteen months earlier, the State Department had warned that 
Egypt would need to make “credible progress toward an inclusive, dem-
ocratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections” 
before the deal could proceed.18 Upon resuming sales, the administra-
tion cited US national security interests as the rationale.19 In July 2015, 
the Egyptian military used F-16 war planes and Apache helicopters to 
create a buffer zone that would stanch the flow of weapons from Israeli- 
occupied Gaza into Sinai. Thousands of civilians were displaced, and 
more than 1,000 homes were destroyed in the process. The same year, 
Israel, which shared the Sisi regime’s antipathy toward both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Islamic State, began a covert air campaign against 
militants in Sinai, with the tacit approval of Cairo. By the end of 2017, 
Israel had carried out more than 100 airstrikes inside Egypt, severely 
weakening the militants’ ranks. As they lost territory and scattered, the 
insurgents turned their attention to civilian targets, homing in on Chris-
tians and Sufis, whom they killed by the hundreds.
 From 2015 on, the war on terror was increasingly cited as the jus-
tification for US collaboration with the Sisi regime. A critical partner 
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in regional counterterror actions, Egypt conducted airstrikes against Is-
lamic State forces in Libya in 2015, following the murder of twenty-one 
Egyptian Christians in Libya, and it joined the United States in sup-
porting the Saudi-led campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels 
in Yemen. In August, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the 
United States hoped to resume joint military exercises with Egypt, which 
had been suspended in 2013, and to expand the training of Egyptian po-
lice who would safeguard the border with Libya. In 2017 President Sisi 
visited the White House, where the new US president, Donald Trump, 
welcomed him with praise for his role in the war on terror and promised 
Washington’s full support.
 By then, the hopes inspired by Egypt’s Arab Spring had been dashed. 
The Mubarak regime had been replaced by one that was even more re-
pressive. Sisi’s brutal suppression of Islamists helped radicalize thou-
sands of young men who rejected their elders’ appeals to refrain from 
violence, and imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood leaders retained limited 
influence. The United States, the EU, Israel, and regional Arab autocra-
cies supported the Sisi regime, which they viewed as an ally in the strug-
gle against Muslim extremists. Many analysts warned that the message to 
Islamists was clear: the democratic process is rigged against them. If Is-
lamists are elected, they will be denied the right to govern—as evidenced 
in Algeria (1991), the Palestinian territories (2006), and Egypt (2013). 
Liberals and secularists will support democracy only if Islamists are ex-
cluded from power (Egypt, 2013 and Tunisia, 2014). Lacking a mass base, 
liberals and secularists rely on the army and police to suppress their op-
ponents. Western powers express distaste for their methods but, sharing 
their hostility toward Islamists, continue to finance them. This message, 
conveyed by authoritarian regimes and their external allies, contributed 
to the radicalization of the region.
Libya, Part 1: Popular Uprising,  
Foreign Intervention, and State Collapse (2011)
Foreign intervention in Libya also contributed to regional radicalization. 
Days after Mubarak was forced to step down in Egypt, the Arab Spring 
arrived in Libya. Once again, popular protests against an authoritarian 
regime set off a chain of events. The target of Libyan demonstrations was 
the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had come to power in a 1969 
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military coup. Dominating a neopatrimonial state for more than four 
decades, Qaddafi, along with his family and his associates, controlled 
enormous wealth generated by Libya’s rich oil and natural gas depos-
its. Much of the revenue was squandered on showcase projects at home 
and adventurism abroad, while domestic infrastructure deteriorated and 
health and education suffered.20 
 Governing through family, clan, and tribal ties, rather than through a 
professional bureaucracy, Qaddafi promoted social cleavages to keep po-
tential rivals weak. Libya’s Arab population was generally favored, while 
members of the Berber and Tubu ethnic groups were among the most re-
pressed.21 Qaddafi rewarded and punished individuals and groups based 
on loyalty to his regime and destroyed any institution that might challenge 
him. As a result, during Qaddafi’s tenure, Libya had no parliament, trade 
unions, political parties, or nongovernmental organizations—in short, no 
organized civil society. Islamists were especially targeted. In both govern-
ment and military, loyalties were divided by tribe and region. Distrustful 
of his own army, Qaddafi protected himself with a 3,000-member revolu-
tionary guard that was supplemented by security forces and militia units 
run by his sons and by some 2,500 mercenaries from the impoverished 
Sahelian countries of Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan.
 It was in this context that Libya’s Arab Spring began. On February 
16, 2011, inspired by the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt, protest-
ers instigated a “day of rage” in the eastern city of Benghazi, a longtime 
center of anti-Qaddafi opposition. The security forces came down hard, 
killing more than 200 protesters and wounding 800 in three days’ time. 
The protests quickly spread to other coastal cities, reaching the capital 
city of Tripoli and extending into western Libya. What began as a day of 
rage was rapidly transformed into an all-out rebellion against the Qaddafi 
regime. Military officers and high-level government officials defected. 
Local army units, police, and other state security forces, motivated in 
part by tribal and regional loyalties, joined the protesters, absconding 
with weapons from military stockpiles while arms flowed in from other 
countries. On February 23, as the western city of Misurata fell to rebel 
forces, Qaddafi called on thousands of African mercenaries and security 
force irregulars to defend the capital. Four days later, regime opponents 
established the National Transitional Council in Benghazi as their provi-
sional government. The Arab League suspended Libya’s membership and 
initiated contact with the rebels.
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 Like his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, Qaddafi had cultivated 
international allies that protected his regime, but he also made enemies 
that worked toward its downfall. These alliances and oppositions came 
into play during the Arab Spring. When Qaddafi seized power in 1969, his 
plans were grandiose; he harbored both pan-Arab and pan-African ambi-
tions. He aspired to succeed Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser as 
leader of the pan-Arab movement, but his relationship with other Arab 
League members was often strained. Conservative Arab regimes allied 
with the West perceived Qaddafi as a threat to their power. They objected 
to his interference in the internal affairs of other countries, including 
Chad, Egypt, and Sudan on the African continent, and Lebanon, Pal-
estine, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in the Middle East. Snubbed by Arab 
states, Qaddafi turned his attention to sub-Saharan Africa, where he won 
supporters in the 1970s by attacking colonialism and neocolonialism and 
by providing weapons, money, and training to national liberation move-
ments. In the 1970s and 1980s, Qaddafi recruited thousands of Bedouins 
and sub-Saharan Africans into his Islamic Pan-African Legion. Hop-
ing to establish a grand Islamic empire in the Sahel, he sent his soldiers 
Photo 10.4. Rebels who have taken control of al-Bayda celebrate on abandoned 
Libyan army tanks, al-Bayda, Libya, February 25, 2011. Photo by              .
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into battle in numerous countries in wars that consumed thousands of 
lives and displaced hundreds of thousands more. Libya’s well-armed, 
war-hardened soldiers became a fearsome force of instability throughout 
the region.
 Qaddafi’s relationship with African governments, as with those in 
the Arab world, was volatile and changing. During the 1970s, the OAU 
embraced Qaddafi and his anticolonial message. However, during the 
1980s and 1990s, Libyan military intervention in Chad and support for 
antigovernment forces in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere led to 
the regime’s increasing isolation. In another reversal, Qaddafi was wel-
comed back into the fold during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Using Libya’s immense oil wealth to garner influence, Qaddafi 
and his associates invested some $5 billion in mines, mosques, hotels, 
mobile phone companies, and infrastructure across the African con-
tinent. Tripoli had a strong voice in the African Development Bank, 
where Libya’s status as one of Africa’s largest contributors gave it sub-
stantial voting power. Qaddafi played a major role in the establishment 
of the AU in 2002. His regime contributed 15 percent of the organiza-
tion’s budget and paid the membership dues of poorer countries. Two 
years before internal unrest and NATO airstrikes toppled his regime, 
Qaddafi was elected AU chair.
 Qaddafi’s relationship with the West was also fraught with contra-
dictions and changed over time. During the Cold War, Qaddafi’s anti- 
imperialist rhetoric, socialist policies, and nationalization of Western- 
owned oil operations raised serious concerns in the United States. The 
presence of Soviet military advisors and weaponry convinced Washing-
ton that Libya was a Soviet proxy, despite the regime’s internal repression 
of communists. After the US Embassy in Tripoli was burned by protestors 
in 1979—in response to a rumor that the United States had led an attack 
on the Grand Mosque in Mecca—Washington severed diplomatic rela-
tions and added Libya to the State Department’s list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, a designation that carried a number of economic restrictions. 
Further US sanctions were imposed between 1981 and 2001. In April 1986, 
following a deadly attack on a German discotheque patronized by US 
soldiers, the United States charged Libya with supporting international 
terrorism and bombed Tripoli and Benghazi in retaliation. The Libyan 
government was subsequently implicated in the 1988 bombing of a US 
civilian aircraft that resulted in 270 deaths and in the 1989 bombing of a 
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French airliner in which 171 people died. Further allegations led to UN 
and EU sanctions in 1992 and 1993.
 After the Cold War, Libya and the United States reevaluated their 
relationship, finding common cause in their mutual hostility toward ex-
tremist organizations that embraced violent jihad. In 1995, the Libyan 
Islamic Fighting Group, organized by Libyan veterans of the Soviet-Afghan 
War, killed dozens of government soldiers in the eastern cities of Derna 
and Benghazi. Qaddafi’s forces crushed the incipient insurgency and 
imprisoned large numbers of LIFG members.22 Regarding al-Qaeda’s 
influence as a threat to his own aspirations, Qaddafi was the first Arab 
leader to denounce the September 2001 attacks on the United States. 
Determined to end Libya’s pariah status and to benefit from renewed 
foreign investment in the oil industry, Qaddafi began to cooperate with 
the United States on counterterrorism issues. He gave tacit approval to 
the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and shared intelligence 
that enabled Washington to hunt down al-Qaeda operatives. The 2003 
war in Iraq, an indication that the government of President George W. Bush 
would follow through on his preemptive strike doctrine, may have in-
fluenced Qaddafi’s subsequent decision to renounce terrorism, to de-
stroy biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons stockpiles, and to 
abandon Libya’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. The 
United States established a small diplomatic presence in Libya in 2004 
and rescinded the travel ban that had prevented Americans from visiting 
that country. In 2006 Washington removed Libya from its list of state 
sponsors of terrorism, lifted economic sanctions—a special request of oil 
industry lobbyists—and restored full diplomatic relations. Intensifying 
their collaboration in the war on terror, the two countries shared intelli-
gence, and the CIA sent terrorism suspects to Libya for interrogation and 
detention as part of its secret rendition program. Many of these suspects 
were LIFG members.
 Other countries also welcomed Libya back into the fold. In 2003 
and 2004, the UN and EU lifted their arms embargoes and other sanc-
tions. French, British, German, Italian, and US interests began to invest 
heavily in Libyan oil and natural gas exploration and production. Be-
fore sanctions were imposed, Libya had been an important customer for 
French military aircraft and missiles. After sanctions were lifted, Italy, 
the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine supplied Libya with 
weapons, military aircraft, spare parts, border security and surveillance 
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equipment, and air defense and communications systems. British and 
Libyan intelligence collaborated in tracking down Libyan dissidents in 
the UK—particularly LIFG members—who were returned to Libya for 
interrogation and detention. Qaddafi also helped European countries 
stanch the flow of illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. In 
exchange for billions of dollars in European trade, investment, and weap-
ons, Qaddafi agreed to halt African migrants on Libyan shores, where 
they were herded into detention camps and employed in low-wage jobs.
 Even as Libya renounced terror and normalized relations interna-
tionally, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, torture, and disappearances 
continued on the domestic front. When the popular uprisings began in 
early 2011, Qaddafi’s Western allies were quick to abandon him. On Feb-
ruary 26, in a resolution promoted by France, Germany, the UK, and the 
United States, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose 
an arms embargo on Libya and sanctions against Qaddafi and his inner 
circle. The resolution also called on the ICC to investigate Libyan gov-
ernment attacks on civilians for evidence of crimes against humanity. 
France, the UK, and the United States closed their embassies in Trip-
oli. European governments and banks blocked Libyan accounts, and the 
Obama administration froze $30 billion in assets held by Qaddafi and his 
associates in the United States. President Obama called on Qaddafi to 
resign and ended cooperation between the US and Libyan armed forces.
 As Qaddafi turned the full force of his military apparatus against ci-
vilian and rebel strongholds, the National Transitional Council appealed 
to the international community to impose a no-fly zone that would 
ground the Libyan air force and prevent it from attacking civilians. Lib-
yan air-defense radars and missile batteries would have to be destroyed 
before foreign planes could patrol the skies. The international community 
was divided in its response. Some members charged that a no-fly zone 
would violate Libyan sovereignty. Others argued that it would demon-
strate the UN’s commitment to its responsibility to protect civilians from 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Still others claimed that such a 
measure would be ineffective; because Qaddafi’s forces were engaged in a 
ground assault, a no-fly zone would do little to protect civilian lives.
 Russia, China, Germany, and the AU opposed the establishment of 
a no-fly zone.23 The AU proposed mediation and dialogue that would 
include the Qaddafi regime and opposition forces, while Germany 
questioned the effectiveness of a no-fly zone unaccompanied by more 
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invasive measures, which it resisted. France, the UK, the Arab League, 
and the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council supported the no-
fly zone option.24 Within the Obama administration, the vice president, 
secretary of defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, national secu-
rity advisor, chief counterterrorism advisor, director of national intel-
ligence, and a number of high-level military officials opposed military 
intervention, warning of the dangers of supporting rebels with possible 
al-Qaeda connections and of an anti-American backlash if the United 
States embroiled itself in another war against a Muslim nation. More-
over, Qaddafi was a bulwark against al-Qaeda in North Africa. If he 
were toppled and chaos ensued, extremists might fill the power vac-
uum. Other top officials, including UN Ambassador Susan Rice, senior 
National Security Council aide Samantha Power, and Secretary of State 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, who were deeply influenced by the US failure 
to thwart genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, urged the 
president to support forceful military action.25 Pressed by France, Italy, 
and the UK, which had promised to take the lead in a UN-sanctioned 
military operation, and confident that Arab League support would pre-
vent a Muslim backlash, pro-intervention forces in the Obama adminis-
tration gained ground.
 On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone 
over Libya and authorized designated member states to enforce it and 
to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians, short of “a foreign 
occupation force.”26 Approved ten to zero with five abstentions, the reso-
lution received support from France, the UK, and the United States, the 
three African members of the Security Council, and four other nonper-
manent members. Russia, China, Germany, Brazil, and India abstained. 
South Africa and Nigeria had initially adhered to the AU position op-
posing the no-fly zone, but under pressure from the United States, they 
broke ranks to support the resolution.27 To weaken the perception that 
Western nations were attacking a Muslim state to protect their oil in-
terests, France, the UK, and the United States were adamant that Arab 
League forces must participate in financing the operation and enforcing 
the no-fly zone.
 On March 19, US and European forces under French and British 
leadership initiated airstrikes against Libya. The United States played a 
critical role, destroying Libya’s air defense systems and its missile, radar, 
and communications centers, while France and the UK attacked Libyan 
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military convoys. By the end of the month, command and control of the 
air campaign was transferred to NATO—despite earlier concerns that a 
NATO operation might be perceived as a Western attack on Islam. Qatar, 
which held the Arab League presidency in 2011–12, convinced the orga-
nization to support the no-fly zone and to suspend Libya’s membership, 
allaying some of the West’s discomfort. However, most of the league’s 
twenty-two member nations kept their distance, and only Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates contributed aircraft to the no-fly zone patrol.
 Although the stated purpose of the air campaign was to protect civil-
ians from Qaddafi’s forces, the Western-led coalition conducted a major 
assault on Libyan troops to persuade the army to turn against Qaddafi. 
Critics, including Russia, Turkey, and the Arab League, charged that the 
targeting of Libyan troops to provoke defections exceeded the limits of 
the UN mandate and that the coalition’s ultimate objective was regime 
change, which had not been sanctioned by the UN.28 Indeed, France, 
the UK, the United Arab Emirates, and other members of the coali-
tion hoped to secure lucrative trade and investment opportunities in a 
post-Qaddafi Libya—including military sales and energy and infrastruc-
ture development.
 Although the Security Council resolution called for dialogue leading 
to political reforms, NATO made no attempt to engage Libya in negotia-
tions for a ceasefire and diplomatic settlement. Libyan offers to negotiate 
were rebuffed, and AU discussions with Qaddafi, which the organiza-
tion had hoped would lead to a ceasefire and transition to democracy, 
were sidelined by the NATO bombings. On April 14, 2011, NATO foreign 
ministers released a communiqué indicating that Qaddafi’s ouster was, 
in fact, their ultimate objective. By May the NATO bombing campaign 
had destroyed half of Libya’s military capacity. High-level Libyan officials 
traveled to the United States and France with proposals for a transition 
to democracy that would include Qaddafi’s departure. In July the AU 
proposed negotiations, to be mediated by the AU and the UN, which 
would lead to a ceasefire monitored by a UN peacekeeping force and 
the establishment of an inclusive interim government. Ultimately, a dem-
ocratic constitution would be written and elections held. Bolstered by 
training and weapons from France, the UK, the United States, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates, the rebels rejected the AU proposals and de-
termined to fight to the finish. As they closed in on Qaddafi strongholds, 
the rebels targeted civilians whose tribal groupings were associated with 
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Qaddafi. The UN took no punitive action and made no effort to pro-
tect those civilians’ lives. In August 2011, the rebels took the capital, and 
Qaddafi fled.
 By September, powerful forces in the international community were 
openly backing an alternative Libyan regime. France, the UK, the United 
States, Qatar, the EU, the Arab League, the UN General Assembly, and 
even the internally divided AU had recognized the National Transitional 
Council as Libya’s legitimate government. On October 20, a US Predator 
drone and a French warplane fired on Qaddafi’s convoy, allowing Libyan 
rebels to capture, brutalize, and execute the former ruler. The NATO air-
strikes had provided local insurgents the air cover they needed to foment 
regime change.
 By the time the NATO military operation ended on October 31, the 
Libyan conflict had devolved into a violent struggle between allies and 
opponents of the Qaddafi regime and between factions of these camps. 
Revolutionary youths challenged their elders who had been technocrats 
and military officials under the old regime. Rival towns pitted their mili-
tias against one another for control of Libya’s enormous oil, natural gas, 
and gold reserves as well as the country’s energy infrastructure, strategic 
towns and airports, and central bank. Moderate Islamists vied with sec-
ularists, and both groups opposed violent Muslim extremists, including 
hundreds of LIFG members who had been freed from Qaddafi’s prisons 
and foreign fighters who had answered al-Qaeda’s call to join the rebel-
lion. Elections in July 2012 established the General National Congress, 
the parliamentary body tasked with writing a permanent constitution. 
Although the new parliament was friendly to the West, it had little inter-
nal support. 
 Without governmental or civil society institutions to fill the power 
vacuum, regime change prompted the collapse of much of the social 
order. Qaddafi’s departure unleashed violent retribution and score set-
tling by groups set against one another during his rule. Hundreds of mili-
tias with as many as 250,000 members had formed along neighborhood, 
town, and tribal lines. Distrustful of militias from other regions, they re-
fused to disarm or to recognize the authority of the central government. 
In Libya as elsewhere, moderate Islamists were confounded with violent 
Muslim extremists, and internal and external forces took harsh measures 
against both groups. In the eastern cities of Benghazi and Derna, Islamist 
militias that advocated participation in the democratic process were 
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ousted by clan-based militias and former members of Qaddafi’s secu-
rity forces. The suppression of the moderates opened the door to violent 
Muslim extremists who targeted officials of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Justice and Development Party, whom they criticized for working within 
the system. Criminal networks and jihadi organizations also entered the 
fray, and Libya became a magnet for violent actors of many sorts. Former 
CIA Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin charged that with new devel-
opments in Libya, “terrorists now have the largest area of safe haven and 
operational training that they’ve had in 10 years.”29 Thousands of civilians 
were caught in the crossfire.
 Members of the UN Security Council who had pushed for military 
intervention were not keen to commit troops or treasure to support 
peacekeeping or nation building. Although the Security Council autho-
rized a mission to restore public services and to assist in promoting a na-
tional dialogue, democratic elections, and a new inclusive constitution, 
it did not establish a peacekeeping operation to help integrate militias 
and former government troops into a disciplined national military. The 
limited UN mission failed to protect civilians from further violence or 
to secure Libyan arsenals. Sophisticated weapons from Qaddafi’s stock-
piles and flooded into neighboring countries, and foreign fighters from 
his vast security forces returned home.30 Together they would contrib-
ute to the destabilization of the entire region. The lessons of Afghanistan 
in 1989, Somalia in 1993, and Iraq in 2003 had not been learned. The 
ill-conceived Libyan operation, where regime change led to a power 
vacuum without a viable plan to fill it, exposed once again the pitfalls of 
a military intervention that paid no regard to history or context.
Libya, Part 2: Muslim Extremism, Civil War,  
and Foreign Influence (2012–17)
The toppling of Qaddafi and the chaos that ensued offered new opportu-
nities to violent Muslim extremists of both domestic and foreign origin, 
to regional militias that fought for a share of the spoils, and to old regime 
remnants that sought a return to power. By 2014, Libya was in the throes 
of civil war.
 Bitterly opposed to Qaddafi, who had collaborated with the West in 
arresting its operatives, al-Qaeda had called on loyalists to support the anti- 
Qaddafi rebellion. Foreign fighters who answered the appeal included 
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veterans of the anti-American insurgency in Iraq and former members 
of Saddam Hussein’s military forces. Domestic fighters included LIFG 
members, many of whom had worked with al-Qaeda in Sudan and Af-
ghanistan, and insurgents associated with new organizations like Ansar 
al-Shari’a, which established three separate entities in Libya, in the cities 
of Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte. The Ansar organizations focused on local 
issues, and initially none was connected to international terrorist net-
works. However, as the conflict intensified, all three established links to 
al-Qaeda, and some members of the Sirte contingent pledged allegiance 
to the leader of the Islamic State.31
 In May 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former commander in 
Qaddafi’s army and onetime CIA asset, assembled a new army and de-
clared war on Islamist and jihadi forces—and on anyone else who op-
posed him. In a campaign dubbed Operation Dignity, Haftar’s army 
made no distinction between Islamists who participated in the demo-
cratic process and Muslim extremists who assassinated establishment 
figures. Following an attack on the parliament building in Tripoli, 
General Haftar dissolved the General National Congress, where the 
Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Development Party held the 
second-largest number of seats. New parliamentary elections, deemed 
deeply flawed by international observers, were held in June in the midst 
of violence, electoral boycotts, and shuttered polling stations. Voter turn-
out was estimated at 18 percent. Many seats were left unfilled, and oth-
ers were abandoned by protesting parliamentarians. Nonetheless, a new 
parliamentary body called the House of Representatives was established 
on the basis of the election results. Western governments, which shared 
Haftar’s anti-Islamist sentiments, recognized the House of Representa-
tives as Libya’s official parliament.
 By August 2014, the conflict spiraled into a civil war. Two different 
governments contended for power. Haftar’s supporters, including former 
members of Qaddafi’s military, relocated the House of Representatives 
to the eastern city of Tobruk and established a governmental execu-
tive in al-Bayda, some 160 miles away. Haftar assumed the position of 
commander in chief of that government’s armed forces. Haftar’s oppo-
nents rallied to Libya Dawn, a coalition that controlled Tripoli and was 
dominant in the western and central regions. It continued to recognize 
the Tripoli-based General National Congress that Haftar had dissolved. 
Libya Dawn brought together an eclectic group of moderate Islamists, 
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militias from Tripoli, Misurata, and other western cities, ethnic Berbers, 
extremist organizations such as Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi, and much 
of the formerly exiled opposition to Qaddafi. Among the Islamists were 
militias that had been deputized by the 2012 government to provide 
security in the absence of a functioning national army and police force. 
Islamist and jihadi groups that had been deeply fractured—and some-
times had targeted one another—found common cause in their oppo-
sition to Haftar and the old regime. By late 2015, fighting between the 
two factions had killed thousands of people and shut down or destroyed 
much of the country’s oil and energy infrastructure.
 The Libyan civil war opened the door to a new wave of foreign inter-
vention, as external powers struggled to reshape the region in their own 
interests. Neighboring countries, regional and global powers, and multi-
national bodies lined up behind opposing sides. The Tripoli government 
was recognized by Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan, which were sympathetic to 
the Islamist factions. The Tobruk/al-Bayda government was recognized 
by the most powerful international entities, including the UN, the EU, 
the Arab League, the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Egypt. Sisi’s Egypt supported the anti-Islamist campaign by 
launching airstrikes against Haftar’s rivals in Benghazi and Derna and 
by allowing the United Arab Emirates to use Egyptian bases to attack 
Libya Dawn positions in Tripoli. Western powers gave diplomatic sup-
port to the Tobruk/al-Bayda government but hesitated to provide it with 
the military and counterterrorism assistance it requested, fearing that it 
might further radicalize the opposition.
 The campaign against moderate Islamists was one of several factors 
that led to increased radicalization in Libya. The wars in Iraq and Syria 
also played a role. After Qaddafi’s fall, Libyan militants had proceeded 
to Iraq, where they joined the anti-American insurgency, and to Syria, 
where they fought the Assad regime. Many had pledged allegiance to the 
Islamic State leader. When the Libyan civil war broke out, they returned 
home to organize. As US, French, and Russian airstrikes exerted pressure 
in Syria and Iraq, high-level Islamic State leaders also moved to Libya. 
By 2015, the Islamic State had established three Libyan provinces: Cyre-
naica Province in the east, Tripolitania Province in the west, and Fezzan 
Province in the southern desert region. By early 2016, the Islamic State’s 
fighting force in Libya was estimated at 5,000 to 6,500 men, including 
volunteers from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
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and Yemen, and also from sub-Saharan African countries. Islamic State 
forces gained control of the western city of Sirte, with its airport, mili-
tary base, port, and waterworks, along with some 150 miles of the sur-
rounding coastal region—which included rich oil and gas fields—and 
large sections of Derna in the east. They were also active in Tripoli, 
Libya’s largest city and official capital, and in Misurata, the third-largest 
city, which contained an important port. By mid-2016, Libya had become 
the Islamic State’s most important training ground for fighters bound for 
Syria and Iraq. Western counterterrorism experts warned that the Lib-
yan affiliates were the region’s most significant threat: they could readily 
extend their influence throughout North Africa, the Western Sahel, and 
into Europe.32
 Using the war on terror as its justification, the United States targeted 
Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and unaffiliated operatives on Libyan soil. In Oc-
tober 2013, US Special Operations Forces raided Tripoli to capture Abu 
Anas al-Liby—a Libyan veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war, LIFG mem-
ber, and al-Qaeda leader who allegedly helped plan the 1998 bombings 
of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In June 2014, Special Op-
erations Forces abducted Ahmed Abu Khattala, an unaffiliated operative 
who was believed to be a key figure in the September 2012 attack on the 
US consulate in Benghazi. Both men were rendered to the United States 
for prosecution.33 In November 2015, a US airstrike in Derna killed Abu 
Nabil al-Anbari, leader of the Islamic State in Libya, who previously had 
headed al-Qaeda operations in Western Iraq. US airstrikes on the Is-
lamic State’s western Libyan headquarters near Sabratha killed some four 
dozen militants in February 2016. Noureddine Chouchane, the primary 
target and high-level Islamic State operative from Tunisia, was believed 
to be an organizer of the 2015 Tunisian museum and beach attacks and 
central to the funneling of African Islamic State recruits to Libya.34
 During the final months of 2015, it was clear that a larger, Western- 
led military operation against the Islamic State in Libya was in the offing. 
French and US reconnaissance flights flew regularly over Islamic State 
bases in Sirte, Benghazi, and Derna, while US, British, French, and Italian 
special operations teams collected intelligence on the ground. However, 
foreign military intervention against the Islamic State would require the 
consent and cooperation of a Libyan government that was recognized as 
legitimate by the international community. As Western powers pressed 
for the establishment of a unity government that would collaborate with 
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their counterterrorism agenda, critics warned that foreign military inter-
vention could trigger a popular backlash, undermining any government 
that endorsed it.
 In December 2015, following year-long negotiations sponsored 
by the UN, EU, AU, and Arab League, representatives of Libya’s rival 
parliaments agreed to form a unity Government of National Accord, 
which would be led by the Presidential Council. Controversy dogged 
the agreement from the outset. Critics charged that it was prompted 
primarily by European security concerns and Western countries’ de-
sire to halt the influx of migrants from Libya rather than by the needs 
and aspirations of the Libyan people.35 Influential preachers argued 
that a government appointed by non-Muslims could not be legitimate, 
a claim that resonated among many Libyan Muslims. Significant ele-
ments of both parliaments along with powerful factions on the ground, 
whose attempts to forge an alternative agreement had been dismissed 
by the international community, continued to oppose the deal. The new 
government did not control the capital city, Central Bank, National Oil 
Corporation, or Libyan Investment Authority—and did not have the 
means to do so.
 Undeterred by these deficiencies, the UN Security Council endorsed 
the Government of National Accord and its Presidential Council as 
Libya’s sole legitimate authority. Important regional militias, trained by 
British and US special operations forces, pledged loyalty to the new gov-
ernment. The existing Tripoli government agreed to step down in order 
to avoid further bloodshed—a move that split its parliament. Despite 
these developments, the accord remained on shaky ground as powerful 
actors continued to rebuff it. The House of Representatives in Tobruk, 
although recognized in the 2015 agreement as Libya’s official legislature, 
refused to ratify it. The presidents of the rival Tobruk and Tripoli par-
liaments and the prime ministers of their respective governments re-
jected the new government’s authority, and the EU and the United States 
imposed sanctions in retaliation. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates broke with their Western allies to join Russia in back-
ing the House of Representatives. General Haftar, commander in chief 
of the Tobruk/al-Bayda government’s armed forces, also repudiated the 
new regime. By 2017, Haftar’s forces controlled most of eastern Libya, 
from Tobruk to Benghazi, and nearly all the country’s oil ports. Egypt, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Russia provided the general with military 
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support, and France insisted that Haftar, a key counterterrorism ally, be 
included in any political solution. As a result, in 2017, Libya had three 
rival governments rather than two.
 Although they lacked authorization from an effective government, 
the United States and the UK moved to oust the Islamic State from 
Libya. In June 2016, Misurata militias loosely aligned with the Gov-
ernment of National Accord, reinforced by US and British intelligence, 
attacked the Islamic State stronghold in Sirte. Within weeks, they had 
taken control of a nearby airfield, military bases, and nearly all of the 
coastline previously under Islamic State control. In August, the United 
States supported the militias with airstrikes, citing as legal justification 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force granted by Congress to the 
president after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.36 By December, the 
Misurata militias, assisted by 495 US airstrikes, had expelled the Is-
lamic State from Sirte, dispersing militants across the eastern, western, 
and southern regions, where they established new cells. Others moved 
into Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, where they joined ongoing insurgencies 
and instigated new ones.
 Foreign intervention was not universally welcomed. In Libya, crit-
ics charged that the disputed unity government, which had approved 
the action, did not have the authority to do so. Some claimed that the 
government was simply a proxy for Western interests. The militias from 
Misurata were generally not well received in Sirte, due to a longstanding 
rivalry between the two cities. Moreover, Misurata fighters, like those 
aligned with the Islamic State, were accused of committing atrocities 
against civilians, and their largely Islamist fighting forces were opposed 
by Haftar’s army. In the United States, detractors warned that the Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force, which sanctioned the targeting of 
nations, organizations, or individuals implicated in the 9/11 attacks, had 
no jurisdiction over Islamic State activities in Libya.
 General Haftar, his allies in the Tobruk/al-Bayda government, and 
his rivals in Tripoli were not the only Libyan actors who stood to lose 
from the externally imposed unity agreement. In the post-Qaddafi era, 
Libya’s long Mediterranean coastline, less than 300 miles from Europe, 
had become a launching pad for drug trafficking and human smug-
gling. The Libyan coast served as a key point of departure for hundreds 
of thousands of undocumented migrants, primarily from sub-Saharan 
Africa, who sought safety and sustenance in Europe. Human smuggling, 
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especially, had become a lucrative enterprise in an otherwise dysfunc-
tional economy. The collapse of the neopatrimonial state, the disruption 
of the formal economy, and the breakdown of law and order only par-
tially explain the upsurge in human trafficking after Qaddafi’s fall. Since 
2008, European countries had paid the Libyan government tens of mil-
lions of dollars to halt the flow of migrants from African shores. After 
Qaddafi’s ouster, the payments stopped, and migrants were herded onto 
vessels to attempt the treacherous, often deadly Mediterranean crossing. 
Profits from this illicit commerce, and from a growing Europe-bound 
drug trade, financed the activities of criminal gangs, regional militias, 
and the Libyan branch of the Islamic State. Because all of these groups 
benefited from the country’s lawlessness, all had more interest in pro-
moting war than peace. In 2017, a deal between Italy and Libyan militias, 
endorsed by EU interior ministers, returned thousands of migrants to 
Libya, where they were housed in detention camps, beaten, fed starva-
tion diets, and forced to work without pay. Many were sold on auction 
blocks as modern-day slaves.37
Algeria and Morocco (2011–17)
Two North African countries stand in marked contrast to Libya and 
Egypt, where the aftermath of the Arab Spring brought even greater 
turmoil, and Tunisia, where those struggling for a new order contin-
ued to face serious obstacles. Algeria and Morocco were also swept up 
in the fervor of the moment, but the governments of both countries 
responded to mass demonstrations with limited concessions, the pro-
tests dissipated quickly, and the movements did not result in significant 
change. Algeria played a minor role in the Arab Spring. However, it was 
significant as the birthplace of extremist organizations whose influence 
spread in the uprisings’ aftermath. Morocco exemplified a conservative 
government’s successful co-optation, intimidation, and appeasement of 
opposition forces, a strategy that ultimately split the protest movement. 
The events in Algeria and Morocco and their impact on the region are 
encapsulated below.
 In Algeria, as elsewhere, anger over poor living conditions and the 
lack of civil liberties sparked antigovernment demonstrations. In De-
cember 2010 and January 2011, protests targeted the high cost of staple 
foods and the scarcity of jobs, housing, utilities, infrastructure, and social 
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services. Opposition parties, trade unions, and human rights organiza-
tions joined ordinary citizens to rally for increased political freedom and 
democracy. The demonstrations were initially met with a massive show 
of force. However, the government quickly turned to appeasement, using 
its enormous oil and natural gas wealth to offer temporary tax relief and 
to increase subsidies on basic foodstuffs. It promised new jobs programs 
and more affordable housing, and offered low-interest loans for new 
businesses. Finally, it lifted the state of emergency that had been in ef-
fect for two decades and announced an agenda of political reforms that 
would result in new electoral laws, media regulations, and an amended 
constitution. In tandem with concessions and promised reforms, the 
government waged a propaganda campaign that warned of the dangers 
of political instability, which, it claimed, would result in widespread 
death and destruction and provide an opening for terrorism and foreign 
intervention.
 By the end of March 2011, most of the demonstrations had abated. 
The uprising in Algeria did not result in regime change, but instead pro-
duced limited accommodations and promises of more change to come. 
Multiparty parliamentary elections held in May 2012 were marked by 
low voter turnout; those who voted, however, returned the ruling party 
to power with an overwhelming majority. Domestic opposition groups 
cried foul, while EU, US, and Arab League observers endorsed the re-
sults. Meanwhile, the British policy institute Chatham House questioned 
the validity of the government’s tally but noted that, in any event, the 
powerless parliament could do no more than rubber-stamp decisions 
taken by the president and his associates.
 What had caused Algerian citizens to draw back, when so many oth-
ers across the region surged forward? Experts pointed to the traumatic 
after-effects of the brutal civil war that had occurred two decades pre-
viously, and the fear, induced in part by government propaganda, that 
such events could happen again. The civil war had followed the Algerian 
Awakening, which began in October 1988 when thousands of Algerians 
instigated protests against corruption, inflation, the elimination of subsi-
dies and social services, and repressive single-party rule by the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), which had led the country to independence in 
1962. The government had responded first with violence and then with 
reform. Multiparty democracy was introduced, and elections for local 
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assemblies were held in 1990. An Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), won the majority of local assembly seats and control of some 
800 municipalities. FIS also won a strong plurality in the first round of 
parliamentary elections held in December 1991; a second round was 
scheduled for January 1992. Fearing that the Islamist party would obtain 
more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, enabling it to alter the 
constitution, the Algerian armed forces staged a coup d’état on January 
11 and cancelled the runoff elections. The new regime declared a state of 
emergency, banned all religious parties, and arrested thousands of FIS 
members.
 The cancellation of the elections and repression of Islamists led to 
a brutal decade-long civil war, which claimed as many as 200,000 lives. 
Armed insurgents, loyal to disparate and sometimes warring organiza-
tions, took to the streets and mountains. The insurgents included groups 
loyal to FIS, which hoped to revive the political process that had resulted 
in its electoral victories, and emergent jihadi groups that sought to over-
throw the secular state. Among the latter was the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), which was founded by Algerian veterans of the Soviet-Afghan 
War after the 1992 military coup. Rejecting FIS’s moderate tactics, GIA 
targeted supporters of FIS, the Algerian government, and the civilian 
population.
 In 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) broke 
from GIA, condemning its massacres of Muslim civilians. Linked by their 
common service in the Soviet-Afghan War, GSPC attracted the attention 
of al-Qaeda, which provided financial and logistical support. On the fifth 
anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks, al-Qaeda selected GSPC 
as its North African representative, and in 2007 GSPC changed its name 
to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM was led by Soviet-Afghan 
War veteran Abdelmalek Droukdel, who had taken charge of GSPC in 
2004. With the establishment of AQIM, the ripple effects of the Algerian 
crisis spread to other parts of North Africa. The Arab Spring and its af-
termath strengthened AQIM’s foothold in North Africa and introduced 
the group to the Western Sahel. Meanwhile, in Algeria, the generals who 
staged the 1992 coup remained the power behind Algeria’s autocratic ci-
vilian regime, and the state security service, which had dominated the 
state since independence, kept close tabs on opposition activists. Unable 
to unite a fearful and divided citizenry in an enduring coalition, Algerian 
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activists were overshadowed by militants in other countries during the 
2011–13 Arab Spring.
 Citizens of Morocco were motivated by the same concerns that in-
spired others in 2011. On February 20, thousands of protesters led by 
middle-class youths surged into the streets of Rabat and other towns 
and cities across the country. Rallying against political repression, cor-
ruption, economic inequality, unemployment, and inadequate social 
services, they called for constitutional changes that would reduce mo-
narchical powers in favor of an elected parliament and recognize the 
Amazigh (Berber) language as an official one. The February 20 Move-
ment was embraced by dozens of civil society and political organizations, 
ranging from leftists to Islamists. In early March, King Mohammed VI, 
an important ally of both France and the United States, released Islamists 
and other dissidents from prison and promised to appoint a committee 
to draft constitutional reforms that would establish an independent ju-
diciary, more effective rule of law, and an elected government endowed 
with enhanced powers. However, significant limitations on the govern-
ment’s prerogatives ensured that real power would remain in the mon-
arch’s hands. The reforms were approved by a popular referendum in July, 
and parliamentary elections were held in November 2011. The moderate 
Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Justice and Development Party, which 
had opposed the February 20 Movement, won a plurality of the vote. Its 
electoral victory permitted the party to hold the position of prime min-
ister, lead a coalition government that included two secular parties, and 
claim eleven of thirty-one ministries, including higher education, justice, 
and foreign affairs.
 Having pursued a dual strategy of co-optation and repression of 
Islamist organizations since the late 1970s, the Moroccan monarchy 
successfully used the Justice and Development Party to undermine sup-
port for the more radical and illegal Justice and Charity Party, which 
promoted social justice, a more equitable distribution of resources, and 
an accountable government based on Islamic law.38 In contrast to its 
counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, the Moroccan Muslim Brotherhood 
party retained control of the post–Arab Spring government, but it was 
unable to effect fundamental political, economic, or social change. The 
repression of political activists and independent journalists continued, 
and the February 20 Movement fractured, strained by conflicting views 
on monarchy, religion, and women’s rights, and divided by region, 
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generation, and socioeconomic class. Meanwhile, the two-decade-old 
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, founded by Moroccan veterans 
of the Soviet-Afghan War, was superseded by new jihadi groups with 
links to AQIM, and some 1,500 Moroccan fighters joined Islamic State 
forces fighting in Iraq and Syria.
Conclusion
In North Africa, as in Africa south of the Sahara, foreign intervention 
during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War installed and sus-
tained dictators whose rule was characterized by economic inequality 
and political repression. During the Arab Spring, secular liberals, left-
ists, and Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were among those who 
mobilized successfully to oust the old regimes. Similar movements in 
Algeria and Morocco led to superficial reforms that curbed the uprisings 
and stymied more significant change. In the three countries where new 
orders were established, civil rights and liberties continued to be applied 
selectively, and hopes for economic transformation were not fulfilled. 
Remnants of the old regimes remained compelling forces and, in Tunisia 
and Egypt, they succeeded in regaining power.
 Once again, foreign political and military intervention influenced 
the outcomes. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, external interests acted in 
response to instability, and in the case of Libya, to protect civilian lives. 
Regime change was an additional but unstated objective in Libya. In all 
three countries, some Western, Middle Eastern, and regional powers and 
multilateral organizations joined local secularists to dampen the influ-
ence of moderate Islamists or even to repress them. Other external forces 
supported Islamist politicians and, in the case of Libya, Islamist mili-
tias. As legal means for expressing dissent or gaining power shut down, 
a growing number of alienated young men joined extremist camps. Al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State emerged as powerful forces in places where 
they had had little or no previous presence. In Egypt and Libya, espe-
cially, external involvement heightened the violence and instability. In-
ternational efforts to bring peace and stability foundered, as they tended 
to focus on external rather than internal interests and to exclude influen-
tial parties that outsiders opposed.
 The Arab Spring and its aftermath had widespread political, eco-
nomic, and social ramifications. As weapons, fighters, and refugees from 
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the regional hotspots flooded into neighboring states, vast regions in 
North Africa and the West African Sahel were destabilized. Two coun-
tries that experienced the ripple effects were Mali and Nigeria. Instability 
and foreign intervention in those countries is the subject of chapter 11.
Suggested Reading
Several works on Islam and Islamism in contemporary Africa and the 
Middle East are especially recommended. A useful overview can be 
found in Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek, eds., Islam and Muslim 
Politics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), which investi-
gates the impact of political liberalization, economic reform, state weak-
ness, and globalization on the practice of Islam. Case studies focus on 
Muslim youth activists, Muslim NGOs, Islamic law, and secularism and 
minority rights. International Crisis Group, Islamism in North Africa I: 
The Legacies of History, Middle East/North Africa Briefing 12 (Cairo/
Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), provides a concise historical 
contextualization of Islamism in North Africa. Contributors to Samer S. 
Shehata, ed., Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), examine the character of diverse Islamist 
movements in North Africa and the Middle East and their roles in do-
mestic and international affairs. See also the Suggested Reading for 
chapter 2.
 The Arab Spring is the subject of a number of useful studies. Roger 
Owen, The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), explores the origins and dynamics of 
the presidential regimes that dominated Middle Eastern and North Af-
rican politics during the second half of the twentieth century and ex-
plains why they were challenged during the Arab Spring. Several works 
provide helpful analyses that investigate the causes, significance, and 
consequences of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East: 
Tariq Ramadan, Islam and the Arab Awakening (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012); James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone 
Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Paul Mc-
Caffrey, ed., The Arab Spring (Ipswich, MA: H. W. Wilson, 2012). Gilbert 
Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, 
trans. G. M. Goshgarian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 
explores the political, economic, and social roots of the Arab uprising, 
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focusing on youth unemployment, governmental repression, corrup-
tion, and the impact of US policies. It also includes a valuable assess-
ment of the significance of Qatar and its Al Jazeera television network 
in shaping events.
 Two recommended works focus on the role of youth in fomenting 
the Arab Spring. Juan Cole, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Genera-
tion Is Changing the Middle East, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 2014), investigates youth movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 
exploring their grievances, aspirations, and use of technology and so-
cial media to mobilize against the presidential regimes. Journalist Robin 
Wright, in Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion across the Islamic World 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), highlights the voices of young 
men and women who hoped to promote fundamental cultural change 
and to reclaim Islam from extremist minorities.
 Several important studies examine the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, focusing on conflicts between secularists and Islamists, the re-
pression of prodemocracy forces, and the reemergence of authoritarian 
regimes. See especially Mark Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished 
Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2012); 
Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revo-
lution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2012); Robert F. Worth, A Rage for Order: The 
Middle East in Turmoil, From Tahrir Square to ISIS (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2016); Gilbert Achcar, Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in 
the Arab Uprising (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); and 
I. William Zartman, ed., Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the 
Intifadat (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015).
 Other works examine the impact of foreign intervention during the 
Arab Spring. Especially useful are two studies by Kristian Coates Ul-
richsen that explore the prominent role of Qatar, which, unlike other 
Gulf states, viewed the revolts not as a challenge to its authority but 
as an opportunity to strengthen its regional and global influence. Kris-
tian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring (London: Hurst, 2014), 
and Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 
investigate Qatar’s involvement in mediation, financial support, and 
media coverage during the Arab revolts. See also Achcar, The People 
Want (mentioned previously).
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 For Tunisia, important historical context is provided in Kenneth J. 
Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), which examines the country’s political, eco-
nomic, and social dynamics from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring. Pia Christina Wood investigates French 
support for the Ben Ali dictatorship in the years before the Tunisian 
uprising in “French Foreign Policy and Tunisia: Do Human Rights 
Matter?” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002). Alcinda Honwana, 
Youth and Revolution in Tunisia (London: Zed Books, 2013), focuses on 
the role of youth, especially cyber activists, in the Tunisian revolt. Mi-
chael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), investigates political, Islamist, and Berber iden-
tity movements in the Maghreb, with special reference to Tunisia. Vet-
eran journalist David B. Ottaway, The Arab World Upended: Revolution 
and Its Aftermath in Tunisia and Egypt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2017), examines the causes of the revolutions and the nature of the states 
formed in its aftermath.
 A number of works explore conflicts between secularists, Islamists, 
and violent extremists in Tunisia in the years after the Arab Spring. 
See especially Anne Wolf, Can Secular Parties Lead the New Tunisia? 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014); 
Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, “The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia,” Jour-
nal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (October 2015): 110–24; Monica L. Marks, 
Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Con-
stitution, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 10 (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 2014); and Monica Marks, Tunisia’s Ennahda: 
Rethinking Islamism in the Context of ISIS and the Egyptian Coup, Re-
thinking Political Islam Working Paper (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2015).
 Several important studies provide a historical framework for the 
uprising and its aftermath in Egypt. Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A 
History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), provides a useful overview. 
Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ’Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 
1958–1970, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), explores 
the turbulent relations between Nasser’s Arab nationalist regime and 
the conservative monarchies in neighboring Arab states. Steven Cook, 
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The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), traces Egypt’s transformation from leader of the 
Arab world under Nasser, through the corrupt regimes that sustained 
US Middle East policy, to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
prodemocracy forces that overthrew the Mubarak regime. Ottaway, The 
Arab World Upended (mentioned previously), examines the causes of 
the uprising in Egypt and explores the reasons for the revolution’s fail-
ure. Achcar, Morbid Symptoms, investigates the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring in Egypt, where progressive forces competed with remnants of 
the old regime and with Islamic fundamentalist movements to shape 
the future. Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the 
U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ex-
plores the collaboration between the United States and successive Egyptian 
regimes, Washington’s delayed support for the prodemocracy movement, its 
hopes for a successor government run by a Mubarak associate, and its con-
tinued support for authoritarian rule. David D. Kirkpatrick, Into the Hands 
of the Soldiers: Freedom and Chaos in Egypt and the Middle East (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 2018), examines the relationship through 2017. Egyptian 
journalist Mohannad Sabry, Sinai: Egypt’s Linchpin, Gaza’s Lifeline, Israel’s 
Nightmare (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2015), explores the 
Sinai insurgency and the social, economic, and political issues at its root.
 A number of recommended works provide historical background 
to the uprising and subsequent conflict in Libya. J. Millard Burr and 
Robert O. Collins, Africa’s Thirty Years’ War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 
1963–1993 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), examines the long-term 
consequences of three decades of war that implicated Libya, Chad, and 
Sudan, as well as France, the United States, the OAU, and the UN. Ye-
hudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2008), investigates the four decades of Qaddafi’s rule, exploring 
Libya’s shift from the Arab Middle East and the Soviet Union to Africa 
and the West. Geoff Simons, Libya and the West: From Independence to 
Lockerbie (Oxford, UK: Centre for Libyan Studies, 2003), examines re-
gional conflicts, human rights abuses, and state terrorism under Qaddafi, 
along with Western involvement in Libyan affairs since independence. 
Ethan Chorin, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revo-
lution (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), written by a former US foreign 
service officer in Libya (2004–6), examines human rights abuses and re-
gional disparities under Qaddafi and the events that led to the uprising. 
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Chorin’s assessment of relations between Qaddafi and the West from 
2003 to 2011 is particularly insightful.
 The dynamics of the Libyan revolt and its aftermath are investigated 
in several important studies. Lindsey Hilsum, Sandstorm: Libya in the 
Time of Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2012), written by a British jour-
nalist stationed in Libya during the Arab Spring, chronicles the Libyan 
uprising at the grassroots. Contributors to Jason Pack, ed., The 2011 Lib-
yan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), examine the role of economics, ethnicity, 
region, religion, and external actors in the uprising and its aftermath. 
Other significant works examine ethnic, clan, regional, and religious 
rivalries in post-Qaddafi Libya. Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, eds., 
The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), provides historical context that explains Libya’s inability to 
form a unified state in the Arab Spring’s aftermath. Other destabilizing 
factors in post-Qaddafi Libya are explored in Frederic Wehrey, “What’s 
Behind Libya’s Spiraling Violence?” Washington Post, July 28, 2014, and 
Frederic Wehrey and Ala’ Alrababa’h, “Rising Out of Chaos: The Islamic 
State in Libya,” Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie, March 5, 
2015. Nicholas Pelham, “Libya in the Shadow of Iraq: The ‘Old Guard’ 
versus the Thuwwar in the Battle for Stability,” in The Politics of In-
ternational Intervention: The Tyranny of Peace, ed. Mandy Turner and 
Florian P. Kühn (New York: Routledge, 2016), 218–28, attributes some 
of the instability to the inaction of Western powers that intervened to 
oust Qaddafi and subsequently disengaged. Frederic Wehrey, The Burn-
ing Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2018), provides a nuanced assessment of the country’s break-
down after Qaddafi’s fall, including insights gleaned from interviews 
conducted across the country.
 Several works examine the impact of foreign intervention during 
the Libyan uprising and its aftermath. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Wil-
liams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (July 2011): 
825–50, explores the history, application, and challenges of the UN’s 
“politics of protection,” with special reference to Libya. Stephen R. 
Weissman, “In Syria, Unlearned Lessons from Libya,” In These Times, 
April 19, 2013, considers the ways in which NATO powers undermined 
AU initiatives for a negotiated transition to democracy and chose 
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instead to intervene militarily to remove Qaddafi from power. Aidan 
Hehir and Robert Murray, eds., Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and 
the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2013), contests the dominant narrative, which deems intervention 
in Libya to have been an effective and positive action motivated by the 
responsibility to protect. Contributors to the volume argue that the 
authorization, conduct, and justification of that intervention will have 
negative consequences for future humanitarian interventions and for 
international peace and security. Two recommended articles focus on 
the role of foreign intervention in Libya’s post–Arab Spring civil war: 
Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, “Libya’s Legitimacy Crisis: The 
Danger of Picking Sides in the Post-Qaddafi Chaos,” Foreign Affairs, 
October 6, 2014; and Frederic Wehrey, “Is Libya a Proxy War?” Wash-
ington Post, October 24, 2014.
 A number of studies explore political transformations in Algeria, 
which did not experience regime change during the Arab Spring, but 
where brutal repression of Islamists in the 1990s influenced the 2011 
uprising and its aftermath. Several works focus on the Algerian inde-
pendence war. See especially Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Al-
geria, 1954–1962 (New York: New York Review Books, 2006); and Frantz 
Fanon’s classic work, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox 
(New York: Grove Press, 2004), which examines the psychological im-
pact of colonialism and liberation. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic 
Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post–
Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), investigates 
Algerian decolonization in the context of the Cold War and examines 
the ways in which Algerian nationalists played on divisions between the 
French colonial power and its allies. Robert Malley, The Call from Alge-
ria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1996), traces Algeria’s transformation from a 
symbol of revolutionary socialism to a battleground between secular and 
religious forces that culminated in a brutal civil war. James D. Le Sueur, 
Algeria Since 1989: Between Democracy and Terror (London: Zed Books, 
2010), examines how Algeria’s attempts to move from authoritarianism 
to democratic pluralism were thwarted by a military coup intended to 
block the rise to power of an elected Islamist government. Willis, Poli-
tics and Power in the Maghreb (mentioned previously), explores Algerian 
political, Islamist, and Berber identity movements, as well as the role of 
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the military in Algerian politics and society. J. N. C. Hill, Identity in Al-
gerian Politics: The Legacy of Colonial Rule (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rien-
ner, 2009), investigates the political, economic, and social upheaval of 
the 1990s, when Algerian national identity was contested, Islamism and 
Berberism emerged as powerful forces, and foreign interests intervened. 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Chal-
lenge to North African States (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), also 
illuminates the role of the Berber identity movement, focusing on both 
Algeria and Morocco.
 Morocco, like Algeria, experienced political reforms but did not un-
dergo regime change during the Arab Spring. Several studies shed light 
on the relative stability of the Moroccan monarchy. Susan Gilson Miller, 
A History of Modern Morocco (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), assesses the government’s strong ties with the West, episodes of 
political repression and reform, détente with Islamists, involvement 
with the war on terror, and reaction to the Arab Spring. Willis, Politics 
and Power in the Maghreb (mentioned previously), investigates political, 
Islamist, and Berber identity movements in the Maghreb, with special 
reference to Morocco. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, 
eds., Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society Under Moham-
med VI (New York: Routledge, 2011), examines the establishment of 
political parties, the evolving relationship between the monarchy and 
Islamists, the growing impact of civil society, and the role of the Ama-
zigh (Berber) renaissance. Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Move-
ment and the Challenge to North African States (mentioned previously), 
also illuminates the role of the Berber identity movement in Morocco. 
James N. Sater, Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity (New 
York: Routledge, 2010), examines the politics of inclusion and exclusion 
in contemporary Morocco, the country’s economic conditions, and its 
role in the region.
 Islamism in Morocco is the subject of several recommended works. 
See especially Marvine Howe, Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and 
Other Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mohamed 
Daadaoui, Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining 
Makhzen Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Malika Zeghal, 
Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics, 
trans. George Holoch (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2008); and Eva 
Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice 
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and Development in Morocco (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2011). Avi Max Spiegel, Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion in Mo-
rocco and the Arab World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2015), highlights the role of youth in Morocco’s religious politics, where 
they have played a major role in shaping and contesting competing vi-
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Unforeseen Consequences (2009–17)
fallout from the Arab Spring in North Africa had widespread 
ramifications elsewhere. The chain of events unleashed by Qaddafi’s 
ouster was felt throughout the region as sophisticated armaments from 
Libyan arsenals fell into the hands of criminals and insurgents in North 
Africa and the Western Sahel. Guns, guerrillas, and refugees swept into 
neighboring states and destabilized weak regimes.
 In Mali, Qaddafi’s demise fueled a separatist movement, a jihadist 
insurgency backed by al-Qaeda affiliates, a military coup, and foreign 
military intervention. Neighboring states, Western countries, and multi-
lateral bodies justified their intervention both as a response to regional 
instability and as an effort to combat international terrorism. External 
players included ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, the EU, France, and the 
United States, as well as foreign jihadis from the al-Qaeda network.
 In Nigeria, a conflict in the northeast that was focused on local griev-
ances established links to al-Qaeda when Nigerian insurgents, who had 
trained in Mali’s al-Qaeda camps, returned home with weapons acquired 
from Libyan stockpiles. As the Nigerian conflict expanded into Camer-
oon, Chad, and Niger, it attracted fighters from Mali, Mauritania, and 
Algeria—as well as support from the Islamic State. Neighboring coun-
tries, attacked by Nigerian insurrectionists and threatened by the influx 
of refugees, joined forces with the Nigerian military to respond both to 
regional instability and to the threat from international terrorist move-
ments. In some cases, they operated under AU auspices; in others, they 
functioned as ad hoc collectives. The subregional bodies, ECOWAS and 
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in mediation efforts. Justifying their intervention according to both par-
adigms, Western nations—led by the United States, France, the UK, and 
various EU member states—provided military training, technical, and 
financial support.
 In both Mali and Nigeria, the foreign military operations decimated 
insurgent forces in some areas but dispersed them to others, where the 
rebels targeted unprotected civilian populations. Ordinary citizens were 
caught in the crossfire, victimized by both insurrectionary and govern-
mental forces. The abuse of civilians by state security personnel, and the 
failure of the international forces to protect them, undermined broader 
counterterrorism objectives. In both Mali and Nigeria, foreign interven-
tion resulted in some short-term gains. However, long-term solutions re-
mained elusive. The governments in Bamako and Abuja failed to address 
the deeply rooted grievances that had precipitated the insurgencies in 
marginalized areas. They did not redistribute state resources to provide 
badly needed infrastructure and governmental and social services to the 
neglected northern regions. Once the military forces withdrew, extremist 
groups in both countries reestablished themselves in remote areas where 
they operated with renewed vigor.
 This chapter examines the mix of factors that led to the conflicts in 
Mali and Nigeria, which by late 2017 had not been resolved. It begins with 
regime change in Libya, which had significant regional consequences, 
particularly for Mali but also for Nigeria. Foreign intervention in Libya, 
purportedly to restore stability and protect civilian lives, led to wide-
spread regional destabilization and the deaths of thousands of civilians in 
other countries. Both case studies expose the intervening powers’ flawed 
understanding of the social and political dynamics in the contested areas.
Setting the Stage: Mali and Its Saharan Neighbors (2011–17)
The spillover effects of the Libyan turmoil had serious consequences in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For Mali, the impact was especially devastating. 
When the anti-Qaddafi insurgency began, some 1.5 million sub-Saharan 
Africans were living in Libya, the vast majority recruited by the govern-
ment to work in low-wage jobs. Thousands were migrants whose onward 
travel to Europe had been thwarted by the Libyan government in ex-
change for billions of dollars in European trade, investment, and weap-
ons. As the rebellion intensified, Qaddafi bolstered his security forces 
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with some 2,500 mercenaries from impoverished sub-Saharan countries. 
His military personnel also included well-trained fighters from the Tuareg 
ethnic group, a nomadic Berber people with significant populations in 
Algeria, Mali, and Niger, and smaller concentrations in Burkina Faso, 
Libya, and Nigeria. Thousands of Tuaregs in the Libyan security forces 
responded to his appeal for help, and countless others crossed the bor-
ders from Mali and Niger to join his cause.
 Although critical to Libya’s economic development, sub-Saharan 
Africans constituted an impoverished underclass that was regularly sub-
jected to racism, xenophobia, and scapegoating for the country’s social 
and economic ills. The presence of sub-Saharan African mercenaries 
among Qaddafi’s fighting forces exacerbated popular hostility during the 
uprising, when militants singled out sub-Saharan Africans for retaliation, 
and untold numbers were robbed, beaten, raped, and lynched. Violence, 
instability, and the targeting of foreign nationals led to a mass exodus of 
civilians during the insurgency, while Qaddafi’s ouster led to an outflow 
of foreign fighters armed with sophisticated weapons.
 The scattering of the Tuareg fighters had immediate consequences in 
Mali, where Tuareg nationalists, who had long struggled for greater auton-
omy, instigated an armed struggle for independence. Like many African 
countries, Mali included a mix of ethnic groups that had been ruled as a 
unit by an external colonial power. The population comprised Tuaregs and 
Arabs, primarily in the north, and sub-Saharan African ethnic groups, 
primarily in the south, where the seat of government was located. North-
ern Tuaregs, who historically were nomadic pastoralists, had conducted 
a sustained resistance to French conquest in the late nineteenth century. 
During the colonial and postindependence periods, they were marginal-
ized politically, economically, and socially. Resisting the rules and regu-
lations of nation-states, they disregarded national boundaries imposed 
by outsiders and moved freely throughout the region, seeking food and 
water for their herds—and later, wage employment or illicit economic op-
portunities. Devastating droughts in 1968–74 and 1980–85 and the damag-
ing effects of desertification destroyed the livelihoods of many pastoralists 
and pushed large numbers of young Tuareg men into Libya, where they 
worked in the oil industry or joined the Islamic Pan-African Legion and 
fought for Libya in Chad and Sudan. Although thousands remained in 
Libya after the immediate crises ended, others returned home to lead a 
succession of rebellions against the Bamako government.
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 The 2011–13 Tuareg insurgency in Mali that followed Qaddafi’s fall 
was the most recent of many that had plagued the government since in-
dependence in 1960. The rebellions grew from grievances stemming from 
the country’s deep structural inequalities that deprived northern Tuaregs 
of educational, developmental, and political opportunities. Since inde-
pendence, Tuaregs had struggled for greater control over their land—in-
cluding the rich uranium deposits beneath the soil—along with greater 
regional autonomy and a halt to pollution by foreign mining companies. 
The rebellions had been brutally repressed, and successive peace agree-
ments had led to unfulfilled promises and renewed fighting. A 1992 ac-
cord resulted in the integration of more than 3,000 Tuareg fighters into 
the Malian military, police, and civil service. However, other grievances 
continued to fester. Tuareg populations lacked adequate drinking water, 
electricity, roads, clinics, and schools. Large numbers of men were un-
employed, and many turned to smuggling and other criminal activi-
ties. New insurgencies erupted during 2007–9. When those conflicts 
ended, legions of Tuareg fighters again left for Libya, where they joined 
Qaddafi’s security forces and elite desert military units.
 While Tuareg nationalists turned to Libya, the Malian government 
found a ready benefactor in the United States, which approached the 
conflict in northern Mali as one emanating from international terrorism. 
The Bamako-Washington alliance would exacerbate tensions between the 
Malian government and the Tuareg populations. Bamako became a key 
player in US counterterrorism initiatives in the Western Sahel. It joined 
the US-led Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), established in 2002, and its succes-
sor organizations, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) 
and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). These 
programs provided Bamako with military equipment, logistical support, 
and border control training and offered the services of US Special Opera-
tions Forces, who trained Malian military personnel in counterterrorism 
and combat techniques. The initiatives brought the Bamako government 
into conflict with Tuareg populations in two ways. First, they required 
Mali to establish a military presence in the Sahara, which violated inter-
nal peace agreements that had reduced the army’s numbers in Tuareg- 
inhabited areas. Second, when the 2007–9 insurgency began, US Army 
Special Forces helped the Bamako government combat it.
 Although the United States justified its intervention as a strike against 
terror, the 2007–9 rebellion was not the work of international terrorist 
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organizations. Rather, it was embedded in the deep political, economic, 
and social inequalities of the Malian system, which had been compounded 
by ecological devastation resulting from drought and desertification, 
especially in the northern region. The government’s historical neglect 
of the north—and the consequent absence of economic development, 
employment, and governing institutions there—provided fertile ground 
for illicit activities and extremist ideologies that crossed international 
boundaries. The lawless region had attracted smugglers and bandits who 
offered economic opportunities, and later, jihadis who promoted visions 
of an alternative society. With few alternatives, many northerners partici-
pated in the illicit activities and embraced the new ideologies. However, 
neither crime nor religion caused the 2007–9 rebellion.
 The Malian conflict also stimulated involvement by neighboring 
states and by France, the region’s dominant external power. These coun-
tries justified their interventions as a response to instability and to what 
they described as a terrorist threat. In March 2009, the governments of 
Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Niger agreed to cooperate in securing their bor-
ders against smugglers, bandits, and AQIM militants.1 The United States 
provided substantial support for the regional efforts, some of which re-
sulted in abuses of civilian populations. Meanwhile, some of the same 
countries operated at cross purposes. France, Algeria, and Mauritania 
assisted the Tuareg rebellions in Mali in the hope that the secular insur-
gencies would help drive AQIM from the region. However, Tuareg 
rebels were doing business with the AQIM militants and criminal net-
works that these countries sought to undermine. Malian government of-
ficials also colluded with the outlaws, reaping a share of their smuggling 
and hostage-taking proceeds in exchange for turning a blind eye.
 It is in this context that the fallout from the 2011 Libyan uprising 
should be viewed. When the Libyan protests began, Malian Tuaregs were 
already prominent among Qaddafi’s crack desert troops. After Qaddafi’s 
death, some 3,000 Malian Tuaregs returned home with all-terrain ve-
hicles, shoulder-launched antiaircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 
and other sophisticated weapons looted from Libyan arsenals. In Novem-
ber 2011, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
emerged from several smaller Tuareg organizations and declared its 
intent to establish an independent state in northern Mali.2 The MNLA 
leader, Mohammed Ag Najim, had served as a colonel in Qaddafi’s army 
and commanded an elite desert unit. The Libyan veterans were joined 
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by elite Tuareg units from the Malian army who had been trained by 
US Army Special Forces as part of the US counterterrorism initiative. 
Responding to Ag Najim’s appeal, they defected from the national army 
with their weapons and vehicles. In addition, 1,600 Tuareg soldiers who 
had been incorporated into the Malian security forces under the terms 
of the 1992 peace agreement aligned with the secessionists, as did some 
Tuareg members of parliament. The MNLA conquest began on January 
17, 2012, with attacks on the Malian army in half a dozen northern towns. 
The cities of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal fell quickly to the MNLA as the 
Malian armed forces collapsed and fled.
 The impact of Qaddafi’s downfall was compounded by the effects of 
US counterterrorism initiatives. On March 22, 2012, Mali’s elected presi-
dent, Amadou Toumani Touré, was overthrown in a military coup led 
by a US-trained army captain, Amadou Haya Sanogo, who had partici-
pated in the US State Department’s International Military Education and 
Training program.3 Claiming that they had deposed the president be-
cause of his ineffective response to the Tuareg insurgency and his role in 
perpetuating a corrupt and repressive governing system, the coup leaders 
suspended the constitution and established a military junta. Although 
Mali had been touted in the West as a model of African democracy, the 
Photo 11.1. An MNLA fighter stands guard in Boulikessi, Mali, near the border 
with Burkina Faso, June 2012. Photo by Ferhat Bouda/Redux Pictures.
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country had suffered from serious electoral irregularities, a rubber-stamp 
parliament, political repression, and endemic corruption among ruling 
elites. Foreign powers quickly condemned the coup. The Obama admin-
istration called for the return of democratic rule and, as mandated by 
US law, withheld military, security, and development aid, discontinued 
the counterterrorism program, and withdrew US Army Special Forces 
from Mali.4 The EU halted all nonhumanitarian aid, ECOWAS im-
posed economic sanctions, and ECOWAS and the AU suspended Mali’s 
membership.
 Rather than bringing order and stability, the coup set the stage for 
the dissolution of the Malian state. On April 6, 2012, having gained con-
trol of more than two-thirds of the country, the MNLA announced the 
formation of a secessionist state called the Islamic State of Azawad. By 
late May, however, the MNLA was financially broke. Hoping to enhance 
its resource base and secure its foothold, the secular secessionist move-
ment formed an alliance of convenience with Ansar Dine (Defenders of 
the Faith), a newly formed Salafi jihadist group led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a 
leader of an earlier Malian insurgency. Ag Ghali had been exposed to 
fundamentalist teachings by Pakistani missionaries in northern Mali in 
the 1990s and in Saudi Arabia, where he had held a diplomatic post from 
2007 to 2010. Closely associated with AQIM, Ansar Dine had consid-
erable resources at its disposal. The weakened MNLA accommodated 
Salafi demands and conceded that the Tuareg state would be an Islamic 
one, governed by Islamic law. By June, the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and 
various AQIM factions controlled separate spheres in Mali’s north. Well 
endowed with money and weapons, Ansar Dine and AQIM rapidly out-
maneuvered the MNLA. Within months, an AQIM splinter organiza-
tion, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), had 
emerged as a new force in northern Mali. While the MNLA and Ansar 
Dine were indigenous organizations, AQIM and MUJWA were domi-
nated by foreign fighters.
 Although initially divided on the question of foreign military inter-
vention, Mali’s postcoup government eventually requested UN assistance. 
The international community was equally divided in its response. In 
October 2012, France and ECOWAS took the lead in pushing for UN 
intervention under a Chapter VII mandate. Voicing concerns about the 
spread of terrorism, France called for immediate action to expel Muslim 
extremists from Mali’s north and to reunite the country. Although it was 
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silent about its economic interests, France was deeply dependent on nu-
clear energy and was aware of untapped uranium deposits beneath the 
deserts controlled by the Tuareg insurgents.5 Moreover, Mali possessed 
significant oil reserves. The United States supported the notion of military 
intervention but argued that such action should be delayed until after 
Mali had elected a new civilian government, which would allow Wash-
ington to resume military and economic aid.6 Moreover, in Washington’s 
view, the political problems that had led to the crisis needed to be ad-
dressed, and the Malian army, which should play a leading role in any 
military effort, had to be properly trained. A number of other nations 
and NGOs urged restraint. The International Crisis Group warned that 
“turning northern Mali into a new front in the ‘war on terror’” could 
obscure the legitimate grievances of the northern populations, increase 
human rights abuses and interethnic conflict, and stimulate AQIM repri-
sals in other countries.7
 Meanwhile, Washington and Paris looked for surrogates to carry out 
their agenda and lobbied African countries to contribute to a military 
intervention force. Beyond the ECOWAS alliance, three countries were 
Photo 11.2. An Ansar Dine fighter in Timbuktu, Mali, 2012. Photo by Magharebia.
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especially important: Chad, which had significant experience with desert 
fighting, and Mauritania and Algeria, which shared long borders with 
Mali and were major sources of AQIM fighters. All three countries had 
participated in Western counterterrorism initiatives. However, Algeria, 
which possessed the strongest military force in North Africa, opposed 
foreign intervention in Mali, particularly if France were involved. Al-
giers worried that such an operation, especially if it were spearheaded 
by AQIM’s primary Western nemesis, might push AQIM militants back 
into Algerian territory and stimulate unrest among Algerian Tuaregs. 
Given its horrific experiences in the 1990s, Algeria was wary of associ-
ating itself with a French-led campaign to eradicate Muslim extremists 
from a neighboring country and warned that regional destabilization 
could ensue.
 While France and the United States pressured non-ECOWAS coun-
tries, ECOWAS proposed its own intervention plan. On November 11, 
the organization agreed to provide 3,300 troops from member states, who 
would train and equip Malian soldiers to retake the north. The ECOWAS 
soldiers would not be peacekeepers, but instead would constitute an inter-
vention force similar to the AU force in Somalia. The AU endorsed the plan, 
with the expectation that Western countries would provide most of the 
financial and logistical support. The UN secretary-general recommended 
that the Security Council approve the proposal, but he noted that political 
reconciliation, which required addressing the north’s longstanding griev-
ances, was essential for reunification and that military action should re-
main a last resort. International human rights organizations urged extreme 
caution, raising concerns about the Malian military’s long record of human 
rights abuses and suggesting that populations with legitimate grievances 
would be treated as terrorists. Many warned of the humanitarian catastro-
phe that would result from airstrikes and ground attacks.
 On December 20, 2012, the UN Security Council voted unanimously 
to endorse the ECOWAS/AU plan and authorized the establishment of 
the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Lim-
iting the involvement of Western troops in order to minimize the possi-
bility of backlash, AFISMA was slated to be an all-African intervention 
force made up of troops from ECOWAS and other AU countries. The EU 
agreed to send 400 officers, led by a French commander, to train Malian 
troops. The United States, which was legally barred from directly assist-
ing the Malian regime, offered to help train, equip, and transport the 
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ECOWAS and AU contingents. Funding for the operation was provided 
by the EU, supplemented with bilateral support from Australia, India, 
Japan, and Norway.
 Provoked by the threat of foreign military intervention, Ansar Dine, 
AQIM, and MUJWA launched a southward advance, taking the central 
Mali town of Konna on January 10, 2013. Konna was less than 40 miles 
from the Sévaré airfield and army base, which the government needed to 
conduct military operations in the north, and less than 400 miles from 
Bamako. Fearing that the jihadi insurgents would move unimpeded into 
the capital, the Malian government appealed to France.
 Casting aside the international plan that had been months in the 
making and that would have limited Western military involvement on the 
ground, France embarked on a unilateral military action it dubbed Opera-
tion Serval. By January 11, hundreds of French troops had arrived in Sévaré 
to reinforce the struggling Malian army. Within days, French warplanes 
were attacking jihadi training camps, weapons depots, and other positions 
throughout the north.8 French President François Hollande declared that 
Paris would stop the jihadi advance to the south, retake the north, restore 
Mali’s territorial integrity and the authority of the central government, 
and eradicate terrorist bases. Foreign powers that initially had supported 
the carefully crafted multilateral proposal switched their allegiance to the 
French operation. Chad provided 2,000 troops, which were placed under 
French command. The United States supplied drone and satellite surveil-
lance, cell phone monitoring, and tanker aircraft that allowed French war-
planes to refuel in flight. Washington also offered logistics support, troop 
transport, and payment for a large portion of the operation’s expenses.
 Even as France engaged in intensive air attacks, a second column of 
mostly AQIM fighters moved west along the Mauritanian border, taking 
the military outpost of Diabaly, less than 300 miles north of Bamako. 
With two-thirds of the country under their control, the jihadi insurgents 
were closer to the capital than they had been before the French interven-
tion. The Malian army was unable to mount an effective counterattack, 
even with French air support. Paris announced that it would increase 
its troop strength from 800 to 2,500. President Hollande promised that 
French forces would remain in Mali until they had halted the jihadi offen-
sive, extremist fighters were captured, killed, or forced out of the country, 
and the capital was secured. By the end of January, French and Chadian 
troops, belatedly supplemented by 1,400 AFISMA personnel, had retaken 
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several important northern cities and towns. The insurgents retreated to 
the mountains near the Algerian border, where they used the relative se-
curity of their remote hideaways to prepare for attacks elsewhere.
 As the jihadi forces gained ground, the Western response grew more 
vociferous. British Prime Minister David Cameron referred to their ac-
tivities as “a global threat” that required “a global response,” one that 
could last decades.9 US officials defined the insurgency as an al-Qaeda 
operation. The September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
permitted the US president to use military force only “against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”10 Therefore, in order 
to legally justify the use of lethal force in Mali, the United States had 
to assert—if not prove—that the fight in northern Mali was against al-
Qaeda. Because the insurgents had links to AQIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate, 
the United States claimed the right to intervene.11 US Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta warned, “We have a responsibility to go after al-Qaeda 
wherever they are. We’re going after them in Yemen and Somalia, and we 
Photo 11.3. Chadian army soldiers participate in Operation Serval and AFISMA, 
near Kidal, Mali, April 3, 2013. Photo by Patrick Robert/Corbis via Getty Images.
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have a responsibility to make sure that al-Qaeda does not establish a base 
for operations in North Africa, in Mali.”12
 Critics of the Western-led operation cautioned that ill-conceived ac-
tions could have unforeseen consequences; Europe and the United States 
were again fighting forces they had trained, armed, and funded to combat 
other foes. Dissenters worried that the precipitous military intervention in 
Mali, with no clear endgame, could result in a Vietnam- or Afghanistan- 
like quagmire and engender even deeper hostility toward the West. Large 
numbers of civilian casualties could rally Muslim extremists worldwide 
and transform Mali into a launching pad for terrorist attacks throughout 
the region. Human Rights Watch reported that Malian security forces and 
civilians of other ethnic groups were abusing Tuareg and Arab civilians, 
and that these attacks had intensified after the French intervention.
 Indeed, the extremist backlash began almost immediately. Jihadis 
had warned that they would attack countries supporting the Mali in-
tervention. Algeria, which had allowed French planes to fly through its 
airspace, was the first target. A major producer of oil and natural gas 
for Western Europe and the United States, Algeria depended on these 
resources for 97 percent of its export earnings and 60 percent of its gov-
ernmental revenues. On January 16, 2013, jihadi militants from several 
countries seized an internationally managed natural gas field near the 
Algeria-Libya border and took dozens of foreign workers hostage. The 
attack was led by al-Mulathameen (Masked Brigade), an al-Qaeda fac-
tion founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Soviet- 
Afghan War and the Algerian civil war and a former AQIM leader.13 A 
reluctant participant in the Mali operation, Algeria had been subjected 
to enormous pressure from France and the United States to accommo-
date their needs. Hardened by its own civil war, Algeria refused to pay 
ransoms or negotiate with terrorists and generally responded forcefully 
to terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the Algerian military launched as-
saults on the natural gas complex on January 17 and 19. At least thirty- 
eight hostages and twenty-nine militants were killed. Niger, which had 
contributed troops to the Mali intervention force and allowed France 
and the United States to use its territory as a base, was targeted on May 
23, when suicide bombers attacked two strategic sites in the Tuareg- 
Berber region of central Niger: a Nigerien military compound in Aga-
dez and a French-owned uranium mine near Arlit, about 135 miles 
from the Algerian border. More than twenty people were killed, and 
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the mine was badly damaged. Al-Mulathameen and MUJWA claimed 
responsibility.
 French military intervention in Mali, like French involvement in 
Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire, preempted or hijacked multilateral initiatives 
under African or UN auspices. In each instance, the UN Security Coun-
cil either ignored the breach or authorized French actions after the fact. 
After the Mali intervention, a UN Security Council resolution passed on 
April 25 retroactively endorsed the French military operation. The same 
resolution vested the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Sta-
bilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with the power to protect Ma-
lian civilians and UN personnel and to help Mali’s unelected governing 
authorities establish state administration and stability throughout the 
country.14 The UN forces were permitted to operate in collaboration with 
Malian security forces, which remained under the authority of the un-
elected postcoup government and had not yet been retrained to comply 
with internationally accepted human rights practices. The UN mission 
was authorized to include up to 12,640 military and police personnel, 
who would assume the functions of AFISMA, the rushed African-led op-
eration that had been overshadowed by the French intervention. Finally, 
the Security Council resolution empowered French forces to intervene in 
support of MINUSMA if requested by the UN secretary-general.
 Despite the large French and UN presence, the northern insurgen-
cies continued. In July 2013, France increased its troop numbers to 3,500. 
In August, the Algerian al-Qaeda group, al-Mulathameen, merged with 
MUJWA to form al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels). The strengthened 
organization continued to challenge government and international 
forces. Tuareg nationalists also kept up the pressure, regularly defeat-
ing the Malian army. By May 2014, the MNLA had regained control of 
much of northern Mali. Once again, France responded militarily. In Au-
gust, Paris initiated Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorism program 
modeled on the US TSCTP, which was intended to counter Muslim 
extremists from Mauritania to Chad. Headquartered in Chad, Opera-
tion Barkhane included a permanent deployment of more than 3,000 
French soldiers—a number that had increased to 4,000 in 2017—as well 
as contingents from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. 
Regular French troops were stationed in Chad and Niger, and French 
special operations forces were based in Burkina Faso. Chad served as 
the center of French air power, which included Mirage fighter jets, while 
306  |  Mali and Nigeria
reconnaissance drones were based in Niger and the logistics hub was 
located in Côte d’Ivoire. Like its US counterpart, the French initiative 
was weakened by its disproportionate focus on Western and regional 
security interests rather than on the political and economic grievances 
underlying the rebellions.
 Expecting France to take the lead in its former colonies, the United 
States played a critical supporting role. After assisting the French in-
tervention in Mali in January 2013, the United States flew daily drone 
surveillance missions from an air base outside of Niamey, Niger. Track-
ing the movements of insurgents who had retreated to the extensive, 
lightly populated desert and mountain regions, US Air Force person-
nel gathered intelligence that helped the French military determine 
targets for its airstrikes. In September 2014 Washington announced 
that it would establish a second drone base in Niger, this one located 
in Agadez, close to the site of large uranium deposits and 150 miles 
from the French mines near Arlit. Within surveillance range of several 
countries, the Agadez base would allow the United States to monitor 
Muslim extremists in Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Chad, and southern Libya, 
which, since Qaddafi’s ouster, had become a key transit corridor for al-
Qaeda and Islamic State–linked fighters, weapons traffickers, and drug 
smugglers.
 While France and the United States focused on counterterrorism, 
Algeria brokered a peace accord under UN auspices. Although it had 
warily supported the military operation in Mali, Algeria believed that a 
political solution that emphasized inclusion and compromise was more 
likely to diminish the threat along its eastern and southern borders. Be-
tween May and October 2015, rival Tuareg insurgent groups—the Co-
ordination of the Movements of Azawad (CMA) and a group known 
as the Platform—signed various agreements with the Bamako govern-
ment. However, the insurgents violated the ceasefires, the government 
failed to implement promised reforms, and fighting resumed. The In-
ternational Crisis Group charged that the accords, written primarily 
by international mediators, had been imposed from outside and em-
phasized foreign security agendas rather than local interests. External 
powers had prioritized the reestablishment of law, order, and stability 
and focused on ending the Tuareg rebellion so that the Malian mili-
tary and international forces could turn their attention to the jihadist 
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insurgency. Local groups, in contrast, were concerned about the milita-
rized political and economic system and the lack of social services, em-
ployment, justice, and political autonomy in the north. Although these 
structural issues were at the source of the conflict, the 2015 agreements 
did not adequately address them.
 A further weakness of the 2015 accords was their failure to include all 
parties to the conflict, including newer jihadi organizations. Ansar Dine 
and the allied Macina Liberation Front, which originated among Fulanis 
in central Mali, had been excluded from the talks.15 Local entrepreneurs, 
who engaged in illicit trafficking and whose private armies were impli-
cated in human rights abuses, were not brought into line. Corrupt gov-
ernment officials and antigovernment insurgents—including CMA and 
Platform members—benefited from these illicit activities and opposed 
any efforts to hamper them.
 Meanwhile, jihadi organizations were transformed rather than de-
feated. As foreign armies ousted jihadi fighters from northern Mali’s cit-
ies and towns and shut them out of peace agreements, militants shifted 
their focus to civilian populations in unprotected rural villages and to 
high-profile targets that captured world attention. Central Mali, which 
Photo 11.4. French Operation Barkhane personnel speak with an elder in Mali’s 
southern region, March 17, 2016. Photo: TM1972/Wikimedia Commons.
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had been ignored in the peace accords, and border regions near Niger, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal were particularly vulnerable, and citizens of 
former French colonies that participated in the French-led military op-
erations were singled out for retaliation. The November 2015 terror attack 
on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako was emblematic of this change. 
In that assault, militants from al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, and the Macina 
Liberation Front seized 170 hostages, targeting especially non-Muslim 
Malians and foreigners. Twenty-two hostages were killed when Malian, 
French, and US security forces stormed the hotel.
 In December, al-Mourabitoun formally affiliated with AQIM, and 
the invigorated organization continued its southward movement. In 2016 
it extended its operations to Burkina Faso, which had contributed a large 
contingent to the UN mission in Mali and where France maintained a 
military base; to Niger, which had also assisted the mission; and to Côte 
d’Ivoire, the logistics hub for French military operations. On January 15, 
al-Mourabitoun and AQIM militants attacked a luxury hotel and nearby 
café in the Burkinabe capital of Ouagadougou that killed at least thirty 
people, including nationals of several Western countries.16 Similarly, in 
March, AQIM struck a beach resort in Côte d’Ivoire, killing more than a 
dozen citizens of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, France, 
and Germany—countries that were central to the region’s counterterror-
ism operations. By the end of the year, jihadis had gained control of large 
swaths of territory in Mali’s rural areas, from which they launched as-
saults on provincial towns. In early 2017, the jihadis’ new strategy met 
with some success: Burkina Faso announced that it would withdraw 
from peacekeeping missions in Mali and Sudan to focus on the growing 
threat at home.
 As al-Qaeda adapted to new circumstances in Mali, the Islamic 
State also found an opening. In 2015 a minority of al-Mourabitoun 
members left the organization to form the Islamic State in Mali, subse-
quently renamed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. In late 2016, 
the organization claimed responsibility for attacks against military 
outposts in northern Burkina Faso near the Mali border, and against 
a prison in Niger’s capital, Niamey. In the Mali-Niger border region, 
where herders and farmers of various ethnic groups competed for 
scarce resources, the Islamic State group found support among Fulanis 
who had been victims of intercommunal violence. Al-Qaeda regained 
the initiative in March 2017, when Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and 
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the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam 
wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims). With 
each constituent dominating a particular geographic region, the new 
al-Qaeda-linked organization promised greater coordination and a 
wider regional reach.
 As 2017 drew to a close, Mali remained in turmoil. Much of the 
north continued to be deprived of a functioning government and basic 
social services. Jihadi organizations profited, and even gained legitimacy, 
by providing security and conflict resolution assistance. New sources of 
violence had also emerged. In northern Mali, the CMA splintered, and 
insurgent organizations based on local ethnic alliances proliferated. As 
nonsignatories to the accords, the community-based groups fought to 
obtain recognition and benefits. In central Mali, conflicts over land and 
other resources spawned bandits, community defense forces, and new 
groups of jihadis. Foreign military intervention in Mali—without con-
sideration for the grievances and desires of affected populations—was 
bound to fail. Because it led to intensified extremist violence in Mali and 
its expansion to neighboring countries, and because in many instances it 
exposed vulnerable populations to retaliatory attacks, foreign interven-
tion arguably did more harm than good.
Setting the Stage in Nigeria: Inequality  
and Insurgency in the Northeast (2009–17)
Not far from the turmoil in Libya and Mali was Nigeria, the continent’s 
most populous nation, largest economy, and greatest producer of oil. As a 
regional powerhouse, Nigeria maintained a high profile in international 
peacekeeping, playing a significant diplomatic and military role on the 
continent as well as in the West African subregion. At the same time, Ni-
geria suffered from numerous internal conflicts, some with serious sub-
regional ramifications. A vast and complex country, comprising more 
than 250 ethnic groups, diverse geographic regions, and many religions, 
Nigeria was marked by huge disparities in wealth and living standards, 
both within regions and between them. After the Cold War, inequalities 
in the distribution of wealth, power, and resources provoked a number 
of local and regional conflicts in Nigeria. Although these struggles pre-
dated the strife in Libya and Mali, instability in those countries contrib-
uted to an insurgency in Nigeria’s northeast that in turn led to foreign 
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military intervention. The northeastern insurgency and its ramifications 
are the focus of this case study.
 To be properly understood, the northeastern insurrection must be 
considered in context. During the early twenty-first century, the region 
was one of several conflict zones in Nigeria. In each zone, civil strife had 
specific local catalysts as well as overarching causes that grew from 
Nigeria’s political, economic, and social structures. Simplistic analyses 
often reduce complex multicausal processes to single-issue rivalries 
rooted in religious, ethnic, or regional differences. In the case of Nigeria, 
it is common to paint a scenario that pits a predominantly Muslim north 
against a mostly Christian south. There is some truth to this portrayal. In 
Nigeria, as in Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, disparities between north 
and south do exist, and they were sharpened during the colonial and 
postindependence eras.
 During the colonial period, northern Muslim elites were incorpo-
rated into the British system of indirect rule, which provided them with 
political recognition and material benefits in exchange for their role in 
implementing colonial policies. Sensitive to the interests of the Muslim 
rulers, British authorities curtailed the activities of Christian missionar-
ies in the north, which limited the number of Western schools and health 
care facilities in that region. As the colonial seat and the center of mis-
sionary focus, the south received an incommensurate share of schools, 
clinics, and job opportunities. After independence, the disparities con-
tinued. In the north, modern schools and clinics remained scarce, and 
northerners suffered disproportionately from high levels of poverty and 
unemployment. Growing rates of joblessness were worsened by the im-
position of an IMF structural adjustment program in 1986 and other free 
market reforms throughout the 1990s, which decimated northern indus-
tries that were unable to compete with cheap foreign goods. The collapse 
of the northern textile industry had ripple effects that drove cotton pro-
ducers out of business. Mismanagement of land and water resources and 
climate change by-products such as drought, desertification, and devas-
tating floods exacerbated the situation, destroying livelihoods based on 
herding, farming, and fishing.
 Although the disparities favor the southern region, the model based 
on a north-south dichotomy offers an overly optimistic assessment of 
the south and masks deep divisions within that region. Poverty, inequal-
ity, and underdevelopment in the south are perhaps most evident in the 
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Niger Delta. Most of Nigeria’s oil is produced in the Delta region, where 
pollution by Western-owned oil companies has destroyed the fishing and 
agricultural industries and the majority of the population lives in extreme 
poverty. Oil wealth accounts for the bulk of state revenues and greases a 
vast patronage system of corrupt government and military officials that 
transcends regional and ethnic boundaries. Very little of this wealth has 
been used to benefit Delta communities.17 The unequal distribution of oil 
wealth and the environmental and economic destruction caused by oil 
industry negligence have sparked significant popular protests, ranging 
from nonviolent civil disobedience in the early 1990s to violent actions 
by armed groups in the early twenty-first century that included sabotag-
ing oil and natural gas facilities and kidnapping foreign oil workers. Until 
the onset of the insurgency in the northeast, the Niger Delta was the site 
of Nigeria’s most serious unrest.
 The north-south binary also ignores Nigeria’s Middle Belt—the 
borderlands where north and south overlap and where people of di-
verse ethnic and religious backgrounds have interacted in both peace-
able and violent ways. In the middle region, Fulani herders, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and farmers of diverse ethnicities, who are 
largely Christian, have a long history of relatively peaceful coexistence. 
However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, drought and desert 
encroachment, intensified by climate change, have led to violent clashes 
over land and water. As in the Darfur region of Sudan, where particu-
lar modes of production are also associated with specific demographic 
sectors, disputes between herders and farmers over scarce resources 
have spiraled into religious and ethnic conflicts in which thousands of 
people have been killed.
 Finally, the north-south paradigm glosses over differences within 
the vast northern region. Residents of Nigeria’s northeast suffer some 
of the lowest human development indicators in the world. In 2010, 71.5 
percent of the population lived in absolute poverty, more than 50 per-
cent were malnourished, and 31 percent did not have access to safe water. 
Prospects for the future were bleak: 40 percent of the children did not 
attend school, and 40 percent of the adults were unemployed; youth were 
even more likely to be jobless. In the border region linking Nigeria with 
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, more than 30 million people depended on 
the waters of Lake Chad. However, the lake was drying up—destroying 
the fishing, farming, and herding sectors in the process. With a rapidly 
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growing population and little industry or modern education available, 
deepening poverty resulted in large out-migrations of people in search 
of resources. These factors, together with a profoundly corrupt govern-
ment and abusive security forces that operated with impunity, gener-
ated feelings of hopelessness that provided fertile ground for extremist 
ideologies.
 Although Nigeria is divided by ethnicity, region, and religion, the 
country’s most fundamental cleavages are along class lines. Nigerian 
elites, like elites elsewhere, have more in common with one another 
than with less privileged members of their own ethnic, regional, or reli-
gious group. However, fissures within the ruling oligarchy are deep, and 
internal divisions are often marked by these demographic differences. 
During much of the period of northeastern neglect, Nigeria was ruled 
by northern Muslim elites, many of whom had military backgrounds.18 
A large number of these officials were members of the Fulani ethnic 
group, which in the nineteenth century had established the powerful 
Sokoto Caliphate in the northwest. The caliphate’s Sufi rulers had been 
incorporated into the British system of indirect rule, and their sons 
were among the few northerners who had access to Western education. 
The descendants of these Fulani emirs, chiefs, and judges and their 
Hausa or Fulani wives assumed positions of power after Nigeria’s in-
dependence.19 In contrast, insurgents in the northeast were generally 
members of the small Kanuri ethnic group. Their antecedents had re-
sisted absorption into the Sokoto Caliphate and had been a source of 
slaves for Fulani elites.
Boko Haram and Ansaru
It was in this context that the northeastern insurgency began to take shape. 
The insurgency was led by two groups: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati 
Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teach-
ings and Jihad), commonly known as Boko Haram, and Jama’atu Ansarul 
Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in 
Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru.20 Boko Haram, established 
first, was the more important of the two groups. Ansaru was a splinter 
organization formed by disaffected Boko Haram members.
 Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, capital of the north-
eastern state of Borno, which borders Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Led 
by the cleric Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram was initially a nonviolent 
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Salafist group, influenced by Saudi thinkers, which rejected Sufi teach-
ings and focused on the moral deterioration of Nigerian society under 
Western influence. Viewing Western education as the entrée for an elite 
few into a corrupt system, Boko Haram responded to social problems with 
solutions emerging from fundamentalist religious beliefs and advocated 
building a society based on Islamic law. Although it criticized Western cul-
tural influences, Boko Haram did not oppose Western technology or tech-
nical education. Aspiring to diminish poverty and to promote economic 
development in the marginalized region, the organization financed micro-
credit schemes and provided food and shelter to jobless youths, widows, 
and children. It appealed to uneducated young men whose traditional 
livelihoods had been undermined, and to the educated but unemployed. 
Many without prospects were attracted to the organization’s critique 
of corruption, message of equality, and call for a more meaningful life 
through adherence to fundamental religious values.
 Boko Haram’s earliest adherents were primarily clerics, students, 
and unemployed Western-educated professionals. Most members were 
Kanuri, a function of the organization’s origins in Kanuri-dominated 
Maiduguri. Initially, they attempted to lead lives apart from what they 
perceived as a corrupt and decadent society. Over time, however, their 
objectives changed, prompted by police actions against northeastern 
residents, escalating clashes between Muslims and Christians in other re-
gions, and Western support for corrupt, repressive Nigerian regimes. As 
Boko Haram’s objectives changed, so did its tactics and targets. The or-
ganization turned first to violence against the state, then to terror against 
civilian populations, expanding its focus from what it deemed impious 
Muslims and their illegitimate government to Nigerian Christians and 
foreigners. Eventually, Boko Haram’s sporadic violence developed into a 
full-blown insurgency that aspired to overthrow the Nigerian state and 
establish a new one based on Islamic law.
 Boko Haram’s shift to violence began in 2009, triggered by the police 
shooting of seventeen of the group’s members at a funeral. After militants 
responded by attacking a police station, security forces killed more than 
800 people, including Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf, who was 
executed extrajudicially while in police custody. Under its new leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram retaliated by targeting police, soldiers, 
government officials, and Muslim clerics who collaborated with the Ni-
gerian state. As the insurgency spread through Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and 
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Kano States, the organization turned its focus to other Muslims it deemed 
impure—traditional leaders, teachers, students, and health workers in-
volved in polio vaccination campaigns, who were accused of dispensing 
antifertility drugs to reduce the Muslim population. Attacks on infra-
structure were expanded from government offices and police stations to 
include schools, mosques, and beer halls. Although Boko Haram’s early 
membership was primarily Kanuri, ethnicity was not the organization’s 
focus. Recruited from among alienated urban youth, the first insurgents 
targeted traditional leadership and rural populations, whose pre-Islamic 
practices they deemed impure, irrespective of ethnicity. Many of its vic-
tims were Kanuri.
 Until 2011, Boko Haram concentrated its attention on Nigeria’s 
northern region. That year, however, it moved into the Middle Belt, stag-
ing attacks in the capital city of Abuja, where it claimed responsibility for 
assaults on both the national police and UN headquarters. Boko Haram 
also began to target Christians, attacking several churches on Christmas 
Day. By 2015, Boko Haram militants controlled most of Borno State and 
were responsible for violent assaults across 20 percent of Nigeria, as well 
as in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The toll on the civilian population was 
enormous. Boko Haram incursions killed an estimated 20,000 people 
between 2009 and 2017 and forced another 2.8 million from their homes 
in Nigeria and neighboring countries. Young men and boys were press-
ganged as fighters, and women and girls were forced into sexual slav-
ery as the “wives” of fighters who, because of their poverty, had minimal 
prospects for marriage—and thus, for social adulthood. The insurgency 
disrupted farming, fishing, and trade, resulting in acute food shortages 
and increased malnutrition.
 Like its grievances, Boko Haram’s focus and finances were both local 
and regional. Although the organization made contact with al-Qaeda in 
the early stages of its insurgency, it was not an al-Qaeda affiliate, and it 
did not rely on the international terrorist network for funding or direc-
tion. Boko Haram’s activities were largely supported by bank robberies, ex-
tortion, kidnapping for ransom, and other criminal activities. Al-Qaeda’s 
most significant contributions to the Nigerian organization were training 
and weaponry. According to UN, EU, and Western government sources, 
some Boko Haram members were trained by AQIM, al-Shabaab, and al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2012–13, Boko Haram fighters 
reportedly fought alongside AQIM and MUJWA cadres in northern Mali, 
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and many returned home with weapons from Qaddafi’s stockpiles. Some 
sources claim that foreign jihadis joined Boko Haram, bolstering the ranks 
of external fighters who had been recruited or press-ganged from Camer-
oon, Chad, and Niger.21 In sum, the involvement of international terrorist 
networks was limited. Boko Haram’s focus remained close to home, and its 
targets were the “near enemy” rather than the “far enemy.”
 Although Boko Haram retained its local orientation, its organiza-
tion, philosophy, and tactics transformed over time. In January 2012, fol-
lowing an attack on the northwestern city of Kano that killed as many as 
300 people, the organization split, giving rise to a new group that opposed 
the indiscriminate killing of Muslims. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi 
Biladis-Sudan, or Ansaru, was established by Boko Haram members 
who had left Nigeria after the 2009 crackdown. Many early members 
were Western-educated Hausa-Fulanis from Nigeria’s northwest who 
aspired to renew the glory of the old Sokoto Caliphate and who advo-
cated attacks against Nigerian Christians and the government, rather 
than against local Muslims. The organization’s leader, Khalid al-Barnawi 
(alias, Abu Usamatal Ansari), had been a close associate of Mohammed 
Yusuf. Some early members had trained with al-Shabaab in Somalia and 
AQIM in Mali and Algeria. They tended to possess more skills than the 
Boko Haram cadres who had remained in Nigeria, and they were more 
deeply influenced by al-Qaeda’s global jihadist focus. Ansaru concen-
trated on Nigerian security forces and high-profile figures instead of car-
rying out indiscriminate attacks that would disproportionately affect 
civilian populations. Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru also targeted West-
erners, particularly engineers and construction workers employed in the 
north, whom they kidnapped for ransom.
 Although domestic concerns remained at its core, the conflict in 
northeastern Nigeria was affected by the insurgencies in Somalia, Libya, 
and Mali in three important ways. First, those upheavals strengthened 
al-Qaeda’s presence on the continent, giving the network access to Ni-
gerian militants, who in turn benefited from its sophisticated weapons, 
military training, and broader jihadist perspective. Second, actions taken 
by UN forces in northern Mali, as well as pressure from Nigerian and 
AU troops in Nigeria, compelled Boko Haram to collaborate with An-
saru, which extended the reach of al-Qaeda’s “far enemy” orientation. 
When UN troops in Mali disrupted its AQIM supply line in 2013, Boko 
Haram kidnapped Westerners for ransom for the first time, and by late 
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2016 it was also attacking Western and military targets. (The impact of 
internal and external military intervention is considered in the sections 
that follow.) Third, the Libyan insurgency opened the door to the Islamic 
State, which took a keen interest in northeastern Nigeria. Although Boko 
Haram embraced some aspects of al-Qaeda’s ideology and accepted the 
network’s assistance, it established formal ties with the Islamic State.
 Fundamental disagreements between al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State were mirrored by those between Ansaru and Boko Haram. Ansaru 
adopted the “Guidelines for Jihad,” written by al-Qaeda leader Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, which instructed jihadis to minimize Muslim civilian 
casualties. Al-Qaeda had publicly criticized the Islamic State, which 
had emerged from al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate and its associates, for its 
harsh treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians in Syria, 
charging that such actions were contrary to Islamic teachings. In Feb-
ruary 2014, al-Qaeda severed ties with the Islamic State. Similarly, in 
February 2015, Ansaru condemned Boko Haram’s killing of innocent 
Muslims and the organization’s attacks on mosques and markets, where 
Muslims were likely to be victims.
 As Ansaru confirmed its loyalty to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram showed 
increasing preference for the Islamic State. Boko Haram declared its sup-
port for the Islamic State leader in 2014 and officially pledged allegiance 
in March 2015. Although the Nigerian organization maintained its local 
focus, its new connections gave it greater access to financial, material, 
and technical support. The Islamic State linkage also raised Boko Haram’s 
global profile, allowing it to attract a growing number of foreign fighters. 
In April 2015, the Islamic State began to refer to Boko Haram as the Islamic 
State in West Africa—its first province in sub-Saharan Africa.22
The Nigerian Government Response
The Nigerian government responded to the northeastern insurgency 
with a heavy-handed crackdown that terrorized the civilian population. 
Declaring a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, 
the government of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010–15) granted 
the military extraordinary powers to arrest suspects and seize prop-
erty. Security forces engaged in a scorched earth campaign that burned 
thousands of homes and killed as many as 8,000 civilians between 2009 
and 2015. More than 1,000 people were executed extrajudicially, and an 
estimated 7,000 died in military custody—beaten, starved, suffocated, 
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tortured, or shot to death. During the same period, tens of thousands of 
civilians were arbitrarily arrested, and countless others “disappeared” 
or were held in detention incommunicado. Government-backed vigi-
lantes—the so-called Civilian Joint Task Force—which was composed 
primarily of youths armed with knives, machetes, and bows and ar-
rows, rounded up and abused men whom they accused of being Boko 
Haram members and turned them over to the Nigerian security forces. 
Within the civilian population, these tactics generated deep-seated fear 
of the Nigerian military and their associates and, in many cases, in-
creased support for Boko Haram. As the violence intensified, fissures 
emerged in the Boko Haram organization. Moderates, who wished to 
negotiate a peace agreement, proved easy targets for the government, 
and most were removed through death or detention. In consequence, 
the hardline faction under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau consol-
idated its power.
 Although the Nigerian military showed few qualms about attacking 
civilians, it was reluctant to confront Boko Haram. Poorly equipped sol-
diers, whose pay was routinely stolen by higher-ups, had little incentive 
to fight. When challenged by Boko Haram, Nigerian soldiers often with-
drew, leaving weapons and equipment in their wake. As a result, by May 
2014 Boko Haram controlled much of the country’s northeast. Saddled 
with a dysfunctional army weakened by deep-seated corruption, the Ni-
gerian government hired some 300 South African private military con-
tractors in 2014–15 to train an elite Nigerian strike force to counter the 
threat. Most of the contractors were former South African Defence Force 
members, some of whom had fought with Koevoet, an apartheid-era 
counterinsurgency unit charged with widespread human rights abuses 
in Namibia and southern Angola.23
 Pledging to defeat Boko Haram, General Muhammadu Buhari, a 
member of the Hausa-Fulani elite in Nigeria’s northwest and a favor-
ite of the Nigerian prodemocracy movement, was elected president in 
March 2015.24 Buhari fired the high-level military officials who coordi-
nated the government’s counterinsurgency strategy and who had been 
widely criticized for human rights abuses, incompetence, and corrup-
tion. He implemented rapid improvements in logistics, equipment, 
and air support and in the timely payment of soldiers’ wages. He insti-
gated a far-reaching anticorruption investigation aimed at the public, 
private, and military sectors and promised to hold accountable those 
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responsible for human rights violations. Finally, he appealed to the 
international community for assistance. Buhari made good on some 
of these promises, indicting more than 300 people and businesses for 
theft and misappropriation of military funds. However, in 2017, human 
rights organizations found that ongoing corruption in the military 
continued to obstruct successful counterinsurgency measures and that 




A powerful anglophone country in a largely francophone region domi-
nated by French interests, Nigeria was of special concern to the United 
States. The United States was the country’s largest foreign investor, with 
significant investments in Nigeria’s petroleum, mining, and wholesale 
trading sectors. Nigeria, in turn, was an important supplier of crude oil 
to the United States, as well as its primary counterterrorism partner in 
northwest Africa, where it played a central role in the TSCTP.
 Despite their close collaboration and common interests, Nigeria 
and the United States experienced periodic strains in their relationship. 
The Abuja government resented the criticisms leveled by US officials, 
particularly during the Obama administration. Terence McCulley, the 
US ambassador to Nigeria from 2010 to 2013, stated publicly that mil-
itary actions against Boko Haram were insufficient to root out violent 
extremism; the Nigerian government must also address endemic cor-
ruption, political repression, human rights abuses, poverty, and the gen-
eral lack of accountability. Secretary of State John Kerry subsequently 
echoed these concerns. The Leahy provision in the US Foreign Assis-
tance Act was another source of tension. Although the United States 
provided Nigeria with millions of dollars annually in military aid, that 
support came with restrictions. The Leahy language, which prohibits US 
assistance to foreign military or police units that have engaged in gross 
human rights violations without penalty, proved to be a significant ob-
stacle to US support for Nigerian military operations.25 The Nigerian 
military had a long history of corruption. Commanders routinely stole 
soldiers’ pay and siphoned off funds intended for critical ammunition 
and equipment. The result was low morale among the rank and file, 
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refusal to engage with the enemy, and widespread desertion. Because 
human rights abuses were so common, US personnel were hard pressed 
to find Nigerian military units with which they could work, and evi-
dence that Boko Haram had infiltrated the Nigerian intelligence and 
security services made them reluctant to share information with their 
Nigerian counterparts.
 Anxious to halt the spread of al-Qaeda and Islamic State influence 
in West Africa, the United States sought alternative ways to assist the Ni-
gerian military. The establishment of the Nigerian Army Special Opera-
tions Command (NASOC) in January 2014 opened the way to renewed 
US-Nigerian military cooperation. Because NASOC included newly 
organized military units that had no record of human rights abuses, 
US personnel were permitted to train them. As a result, during 2014, 
more than 200 US Special Operations troops prepared Nigerian forces 
to challenge Boko Haram in the north and other militants in the Niger 
Delta. Although US counterterrorism instruction stressed the need to 
respect human rights, protect civilians, address underlying grievances, 
and hold security forces accountable, US impact in these areas remained 
weak.
 The intensification of US support in 2014 was motivated in part by 
Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in 
April. Although Boko Haram militants had killed nearly 20,000 civilians 
and abducted thousands of boys, girls, and women since 2009, it was 
the seizure of the schoolgirls that caused an international outcry. Pushed 
by media and popular attention, the United States sent eighty Special 
Operations Forces troops and dozens of experts from the State Depart-
ment, Pentagon, and FBI to assist in finding and aiding the victims. De-
ploying reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned surveillance drones, US 
military personnel flew hundreds of missions over 37,000 square miles 
in the heavily forested northeast. However, they found little that might 
help locate the girls, and the Nigerian military failed to act on the scant 
information provided.
 Frustrated by the corruption and incompetence of the Nigerian 
security forces, US trainers and specialists increasingly focused on the 
armed forces of neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, which they 
hoped would boost Washington’s efforts in Nigeria. In March 2015, US 
instructors in Chad were joined by experts from other Western countries 
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and 1,200 African troops for a three-week counterterrorism training ex-
ercise. Boko Haram’s declaration of allegiance to the leader of the Islamic 
State coincided with the conclusion of that event.
 The election of General Buhari as Nigeria’s new president in March 
2015 initially did little to assuage tensions between Washington and 
Abuja. Like his predecessor, President Buhari publicly dismissed claims 
of human rights abuses by the Nigerian military and charged that Wash-
ington’s refusal to provide his country with strategic weapons had “aided 
and abetted” the terrorists.26 He nonetheless removed a number of high-
level military officials, including the heads of the army, navy, and air 
force, and initiated anticorruption and security sector reforms. By 2016 
the United States was again working closely with the Nigerian military, 
despite the ongoing concerns of human rights organizations and some 
members of Congress. The Trump administration, which took office in 
January 2017, made clear that the common goal of fighting terrorism 
would take precedence over other concerns.27
Subregional Response
The conflict in Nigeria, like those in other subregions, had spillover effects 
in neighboring countries that threatened to destabilize a wide geographic 
area. Anxious to contain the insurgency before it could undermine their 
own societies, Nigeria’s neighbors were motivated by both the response 
to instability and war on terror paradigms. However, dealing with Nige-
ria required finesse. As a regional powerhouse possessing Africa’s largest 
economy and one of its strongest militaries, Nigeria was among the most 
important contributors to UN, AU, and ECOWAS peacekeeping mis-
sions in Africa. It had spearheaded military and diplomatic efforts to end 
conflicts far beyond the West African subregion and was widely regarded 
as a continental leader. Given Nigeria’s stature and influence, neither the 
AU nor ECOWAS was willing to exert pressure on Abuja to address local 
grievances, political corruption, and security force abuses. Unwilling to 
admit its inability to resolve its own problems, the Jonathan government 
had resisted the notion of a UN intervention force and only reluctantly 
engaged its neighbors in an alternative counterinsurgency scenario.
 Under intense international scrutiny following the Chibok kidnap-
pings, President Jonathan asked France to organize a meeting to focus on 
subregional security concerns. The May 2014 gathering included Nigeria 
and four neighboring francophone states: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and 
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Niger. Diplomats from the United States, France, the UK, and various 
EU member states were also present. At the May meeting, Nigeria and its 
neighbors agreed to share and coordinate intelligence, to engage in joint 
border surveillance, and to increase military cooperation to counter the 
growing threat to subregional stability. At a follow-up meeting in Octo-
ber, the five West and Central African states agreed to establish a mul-
tinational military force to combat Boko Haram that would be modeled 
on the AU force fighting the al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. Repre-
sentatives from the UN, AU, and the five neighboring countries then met 
in February 2015 to iron out the details, again with the participation of 
the major Western powers. In March, the AU approved the Multinational 
Joint Task Force (MNJTF), slated to include as many as 10,000 troops 
from the five West African countries, and asked the UN to endorse and 
finance the endeavor. A Security Council statement in July commended 
the efforts of the AU, ECOWAS, and ECCAS to develop a comprehensive 
strategy, but it did not provide the political and financial commitment 
the AU had sought. Other extracontinental entities provided some as-
sistance. The EU and the United States each pledged approximately $45 
million. Washington also announced that it would establish a new drone 
base in Cameroon and send 300 US troops to provide intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance assistance, while France offered military 
training and equipment.
 Meanwhile, joint task force members began their offensive. In Janu-
ary and February 2015, some 5,000 Chadian troops forced Boko Haram 
militants from a number of northeastern Nigerian towns while Chadian 
planes bombed insurgent outposts along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. 
Boko Haram launched retaliatory attacks into Cameroon, Chad, and 
Niger, targeting villagers near the frontier and striking into the heart of 
Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. By October, members of the African coalition 
had assigned 8,700 troops to the multinational task force and were using 
their national armies to fight Boko Haram within their own borders.
 Given the historical rivalry between Nigeria and France and its 
protégés for subregional domination, the establishment of the multina-
tional coalition was both notable and problematic. Nigeria and Cam-
eroon harbored deeply rooted and enduring tensions. A decades-long 
border dispute over the oil-rich Bakassi region had been resolved in 
favor of Cameroon in 2002, but Nigeria only conceded the territory in 
2012. Like the anglophone powerhouse, all four francophone countries 
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were marked by poverty, corruption, and security forces that had en-
gaged in human rights abuses. US-trained troops in Niger had been 
accused of committing atrocities against Tuareg civilians in 2007–8. 
Chadian troops who participated in an AU peacekeeping mission in the 
Central African Republic had been implicated in attacks on civilians in 
2013–14, and Chadian, Cameroonian, and French soldiers in the Central 
African Republic had been accused of sexually abusing children during 
the same conflict. Finally, Nigeria chafed at the prospect of being rescued 
by its poor francophone neighbors and the increased French influence 
that would likely ensue.
 Despite the internal tensions, the African regional task force proved 
more effective than the Nigerian armed forces, and by early 2016 it had 
regained much of the territory once held by the insurgents. However, 
Boko Haram insurrectionists, like those in Somalia and Mali, were not 
Photo 11.5. Nigerien soldiers fighting Boko Haram in Diffa, Niger, near the border 
with Borno State, Nigeria, March 2015. Photo by Voice of America.
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defeated. No longer in control of vast expanses of territory, they shifted 
their tactics, increasing the number of high-visibility suicide bombings 
in crowded marketplaces, mosques, and unprotected villages. Military 
pressure in Nigeria forced militants across international borders, and 
they established new operational bases in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. 
By 2017, some 8.5 million people in the Lake Chad basin suffered from 
extreme food insecurity as a result of both climate change and the re-
gional conflict. Experts continued to warn that the threat could not 
be suppressed by sheer military might, but instead required increased 
support for social, economic, and infrastructural development, sub-
stantive participation by local citizens, responsive and accountable 
government, and the establishment of trust between local communities 
and the state.
 The Nigerian government and its external backers responded to 
the insurgency with enormous military force, but they did little to 
begin the fundamental political, economic, and social transformation 
necessary for a lasting peace. Increased counterterrorism spending was 
a boon to the corrupt Nigerian military bureaucracy, which siphoned 
off billions of dollars to finance personal luxury and political patron-
age. Illegal financial flows from Nigeria tripled between 2001 and 2017. 
With much to gain from a war economy, Nigeria’s military elite had 
little incentive to seek political, economic, and social transformation or 
to work for an enduring peace. Foreign military support strengthened 
this corrupt system.
Conclusion
Regime change in Libya, fomented by internal rebellion and foreign in-
tervention, had ramifications that penetrated into the Western Sahel. In 
Mali and Nigeria, an influx of weapons, fighters, funding, and training 
fueled existing grievances and incipient insurgencies. Foreign powers 
and entities also intervened in these countries, justifying their actions 
according to the response to instability/responsibility to protect and war 
on terror paradigms.
 In Mali, weapons and fighters unleashed by Qaddafi’s fall bolstered a 
simmering separatist insurgency and gave birth to a jihadi one. These in-
surrections in turn sparked an internal coup and external military inter-
vention. The involvement of foreign powers and entities completed the 
324  |  Mali and Nigeria
circle by attracting fighters from the international al-Qaeda network. In 
northeastern Nigeria, local grievances emerging from regional inequali- 
ties and economic marginalization gave rise to a religious movement 
that proposed to remedy these ills through a return to the fundamen-
tals of Islam. A ruthless government crackdown on the movement and 
the surrounding population provoked an insurgency that attracted Ni-
gerian fighters who had trained with AQIM in Mali and returned home 
with Libyan weapons. Instability in northeastern Nigeria penetrated 
into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and stimulated intervention by for-
eign powers and multinational organizations, as well as by jihadis linked 
to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In both Mali and Nigeria, insurgents 
scattered by foreign militaries regrouped in new areas and transformed 
their tactics. They escalated attacks on soft targets, which placed civilians 
at even greater risk.
 In both cases, foreign military intervention brought short-term gains 
but failed to produce long-term solutions that would resolve underlying 
grievances. Although feared for their brutal tactics, insurgents in both 
countries generated some support by providing services and a means to 
redress local grievances, however limited. Yet neither Bamako nor Abuja 
embarked on serious efforts to reestablish governmental and social ser-
vices in the areas from which the insurgents had been expelled. Instead, 
they continued to concentrate power and resources in the urban centers 
inhabited by the majority of voters and political elites. In 2017, Mali ac-
tually intensified its military-heavy, law-and-order focus. Together with 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Mali helped institute a new 
G5 Sahel Joint Force with a broader mandate and geographic reach than 
MINUSMA or MNJTF. Comprising as many as 5,000 military, police, 
and civilian personnel, the multinational force was established to fight 
terrorism, organized crime, and illegal migration and to help to restore 
state authority across the Sahel. The AU approved the plan, the EU of-
fered financial support, and France convinced the UN Security Council 
to authorize and fund the enterprise.
 At the end of 2017, prospects for the success of the G5 Sahel Joint 
Force were dim. The Trump administration, which hoped to reduce 
Washington’s UN peacekeeping contributions, succeeded in weakening 
the force’s mandate and blocked its funding from the UN peacekeep-
ing budget, although it promised some bilateral US support. If sufficient 
funding is found, the new entity will still face many of the obstacles that 
Military Intervention and Unforeseen Consequences (2009–17)  |  325
confronted its predecessors. Local populations, historically neglected by 
corrupt governments and abused by police, customs officials, and secu-
rity forces, will have little reason to support another externally driven 
law-and-order initiative that will likely expose them to retaliation and 
threaten the underground economy that enables them to survive.
 In West Africa, both internal and external forces have promoted 
military responses to political, economic, and social problems. In the 
cases of Mali and Nigeria, multinational bodies, neighboring states, and 
France played significant roles in promoting the military-driven agen-
das. In those instances, the United States had a relatively minor im-
pact. However, in other African conflicts, the influence of Washington’s 
pro-military orientation was strong and its imprint on the war on terror 
paradigm especially critical. The continuities and changes in US Africa 
policy after the Cold War and their increasing militarization are the sub-
ject of chapter 12.
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US Africa Policy after the Cold War  
(1991–2017)
the eight preceding chapters present cases of foreign intervention 
in Africa that were justified by the two dominant post–Cold War para-
digms: response to instability/responsibility to protect and the war on 
terror. The United States was a major player in many of these cases, but it 
was not the only one. France and the United Kingdom sent troops to the 
continent through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and global, 
regional, and subregional organizations sponsored multinational inter-
vention and peacekeeping forces. African countries also intervened in 
their neighbors’ affairs. Often, the United States was not the most sig-
nificant external actor. Yet as the last remaining superpower, it played 
an outsized role. Although Africa was relatively marginal to US interests 
during this period—subordinate to US concerns in Europe, East Asia, 
and the Middle East—Washington’s decision to intervene, its refusal to 
engage, or even a delay in its response often shaped the end result. As a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council and primary funder of 
UN operations, the United States wielded enormous power and was not 
hesitant to use it to advance its interests. For this reason, US Africa policy 
merits a chapter of its own and provides a vantage point from which to 
assess the policies and actions of other major actors.
 Although the United States exerted undue influence, it could not 
always impose outcomes that were optimal for its national interests. De-
spite its political, economic, and military clout, Washington relied on 
allies to take the lead in countries that were peripheral to US concerns. 
Allies and adversaries at all levels set limits. Sometimes the interests of 
less powerful actors held sway and precluded Washington’s preferred re-
sults. When the United States did intervene, it justified its involvement 
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according to the dominant paradigms—as a response to instability and 
the responsibility to protect civilian lives, or as a component of the war 
on terror. After the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the war 
on terror was referenced more frequently, and the US counterterrorism 
agenda assumed greater prominence in US Africa policy. Washington 
provided money, training, hardware, and equipment to dozens of stra-
tegically located countries that were considered vulnerable to terrorist 
activity; it also provided air support in conventional military actions and 
engaged in a growing number of covert military operations. The increas-
ing securitization of US Africa policy after September 2001 shifted at-
tention and resources away from some countries and toward others, and 
privileged military security over broader forms of human security that 
focused on poverty, disease, climate change, and governance.
Setting the Stage:  
From the War on Communism to the War on Terror
To understand US Africa policy after the Cold War, one must place it in 
historical context. US policies toward the continent underwent several 
transformations during the periods of decolonization, the Cold War, and 
their aftermath. Although there were distinctions between the policies 
of different presidential administrations, continuities were pronounced. 
During the Cold War, Washington’s chief concern was combatting com-
munism. US policymakers tended to view conflicts in incipient African 
nations through an East-West lens. As a result, they commonly ignored 
local circumstances, undermined radical nationalist movements and 
states, and backed pro-Western governments that were repressive and 
undemocratic. When the Cold War ended, the United States severed ties 
to many of its erstwhile allies. Once they were no longer useful as regional 
policemen, their human rights abuses and corrupt practices increasingly 
appeared as impediments to US interests. Bilateral US aid to African coun-
tries declined in the early 1990s, even as political and economic pressures 
peaked, and dictatorships once propped up were allowed to fall. Former 
client states like Somalia, Zaire, and Liberia descended into chaos. Where 
civil society institutions and prodemocracy movements were weak, war-
lords and insurgents moved into the power vacuums.
 As regional instability grew in the mid-1990s, Washington responded 
with renewed attention to Africa. Focusing on the economic distress 
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that had provoked much of the political crisis, Presidents Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush promoted free market reforms, trade in lieu of aid, 
and debt relief for the poorest African countries. Both administrations 
addressed the role of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa’s social and 
economic decline and allocated increased funding to health initiatives. 
Before the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the war on terror 
played a marginal role in US Africa policy. The US military intervention 
in Somalia, for instance, was triggered by the threat of regional instability 
and a growing concern with the protection of civilian lives. Although the 
United States provided significant financial and material support to UN 
peacekeeping operations during the 1990s, after the Somalia debacle it 
was reluctant to participate in multinational ventures that might entail 
American boots on the ground, and it actively blocked UN intervention 
to stop the Rwanda genocide.
 After 9/11, US Africa policy was again reevaluated, with three import-
ant consequences. First, Washington paid closer attention to economic 
deprivation and political chaos. Impoverished nations with weak state 
apparatuses were viewed as potential breeding grounds for political 
extremism—which now took the form of terrorism rather than commu-
nism. As a result, Washington sought to bolster economies, strengthen 
military alliances, provide financial assistance and training, and open 
military bases in dozens of African countries. Second, the Pentagon as-
sumed responsibility for a number of revamped humanitarian and devel-
opment assistance programs that previously were under civilian authority, 
and the human security/human rights agenda of USAID was eclipsed by 
the counterterrorism program of the Defense Department and the CIA. 
The military structures established in response to terrorism were often ill 
suited to the peacekeeping and peace-building tasks they were expected 
to accomplish. Third, target countries were chosen according to new cri-
teria. As war and instability engulfed the Middle East, the United States’ 
access to its customary sources of foreign oil was threatened and the ter-
rorist menace assumed a growing importance on the US foreign policy 
agenda. US Africa policy focused increasingly on countries that were ei-
ther rich in oil and natural gas or strategic to the war on terror or both.
 After September 2001, the George W. Bush administration’s war on 
terror became the new anticommunism.1 Just as domestic insurgencies 
arising from local grievances were mistaken for communist aggression 
during the Cold War, the vague rubric of international terrorism was 
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used to explain a range of civil disturbances in the early twenty-first cen-
tury. African dictators who had appealed to the West by playing up the 
communist menace were replaced by a new generation of strongmen 
who won support by cooperating in the fight against terrorism. Aided by 
US military and economic largess, they cracked down on domestic dis-
sent. By the end of the Barack Obama administration, the United States 
was focused on four organizations in Africa that were deemed a threat 
both to that continent and to Europe: al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb, the Islamic State provinces in Libya, and Boko 
Haram in Nigeria.
 Concerns about terrorism converged with US strategic and economic 
concerns. The protection and expansion of US economic interests were 
critical during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, although 
the relative weight of these elements varied. While the war on terror para-
digm emerged during the Clinton administration, it is largely identified 
with the George W. Bush presidency, and it played a significant role in 
the Africa policies of Barack Obama. During all three administrations, 
perceived national interests were key factors in determining where the 
United States chose to intervene or not to intervene, and the responsibil-
ity to protect paradigm increasingly served as a rationale for intervention 
when other interests were also at stake. Because Africa was in most cases 
deemed tangential to US concerns, all three presidents generally pre-
ferred that other countries (the former colonial powers) or multilateral 
entities (the UN, EU, AU, or subregional organizations) assume the lead 
in resolving African crises. Only when these actors failed did the United 
States take military action, and then only if the crises threatened US in-
terests. The varying emphases of US Africa policy during three post–
Cold War presidential administrations, those of Clinton (1993–2001), 
Bush (2001–9), and Obama (2009–17), are assessed below, while the first 
year of the Trump administration (2017–) is surveyed in chapter 13. The 
present chapter concludes with an examination of the US war on terror 
in Africa after 9/11.
The Clinton Administration (1993–2001)
President Bill Clinton took office one year after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. During his administration, US Africa policy was characterized 
by initial disengagement, followed by renewed interest and increased 
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involvement. American triumphalism, rooted in the belief that the 
United States had won the Cold War, diminished Washington’s concern 
for Africa as a strategic asset.2 Conflicts in what once were Cold War 
battlegrounds fell from Washington’s radar screen, even as abandoned 
strongmen, disintegrating patronage networks, and leftover weapons 
fueled new contests for wealth and power. Humiliated by the debacle 
in Somalia and no longer challenged by Soviet competition, the United 
States had little desire to engage and began instead to promote the notion 
of “African solutions for African problems.”3 During his first term, 
President Clinton rejected the responsibility to protect paradigm that 
had underpinned President George H. W. Bush’s intervention in So-
malia, and the Clinton administration thwarted effective UN action to 
stop the genocide in Rwanda.4 A presidential directive in May 1994, one 
month after the genocide began, set limits on US participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. The United States would not commit troops 
unless the president determined that the mission promoted US interests 
and that there was an imminent threat to international peace and secu-
rity. The United States would reduce its contributions to peacekeeping 
costs from more than 30 percent to 25 percent, requiring other nations 
and state-based multilateral organizations to shoulder a greater share of 
the burden and African countries to assume greater responsibility for 
resolving what were deemed African problems. In most cases, US troops 
would serve only under US commanders.
 The Clinton administration shied away from direct military en-
gagement in Africa until August 1998, when it ordered a cruise missile 
attack against alleged al-Qaeda targets in Sudan—using the emergent 
war on terror paradigm as justification. In the interim, President Clinton 
launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which stressed 
African responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent, with the United 
States and its Western allies in a supporting role. African partners that 
were judged to be committed to democratic governance and civilian rule 
were offered training and equipment that would enhance their capacities 
to respond to instability or humanitarian crises and to engage in multilat-
eral peacekeeping operations. In this way, African rather than US troops 
would assume the risks and provide the manpower that served both Af-
rican and US interests. The Clinton program was later tarnished by evi-
dence that partner governments were using US training and equipment 
to quash internal dissent and interfere in neighboring countries.
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 Simultaneous with the pullback from military involvement, the 
Clinton administration and Congress scaled back diplomatic engage-
ment and pared down economic aid. The staff of the State Department’s 
Africa Bureau was significantly reduced, and nine USAID missions in 
Africa were shut down. US economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa declined 
by 27 percent from 1992 to 1996.
 During his second term in office, President Clinton embarked on a 
strategy of low-profile reengagement with Africa. Economic and political 
crises on the continent had led to widespread instability that threatened 
international peace and security, and Clinton was compelled to respond. 
Stymied by a Republican-dominated Congress that opposed his funding 
initiatives, the president emphasized trade over aid. The revamped Af-
rica policy was launched with a presidential tour of six African nations 
in early 1998, where Clinton promoted the notion of mutually beneficial 
partnerships based on trade and investment that would replace the aid 
and dependency of the past. To encourage African partners to engage in 
significant economic reforms, the Clinton administration promoted debt 
relief for countries that adopted IMF/World Bank structural adjustment 
programs.
 The Clinton administration also embraced a new generation of Af-
rican leaders who came to power as the Cold War waned. Most were 
military men who had led successful insurgencies against corrupt and 
repressive regimes.5 The new leaders were expected to usher in a new era 
of efficient and responsible government and free market economics. Al-
though the Clinton administration proclaimed its support for the expan-
sion of democracy, promoting multiparty elections, good governance, 
and strong civil society institutions, the new leaders adopted Western 
norms only selectively. Reminiscent of their Cold War predecessors, they 
imposed the neoliberal economic reforms mandated by international fi-
nancial institutions and Washington, but eschewed multiparty democ-
racy and repressed the political opposition. Valuing stability more than 
democratization, the Clinton administration, like previous administra-
tions, turned a blind eye to its allies’ abuses.
 The cornerstone of the Clinton administration’s new Africa policy 
and the culmination of its market-oriented approach was the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 (AGOA), a bipartisan congressional 
initiative that expanded trade between the United States and sub-Saharan 
Africa.6 Designed to enhance US access to African commodities and to 
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create new markets for US goods, AGOA was the product of a half decade 
of negotiations between the Clinton administration, Congress, and US 
corporate interests. AGOA’s primary beneficiaries were Americans. While 
many African political leaders supported the bill, African civil society 
organizations, including trade unions and human rights groups, had no 
voice in shaping it, and many opposed its central features.7
 One of several free trade laws and agreements enacted during the 
Clinton administration, AGOA expanded the access of sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries to US markets if they met certain eligibility requirements. 
Like the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs that preceded 
them, many of these stipulations undermined African sovereignty. Con-
ditions imposed on AGOA partners included adherence to the neolib-
eral principles of the Washington Consensus that had crippled African 
societies in the 1980s. To qualify for AGOA trade preferences, African 
countries were required to demonstrate their embrace of market-based 
economies that would protect private property and limit government 
involvement (no price controls, subsidies, or state ownership). They 
also had to enact measures to facilitate US trade and investment: this 
meant no tariffs on US goods, even if such imports undermined local 
industries or promoted unemployment, and no preference to locally 
owned businesses over US corporations. Partner governments could not 
take actions counter to US national security or foreign policy interests. 
They could not support acts of international terrorism—as defined by 
the United States—and they were obliged to cooperate in international 
efforts to eliminate terrorist activities. Beyond protecting US political 
and economic interests, eligible governments were expected to adhere 
to Western norms concerning good governance and civil and human 
rights. They were required to promote the rule of law, political pluralism, 
civil liberties, and worker protection, and to reduce poverty, corruption, 
and bribery; finally, they could not engage in gross human rights viola-
tions.8 The United States was empowered to determine each year whether 
countries met the requirements, and the US president could eliminate 
countries from the list of beneficiaries without the possibility of appeal.9 
This provision, in particular, deterred potential investors from backing 
African enterprises.
 Although US trade with sub-Saharan Africa increased significantly 
after AGOA’s passage—primarily after President Clinton left office—the 
law did not help African countries diversify their economies, promote 
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good governance, or eliminate corruption. In fact, AGOA undermined 
African potential for sustainable economic development and weakened 
African political institutions. In the economic sphere, extractive enter-
prises remained dominant, and oil and strategic minerals continued to 
be the mainstay of African exports to the United States. African agricul-
tural commodities were disadvantaged by the law’s provisions that barred 
sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and beef from the duty-free list—all products for 
which African countries might have a competitive advantage.10 In con-
sequence, AGOA benefits accrued primarily to US businesses and to a 
small number of African elites in a limited number of countries. In the 
political sphere, the law strengthened governments that were beholden 
to foreign interests and eroded the social contract between the govern-
ment and the governed. Regimes in resource-rich countries often ranked 
among the lowest in terms of government accountability.11 Although 
some countries were suspended from AGOA as a result of human rights 
violations, undemocratic political transitions, or concerns about terror-
ism, many countries flouted the good governance, economic transpar-
ency, and human rights provisions and remained AGOA beneficiaries. 
Countries that were rich in oil and strategic minerals were most likely to 
receive special treatment.
The George W. Bush Administration (2001–9)
President George W. Bush continued and elaborated on many aspects of 
Clinton’s Africa policy. In the economic realm, he, too, emphasized trade 
and market-oriented economic growth according to neoliberal norms 
prescribed by the US government. Although the Clinton administration 
laid the groundwork for AGOA, its impact was more notable during the 
Bush administration, when Congress extended its lifespan and strength-
ened its provisions. The president and his congressional allies also ex-
panded economic assistance programs, arguing that poverty was a recipe 
for instability.
 Bush initiatives led Congress to allocate more than $5 billion annu-
ally to humanitarian aid in Africa, primarily to combat HIV/AIDS and 
malaria—a sum that exceeded any previous appropriation. The Presi-
dent’s Malaria Initiative was credited with saving the lives of nearly 2 mil-
lion African children between 2006 and 2014. The President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) represented the largest commitment by 
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any country to combat a single disease beyond its borders. Although 
HIV/AIDS activists generally agreed that PEPFAR played a central 
role in stemming the AIDS tide in Africa and elsewhere, many charged 
that pressure from the Christian right and other conservative interest 
groups—which resulted in the favoring of premarital abstinence and fi-
delity programs, severe limitations on condom distribution and services 
for sex workers, and a prohibition on needle exchanges—imposed for-
eign values and greatly reduced the program’s effectiveness. Moreover, 
PEPFAR disproportionately benefited large US pharmaceutical manu- 
facturers and pushed up costs in developing countries by imposing a 
near-total ban on the use of generic drugs. Finally, the Bush admin-
istration’s unilateral effort under US control diverted significant po-
tential support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, a collaborative multinational endeavor promoted by a range 
of governments, NGOs, private businesses, civil society organizations, 
and affected communities.
 To further the economic development and good governance agenda, 
the Bush administration established the Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration (MCC), a congressionally funded government entity that was in-
dependent of the State and Defense Departments and of USAID. The 
MCC rewarded countries that adopted free market reforms, anticorrup-
tion and good governance practices, and poverty reduction programs, 
and that encouraged political participation by civil society organizations. 
Recipient countries, including a number from Africa, were selected by a 
board of directors composed of US government and corporate officials 
according to criteria that were intended to separate the process from US 
strategic and economic interests.12 In 2006, only eleven of thirty-seven 
African countries on the AGOA-eligible list were also deemed worthy 
of MCC funding. However, measures taken to depoliticize foreign aid 
were weak, and they were undermined by other MCC principles. The 
free market reforms at the core of the MCC program were mandatory—
and these formulations for economic restructuring were central to the 
US global mission.
 In the political and military arenas, the Bush administration re-
newed US engagement where Clinton had been reluctant. The response 
to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm was still influential and 
guided US diplomatic initiatives in Sudan as well as US support for mili-
tary operations against Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
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Uganda. However, the decision to intervene or not intervene remained 
linked to America’s perceived national interests—particularly in the 
realm of economics and security. Conflict mediation and humanitar-
ian intervention were often undertaken with an eye to protecting or 
expanding US access to strategic resources or strengthening US coun-
terterrorism partners. The heightened prominence of the war on terror 
paradigm became evident over the course of the eight-year Bush presi-
dency, although Africa continued to rank low on the list of US foreign 
policy priorities. During the Bush years, the United States participated in 
several multilateral ventures on the continent. However, those in charge 
preferred to operate independently and refused to subordinate US inter-
ests, policies, and troops to other authorities.
 Although the Bush administration’s foreign policy maintained some 
continuities with that of its predecessor, it also manifested fundamental 
differences. The Bush worldview was deeply influenced by neoconserva-
tive thinkers who had emerged in the 1960s to challenge the domestic and 
foreign policy agendas of the New Left, a political movement that pro-
moted government-run social programs at home and opposed military 
adventurism abroad. Neoconservatives held prominent positions in the 
Bush State and Defense Departments, on the National Security Council, 
and in the Washington think tank world—most notably in the Project for 
the New American Century (PNAC). A number of high-ranking admin-
istration officials had signed PNAC’s 1997 statement of principles, which 
proclaimed that the United States had won the Cold War and thus had 
earned the right “to shape a new century favorable to American princi-
ples and interests.” The statement contended that to accomplish its mis-
sion, the United States needed a strong military that it was ready to use, 
a bold foreign policy that promoted American ideals, and leaders who 
embraced America’s “global responsibilities.” If the United States failed in 
its duty, it would “invite challenges to [its] fundamental interests.” Hence, 
it must take preemptive action to “shape circumstances before crises 
emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire.”13 PNAC’s views 
were reflected in the Bush administration’s 2002 national security strat-
egy, which asserted that the global strength and influence of the United 
States were without equal and brought with them “unparalleled responsi-
bilities, obligations, and opportunity” to promote freedom worldwide.14
 The Bush doctrine of preemptive war, outlined in the 2002 national 
security strategy, was also a product of the neoconservative vision. 
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Formulated after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the doctrine jus-
tified unilateral military operations to protect American security and 
embraced the strategy of preemptive strikes to ward off future threats. 
The doctrine was to be applied in countries that harbored or assisted 
organizations deemed by the US State Department to be foreign terror-
ist organizations that threatened American security—whether or not the 
host country was at war with the United States.15 Although US military 
actions against terrorist targets predated the Bush administration, it was 
President George W. Bush who coined the phrase “war on terror” shortly 
after 9/11.16 The new orientation would have serious implications for US 
Africa policy during the Bush and Obama administrations.
 The war on terror transformed a number of longstanding American 
practices, some of which impinged on US Africa policy. Among the first 
casualties was a decades-old ban on foreign political assassinations. In 
1976, the US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, known as the Church Committee, 
published an in-depth investigation of US involvement in the assassi-
nations of foreign leaders.17 The previous year, neoconservative stalwart 
Dick Cheney, then deputy chief of staff to President Gerald Ford, had 
led the executive branch campaign to stymie the congressional inquiry 
into the CIA’s targeted killings.18 In response to the public outcry that 
followed the Church Committee’s revelations, President Ford issued an 
executive order in 1976 that forbade US government participation in po-
litical assassinations abroad. For more than twenty-five years, this direc-
tive remained US policy—at least officially. The protocol began to erode 
shortly after 9/11, when Congress granted President Bush the power to 
authorize the use of military force “against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons.”19 These war powers laid the groundwork for a 
subsequent presidential finding that authorized the CIA to capture or kill 
al-Qaeda militants worldwide, whether or not they had been involved in 
the September attacks.
 The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force had ripple effects 
in Africa. In 2004, President Bush empowered the US Special Opera-
tions Command to conduct covert military operations to capture or kill 
suspected members of the al-Qaeda network anywhere in the world—
even in countries that were not at war with the United States and without 
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those countries’ consent. The Pentagon subsequently dispatched Special 
Operations troops to African and Asian nations to collect intelligence 
and to capture or kill alleged terrorists—a practice that intensified under 
the Obama administration.
 The military components of US Africa policy were strengthened 
under the Bush administration. Clinton’s ACRI was reformulated as 
the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program 
(ACOTA). The revamped initiative emphasized instruction for peace en-
forcement as well as peacekeeping and replaced the direct training of for-
eign troops with projects that focused on training the trainer; US military 
personnel imparted skills to African partners, who then trained their 
own countries’ troops. Although this innovation reduced the number of 
American boots on the ground, it also offered participants an opportu-
nity to disregard externally imposed human rights and good governance 
practices. In 2005, ACOTA was incorporated into the Bush administra-
tion’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which represented the 
US contribution to the Group of Eight industrialized nations’ “G8 Action 
Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations.”20 
Focusing on Africa especially, GPOI’s goal was to assist partner nations 
in training and equipping troops that would be used in UN, regional, and 
subregional peacekeeping missions.
 During the Bush administration, repressive African regimes rou-
tinely played up the international terrorist threat as a means of obtaining 
US funds and military assistance—just as their predecessors had exag-
gerated the communist menace during the Cold War. In many instances, 
security forces that had been trained and financed by the United States 
were used to crack down on internal opposition and fight regional wars, 
rather than to counter actual terrorist threats. Governmental repression 
and US support for those responsible resulted in backlashes that height-
ened hostility toward the United States. As a result, instead of winning 
hearts and minds, US intervention tended to alienate local populations, 
rendering them more susceptible to the appeals of international terrorist 
organizations and undermining America’s long-term security interests.
The Obama Administration (2009–17)
Despite an anticipated break from tradition, the Obama administration 
built on the Africa policies of previous administrations. The new team 
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extended AGOA’s lifespan, expanded PEPFAR and the President’s 
Malaria Initiative, and increased the quantity of military and security as-
sistance granted to African allies. Like his predecessors, President Obama 
promoted greater trade and investment opportunities in Africa and em-
phasized the benefits to US businesses. Amplifying PEPFAR’s scope, he 
launched the Global Health Initiative (GHI) to develop a comprehensive 
strategy to improve health worldwide, with significant implications for 
Africa. President Obama also continued to prosecute the war on terror. 
However, he rejected the neoconservative remake-the-world agenda of 
the Bush administration and was wary of committing US troops to an-
other unwinnable war. Spurning the unilateralism favored by his prede-
cessor, Obama looked to multinational institutions to spearhead military 
actions and expected US allies to take the lead in their historic spheres 
of influence. He tended to oppose direct US military intervention when 
there was no immediate threat to American national security, but his 
administration contributed US money, materiel, and even Special Op-
erations Forces to actions led by others.
 Like his predecessors, President Obama built strategic partnerships 
with oppressive regimes that were expected to safeguard US interests. 
Some counterterrorism partners employed US training and equipment 
against domestic opponents and civilian populations at home and in 
neighboring countries. Ethiopia and Kenya used US resources to crack 
down on political opponents and restrict Muslim rights. Security forces 
in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda perpetrated rape, torture, and extrajudi-
cial killings. Rwanda and Uganda supported a rebel insurgency in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and US-trained and -financed troops in 
South Sudan and the DRC committed mass rape and other atrocities.
 During President Obama’s tenure, the resort to force was rational-
ized by both the response to instability/responsibility to protect and the 
war on terror paradigms. Although Obama rejected some Bush admin-
istration conventions, such as the use of torture and secret “black site” 
prisons abroad, he continued the practice of extraordinary rendition—
that is, delivering terror suspects to third countries where they were 
likely to be tortured.21 He intensified the use of US Special Operations 
Forces on covert missions to kidnap and kill, and expanded the program 
of targeted assassinations by airstrikes and unmanned drones. On Presi-
dent Obama’s watch, covert actions under the auspices of US intelligence 
agencies were favored as low-cost, politically palatable alternatives to 
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large-scale military engagements under Pentagon authority. Covert 
operations and the targeted killing of terrorism suspects became the 
primary counterterrorism tools of the Obama administration.
The Trump Administration (2017–)
Donald Trump’s upset victory in the presidential elections of November 
2016 moved US Africa policy into unknown territory. As a candidate, 
Trump had little to say about the world’s second most populous conti-
nent, and the silence continued after he took office. However, Trump’s 
statements and actions in other arenas suggested the nature of his 
thinking and the potential course of future policies. The Trump admin-
istration will likely favor military solutions to regional problems and 
downplay the importance of economic development, good governance, 
and human rights. Like his predecessors, President Trump will almost 
certainly strengthen US-African military alliances and reinforce Afri-
can counterterrorism capabilities, targeting countries that are rich in 
oil and natural gas or focal points in the war on terror. He will probably 
continue to minimize the number of American boots on the ground, 
using military technologies and African personnel to implement policies 
deemed to be in the US interest. Such policies will strengthen corrupt, 
authoritarian regimes, intensify local grievances, and increase regional 
instability. They are likely to accelerate the movement toward radicaliza-
tion and violence, undermining rather than accomplishing America’s 
official goals. 
The War on Terror in Africa (2001–17)
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, con-
cern about the spread of violent extremism associated with a small Mus-
lim minority has strongly influenced the direction of US Africa policy. 
Approximately 40 percent of Africa’s population is at least nominally 
Muslim. Most adherents live in North Africa, West Africa, and along the 
East African coast, although Muslim communities can also be found in 
Central and Southern Africa. Some members of these communities have 
harbored hostility toward the United States. They have been angered by 
the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, site of the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina; by the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Libya, 
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which have caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Muslims; and 
by the decades-long plight of Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories. 
Some African Muslims, like members of other groups, have resented US 
exploitation of the continent’s oil and US support for repressive regimes 
that have abused local populations. However, very little of this rancor has 
led to acts of terrorism, and only a small minority of Muslims worldwide 
have embraced violence as a means of achieving their goals. As a result, 
when President George W. Bush referred to the 2001 war on terror as a 
“crusade,” he reinforced the belief of many that the United States was 
waging a war not against terrorism but against Islam.22 This determina-
tion intensified Muslim distrust of US motives and actions in Africa.
 Muslim extremist organizations have emerged in some parts of 
Africa, but they have few, if any, connections to the events of September 
2001. Supported by only a tiny minority of African Muslims, some have 
roots in US Cold War policies that sustained repressive African regimes. 
Several US allies, particularly in North Africa, banned Islamist parties, 
imprisoned thousands of their members and sympathizers, and barred 
them from participating in the electoral process. Although most of these 
partisans continued to eschew violence, some turned to armed struggle. 
Their homegrown organizations embraced diverse movements and in-
dividuals; their origins and grievances were local, and their focus was 
on the “near enemy.” Although some groups eventually received support 
from international jihadi networks, even they retained their own agen-
das. Other extremist bodies had both distant and local origins. Many 
were founded by veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, who had been re-
cruited by the United States and its allies to fight the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan. After Moscow’s withdrawal, they had returned home to 
organize local jihadist organizations that focused on purportedly impi-
ous, but nominally Muslim, governments in their own countries.
 Despite a plethora of evidence to the contrary, the dominant ac-
tors in the US security establishment tended to view African extremist 
organizations as part of a broad-based global movement that threat-
ened American lives and security. As a result, the US State Department 
classified many of them as “foreign terrorist organizations.” Because US 
residents are barred from providing “material support or resources” to 
such organizations, the designation had serious implications for the or-
ganizations’ associated schools, hospitals, charities, and money transfer 
companies that were heavily reliant on foreign remittances, especially 
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from African diasporic communities.23 Rather than winning hearts and 
minds, these punitive actions generated further animosity toward the 
United States.
 After September 2001, US Africa policies prioritized aid to Afri-
can counterterrorism partners who were expected to maintain stabil-
ity in their own countries and regions. Security assistance programs in 
the State and Treasury Departments and in USAID were strengthened, 
and civilian personnel performed a growing number of security- and 
defense-related functions. In the State Department, the Antiterrorism 
Assistance Program provided training, equipment, and technology to 
security and police officials in partner nations, and the Foreign Mili-
tary Financing program built counterterrorism capabilities in friendly 
countries, enhanced border and maritime controls, and improved secu-
rity sector capacities. The African Coastal and Border Security program 
provided patrol vessels and communications equipment to help African 
countries police their borders, shorelines, and coastal waters. Billed as a 
vehicle to combat smuggling, piracy, and terrorist operations and to pro-
tect fishing, oil production, and the coastal environment, the program 
was controversial in contested regions like the Niger Delta, where local 
claims to economic and political rights conflicted with activities of the 
Nigerian government and international oil interests. Finally, the State 
Department’s International Military Education and Training program 
brought African military officers to US military institutions for instruc-
tion. Although the curriculum included such topics as democratization, 
rule of law, and human rights protection, the program’s primary objec-
tive was to create viable African partners in the war on terror. As the pre-
vious case studies demonstrate, the human rights and good governance 
provisions of US aid agreements were waived or ignored if US national 
security interests were deemed to warrant it. 
 In addition to the State Department programs, the Defense Depart-
ment provided military training and logistical support in exchange for 
access to African bases, ports, and other facilities. Agreements with Al-
geria, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia guaranteed the United States use 
of military facilities in those countries for refueling, transit, combat, sur-
veillance, and other functions. In 2017, the United States maintained 
forty-six military bases, outposts, and staging areas in at least twenty- 
four African countries.
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East Africa and the Horn
East Africa and the Horn became the first African front in the US war on 
terror. US concern about the region began before the 2001 attacks, but es-
calated in their aftermath. From 1991 to 1996, al-Qaeda’s world headquar-
ters were in Sudan. When Khartoum expelled the organization in May 
1996, as a result of pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
the UN Security Council, al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to Afghan-
istan and transferred its East African operations to its Nairobi cell. The 
State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program helped establish 
Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 1998, the same year that al-Qaeda’s 
Nairobi cell orchestrated deadly attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. In 2002, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for assaults on an 
Israeli-owned hotel and civilian airliner in Kenya. The United States be-
lieved that the perpetrators had trained in Somalia and used that country 
as a transit route for weapons and operatives. Southern Somalia replaced 
Nairobi as al-Qaeda’s regional nerve center in that same year.
 Central to US counterterrorism efforts in East Africa was Camp 
Lemonnier, located in Djibouti, a country strategically situated on the 
narrow Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the juncture of the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden.24 Established in 2002, Camp Lemonnier was the first US military 
base opened in Africa since the Cold War. The camp was home to the 
new Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which in-
cluded some 1,800 military and civilian personnel. CJTF-HOA’s mission 
was to discover and destroy international terrorist networks in the Horn, 
East Africa, and Yemen, and on the adjacent Indian Ocean islands.25 It 
conducted patrols of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean, en-
gaged in military actions, and assisted in training the military forces of 
its partner states. During the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, CJTF-
HOA provided the Ethiopian army with satellite photos and other in-
telligence to help it locate insurgents, and Camp Lemonnier served as a 
base for US air attacks against alleged al-Qaeda operatives. To counter 
the appeal of extremist ideologies, CJTF-HOA instigated a strategy that 
integrated defense, diplomacy, and development efforts in the region. US 
military personnel built schools, clinics, and hospitals; they dug wells 
and provided medical and veterinary services. However, these public 
relations initiatives sometimes backfired. Local Muslim leaders warned 
that a US “humanitarian intervention” reminiscent of the one in Somalia 
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a decade before could attract foreign fighters to local struggles, resulting 
in even greater insecurity for the civilian population.
 In 2003, the United States launched the East Africa Counterterror-
ism Initiative (EACTI), a $100 million multi-department program to 
combat terrorist activities in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda.26 Personnel from these countries were trained in border, 
coastal, and aviation security, and in general police work. EACTI also es-
tablished programs to thwart money laundering and terrorist financing, 
along with education programs to undermine the appeal of extremist 
ideologies. Just as the Cold War had produced many unsavory partner-
ships, the war on terror resulted in assistance to governments that were 
engaged in human rights abuses. EACTI partners included Ethiopia, 
which was described by USAID as “the linchpin to stability in the Horn 
of Africa and the Global War on Terrorism.”27 Yet the Ethiopian gov-
ernment detained and killed political opponents, perpetrated electoral 
fraud, and suppressed dissent. Kenya, another EACTI partner, engaged 
in systematic harassment of Muslim citizens, who constituted approxi-
mately 11 percent of the population, and in 2007 the Mwai Kibaki regime 
engaged in electoral fraud that unleashed a wave of ethnically targeted 
killings that left more than 1,000 civilians dead. Political and community 
leaders were implicated in planning the attacks, and human rights orga-
nizations charged that the police were responsible for nearly 40 percent 
of the deaths. The same year, the EACTI-funded Anti-Terrorism Police 
Unit in Kenya arrested civilians who were alleged to be al-Qaeda op-
eratives and transferred them to Ethiopia, where they were brutally in-
terrogated in the presence of FBI and CIA operatives. In EACTI’s most 
recent reconfiguration, Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterror-
ism (PREACT), member countries Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and 
Sudan have engaged in serious human rights abuses against large seg-
ments of their populations and have manipulated ethnicity to perpetuate 
the regimes in power.
The Maghreb and the Sahel
The Maghreb and the Sahel constituted the second African front in 
the US war on terror. Bounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, 
the Sahara Desert to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the 
Maghreb embraces Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the disputed terri-
tory of Western Sahara, and Mauritania. Mauritania serves as a bridge 
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to the Sahel, the Sahara’s southern borderlands, which stretch more than 
3,000 miles from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east. Portions of 
Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria form the 
Western Sahel; parts of Cameroon, Chad, and the Central African Re-
public constitute the central region; while sections of Sudan, South 
Sudan, and Eritrea make up the east. After the Cold War, the Maghreb’s 
large, sparsely populated, loosely governed spaces hosted a wide range 
of criminal, insurgent, and jihadist organizations whose networks ex-
tended into the Western Sahel and aroused the concerns of Europe and 
the United States.
 In 2002, the US government launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), 
which included Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger, countries that suf-
fered from acute poverty, political instability, environmental degradation, 
and a regular cycle of devastating droughts.28 Together these countries 
were home to more than 44 million Muslims. The PSI’s mission was to 
enhance border control to impede the movement of terrorists and traf-
fickers in guns and drugs, who crossed porous national boundaries with 
ease. In 2005 the PSI program was extended and transformed into the 
five-year, $500 million interagency Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Ini-
tiative (TSCTI). Like its counterpart in East Africa, TSCTI’s mission was 
to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and to thwart the 
spread of extremist ideologies. TSCTI’s military program, Operation En-
during Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), provided equipment, logistical 
support, and border control training, as well as US Special Operations 
Forces who trained regional partners in counterterrorism and combat 
techniques. TSCTI’s civil component included USAID programs to pro-
mote education and good governance, State Department programs to 
enhance airport security, Treasury Department aid to curb money laun-
dering, and FBI assistance in tracking down illegal operatives. TSCTI 
members also joined the United States and other Western countries in 
annual military exercises dubbed Flintlock, which were organized by the 
US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA).29 In 2017, the 
renamed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) included 
eight Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) and three Maghrebian partners (Alge-
ria, Morocco, and Tunisia).30
 US counterterrorism partners in North, West, and Central Africa, as 
in East Africa and the Horn, included corrupt governments that engaged 
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in serious human rights abuses. Burkina Faso was ruled for twenty-seven 
years by Blaise Compaoré, a military strongman whose regime engaged 
in violence against civilians, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and support 
for brutal insurgencies in neighboring countries. Chad was run by Id-
riss Déby, another military despot, who seized power in 1990 and whose 
corrupt regime was responsible for widespread arbitrary arrests, torture, 
rape, and murder. Opponents viewed Déby’s counterterrorism partner-
ship with the West as an attempt to bolster a regime without internal 
legitimacy. A succession of Nigerian governments were also deeply cor-
rupt and engaged in major human rights abuses against civilian popula-
tions, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta and the volatile northeast.31
 Critics of US policies in the Sahel argued that most of the conflicts 
were local in origin. The dire political and economic conditions of the 
Sahelian countries made them ripe for insurgency, and the insurrec-
tionists generally had little if any connection to international terrorist 
organizations. Many of the targeted groups were more criminal than ji-
hadist, blending religious extremism with drug and weapons trafficking, 
which funded their operations and provided livelihoods to people with 
few alternatives. Rather than addressing the deprivation and inequal-
ity at the root of the conflicts, Washington’s counterterrorism partners 
played up the terrorist threat to obtain US military assistance. The poli-
cies backfired when US-trained security forces cracked down on internal 
opposition and intervened in neighboring countries. Such actions fueled 
extremism and rendered local populations more susceptible to interna-
tional terrorist appeals.
AFRICOM
The establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) 
during the George W. Bush administration signaled the growing im-
portance of Africa to US security concerns. In February 2007, President 
Bush announced plans to create a unified military command that would 
oversee US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine activities in Africa. This 
development was significant. During the Cold War and its aftermath, re-
sponsibility for US military activities on the continent had been divided 
between the European, Central, and Pacific Commands, attesting to Af-
rica’s adjunct status in the geopolitical arena. The European Command 
(EUCOM) had jurisdiction over forty-three African countries, most of 
which were in sub-Saharan Africa and all of which had been European 
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colonies, Liberia excepted. The Central Command (CENTCOM) had ju-
risdiction over Egypt and the Greater Horn—including Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan—as well as the Middle East and 
Central Asia. The Pacific Command (PACOM) covered the Asia-Pacific 
region, from the west coast of the United States to Madagascar, Sey-
chelles, and the other Indian Ocean islands. Seen through lens of US- 
European relations or the Cold War, Africa as a self-contained entity was 
not high on the US priority list. The establishment of AFRICOM was 
concrete evidence that Africa had migrated from the periphery to the 
core of US security interests.
 AFRICOM became fully functional in October 2008. Its headquar-
ters were originally intended to be located in Africa. However, hosting 
the US military entity was politically unpalatable for most African coun-
tries, and few were willing to risk becoming terrorist targets. Therefore, 
AFRICOM established its base in Stuttgart, Germany, where EUCOM 
was headquartered. Employing the human security/human development 
discourse that characterized the Bush administration’s economic assis-
tance policy, AFRICOM documents argued that poverty, corruption, and 
dysfunctional states breed discontent and provide fertile ground for ter-
rorism. To counter the threat effectively, the United States must engage 
in “armed social work,” linking strategic and humanitarian interests by 
implementing free market–led economic development, diplomacy, and 
defense measures.32 AFRICOM’s civil-military mission included staff 
members from the State Department, USAID, and other governmental 
departments and agencies. However, the Defense Department was by far 
the strongest partner in terms of resources, personnel, and authority, and 
the security and counterterrorism initiatives of the defense and intelli-
gence communities dominated AFRICOM’s agenda.
 From the outset, AFRICOM and its mission faced heavy criticism. 
As was the case during the Cold War, the State and Defense Departments 
chose partner countries on the basis of strategic and economic consid-
erations; the countries’ records on good governance and respect for de-
mocracy and human rights were of secondary concern. AFRICOM’s top 
priorities were to counter regional instability and to fight international 
terrorism in areas of strategic interest to the United States. As a result, 
the organization focused on countries that were rich in oil, natural gas, 
and uranium, were near important transportation and communications 
routes, or were the site of extremist activities. AFRICOM’s detractors 
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warned that if military priorities dominated the agenda, humanitarian 
initiatives would be suspect, and the long-term objective of winning 
hearts and minds would be undermined by short-term military opera-
tions. They charged that AFRICOM militarized diplomatic, development, 
and police functions that were more effectively performed by civilians.
 As the Pentagon took over initiatives previously under the jurisdic-
tion of USAID, soldiers engaged in activities for which they were not 
trained—and trained experts were shunted aside. Threats to human se-
curity, such as poverty, disease, climate change, corruption, and politi-
cal oppression, were considered problematic only insofar as they led to 
chaos and instability that opened the door to extremist recruitment. The 
counterterrorism lens distorted the US response. US-led training pro-
grams emphasized elite counterterrorism forces and underplayed the 
importance of civil policing and humane responses to epidemics and 
climate-related disasters. As a result, African partners often engaged 
in abuses against civilian populations and were implicated in military 
coups, strengthening the insurgencies they were expected to combat.
 Finally, AFRICOM personnel often continued past trends of conflat-
ing local grievances with international terrorism and strengthening the 
military capacity of armed forces that attacked civilians. Increased US 
military presence sometimes sparked popular backlashes, exacerbating 
rather than abating regional insecurity. Although AFRICOM was billed 
as promoting “African solutions to African problems,” its programs were 
not developed in consultation with African civil societies, and US rather 
than African security concerns dominated its agenda.33 As a result, 
AFRICOM and its constituent programs frequently intensified rather 
than reduced international terrorist threats.
The War on Terror under the Obama Administration (2009–17)
The enactment of policies justified by the war on terror paradigm inten-
sified during the Barack Obama administration. Many people, at home 
and abroad, had hoped that the first US president of African descent 
would have a deeper understanding of African realities and would im-
plement policies that embraced political, economic, and social rights. 
President Obama spoke to these aspirations in June 2009 when he ad-
dressed the global Muslim community from Cairo, Egypt. “I’ve come 
here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims around the world,” the president announced. “One based on 
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mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that 
America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.” 
He affirmed that the United States and Islam “share common princi-
ples—principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all 
human beings.” He reiterated earlier assertions that “America is not—
and never will be—at war with Islam.”34 President Obama revisited some 
of these themes the following month in Accra, Ghana, where he spoke of 
a US-Africa partnership “grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual 
respect” and emphasized US support for “strong and sustainable demo-
cratic governments.”35
 Obama’s Cairo speech highlighted ambitious goals, but it also in-
cluded words of caution. In tandem with his affirmation of friendship, 
the American president warned that the United States would “relent-
lessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our secu-
rity.”36 It was the definition of “threat to our security” that became the 
greatest obstacle to a new, mutually beneficial US Africa policy. It was 
soon evident that in this domain, the Obama and Bush administrations 
were more alike than different. Less than a month after President Obama 
took office, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) repudiated the 
Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies. An ICJ investigative 
panel, which included eight senior lawyers and judges from around the 
world, condemned as “legally and conceptually flawed” the Bush admin-
istration’s “conflation of acts of terrorism with acts of war” and concluded 
that “the use of the war paradigm has given a spurious justification to a 
range of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations.”37 The 
Obama administration substituted the phrase “overseas contingency op-
eration” for the Bush administration’s “war on terror,” but it abandoned 
the war on terror in name only. In Africa, the United States expanded on 
the policies that had guided US military activities during the previous 
decade. The Obama government continued to use African proxies to im-
plement US policies and strengthened ties to corrupt, repressive regimes 
that used US funds, training, and equipment to suppress dissent and 
maintain control over natural resources. President Obama also broad-
ened his predecessor’s program of targeted assassinations and intensified 
the use of US Special Operations Forces and remotely controlled drones 
to track down and kill terror suspects.
 The administration failed to forge the relationship of “mutual in-
terest and mutual respect” that President Obama promoted in Cairo. 
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Such relations were thwarted not only by the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Syria, which many Muslims viewed as campaigns against Islam, but 
also by drone strikes, targeted assassinations, and commando operations 
outside the war zones. During the Obama presidency, covert operations 
in Africa multiplied, resulting in civilian casualties that sometimes pro-
voked an upsurge in terrorist activity. The number of US military and 
Defense Department personnel working in Africa fluctuated from 5,000 
to 8,000. This number included some 1,000 US Special Operations Forces 
and private military contractors who worked from dozens of outposts, 
airstrips, and military bases in East Africa, the Horn, and across the 
Sahel. From these far-flung locales, they ran surveillance and reconnais-
sance missions conducted by turboprop planes and remotely piloted 
drones, launched air and drone attacks, and staged commando actions 
by Special Operations Forces.38
speciAl OperAtiOns fOrces
Worn down by the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early twenty- 
first century, Americans were reluctant to sacrifice more lives and treasure in 
faraway places that had little apparent impact on their lives. Sensitive to 
the domestic political climate, the Obama administration was also anx-
ious to minimize local resentments against foreign troops. It refrained 
from sending large numbers of US combat soldiers to fight African wars. 
Instead, it sent smaller contingents of military personnel to gather in-
telligence, provide logistical support, train and advise African security 
forces, and accompany African trainees on missions. The US-trained 
troops served as US proxies on the continent. Elite commando units 
called Special Operations Forces were the Obama administration’s mili-
tary instrument of choice. These forces gathered intelligence and engaged 
in reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare opera-
tions. Although characterized as trainers and advisors, they often played 
significant, if rarely acknowledged, combat roles. Functioning largely 
under the radar, they carried out activities not subject to public scru-
tiny, and the domestic political costs of their endeavors were relatively 
low. Working under the authority of the United States Special Opera-
tions Command (SOCOM), which coordinated special operations in all 
branches of the US armed forces, these specialized units included the US 
Army’s Delta Force, Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Army Rang-
ers, Navy SEALs, Marine Raiders, and others.39 Within these publicly 
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acknowledged entities, a subgroup of “black units” controlled by the 
Pentagon’s highly secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
engaged exclusively in covert operations.40 Established in 1980 after the 
failed attempt to rescue American hostages from the US Embassy in Iran, 
JSOC answered only to the US president or secretary of defense. Neither 
official was required to request permission from Congress to approve an 
operation or to report to Congress in its aftermath.
 During the Obama presidency, JSOC and the CIA competed with 
one another to control the US war on terror. Boundaries between the 
military and intelligence sectors grew increasingly blurred, and dis-
tinctions between their missions, capabilities, and leadership dissolved. 
In September 2009, General David H. Petraeus, then commander of 
CENTCOM, signed the “Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force 
Execute Order,” a secret directive that authorized the deployment of US 
Special Operations Forces to nations in the Middle East, Central Asia, 
and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and establish liaisons with 
local military forces. The directive extended the Bush administration 
practice of engaging in covert military activities in countries with 
which the United States was not at war. It also expanded on the Bush 
policy by making such activities routine—permitting the creation of 
networks to penetrate and destroy militant groups in those countries, 
allowing joint operations with local counterterrorism forces, and laying 
the groundwork for future US attacks. While covert actions by the CIA 
required reports to congressional intelligence committees, actions un-
dertaken under the new directive—by US military rather than intelli-
gence agencies—did not.41
 By the end of President Obama’s first term, JSOC was clearly the 
dominant player in the war on terror. Special Operations Forces, en-
dowed with much larger budgets than the CIA, engaged in both intel-
ligence gathering and counterterrorism. The CIA, in turn, had become 
far more militarized. From September 2011 to November 2012, the in-
telligence agency was led by a military man, the same General Petraeus 
who had intensified US military involvement in covert activities outside 
official war zones.42 A large portion of the CIA budget was designated for 
paramilitary activities, and CIA paramilitary bodies worked closely with 
JSOC forces.
 Under President Obama’s leadership, US Special Operations Forces in 
Africa tracked and killed suspected terrorists and trained and equipped 
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local security forces to carry out missions in America’s interests. US 
Special Operations Forces provided support for multiple interventions 
in Somalia aimed at destroying the al-Shabaab network; they trained 
AMISOM soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda in counterinsur-
gency tactics; and they engaged in targeted assassinations. In Central 
Africa, US Special Operations Forces coordinated the African armies 
searching for Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which 
had long terrorized parts of Uganda, the Central African Republic, the 
DRC, and South Sudan. The armies from these countries, trained by the 
US military, also engaged in extensive human rights abuses in their own 
countries.
drOnes
The blurring of lines between military and intelligence activities—and 
competition between the Pentagon and the CIA—was also evident in 
drone warfare. Armed drone programs in the Afghan war zone were 
run by the Defense Department, while purportedly covert programs in 
Pakistan were controlled by the CIA. In Yemen, the Pentagon’s JSOC 
and the CIA ran separate programs, while JSOC was in charge of drone 
operations in Somalia, which were launched from Camp Lemonnier in 
Djibouti. The use of armed drones outside official war zones increased 
dramatically during the Obama presidency and expanded into new arenas 
in Yemen and Somalia. The CIA and JSOC deployed drones to kill high-
level al-Qaeda officials, but also low-level operatives and their associates, 
who were not direct threats to the United States. Targets were selected 
on the basis of secret evidence, which, in the absence of trials, was never 
revealed. Because attacks required no American boots on the ground, 
drone usage meant fewer US casualties. Moreover, it was easier to kill ter-
ror suspects than to capture and try them, and their extrajudicial elimi-
nation circumvented the problem of determining where to house them 
after the CIA’s secret overseas prisons were closed.
 Just as the use of torture and secret prisons had generated debate 
when President Obama took office, the CIA’s foray into paramilitary 
activities and the Pentagon’s involvement in intelligence gathering pro-
voked contention at the beginning of his second term. Some adminis-
tration officials argued that the CIA should return to its traditional work 
of recruiting spies and gathering and analyzing intelligence, leaving le-
thal operations to the military, while the Pentagon should refrain from 
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intelligence gathering and focus on military operations. This position 
was in keeping with the 9/11 Commission’s 2004 recommendation that 
“lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, 
whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Depart-
ment.”43 Critics of existing practices argued that the move would provide 
greater public scrutiny of American killings abroad. The US military is re-
quired to adhere to international laws of war, while the CIA often does not. 
The Pentagon’s operations are based on publicly available policies, while 
the CIA’s covert operations are not officially acknowledged—reports to 
congressional intelligence committees notwithstanding. History has 
demonstrated time and again that secrecy impedes accountability and 
transparency promotes it.
 In the face of mounting criticism, the Obama administration began 
to reevaluate the lethal drone programs. Drone strikes and their “col-
lateral damage”—including women, children, the elderly, and men who 
were killed simply because of their age, location, or association—had 
generated enormous hostility toward the United States. Indeed, the kill-
ing of innocents had become a focal point of international criticism and 
a recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. None of Washington’s 
Western allies supported drone or other targeted killing programs. In a 
May 2013 speech at the National Defense University, President Obama 
announced the imminent end to the use of “signature strikes” outside the 
Afghan war zone and Pakistani tribal areas. These highly controversial 
strikes permitted the targeting of individuals or groups based solely on 
their location (proximity to terror suspects) or on their conduct (sus-
picious behavior that might link them to al-Qaeda and its allies). In 
practice, any military-age man who happened to be in an area where 
terrorist activity was suspected was considered fair game. In the fu-
ture, the president announced, drones would be launched outside war 
zones only if the targets posed a “continuing and imminent threat to the 
American people” and could not be thwarted in any other way, and only 
if there were a “near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured” 
by the drone strike. The related Presidential Policy Guidance also man-
dated high-level interagency approval of the proposed actions, removing 
such authority from commanders on the ground.44
 Despite the president’s pronouncement, US drone policy was slow 
to transform. In August 2013, US forces launched nine drone strikes in 
Yemen that killed more than three dozen people, including insurgents 
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fighting the Yemeni government and young men who the US feared 
might become insurgent leaders of the future. In 2015, US drone strikes 
in Somalia killed al-Shabaab leader Adan Garar, who was alleged to have 
planned the 2013 Kenyan mall attack, and two other senior commanders. 
It was not clear that any of the targets posed a “continuing and imminent 
threat to the American people” and could not be stopped by other means. 
A turf war between the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 
which supported the transfer of authority for armed drones from the 
CIA to the Pentagon, and the House and Senate Intelligence Commit-
tees, which upheld the CIA’s jurisdiction, also obstructed significant 
policy change.
tArgeted AssAssinAtiOns
With commandos, drones, and missiles at its disposal, the Obama ad-
ministration permitted the Pentagon and the CIA to ignore the long-
standing US ban on political assassinations abroad. Although the ban 
had been eroded by his predecessors, President Obama embraced tar-
geted killings on an unprecedented scale and authorized JSOC and the 
CIA to draw up kill lists. He personally approved each name, as well as 
every strike carried out in Yemen and Somalia and the riskiest ones in 
Pakistan. In Somalia, al-Qaeda officials were the first targets. In Sep-
tember 2009, President Obama authorized Navy SEALs to kill Kenyan 
national Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, head of the al-Qaeda East Africa cell 
that orchestrated the 1998 US Embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks on 
an Israeli-owned hotel and airliner. Nabhan and several associates were 
killed in southern Somalia when Navy SEALs strafed their convoy. In 
January 2012, Bilaal al-Barjawi, the former head of al-Qaeda intelligence 
in Kenya, who was also implicated in the embassy bombings, was killed 
by a US drone strike near Mogadishu. Other US missile attacks homed 
in on high-level al-Shabaab operatives, including al-Shabaab’s top leader, 
Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in a targeted airstrike in Septem-
ber 2014—more than a year after President Obama’s May 2013 speech. US 
forces made no attempt to capture and try these suspects before a court 
of law.
 The Obama administration’s targeted killing program caused an out-
cry at home and abroad. Critics charged that US actions violated inter-
national law. Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary, or arbitrary executions from 2004 to 2010, questioned the US 
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government’s presumed right to target and kill individuals anywhere in 
the world. He claimed that “this strongly asserted but ill-defined license 
to kill without accountability [will do] grave damage to the rules designed 
to protect the right to life and prevent extrajudicial executions.”45 Other 
critics argued that the targeted killings violated domestic as well as inter-
national law. The legal justification for US military activities in Somalia 
was the Authorization for Use of Military Force, granted by Congress 
to the president after the September 2001 attacks on the United States. 
The 2001 law permitted the president to target nations, organizations, and 
individuals implicated in those attacks. The connection to Somalia, how-
ever, was tenuous. Al-Qaeda targets in Somalia had had nothing to do 
with the 9/11 attacks. Al-Shabaab had begun to associate with al-Qaeda 
only in 2007, and it did not formally affiliate until 2012. Nonetheless, both 
the Bush and Obama administrations used the authorization to justify 
their fight against al-Qaeda and its associates worldwide, and under Presi-
dent Obama targeted killings were extended to include the Islamic State, 
which emerged from al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate and its associates in 2006.
 President Obama tacitly acknowledged the discrepancy between 
the targets authorized by Congress in 2001 and many of those selected 
by his administration. In his May 2013 speech, he noted that al-Qaeda’s 
primary leadership had been destroyed and that the United States could 
not justify its current policies on the basis of the 2001 congressional reso-
lution. Observing that not every group that “labels themselves al-Qaeda 
will pose a credible threat to the United States,” he remarked that many 
are “collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing ter-
ritory. . . . most are focused on operating in the countries and regions 
where they are based.” He concluded that the 2001 mandate needed to 
be refined and eventually repealed so that the United States did not find 
itself in a perpetual war, with presidents wielding “unbound powers” and 
democratic practices falling by the wayside.46
 Although Obama adopted regulations that limited drone strikes 
and other counterterrorism measures outside of war zones, he reverted 
to past practices when he considered them necessary for self-defense. 
During the summer of 2016, the president exempted parts of Libya from 
the 2013 regulations, and between August and December 2016, AF-
RICOM forces conducted 495 airstrikes against the Islamic State strong-
hold in Sirte. As the United States intensified military action in Somalia, 
increasing the exposure of US and allied personnel, Obama invoked the 
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self-defense exclusion and broadened its definition to include the AU 
and Somali troops whom US soldiers were training, advising, and assist-
ing. In November 2016, the United States began to treat al-Shabaab as 
an “associated force” of al-Qaeda. This designation allowed the admin-
istration to broaden its targets from al-Shabaab leaders with established 
al-Qaeda links to rank-and-file members whose ties were less certain.47
Conclusion
Although US Africa policy went through several transformations after 
the Cold War, the approaches of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama admin-
istrations exhibited more commonalities than differences. All three pres-
idents expected other states or multilateral organizations to assume the 
premier role in resolving African crises. All three touted the notion of 
African solutions for African problems, but in fact used African soldiers 
to implement American solutions to protect American interests. If US 
partners and proxies failed, Washington engaged more directly. During 
all three administrations, political or military intervention as a response 
to instability or humanitarian crises was more likely in areas of strategic 
or economic concern or in those menaced by international terrorism.
 The United States largely ignored African crises during the first 
post–Cold War decade. However, the continent returned to the US radar 
screen after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the war on terror 
became a focal point of US Africa policy. During the second post–Cold 
War decade, US policymakers increasingly viewed impoverished Af-
rican nations with dysfunctional states as potential breeding grounds 
for violent extremism. Drawing on American Cold War strategies, 
they strengthened US-African military alliances and reinforced Afri-
can security enforcement capabilities. In choosing its partners, Wash-
ington focused primarily on countries that were endowed with energy 
resources or critical to the war on terror, even though these countries 
were often governed by corrupt, oppressive political and military elites. 
Despite rhetoric that promoted human rights, democracy, and account-
able and responsive governance, US assistance frequently strengthened 
authoritarian, kleptocratic regimes. The failure of the counterterrorism 
approach was evident when US-trained security forces targeted politi-
cal opponents and civilians and staged coups against democratically 
elected governments. Blowback resulting from governmental abuse and 
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foreign support for unjust regimes sometimes strengthened local insur-
gencies. After September 2001, the increasing securitization of US relief 
and development assistance blurred the lines between humanitarian and 
military endeavors, putting at risk the credibility—and sometimes the 
lives—of foreign aid personnel.
 The expansion of extremist influence and the intensification of 
extremist activities in countries targeted by the United States and 
Western-led coalitions underscored the flawed premises of US Africa 
policy after the Cold War. As the Obama presidency drew to a close in 
2016, the hope for a transformative Africa policy that stressed education, 
economic development and opportunity, government accountability, and 
respect for human rights was undermined by deepening US involvement 
in local conflicts in partnership with abusive governments. The election 
of the Donald Trump as president in November 2016 rendered the pros-
pects for a constructive policy even less likely. A preliminary assessment 
of US Africa policy during the Trump administration’s first year is the 
subject of chapter 13.
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New American Security State (New York: Little, Brown, 2011), examines 
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the secret security apparatuses that emerged after the September 2001 
terrorist attacks and includes a chapter on the Joint Special Operations 
Command. Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield (New 
York: Nation Books, 2013), investigates US covert operations during the 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, focusing on the 
activities of US Special Operations Forces outside established war zones, 
where they engaged in kidnappings and targeted killings. Mark Mazzetti, 
The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of 
the Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013), examines US Special Operations 
Forces in Yemen, East Africa, and Pakistan and explores the transforma-
tion of the CIA from spy agency to paramilitary force. Daniel Klaidman, 
Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), considers internal debates 
within the Obama administration as it escalated the use of targeted 
killings and covert operations. Nick Turse, Tomorrow’s Battlefield: U.S. 
Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015), 
focuses on America’s secret wars in Africa during the Obama adminis-
tration, while Nick Turse, “The U.S. Military Moves Deeper into Africa,” 
TomDispatch.com, April 27, 2017, investigates the expansion of US mili-
tary bases and secret operations on the continent.
 Several works focus on the intensification of drone warfare during 
the Obama administration and include some reference to Africa. See es-
pecially Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Control Warfare (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2016); Jeremy Scahill and The Intercept staff, The Assas-
sination Complex: Inside the Government’s Secret Drone Warfare Program 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016); David Cortright, Rachel Fair-
hurst, and Kristen Wall, eds., Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: 
Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2014); and Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, eds., Drone 
Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014).
 A number of works explore the broader issues of globalization, inse-
curity, and the US war on terror. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guer-
rilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), provides an overview of the interactions of local 
insurgencies, international movements, and the war on terror. James 
Mittelman, Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), examines the impact of globalization 
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on security and world order, the growing involvement of nonstate actors 
in regional conflicts, and the implications of the overriding political, eco-
nomic, and military power of the United States.
 Several works examine the impact of the war on terror on specific 
African subregions. For the Horn of Africa, see the Suggested Reading 
for chapter 4, especially Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Battling Terrorism in the 
Horn of Africa, and Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of 
Africa. For West Africa, see George Klay Kieh and Kelechi Kalu, eds., 
West Africa and the U.S. War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
which investigates the societal crises underlying the rise of terrorism in 
West Africa and examines US counterterrorism policies. Jeremy Keenan, 
The Dark Sahara: America’s War on Terror in Africa (New York: Pluto 
Press, 2009), questions the extent of al-Qaeda activity in the Western 
Sahel and posits that the United States has used terrorism as an excuse to 
expand military activities in that region in pursuit of other objectives.
 Three works explore the complex web of terrorist financing through 
African money transfer companies, Muslim charities, and commodi-
ties. See Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Net-
work of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004); Ibrahim Warde, The 
Price of Fear: The Truth behind the Financial War on Terror (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); and Global Witness, For a Few 
Dollars More: How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade (London: 
Global Witness, 2003).
 For scholarship that explores the relationship between Islamic fun-
damentalism, Islamism, and violent extremism, see the Suggested Read-
ing for chapter 2. For an examination of these issues in the Horn of Africa, 
see the Suggested Reading for chapters 4 and 5, especially Alex de Waal, 
ed., Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa; Gregory A. Pirio, Af-
rican Jihad: Bin Laden’s Quest for the Horn of Africa; Ken Menkhaus, So-
malia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism; and Donald Petterson, 
Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe. For West Africa, 
see the Suggested Reading for chapter 11, especially Virginia Comolli, 
Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency; N. D. Danjibo, Islamic Funda-
mentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” 
Crises in Northern Nigeria; Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko Haram Upris-
ing and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria”; Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Mont-
clos, ed., Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria; 
and Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist 
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Movement. See also William F. S. Miles, ed., Political Islam in West Africa: 
State-Society Relations Transformed (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 
which examines the evolving relationships between religion and state in 
several West African countries and considers the impact of the Septem-




trump and africa (2017–)
as the obama presidency entered its final days in 2016, pundits widely 
anticipated that Hillary Rodham Clinton, the former US senator and 
secretary of state, would replace him. US Africa policy would continue 
much as before, but with the potential of becoming even more milita-
rized.1 However, in a stunning upset, Donald Trump carried the electoral 
college on November 8, and on January 20, 2017, a man without political 
or military experience took command of the world’s most powerful na-
tion. His victory pushed US Africa policy into uncharted terrain. Trump 
had said little about Africa on the campaign trail, and the silence contin-
ued during his first months in office. However, his statements and actions 
concerning Islam, terrorism, immigration, climate change, military in-
tervention, human rights, and foreign aid offer insights into his thinking 
and suggest the direction of future policies.
 Like his predecessors, President Trump will likely strengthen US- 
African military alliances and reinforce African security enforcement 
capabilities, concentrating on countries that are rich in energy resources 
or central to the war on terror. He will probably persist in using Afri-
can soldiers as proxies to implement US solutions to African problems. 
Such policies would signal continued US support for authoritarian, klep-
tocratic regimes that contribute to local grievances and would intensify 
the movement toward radicalization and violence. The enactment of a 
transformative US Africa policy that emphasizes education, economic de-
velopment and opportunity, government accountability, and respect for 
human rights is less likely in the current political climate than ever before.
 This chapter assesses the potential impact on Africa of Trump’s atti-
tudes and actions in regard to Islam and terrorism; Muslim immigration; 
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climate change; military intervention versus development, diplomacy, 
and human rights; and foreign aid.
Misconceptions about Islam and Terrorism
President Trump holds a distorted view of Islam that will influence his 
policy toward Africa, home to approximately one-third of the world’s 
1.8 billion Muslims. He harbors a deep suspicion of the religion and 
tends to conflate diverse Muslim groups, confusing terrorist networks 
like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State with organizations that work within 
established political systems, such as the nonviolent Muslim Brother-
hood. These views evoke the “clash of civilizations” thesis promoted by 
American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, which regards Islam 
as fundamentally incompatible with the Judeo-Christian values that are 
the foundation of Western civilization.2 Warning that “Islam hates us,” 
Trump has vowed to “defeat Radical Islamic Terrorism.”3 These extrem-
ist views have been refuted by most reputable scholars of religion and 
rejected by Trump’s two immediate predecessors, Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama. However, they have remained popular in right-
wing circles and among Trump’s closest advisors. As a result, they gained 
momentum during the 2016 presidential campaign and in its aftermath.
 Trump’s inner circle includes a number of right-wing ideologues 
who promote fallacious views of Islam. In his administration, the most 
prominent have been his first national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Mi-
chael T. Flynn, and his attorney general, Jeff Sessions, as well as former 
chief political strategist Stephen K. Bannon, senior policy advisor Ste-
phen Miller, and former deputy national security assistant Sebastian 
Gorka. His first secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, although generally 
not deemed a right-wing ideologue, has referred to both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and al-Qaeda as “agents of Radical Islam.”4 Although Gen-
eral Flynn was forced to resign within weeks of taking office, his claims 
that radical Muslims are waging war against the United States and that 
extreme measures are needed to defeat them had already taken root. 
Bannon and Gorka also left the White House during the first year but 
continued, especially in the case of Bannon, to influence the president’s 
thinking. Subsequent events offered proof that the Trump administra-
tion would collaborate with any regime willing to combat “radical Islam,” 
regardless of the regime’s human rights record. President Trump’s high 
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praise and special treatment of Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Saudi Arabia’s 
King Salman, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Philippines’ Rodrigo 
Duterte, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi are clear examples of this trend.
 If Trump’s early actions are revealing, his words are also important, 
as judicial rulings and firestorms over his tweets have demonstrated. 
President Trump’s refusal to abandon reference to “radical Islamic ter-
rorism” is further indication of his misunderstanding of Islam and 
his erroneous conflation of religion and violent extremism. President 
Obama had publicly repudiated the notion of “radical Islamic terrorism,” 
because it wrongly associated the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims with the 
actions of a fringe element whose actions were deemed un-Islamic by 
established religious scholars and by most Muslims. Instead, Obama de-
scribed al-Qaeda and Islamic State militants as “violent extremists” who 
were peddling “warped ideologies . . . [in] their attempt to use Islam to 
justify their violence.” He concluded, “All of us have a responsibility to 
refute the notion that groups like [the Islamic State] somehow represent 
Islam, because that is a falsehood that embraces the terrorist narrative.”5
 President Trump’s second national security advisor, Lt. Gen. H. R. 
McMaster, agreed with President Obama’s assessment. A career army of-
ficer with a mainstream view of foreign policy, McMaster also rejected 
“radical Islamic terrorism” as inappropriate terminology, arguing that 
terrorists behave in ways that are “un-Islamic” and warning that the 
United States needed to retain Muslim allies in the war on terror.6 Mc-
Master’s views have wide support among career officials in the State and 
Defense Departments and other agencies that work with the National 
Security Council. However, Trump persisted in his use of the inflamma-
tory terminology, despite warnings by seasoned professionals that such 
language bolsters extremists’ claims that the United States is at war with 
Islam and legitimizes their pretense to represent the Muslim faith.
 President Trump’s mischaracterization of extremist violence is 
rooted in his misunderstanding of its causes, which has prevented 
him from developing an appropriate and effective response. Address-
ing Muslim world leaders in May 2017, Trump urged harsh treatment 
of extremists: “Drive them out of your places of worship. Drive them 
out of your communities. Drive them out of your holy land. And drive 
them out of this earth.”7 In prescribing force alone to counter terrorism, 
the president exhibits a failure to comprehend the political, economic, 
and social grievances that engender extremism and the importance of 
Trump and Africa (2017–)  |  371
education, employment, and representative, transparent governance in 
combatting it.
 President Trump’s erroneous conceptions of Islam have led him to 
confound nonviolent and violent organizations. A case in point is the 
Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most important Islamist organizations 
in North Africa and the Middle East, which boasts millions of mem-
bers and supporters and engages in educational and charity work, as 
well as religious and political activities. Although some adherents en-
gaged in violent protest after World War II, the organization renounced 
violence in the 1970s. This shift led to the departure of dissenters, who 
established other organizations. Following their repudiation of armed 
struggle, Brotherhood members engaged in politics and participated in 
elections—when ruling regimes permitted. In the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, Brotherhood parties, with their powerful organizational net-
works, won national elections in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.
 Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s decades-old renunciation of vio-
lence, the Trump administration has considered designating the group a 
foreign terrorist organization. Such a move was rejected by the Obama 
administration and the UK, but has been promoted by US allies Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Many autocratic rulers in 
the Muslim world consider the Muslim Brotherhood to pose a threat 
on par with that of violent extremists. Although the organization is not 
violent, it is embedded in a strong popular base and grassroots political 
structures, and it has the potential to challenge repressive, unrepresen-
tative governments. Some of Trump’s closest advisors are proponents of 
the Muslim Brotherhood/terrorist equation. Before assuming the role 
of White House political strategist, Stephen Bannon cast the Muslim 
Brotherhood as “the foundation of modern Terrorism.”8 As secretary of 
state designate, Rex Tillerson equated the Muslim Brotherhood with al-
Qaeda, and he considered the defeat of both organizations to be of equal 
importance.9 However, many career officials in the State Department, 
National Security Council, and CIA contest this assessment. A terrorist 
designation would shut down Brotherhood charities, mosques, and other 
entities in the United States, freeze the organization’s US assets, outlaw 
financial interactions with US interests, and end the issuance of US visas 
to Brotherhood members. The career officials warn that a terrorist desig-
nation could alienate allies, increase polarization, and encourage radical-
ism in countries where the Brotherhood has strong support. Moreover, it 
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would close communication channels with moderate Islamists, who are 
important collaborators in the fight against violent extremism. Finally, 
designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization could re-
inforce extremists’ claims that the United States is at war with Islam and 
that nonviolent opposition and accommodation with Muslim moderates 
and the West are futile. This outcome would have serious ramifications 
for US-African relations.
The Muslim Travel Ban
President Trump’s distorted and hostile view of Islam is also evident in 
his attempt to impose a US travel ban on citizens from several predomi-
nantly Muslim countries, including three countries in Africa. As a candi-
date, Trump had advocated “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States” while the country established an ideological 
screening process that would allow the government to admit only “those 
who share our values.” He had called for “extreme vetting” that would 
exclude not only terrorists and their sympathizers, but also “any who 
have hostile attitudes towards our country or its principles.” Candidate 
Trump had promoted the temporary suspension of immigration from 
regions that had “a history of exporting terrorism” while such procedures 
were being implemented. Finally, he had proclaimed that as president, 
he would “establish a Commission on Radical Islam . . . to identify and 
explain . . . the core convictions and beliefs of Radical Islam, to identify 
the warning signs of radicalization, and to expose the networks in our 
society that support radicalization.”10
 On January 27, 2017, one week after his inauguration, President 
Trump issued an executive order that temporarily suspended entry into 
the United States of people from seven predominantly Muslim coun-
tries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. After a 90-day 
pause, Christians and adherents of other minority religions from these 
countries would be given priority entry over Muslims. The admission of 
all refugees would be suspended for 120 days, after which all applicants 
would be subjected to a special screening—beyond the 18-month process 
already required for security clearance—to keep out “radical Islamic ter-
rorists.” Refugees from Syria would be barred indefinitely, and the num-
ber of refugees accepted for resettlement in the United States would be 
reduced from a limit of 110,000 in 2017 to 50,000.
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 Condemnation of Trump’s action was immediate and widespread. 
US allies, human rights organizations, and citizens in Muslim-majority 
countries decried the order as another signal that the United States op-
posed Islam, rather than violent extremism. They warned that the mea-
sure would alienate friends, hinder efforts to win hearts and minds, and 
play into the hands of extremists. US citizens and residents protested at 
airports, in Washington, DC, and in towns and cities across the coun-
try. Within days, more than 1,000 State Department employees signed 
a memo opposing the travel ban, and dozens of lawsuits were filed by 
states, NGOs, and individual plaintiffs. On February 3, a federal judge 
in Washington state blocked enforcement of the order nationwide, and 
six days later the federal appeals court in California upheld the ruling 
on the grounds that the executive order denied due process to perma-
nent residents, individuals holding visas, and refugees—all of whom are 
protected by the US Constitution. In response, President Trump issued 
a revised order on March 6 that removed Iraq from the list of countries 
covered by the travel ban, eliminated the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees, 
exempted from exclusion permanent residents and individuals currently 
holding visas, and omitted language giving preference to persecuted reli-
gious minorities in the predominantly Muslim states.
 Criticism continued unabated. On March 10, 134 career diplomats, 
national security officials, and foreign policy experts from both Republi-
can and Democratic administrations sent an open letter to the president 
charging that the revised ban would damage US national security and 
America’s position as a world leader, promote the view that the United 
States opposed Islam, and fuel radicalization. Former CIA director John 
Brennan called the revised order “simplistic and misguided,” because it 
wrongly assumed that nationality was “responsible for a potential terror-
ist act.” He claimed that it would alienate potential allies, who would see 
the ban as “profiling specific nationalities.”11 
 The attorneys general of Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New York, Oregon, and Washington sued to block the revised 
order, charging that it was unconstitutional. On March 15, a federal 
judge in Hawaii blocked the revised travel ban nationwide, invoking 
candidate Trump’s call for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States” as “significant and unrebutted evidence of 
religious animus driving the promulgation of the Executive Order and 
its related predecessor.” As a result, the ruling held, the order violated the 
374  |  Epilogue
constitutional proscription against religious discrimination. Moreover, 
the order’s “focus on nationality,” rather than on acts of the individu-
als barred, undermined its stated purpose of protecting Americans from 
terrorist attacks.12 Hours later, a federal judge in Maryland issued a sepa-
rate ruling, noting that the purpose of the order seemed to be “the effec-
tuation of the proposed Muslim ban” that Trump had advocated during 
his presidential campaign.13 The Trump administration immediately 
appealed both rulings.
 On May 25, 2017, the federal appeals court in Virginia upheld the 
Maryland ruling, noting that the revised travel ban “drips with religious 
intolerance, animus and discrimination” and contravened the First 
Amendment prohibition against government establishment of religion. 
Furthermore, it appeared that the executive order’s “stated national secu-
rity interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious pur-
pose.”14 On June 12, the federal appeals court in California upheld the 
Hawaii determination that the revised travel ban violated federal law in 
suspending entrance to the United States of whole classes of people with 
discriminatory intent and without adequate justification. The Trump 
administration appealed the lower court rulings to the Supreme Court, 
which initially agreed to hear the cases. However, in October 2017 the 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of both decisions on the grounds 
that the temporary travel ban had expired and the cases were now moot. 
The high court also vacated the federal appeals court decisions, which 
precluded their use as precedent.
 Meanwhile, on September 24, 2017, hours before the expiration of 
the second travel ban, President Trump issued a third iteration of the 
policy. Rather than imposing a temporary prohibition on entry, the new 
ban bars indefinitely nearly all travel to the United States by citizens of 
Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In addition, 
some citizens of Iraq and Venezuela will be subjected to increased re-
strictions or vetting. Citizens of the listed countries who have permanent 
legal residency or who seek refugee status in the United States will not be 
affected, and those with temporary visas will be permitted to stay until 
their visas expire. To deflect the charge that the measures specifically tar-
geted Muslims, two non-Muslim-majority countries (North Korea and 
Venezuela) were added to the original lists, and the restrictions were tai-
lored to each country according to its security capabilities as assessed by 
the Trump administration. 
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 On October 17, the day before the third ban was to take effect, fed-
eral district courts in Hawaii and Maryland blocked the wholesale ex-
clusion of citizens from Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, 
which would affect some 150 million people. Like the first two bans, the 
courts determined, the new proclamation discriminated on the basis of 
nationality and religion. Moreover, the administration failed to substan-
tiate claims that the admission of citizens from these countries would 
harm US interests. The federal appeals courts in California and Virginia 
also ruled against the administration’s blanket prohibitions. However, 
the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to fully imple-
ment the ban while legal challenges proceeded. In early 2018, Trump 
lifted travel restrictions on citizens of Chad, a key US counterterrorism 
partner. However, in June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the travel ban 
in its entirety, rejecting lower court arguments concerning religious and 
national discrimination.
 The Trump administration also took action to restrict the number of 
refugees entering the United States, particularly from Muslim-majority 
countries. In September 2017, President Trump announced that refugee 
resettlement in the United States would be capped at 45,000 during fiscal 
year 2018, a 59 percent reduction from the ceiling of 110,000 instituted 
during the Obama administration’s last year in office. On October 24, 
2017, following a months-long hiatus in new refugee admissions, President 
Trump ended the suspension but issued an executive order that subjected 
individuals from eleven unidentified countries to an additional 90-day 
security screening. The countries in question were reported to be Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, 
and Yemen. Nine of the eleven are Muslim-majority countries, and to-
gether they account for more than 40 percent of the refugees resettled 
in the United States in recent years. The administration also ended the 
ability of resettled refugees to bring to the United States spouses and chil-
dren who remained outside the country.
 The Trump administration’s reluctance to admit Muslim refugees 
fleeing conflict and oppression strained US relations with European, 
as well as African and Asian, allies. At the G7 summit of industrialized 
countries in May 2017, the United States rejected an Italian draft report 
on human mobility that framed mass migration as a humanitarian cri-
sis that required a sensitive global response. The Italian document rec-
ognized migrants’ rights, acknowledged their positive contributions to 
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host countries, and noted the dire factors that drive people to become 
refugees. Trump officials offered instead a brief statement that asserted 
“the sovereign rights of states to control their own borders and set clear 
limits on net migration levels as key elements of their national security.”15 
As the most powerful of the G7 countries, the United States prevailed, 
and Italy’s communiqué was jettisoned. In December 2017, the Trump 
administration exacerbated tensions when it withdrew from discussions 
concerning the UN-sponsored Global Compact on Migration, which 
promotes the resettlement, education, and employment of refugees and 
migrants. Matters were brought to a head in January 2018, when Presi-
dent Trump referred to some Africa nations as “shithole countries” and 
suggested that citizens from these countries are not desirable immi-
grants. His comments provoked outrage in African, European, and US 
diplomatic circles, where his remarks were widely condemned.16
Climate Change
If violent conflict is a major impetus for human migration, the calamitous 
effects of climate change—devastating droughts and floods, destructive 
storms, rising sea levels, and severe food and water shortages—are at the 
source of numerous contemporary conflicts, including many in Africa. 
Although industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere histori-
cally have produced most of the greenhouse gases that promote climate 
change, poorer countries in the Global South have suffered most of the 
consequences.
 The Paris Agreement of 2015 was an unprecedented attempt by 
the world community to address the growing climate crisis and to as-
sist those that were most affected. A legally binding document that was 
nearly a decade in the making, the Paris Agreement was signed by 195 
countries. Signatory states developed their own targets for greenhouse 
gas reduction, pledged to do their best to meet them, and agreed to pro-
vide mandatory updates on their progress. Historically the world’s largest 
polluter, the United States promised that by 2025 it would cut greenhouse 
emissions by 26 to 28 percent below its 2005 levels.
 Donald Trump campaigned against President Obama’s climate 
policies, which he claimed were destroying the US coal industry and 
killing jobs. He pledged that if elected, he would revoke his predecessor’s 
greenhouse gas regulations and withdraw from the Paris climate accord. 
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President Trump quickly made good on his promises. On May 28, 2017, 
he signed an executive order that rescinded the regulations intended to 
reduce greenhouse gases. His 2018 budget proposal eliminated funding 
for Obama’s Global Climate Change Initiative, which promoted low- 
carbon economic growth in developing countries, and ended US support 
for UN climate change programs. On June 1, Trump announced that the 
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Moreover, it 
would not pay the $2 billion balance of a $3 billion US commitment to 
help poor countries cope with the effects of climate change. The Trump 
administration’s climate polices, like those pertaining to Muslim coun-
tries and peoples, will have significant implications for Africa.
Dominance of Military Action over Development,  
Diplomacy, and Human Rights
The Trump administration’s actions in the foreign policy arena will also 
have major consequences for Africa. In what he has billed as an “Amer-
ica First” foreign policy, President Trump has promised to champion 
“American interests and American national security” over all other 
considerations.17 The problem lies less in the ultimate objective than in 
the president’s narrow understanding of national interests and security. 
When considering interests, President Trump defines “national” in ways 
that exclude many groups residing within US borders; the well-being 
of these populations is ignored. Where security is concerned, the presi-
dent adopts a limited law-and-order interpretation that emphasizes the 
defense of international borders from foreign military threats, rather 
than the more expansive concept of “human security” favored by the 
UN, which focuses on people rather than territory. The broader definition 
embraces health, education, employment, environment, and respect for 
human rights and civil liberties as factors critical to human well-being.18 
The safeguarding of both national interests and national security re-
quires a multidimensional approach that addresses the prime causes of 
the problems that plague the world today. Career officials in the military 
and diplomatic arenas warn that President Trump’s embrace of simplistic 
understandings and his impulse to respond with military might are mis-
guided, ineffective, and dangerous.19
 To a greater degree than any of his predecessors, President Trump 
has surrendered foreign and national security policy to the military. His 
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high-level appointments—both in the Cabinet and among senior White 
House staff—reveal a heavy reliance on military commanders, who, by 
training, will be inclined to offer military over social, economic, and po-
litical solutions. The National Security Council, an interagency body that 
advises the president on foreign policy and national security matters, is 
administered from the White House, rather than the Pentagon, to en-
sure that the military does not dominate US foreign policy decisions.20 It 
is chaired by the president’s national security advisor, who typically has 
been a civilian.21 However, President Trump’s first two national security 
advisors were US Army generals—one retired (Michael Flynn) and one 
active duty (H. R. McMaster). Nearly half of the senior policy and lead-
ership jobs on the Trump National Security Council are held by active or 
retired military officers, even though historically most of these positions 
have been filled by career civil servants and other civilian experts from 
outside the government. The new military dominance is also evident in 
President Trump’s Cabinet-level appointments. His defense secretary 
(Jim Mattis) and his first homeland security secretary and second chief 
of staff (John Kelly) are retired US Marine Corps generals, while his in-
terior secretary (Ryan Zinke) is a former US Navy SEAL commander. 
His first CIA director and second secretary of state (Mike Pompeo) is a 
former army captain. 
 The Trump administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2018 
and related policy prescriptions underscored the president’s preference 
for military action over development, diplomacy, and human rights. The 
budget blueprint called for a 10 percent increase in military spending and 
a reduction of State Department and USAID funding by up to 37 percent. 
Meanwhile, the first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, pushed for the elimina-
tion of as many as 2,300 State Department jobs—an estimated 9 percent 
of the agency’s global workforce. Challenged in Congress from both left 
and right, the bill that was signed into law in March 2018 retained the 
military increases but reinstated many of the diplomacy and foreign aid 
cuts the White House had requested. The original proposal, however, of-
fers insight into the administration’s objectives and priorities.22
 President Trump’s inclination toward military action has also been 
evident on the ground. During his first months in office, the president 
intensified US military activities in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Somalia, and made threats against North Korea. He promised that ag-
gressive military action to defeat the Islamic State would be a centerpiece 
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of his foreign policy. However, conflicting statements and mixed sig-
nals have muddied the waters, and the actual trajectory of his policies 
remains unclear. As both candidate and president, Trump asserted that 
his “America First” policy meant that the United States would no longer 
serve as the world’s peacekeeper, and his proposed budget for fiscal year 
2018 would reduce US contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts by 50 
percent. In Africa, this may mean that the Trump administration will 
continue the Bush and Obama strategies of strengthening African se-
curity forces in their counterterrorism efforts in order to minimize the 
number of American boots and casualties on the ground—although there 
are other indications that the number of US military personnel in Africa 
will increase. At the same time, the United States is likely to diminish 
its involvement in postconflict reconstruction and development; Trump 
promised on the campaign trail to “end the era of nation-building” and 
to focus instead on destroying “Radical Islamic terrorism.”23 Such an ap-
proach, characterized by Daniel Benjamin as the “hyper-militarization 
of the fight against terror,” fails to address the poverty, unemployment, 
insecurity, and absence of accountable governance that lie at the root of 
violent extremism.24 It likely to intensify regional instability and increase 
the potential for radicalization and violence.
 In Africa, the military’s increased influence quickly surfaced in So-
malia. Only days after the president’s inauguration, Defense Secretary Jim 
Mattis proposed that military commanders be granted more authority in 
conducting strikes and raids against suspected al-Shabaab targets with-
out the burden of interagency review in Washington. The Obama admin-
istration had deferred such authority to high-level civilian and military 
officials from several government agencies, who considered the wider 
implications of such actions, including risks to civilians and to US mili-
tary personnel and ramifications for broader US national security inter-
ests. High-ranking career officials in the national security establishment 
opposed the proposed change of policy; more than three dozen signed 
a letter to Mattis that warned against the relaxation of counterterrorism 
standards outside of war zones. “Even small numbers of unintentional 
civilian deaths or injuries . . . can cause significant strategic setbacks,” 
they wrote. Such events could increase the reluctance of allies to col-
laborate and could boost extremist recruitment and violence.25 Other 
critics claimed that the easing of constraints could serve to intensify past 
practices that had proven to be ineffective or even counterproductive. 
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US strikes against al-Shabaab leaders had frequently resulted in civil-
ian deaths that generated considerable anti-American sentiment. The 
targeted killings did not significantly weaken the organization, and the 
dead leaders were often replaced by others who were even more extreme. 
Despite these protests, President Trump signed a directive on March 29 
that designated much of Somalia an “area of active hostilities,” permitting 
war zone regulations to apply for 180 days or more.26 This classification 
obviated the need for high-level interagency approval of raids against 
al-Shabaab targets, accepted greater potential for civilian casualties, and 
allowed individuals to be targeted simply because they were suspected to 
be members of al-Shabaab, not because they were a direct threat to the 
lives of Americans or American partners.27
 During Trump’s first year in office, the number of US airstrikes and 
drone attacks in Somalia escalated dramatically, killing dozens of civil-
ians as well as hundreds of alleged al-Shabaab militants. The insurgent 
organization responded by intensifying its focus on soft targets; in Octo-
ber 2017 alone, al-Shabaab truck bombs killed more than 500 people in 
Mogadishu. The following month, the United States expanded the war 
on terror to Puntland, where it conducted its first airstrikes against the 
Islamic State’s Somali affiliate. Meanwhile, the number of US Special 
Operations troops in Somalia approached 500, double the 2016 tally. 
 The new policy in Somalia foreshadowed intensified military activity 
elsewhere on the continent. The Trump administration extended the re-
laxed regulations on drone strikes and commando raids to other African 
regions where the United States perceived a threat, and it increased the 
number of Special Operations troops in Africa to some 2,000. In October 
2017, four US Army Special Forces soldiers were killed in Niger, where 
800 US Special Operations troops were stationed, and in November the 
Nigerien government granted Washington permission to fly armed at-
tack drones, as well as unarmed surveillance drones, from a base near the 
capital city. The armed drone program, aimed at militants in Mali and 
Niger, will require hundreds of additional US military personnel. Finally, 
in March 2018, the US broadened its drone operations in Libya from Is-
lamic State targets in the north to include AQIM militants in the south. 
All of these actions signaled an expansion of America’s war on terror in 
North Africa and the Sahel.
 US Africa policy would also be affected by other counterterrorism 
measures under review by the Trump White House. In January 2017, draft 
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executive orders circulating within the National Security Council re-
vealed the administration’s interest in resurrecting the CIA’s secret “black 
site” prisons, where terror suspects were detained and tortured, and in 
reinstating the agency’s aggressive interrogation tactics, which most in-
ternational legal experts had deemed torture. During the George W. Bush 
administration, secret CIA prisons in Africa—later closed by President 
Obama—were located in Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Libya, and Morocco. 
Disagreement within the Trump Cabinet and among Republicans in Con-
gress put both the secret prison and harsh interrogation orders on hold.28
 The president’s misunderstanding of the causes of violent extremism 
and his preference for force over development and diplomacy had sig-
nificant consequences for US Africa policy. However, his prescriptions 
also faced serious opposition from high-level career officials in both the 
military and foreign policy establishments. In February 2017, 121 retired 
generals and admirals wrote to Congress to protest the proposed aid and 
diplomacy cuts in the 2018 budget. “The State Department, USAID, Mil-
lennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps and other development 
agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put 
our men and women in uniform in harm’s way,” they wrote. “The mili-
tary will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs 
strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism—
lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness.”29 Retired 
General Colin Powell, who served as secretary of state in the George W. 
Bush administration, called the State Department and foreign aid cuts a 
narrow, misguided understanding of putting “America first” that would 
undermine US economic interests and security.30 In sum, the Trump 
budget proposal bucked the military and diplomatic consensus that US 
counterterrorism measures must tackle the underlying causes of insta-
bility and extremism, providing solutions that embrace health, economic 
development, and accountable governance. Military action alone would 
only exacerbate tensions and play into the hands of violent extremists.
 Other powerful stakeholders also opposed reductions in foreign aid. 
The US Chamber of Commerce, arguably the most powerful lobby in the 
United States, has historically supported “a robust international affairs 
budget,” which it describes as “a critical tool . . . to ensure America’s na-
tional security” and central to the promotion of US economic interests.31 
In Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike understood the impor-
tance of diplomacy and the key role played by foreign aid in building 
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international alliances and strengthening the US economy. American 
businesses and members of Congress were well aware that foreign assis-
tance programs include “buy American” clauses that subsidize US agri-
cultural, manufacturing, defense, and shipping sectors, and that greater 
prosperity in Africa expands future markets for US goods and services. 
They knew that foreign aid programs, which constitute approximately 
1 percent of the federal budget, create thousands of American jobs, and 
that a healthier, more stable world enhances US security. As a result, the 
much-contested spending bill signed by President Trump in March 2018 
included a relatively small reduction in the State Department and USAID 
budgets, rather than the 37 percent the administration had requested.
 Beyond budget and staffing cuts, the Trump White House has dimin-
ished the role of diplomacy in other ways. The first secretary of state, Rex 
Tillerson, a former chairman and chief executive officer of the transnational 
oil and gas company ExxonMobil, had no previous government experience. 
Under his leadership, the State Department was sidelined. Foreign policy 
decisions traditionally made with input from high-ranking State Depart-
ment officials were made instead by political advisors in Trump’s inner cir-
cle, often without expert advice or consultation. An unprecedented number 
of career officials in the State Department resigned or were dismissed as the 
Trump administration took office, and high-level resignations continued 
throughout the first year. Months into the Trump presidency, nearly 200 
senior staff positions that require Senate confirmation had not been filled, 
and there were no recommendations in the pipeline. Secretary Tillerson’s 
knowledge of Africa was limited, and at the close of 2017, there was no per-
manent assistant secretary of state for African affairs and no US ambassa-
dors in strategically important countries such as the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Egypt, Somalia, South Africa, and Sudan.
 Marginalized by Trump’s inner circle and lacking in diplomatic 
experience and expert guidance, Tillerson nonetheless signaled a new 
emphasis for the State Department under his leadership. Human rights 
as an element of US foreign policy would be minimized. As head of 
ExxonMobil, Tillerson had had regular dealings with corrupt and repres-
sive governments worldwide. In Africa, his corporation worked closely 
with kleptocratic, authoritarian regimes in the oil-rich countries of An-
gola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Chad. At his Senate confirmation 
hearings in January 2017, Tillerson was reluctant to call out human rights 
violators—despite the fact that an important State Department task is the 
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annual publication of human rights reports for countries that maintain 
political and economic relations with the United States.32 In March, he 
failed to appear at the event marking the official release of the depart-
ment’s 2016 human rights report, even though for the past four decades 
the release has featured a press briefing and remarks by the secretary of 
state. In May, Tillerson lectured State Department diplomats and staff on 
the distinction between values and policy, noting, “Our values around 
freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated—those are our val-
ues. Those are not our policies.” He concluded that if the United States 
expects other countries to adopt American values, it will create “obstacles 
to our ability to advance on our national security interests, our economic 
interests.”33 When asked by a senior State Department official to provide 
more specific policy direction for diplomats, Tillerson responded, “It’s 
very simple. End terrorism. End radicalization. Deal with China.”34 This 
approach had significant ramifications for US Africa policy.
 The increased marginalization of good governance and human 
rights in US foreign policy has been accompanied by a closer embrace 
of autocrats and human rights abusers. During his first months in of-
fice, President Trump praised Vladimir Putin of Russia, King Salman 
of Saudi Arabia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, and Rodrigo Duterte 
of the Philippines. He extended this pattern to Africa, where he hon-
ored Egyptian dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, whose regime was waging 
a brutal campaign against Islamist and secular opponents, and Nigerian 
President Muhammadu Buhari, who had failed to hold accountable se-
curity forces that perpetrated human rights abuses against the civilian 
population. “We are very much behind President el-Sisi,” Trump affirmed 
during the Egyptian president’s White House visit. “He’s done a fantastic 
job in a very difficult situation.”35 Meanwhile, Nigeria was slated to pur-
chase a dozen Super Tucano attack planes, a sale that had been halted by 
the Obama administration because of the Nigerian military’s abysmal 
human rights record. Egypt and Nigeria are the linchpins of US counter-
terrorism initiatives in their respective regions. This partnership remains 
Trump’s overriding, if not his sole, concern.
Aid to Africa under Fire
As President Trump’s first year in office made clear, the continent of Africa 
does not interest Donald Trump—unless it poses a threat or provides a 
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benefit to the United States. As a candidate, Trump made few explicit 
references to Africa. After the election, his transition team submitted to 
the State and Defense Departments a list of Africa-related questions that 
stressed counterterrorism and economic concerns over humanitarian 
and development goals. Questioning the value and effectiveness of US 
humanitarian assistance, his staffers asked, “With so much corruption in 
Africa, how much of our funding is stolen?”36 Yet only a few weeks into 
his presidency, Trump signed a law that revoked the Cardin-Lugar anti-
corruption/transparency regulation, which required US businesses deal-
ing with corrupt governments in oil-, gas-, and mineral-rich countries 
to reveal the details of their transactions. Several African countries were 
affected by this regulation, which was intended to stem bribery and cor-
ruption and help citizens of resource-rich countries hold their govern-
ments accountable. Greater government accountability would facilitate 
escape from the poverty-amid-affluence syndrome often associated with 
the “resource curse.” Supporters of Cardin-Lugar argued that corruption 
intensifies poverty and conflict and that human rights, good governance, 
and financial transparency are fundamental to US economic and na-
tional security. The Trump administration responded that publicizing 
the nature of their business arrangements would make US companies 
less competitive. During Tillerson’s tenure at the helm of ExxonMobil, 
the oil giant had lobbied hard against Cardin-Lugar, which exposed 
the corporation’s dealings with corrupt regimes in Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, Chad, and elsewhere.
 Downplaying the importance of transparency and good gover-
nance, President Trump has demonstrated a similar disinterest in Afri-
can health—except insofar as diseases found in Africa might affect the 
United States. During the 2014–16 Ebola epidemic, which killed more 
than 11,000 people in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, candidate Trump 
decried the airlifting of US health workers, who had been infected while 
caring for African victims, to a treatment facility in Atlanta, Georgia. He 
tweeted, “Stop the EBOLA patients from entering the U.S. Treat them, 
at the highest level, over there. THE UNITED STATES HAS ENOUGH 
PROBLEMS!”37 The American patients were treated in a special isolation 
unit at Emory University Hospital, a joint enterprise of Emory and the 
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The unit is one of the 
few facilities worldwide that can care for such highly infectious patients 
while simultaneously protecting those who are attending them. There are 
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no such facilities in Africa. Although no Americans died in the epidemic, 
the only Ebola-related question posed by the Trump transition team was 
“How do we prevent the next Ebola outbreak from hitting the U.S.?”38
 Even PEPFAR, George W. Bush’s signature anti-AIDS initiative, 
was questioned. By 2016, the Bush program, which focuses primarily on 
Africa, had helped treat more than 11.5 million people worldwide with 
life-saving medications. It had trained some 220,000 health workers 
and enabled more than 74.3 million people to receive HIV testing and 
counseling. In sub-Saharan Africa, PEPFAR projects have promoted in-
creased social stability and economic development. Yet the Trump tran-
sition team queried, “Is PEPFAR worth the massive investment when 
there are so many security concerns in Africa? Is PEPFAR becoming a 
massive, international entitlement program?”39 The failure to understand 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a security concern, not to mention a global 
humanitarian crisis, is indicative of the Trump administration’s weak 
grasp of the underlying causes of human insecurity.
 The proposed 2018 budget offered further proof of the administra-
tion’s disregard for African health. Historically, the United States has 
been the world’s largest contributor to global health funding, providing 
billions of dollars each year to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, 
and other preventable diseases and to provide childhood vaccinations, 
family planning, and maternal care services. Most of this funding is allo-
cated to programs in some thirty African countries, where US contribu-
tions for malaria prevention saved the lives of nearly 2 million children 
between 2006 and 2014. The Trump administration’s proposed budget 
would have downsized State Department/USAID global health alloca-
tions by 26 percent. These cuts would have resulted in a 20 percent reduc-
tion in US spending on antiretroviral drugs, a 17 percent decline in funds 
for PEPFAR, and 11 percent less for anti-malaria programs. Public health 
researchers and advocates asserted that if the proposed cuts to AIDS 
treatment programs were enacted, at least 1 million more people would 
die, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, and more than 300,000 children 
would be orphaned. Core constituencies rallied, and the spending bill 
pushed through Congress in March 2018 retained HIV/AIDS funding at 
the 2017 level.
 Beyond reductions on the HIV/AIDS front, the proposed 2018 
budget would have virtually eliminated aid to overseas family planning 
programs, which provide birth control and reproductive health care to 
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women across the Global South. These cuts would have led to a greater 
number of unwanted pregnancies and maternal deaths and, in conse-
quence, to intensifying cycles of poverty. However, congressional bar-
gaining retained international family planning and reproductive health 
at their 2017 levels. Left in place was the Mexico City Policy, commonly 
referred to as the “global gag rule.” Introduced by the Reagan administra-
tion in 1984, the policy prohibits the provision of US government family 
planning assistance to foreign NGOs that discuss abortion as a method 
of family planning—even if those organizations do not promote or offer 
abortion services. Since 1973, the Helms amendment to the US Foreign 
Assistance Act has precluded the use of foreign aid funds for abortions. 
However, until the Mexico City Policy took effect, US family planning 
assistance could be given to organizations that tapped other sources for 
abortion-related purposes.
 Since its inception, the Mexico City Policy has been routinely re-
scinded by Democratic administrations and reinstated by their Republi-
can successors. Shortly after taking office, President Trump restored the 
gag rule that Obama had revoked—and went one step further. The new 
administration expanded the policy from family planning assistance to 
include global health assistance of any kind, affecting some $9.5 billion 
provided through the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, and 
other government agencies. In many of the affected countries, foreign 
NGOs sponsor local clinics that offer all health services available in 
the area: testing and treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculo-
sis; women’s and children’s health care, including screenings, immuni-
zations, and nutrition; family planning counseling and contraceptives; 
prenatal and maternal health care—and sometimes abortion services or 
counseling. If abortion is mentioned in a clinic, or if an international 
NGO sponsoring the clinic provides abortion counseling or services 
anywhere in the world, none of its programs may receive US government 
funds. Experts warn that the new rules will devastate African health care 
services, increase infant and maternal mortality, and have a severe im-
pact on surviving family members.
 The proposed budget would have threatened African well-being 
in other ways. Trump’s budget request included significant cuts in US 
food aid at a time when nearly 20 million people in Nigeria, Somalia, 
and South Sudan were facing dire food insecurity. It recommended a 43 
percent decrease in funds for international disaster relief, while climate 
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change–induced droughts and floods were threatening many African 
populations. It called for the elimination of the United States African 
Development Foundation, which supports local projects focusing on 
the most vulnerable populations in thirty African countries. Reflecting 
the administration’s “America First” emphasis, the 2018 budget also pro-
posed a 44 percent decrease in US allocations to international organiza-
tions, with the notation that “funding for organizations that work against 
US foreign policy interests could be terminated.”40
 Portions of the Trump budget proposal, rejected by Congress, would 
have jeopardized numerous UN programs that address poverty, health, 
security, development, climate change, and humanitarian assistance—
with major implications for Africa. As the UN’s largest single donor, the 
United States provides 22 percent of the institution’s $5.4 billion annual 
operating budget and 28.5 percent of its $7.9 billion annual peacekeep-
ing budget. Projected reductions in US support—including a 50 percent 
cut in peacekeeping payments—would have imperiled many of the UN’s 
basic programs. The cost-cutting actions would have placed the United 
States in violation of the UN Charter, which authorizes the General 
Assembly to apportion budgetary responsibilities to member nations. 
Those allocations are determined primarily on the basis of the countries’ 
wealth. Washington’s failure to make its obligatory contributions for two 
or more years should, in theory, lead to its loss of voting rights in the 
General Assembly. Given America’s position as a world power, it is un-
likely that this sanction would be applied. However, default on its com-
mitments would severely damage US standing in the global arena.
 Conclusion
When Donald Trump assumed the US presidency in January 2017, US 
Africa policy entered a period of profound uncertainty. At the helm of 
the world’s most powerful country was a man without political experi-
ence who surrounded himself with advisors who were similarly lacking 
in diplomatic involvement and expertise. Without vision or plan, and 
failing to fill an unprecedented number of important diplomatic posi-
tions, President Trump has maintained some of his predecessors’ poli-
cies through inertia. Like Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, 
Trump has emphasized regional counterterrorism initiatives, military al-
liances, and training programs, along with joint exercises and operations. 
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He is likely to intensify the trend toward minimizing US support for 
economic development, good governance, and human rights—a course 
indicated both by official statements and by actions that have rewarded 
corrupt or brutal regimes. During his first year in office, President Trump 
escalated US military involvement in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, 
and the Sahel, loosening rules of engagement intended to guard against 
mission creep and civilian deaths.
 In other areas, Trump’s statements and actions suggest significant 
departures. Unlike his predecessors, President Trump has demonized a 
religion practiced by hundreds of millions of Africans, identifying Islam 
with the violent actions of a small minority whose claims to legitimacy 
are rejected by the vast majority. He has taken actions that have deeply 
offended Muslims, including important US allies. The administration’s 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2018 would have significantly increased 
military spending while dramatically reducing funds for diplomacy and 
foreign aid. Although Congress did not sustain the deep cuts to aid, given 
the importance of foreign assistance to US diplomacy and the US econ-
omy, the Trump initiative provides further evidence of his shift in goals 
and priorities. The undoing of Obama’s climate policies will also have 
significant ramifications for Africa. If the Trump administration con-
tinues on this course, it will further undermine African people’s health 
and well-being, strengthen corrupt, authoritarian regimes, intensify 
local grievances, and increase regional instability. Such developments 
are likely to accelerate the movement toward radicalization and violence, 
undermining rather than accomplishing America’s stated goals.
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assessing the impact of Foreign intervention
in the decades following the Cold War, numerous African countries 
were the subject of foreign political and military intervention. Neigh-
boring states and subregional, regional, and global organizations and 
networks interceded in their affairs, supporting both war-making and 
peace-building processes. The Cold War paradigm as justification for in-
tervention was replaced by two new ones: a response to instability, with 
the corollary of the responsibility to protect civilian lives, and the war 
on terror. During the post–Cold War period, the majority of externally 
driven actions were legitimized as responses to instability. The war on 
terror justification, which predated the 9/11 attacks, was used with in-
creasing frequency in its aftermath. This book investigates the impact of 
those interventions through the lens of case studies from East, Central, 
West, and North Africa. Its findings support four central propositions.
 First, regardless of the rationale, external powers tended to intervene 
only where their own political, economic, and strategic interests were 
at stake. In many instances, the promotion of their own interests was 
the underlying motivation. The failure to intervene when interests were 
not at risk also had critical consequences. Although foreign intervention 
sometimes benefited civilian populations, many actions had harmful re-
sults, both immediately and in the long run.
 Second, the war on terror, like its Cold War antecedent, augmented 
foreign military presence in Africa and increased outside support for 
repressive regimes. The US case is especially notable. In both Republi-
can and Democratic administrations, the counterterrorism agenda took 
precedence over concerns for basic human rights and broader forms of 
human security. Programs enhancing military security were privileged 
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over those that approached human security more holistically. Safeguard-
ing access to energy resources and strategic minerals and strengthening 
allies in the war on terror often overrode other considerations. Rather 
than promoting peace and stability, US military intervention often exac-
erbated local conflicts and undermined prospects for regional peace.
 Third, the securitization of US Africa policy had enormous implica-
tions, transferring attention and resources from destitute populations in 
some countries to those in regions of greater strategic importance. How-
ever, the United States was not the only external actor in Africa after the 
Cold War. The United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, 
and numerous African subregional organizations played important dip-
lomatic and peacekeeping roles, and in some cases engaged in multilat-
eral military enforcement actions. France, a former colonial power, never 
relinquished its sense of imperial entitlement; it retained a strong military 
presence in Africa and demonstrated a will to use it on many occasions. 
Paris, like Washington, harnessed its influence in the UN and NATO 
to further its African agenda. After the Cold War, emerging powers in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America wielded new diplomatic and economic 
clout. They leveraged their authority both to promote their own interests 
in Africa and to advance peace and security initiatives. The success of 
externally backed accords depended on the degree to which all parties to 
the conflicts and representative civil society organizations were engaged. 
Agreements that were imposed from above or outside were least likely to 
succeed.
 Public pressure for intervention in response to humanitarian crises 
in Africa also contributed to foreign involvement. Activists in Western 
countries, in particular, pushed governments and international bodies 
to protect civilians’ lives. However, well-meaning advocates frequently 
viewed complex situations as straightforward battles between good guys 
and bad guys—with Western countries playing the part of savior. Too 
often they perceived their allies as faultless and sought to isolate their 
opponents through sanctions or prosecution, undermining prospects 
for negotiations between parties essential to resolving the conflicts. They 
often failed to consult those affected by the conflicts and to promote 
the solutions offered by local populations.1 Seeking quick resolutions 
to entrenched problems, Western human rights advocates sometimes 
proposed military solutions that historically have undermined the goals 
they support.
Assessing the Impact of Foreign Intervention  |  391
 Fourth, foreign intervention in response to the war on terror tended 
to intensify rather than diminish conflicts, and external involvement in 
response to instability often rendered local conflicts more lethal. Even 
humanitarian missions, which were established to protect civilian lives, 
sometimes had deadly consequences. Like more militaristic initiatives, 
they were frequently undermined by weak mandates, insufficient funds, 
and the competing interests of the parties involved. The seduction of 
quick military fixes undermined long-term prospects for enduring peace 
because underlying political, economic, and social grievances were 
ignored.
 As these case studies demonstrate, foreign military intervention has 
sometimes resulted in short-term gains, but military actions have gener-
ally failed to produce enduring solutions. Those in charge have rarely ad-
dressed the deeply rooted local problems and grievances that provoked 
the conflicts. Frequently they have failed to distinguish between opposi-
tional forces with different objectives, and they have refused to negotiate 
with parties they find objectionable.2 Counterterrorism operations have 
been especially damaging. Government actions against civilian popula-
tions in insurgent areas have been notoriously brutal, and externally di-
rected drone and missile strikes have killed countless unarmed civilians. 
Such encounters have sometimes increased local support for antigovern-
ment insurgencies. Foreign-led victories over guerrilla fighters have gen-
erally been short-lived. Scattered by powerful military forces, insurgents 
have tended to regroup in new areas and transform their tactics to focus 
on soft targets, placing civilians at even greater risk.
 History has shown that there will be no peace if underlying griev-
ances are not addressed, domestic and foreign militaries continue to vic-
timize local populations, and dysfunctional states fail to provide basic 
social and security services.3 Since the early 1990s, African prodemoc-
racy movements have demanded better education, employment, health 
care, clean water, sanitation, electricity, and roads, along with programs 
to rehabilitate rank-and-file fighters and counter future radicalization. 
They have demanded responsive democratic governments that respect 
the rule of law, eliminate corruption, and address such contentious is-
sues as climate change, pollution, and the inequitable distribution of 
resources. They have called for an end to harsh counterinsurgency cam-
paigns and to the impunity of military and police personnel who have 
engaged in human rights abuses.
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 These concerns are longstanding, and there are no easy fixes or 
short-term solutions. Fundamental political, economic, and social trans-
formations will take decades. In the interim, peace agreements will be 
negotiated. Those that are imposed from above or outside, with little 
buy-in from relevant groups on the ground, have the least chance of 
success. Those most likely to succeed are those that give voice to men, 
women, elders, youth, and other civil society members, and that integrate 
these constituencies into the discussions from start to finish. Important 
parties must not be silenced or sidelined. Islamists who are willing to 
work within the democratic process must be allowed to do so. If they are 
not permitted to participate, to take office after winning elections, or to 
govern without special constraints, many will reject the systems that are 
rigged against them. Some will seek rectification in violent extremism. 
Citizens who are abused or neglected by their governments or who seek 
a semblance of order and security where none exists may respond to ex-
tremists’ appeals. There will be no end to conflicts if insurgent groups are 
barred from the discussions; a refusal to negotiate with those defined as 
terrorists will doom any deals that might result. The adoption of popu-
larly supported accords is a crucial first step. However, such agreements 
can be effectively implemented only if governments are responsive to the 
people’s will and held accountable. Foreign support for repressive gov-
ernments that act with impunity and represent only a privileged elite, 
military strikes that kill civilians, and commercial engagement with cor-
rupt governments and enterprising warlords will perpetuate violence 
and instability on the continent.
 At the close of 2017, many of the conflicts discussed in this book 
were unresolved. Debates about the merits and demerits of foreign in-
tervention remain contentious, and experts disagree. Critical constitu-
encies have been noticeably absent from mediation efforts. The voices 
of African civil societies have not been central to the discussions, nor 
have the concerns of affected populations been foremost on the agenda. 
Peace initiatives are doomed to fail if these groups are not their top pri-
ority. This book does not claim to offer solutions. Rather, its goal is to 
question faulty assumptions, to expose superficial understandings and 
simplistic analyses, and to offer deeper knowledge to those hoping to 





1. Full disclosure: I served as a consultant on both books, reviewing 
drafts, discussing the topics, and raising difficult-to-answer questions with 
the author.
2. For early assessments of the options for US Africa policy, see “USA/
Africa: No Policy? Bad Policy? Or Both?,” AfricaFocus Bulletin, http://www 
.africafocus.org/docs17/usa1708.php.
3. The full text of Mandela’s speech in Trafalgar Square, London, on 
February 3, 2005, is available on the BBC News website, http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4232603.stm.
Chapter 1: Outsiders and Africa
1. Emblematic of this perspective is Robert D. Kaplan’s “The Coming 
Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease 
Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” Atlantic Monthly 
273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–77.
2. Commonly referred to as the United Kingdom (UK), the country is 
officially the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
3. This study uses United Nations (UN) terminology, which describes 
Africa as a world “region” and North, West, Central, East, and Southern 
Africa as “subregions.” Regional organizations are those that embrace the 
African continent, whereas subregional organizations include members 
from specific geographic areas within it. The term “global” describes en-
tities with members from multiple continents. However, common usage 
requires some flexibility. Discussions of regional interests, conflicts, or sta-
bility, for instance, do not refer to continentwide phenomena, but rather to 
those confined to a smaller geographic area within Africa.
4. The German sociologist Max Weber describes patrimonialism as 
a system of political domination in which all power emanates from the 
ruler and the state apparatus has no independent power base. The Israeli 
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sociologist Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt describes neopatrimonialism as a 
system of political domination that includes a veneer of codified laws, a 
state bureaucracy, and a legal distinction between the public and private 
spheres. However, the ruler continues to use state resources for his own 
benefit and to buy the allegiance of clients inside and outside the official 
bureaucracy. These clients operate on behalf of their patron rather than the 
state or the citizenry.
5. Neoliberal economic models promoted by the International Mone-
tary Fund, the World Bank, and the US government require the privatization 
of state-owned enterprises and limited state involvement in the economy, 
eliminating subsidies, price controls, and protective tariffs.
6. Warlords are leaders of armed antigovernment movements who act 
outside the state apparatus. They seek political and military power in order 
to establish control over resources for their own benefit and that of their 
family members and close associates. Many are disgruntled former offi-
cials of neopatrimonial states whose patrons no longer have the means to 
purchase their allegiance.
7. The African Union was founded in 2002 to integrate the continent 
politically and economically and to promote peace, security, stability, and 
sustainable development. It superseded the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), which was established in 1963 by thirty-two independent African 
states to promote African unity and emancipation.
8. UN General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” paras. 138–
39, adopted September 15, 2005.
9. For further elaboration on Islamist beliefs and identity, see chapter 2.
10. The Gulf states include the seven Arab states that border the Per-
sian Gulf: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates.
11. Quoted in Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of 
Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Houghton Miff-
lin, 1998), 58.
12. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism 
(New York: International, 1966), ix.
13. The African continent ranks either first or second in world reserves 
of bauxite, chromite, cobalt, industrial diamonds, manganese, phosphate 
rock, and platinum-group metals. In 2014, the African percentage of world 
mineral reserves included chromite (85 percent), manganese (82 percent), 
columbo-tantalite or “coltan” (80 percent), phosphate rock (80 percent), 
cobalt (50 percent), bauxite (32 percent), uranium (21 percent), gold (15 
percent), and petroleum (8 percent). Africa also produces 65 percent of the 
world’s diamonds.
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14. According to World Resources Institute data for 2012, the top ten 
greenhouse gas producers are China, the United States, the European 
Union, India, Russia, Japan, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and Mexico. This 
group includes Western countries that have intensified greenhouse gas 
emissions since the Industrial Revolution, as well as several members of 
the influential BRICS group of countries with rapidly expanding econo-
mies, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
15. A 2014 report by the United Nations Convention to Combat De-
sertification forecast that by 2020, 60 million people may be fleeing the 
expanding desert regions of sub-Saharan Africa for North Africa and 
Europe. By 2050, the number permanently displaced by desertification 
could reach 200 million. See United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification, Desertification: The Invisible Frontline (Bonn: UNCCD, 
2014), 9. For a US military assessment of the role of climate change in 
violent conflict, ideological extremism, and authoritarianism in Africa, 
see three reports by the CNA Corporation: National Security and the 
Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2007), National Secu-
rity and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 
2014), and The Role of Water Stress in Instability and Conflict (Alexandria, 
VA: CNA, 2017).
16. When discussing ethnicity in Africa, four factors should be con-
sidered. First, ethnic groups are social rather than biological construc-
tions, and they change over time. Second, in many parts of Africa, ethnic 
identification is a relatively recent phenomenon. Ethnic belonging was 
often determined by outsiders and was rooted or solidified in colonial 
policies. Third, ethnic groups may be marked by flexible boundaries that 
allow people to move between them—albeit over a considerable period 
of time. Fourth, during times of crisis, ethnicity can be manipulated by 
powerful social actors to rally supporters in an in-group against others 
in an out-group—largely to the benefit of social, economic, and political 
elites.
17. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project and the Silk Road 
Economic Belt together constitute China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. 
The Silk Road Economic Belt is a production and trading network that ex-
tends from China to Europe, embracing the historical Silk Road land route 
as well as other countries in South and Southeast Asia.
18. One notable exception to this generalization was South Africa’s 
military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. Pretoria justified the interven-
tion on humanitarian grounds—although critics claimed the regional 
powerhouse was simply pursuing its own strategic and economic inter-
ests. See Siyabonga Patrick Hadebe, “South Africa’s Military Intervention 
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in Lesotho in 1998: A Critical Overview,” http://www.academia.edu/1330315 
/South_African_military_intervention_in_Lesotho.
19. Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.
20. The Sahel (derived from the Arabic word for “shore”) refers to 
the Sahara Desert’s southern borderlands, which stretch more than 3,000 
miles from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east.
Chapter 2: The Post–Cold War Context
1. UN General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” adopted 
September 15, 2005, paras. 138–39. R2P is common shorthand for the re-
sponsibility to protect.
2. See United Nations Charter, Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes”; Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches 
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”; and Chapter VIII, “Regional Ar-
rangements.” The UN Charter was adopted in San Francisco on June 26, 
1945, and is available on the United Nations Treaty Collection website.
3. Genocide was defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” See UN 
General Assembly, Resolution 260, “Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,” December 9, 1948, 174, available on the United Na-
tions Treaty Collection website.
4. Preamble to the United Nations Charter (see note 2 above).
5. “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,” June 25, 1993.
6. United Nations Charter, Chapter I (see note 2 above).
7. UN General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” paras. 138–
39 (see note 1 above).
8. Islam’s two main branches, the Sunni and the Shi’a, are the product 
of a schism that occurred after the prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 CE. 
The Shi’a argued that Muhammad’s successor should be a blood relation 
ordained by Allah, while the Sunni claimed that the successor should be 
chosen by a council of religious elders based solely on his qualifications. 
Although both groups agree on the fundamental tenets of Islam, they dis-
agree about the basis of religious and political authority, which has resulted 
in different interpretations of Islamic law.
9. After the war, the mujahideen sold the weapons on the black market, 
where they fell into the hands of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Central Asian 
drug smugglers, and insurgent forces in Iraq and the Soviet-controlled ter-
ritories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Tajikistan.
10. The concept of jihad is discussed below.
11. The glossary includes definitions of these and other terms associ-
ated with Islam.
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Chapter 3: Identifying the Actors
1. In 2017, NATO’s twenty-eight member states included Albania, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2. The Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and Sweden, and their autonomous regions (Åland Islands, Faroe Islands, 
and Greenland).
3. Of the seven Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar played notable roles. The other Arab 
Gulf states are Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, and Oman.
4. Warlords, who led armed movements outside the state apparatus 
and often included former government officials, played key roles in post–
Cold War conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. In their new positions, they continued 
to use the patronage networks of the old regime to plunder and distribute 
resources and to buy loyalty. They also established personal militias, com-
posed of alienated, unemployed young men, to loot resources and elimi-
nate rivals. Their political and economic partners included foreign busi-
nesses and criminal networks, which served as conduits for the clandestine 
exportation of natural resources and the importation of weapons, both of 
which fueled the conflicts.
5. The Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Soma-
lia, while the Greater Horn includes these countries and adds Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
6. In 2013–15, the United States, EU member states, Japan, Canada, and 
Australia provided 81 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget; the United 
States alone contributed 28.4 percent.
7. “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Lomé, Togo, July 11, 2000, 
and “Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union,” Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 3, 2003. 
8. EU member states in 2017 included Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, which in 2016 voted to leave.
9. During the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, for instance, Qatar was 
exceptional among the Gulf monarchies for its support for moder-
ate Islamist forces, which Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab 
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Emirates considered as much a threat to their power as the prodemocracy 
movements.
10. Arab League member states in 2017 included Algeria, Bahrain, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauri-
tania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Brazil, Eritrea, India, 
and Venezuela had observer status.
11. ECOWAS member states in 2017 included Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Li-
beria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. (Mauritania 
withdrew from the organization in December 2000.)
12. ECCAS member states in 2017 included Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
13. ICGLR member states in 2017 included Angola, Burundi, Cen-
tral African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
(South Sudan joined in 2012.)
14. IGAD member states in 2017 included Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. (Eritrea joined in 1993, 
and South Sudan joined in 2011.)
15. SADC member states in 2017 included Angola, Botswana, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mo-
zambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
16. G7 members in 2017 included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Until 2014, when Russia 
was suspended following its annexation of Crimea, the organization was 
known as the Group of Eight (G8).
17. G20 members in 2017 included Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Can-
ada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Re-
public of Korea (South Korea), Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.
18. Salafism is a movement within Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi 
Arabia. Its adherents advocate a return to the righteous practices of the 
Prophet Muhammad and the early fathers of the faith (Salaf) and promote 
a strict, literal interpretation of Islamic teachings. (See the glossary for fur-
ther detail.)
19. Originally an Algerian insurgency group called the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the organization assumed the name 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb after joining the international terrorist 
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network in 2007. GSPC had splintered from the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), itself an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which had 
won a plurality in Algeria’s 1991 parliamentary elections. Fearing that FIS 
would dominate parliament and rewrite the constitution, the Algerian 
military staged a coup and cancelled runoff elections, which sparked the 
beginning of a decade-long civil war (see chapter 10).
20. Ansar (Followers or Supporters) is a core name that has been ad-
opted by numerous, often unrelated, organizations. In this book, the full 
name is included when the organization is first introduced, followed by an 
abbreviated version on subsequent mention. Further identifying informa-
tion is provided if required for clarity.
21. The Levant is a region on the eastern Mediterranean Sea that 
stretches from Greece to the ancient province of Cyrenaica in eastern 
Libya and includes Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, 
Syria, and Turkey.
22. According to the “Guidelines for Jihad” released by al-Qaeda 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2013, jihadis should minimize Muslim civil-
ian casualties. Al-Qaeda publicly charged that the Islamic State’s ruthless 
practices were contrary to Islamic teachings.
Chapter 4: Somalia
1. Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have military bases in Soma-
lia, and Turkey trains thousands of Somali soldiers.
2. Uganda and Kenya, the mainstays of an AU peacekeeping force, 
were among the most notable targets. Al-Shabaab operations in those 
countries that killed scores of civilians include the July 2010 bombings in 
Uganda that killed 76 people who were watching a broadcast of the World 
Cup soccer finals; the September 2013 attack on a shopping mall in Kenya 
that killed 67 people; and the April 2015 attack on a university in eastern 
Kenya that killed 147 students.
3. British Somaliland stretched from east to west along the Gulf of 
Aden, while Italian Somaliland extended southward from the Gulf of Aden 
along the Indian Ocean coast.
4. The perception of Somali clans as rigid categories with deep historical 
roots was widely disseminated in the classic study by I. M. Lewis, A Pasto-
ral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern So-
mali of the Horn of Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961). Lewis 
posits that Somalia has six clan-based families, which are further divided 
into clans, subclans, patrilineages, and smaller segments. Abdi Samatar’s 
critique of this perspective is discussed in the Suggested Reading section 
at the end of this chapter.
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5. All dollar amounts in this book are US dollars unless otherwise 
indicated.
6. Within the Darod clan family, some segments were especially privi-
leged. These included the Marehan (Siad Barre’s father’s clan), Ogaden (his 
mother’s clan), and Dhulbahante (the clan of his son-in-law, who was also 
head of the feared National Security Service).
7. Aidid was a member of the Habar Gidir clan and Ali Mahdi be-
longed to the Abgaal clan, both part of the Hawiye clan family.
8. Clan cleansing, or massive clan-based violence against civilians, is 
examined in depth in Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The 
Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013).
9. The northwest (Somaliland) and northeast (Puntland) were less af-
fected by the famine and ensuing devastation, which resulted in different 
political trajectories in those regions.
10. Quoted in John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in 
Somalia, 1990–1994 (Geneva: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 22.
11. Quoted in Sommer, Hope Restored, 16. Natsios served as director 
of USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) from 1989 to 
1991 and as assistant administrator of USAID’s Bureau for Food and Hu-
manitarian Assistance, which included the OFDA, from 1991 to 1993.
12. CENTCOM had jurisdiction over US military activities in Egypt 
and the Horn of Africa, as well as in the Middle East and Central Asia.
13. Numerous Western intelligence sources allege that Mohammed 
Atef, al-Qaeda’s military chief and an Egyptian veteran of the Soviet- 
Afghan War, led the al-Qaeda contingent that trained the Somali forces. In 
November 1998, Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef were indicted in a 
US federal court for conspiring to kill Americans outside the United States, 
including in Mogadishu in October 1993. See “US Grand Jury Indictment 
Against Usama bin Laden,” United States District Court, Southern District 
of New York, November 6, 1998.
14. The 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) determined that the charges 
against al-Barakat were baseless; there was no evidence that the organiza-
tion had funded either al-Itihaad or al-Qaeda.
15. The UN Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee removed 
al-Barakat from its sanctions list in February 2012.
16. US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa: Pro-
gram, Activity, and Reference Information, vol. 1, Angola–Namibia FY 2006 
(Washington, DC: USAID, 2006), 74.
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17. Because they oppose religious innovations and new interpretations, 
Salafis reject the mystical spiritual practices and tradition of tolerance as-
sociated with Sufism, which incorporates pre-Islamic beliefs and practices.
18. Quoted in Chris Tomlinson, “Somalia’s Islamic Militia Rebuffs 
U.N.,” Washington Post, July 25, 2006.
19. UN Security Council, Resolution 1725 (2006), December 6, 2006.
20. Quoted in Ken Menkhaus, “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five 
Acts,” African Affairs 106, no. 424 (July 2007): 378.
21. The legal justification for US military activities in Somalia was 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, granted by Congress to the 
president after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. 
Because actions were authorized only against nations, organizations, or in-
dividuals implicated in those attacks, the use of this law against those not 
involved in 9/11 has been hotly contested. See Public Law 107-40, Joint 
Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against 
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United 
States (Authorization for Use of Military Force), September 18, 2001.
22. The criteria for and consequences of the designation “foreign ter-
rorist organization” can be found on the US State Department website.
Chapter 5:  Sudan and South Sudan
1. Sudanese Arabs are people of diverse African ethnic makeup who 
speak Arabic, have embraced some aspects of Arab culture, and are pre-
dominantly Muslim.
2. Following a coup attempt in 1971, Nimeiri severed ties to the Sudanese 
Communist Party and executed many of its leaders.
3. A descendant of Bedouin Arabs and Arabized Berbers, Qaddafi as-
sumed power in Libya after a 1969 military coup. Embracing the pan-Arabism 
of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qaddafi hoped to establish a 
vast Arab Islamic state in North Africa. He also articulated a pan-African 
vision and extended Libyan influence south of the Sahara, where his diplo-
matic overtures were supplemented by development projects financed by 
Libyan oil revenues.
4. John Garang, commander in chief of the SPLA from 1983 to 2005, 
advocated a democratic, secular, and united Sudan, in which all popula-
tions would share in the country’s power and resources. His death in a 
helicopter crash in July 2005, weeks after joining a north-south coalition 
government, led to new leadership that supported southern secession.
5. Sadiq al-Mahdi was a great-grandson of Muhammad Ahmad ibn 
Abd Allah, who had expelled the Ottomans and British from Khartoum 
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in 1885. His grandfather, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, a Sufi imam, 
founded the Umma Party in 1945.
6. The criteria for and consequences of the designation “state sponsor 
of terrorism” can be found on the US State Department website.
7. The files in question included information about al-Qaeda opera-
tives who would play key roles in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania.
8. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway, known as the 
Troika, would continue to play significant mediation roles in Sudan after 
2005 and in South Sudan after 2011.
9. Among the Darfur rebel organizations that joined the SRF were 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Army–
Abdel Wahid (SLA-AW), and the Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi 
(SLA-MM), discussed below.
10. IGAD-Plus included the members of IGAD as well as representa-
tives from the UN, the AU, and the EU; the Troika of the United States, the 
UK, and Norway; China, a key economic partner and permanent member 
of the UN Security Council; and South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, and 
Rwanda, representing the continent’s five regions.
11. The Janjaweed phenomenon first emerged during the civil war 
in Chad, where the crisis in the nomadic way of life was even more pro-
nounced than in Darfur. The term was also used to describe the ethnic 
militias involved in the Arab-Fur War.
12. Founded in 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People is now commonly known by its acronym, NAACP.
13. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, January 25, 2005, 4.
14. UN General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” adopted 
September 15, 2005, paras. 138–39.
15. Quoted in Joel Brinkley, “Security Council Agrees to Send Troops 
to Darfur,” New York Times, February 4, 2006.
16. Whereas the original SLA had included both Fur and Zaghawa 
members, the splinter groups were more starkly organized along ethnic 
lines. SLA-AW attracted mostly Fur adherents, while the SLA-MM was 
composed primarily of Zaghawa members.
17. Quoted in Johan Brosché and Daniel Rothbart, Violent Conflict 
and Peacebuilding: The Continuing Crisis in Darfur (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 68.
18. Mike Pflanz, “Bin Laden Calls for Jihad on Darfur Force,” Telegraph 
(UK), October 25, 2007.
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19. A second arrest warrant, on charges of genocide, was issued in July 
2010. In December 2014, the ICC suspended its case against Bashir, noting 
that ICC member countries continued to allow Sudan’s president to come 
and go unimpeded and that the UN Security Council had ignored numer-
ous appeals for assistance in facilitating his arrest. China, Russia, and the 
United States were among the Security Council members that failed to 
act. Apart from their political and economic considerations, none of these 
countries had ratified the ICC treaty.
20. Quoted in Colum Lynch, “Sudan’s ‘Coordinated’ Genocide in 
Darfur Is Over, U.S. Envoy Says,” Washington Post, June 18, 2009.
21. Quoted in Brian Knowlton, “White House Unveils Sudan Strategy,” 
New York Times, October 20, 2009. The Obama administration suspended 
a number of sanctions in January 2017, and the Trump administration 
revoked them permanently in October of that year. However, Sudan was 
not awarded debt relief and retained its designation as a state sponsor of 
terrorism.
22. Although Tijani al-Sisi, a Fur intellectual, chaired the LJM, critics 
claimed that he was not representative of the Fur population. Having spent 
decades in exile, he was out of touch with local issues, and he had not par-
ticipated in the armed struggle.
23. A referendum in April 2016 offered the choice of five ethnically 
based states or a single regional state—each to be led by a Khartoum- 
appointed governor. Proponents of unification argued that a united Darfur 
could more effectively counter the central government’s power. The condi-
tions surrounding the vote were widely criticized. Most of the 2.6 million 
Darfuris who were displaced could not vote, and balloting occurred amid 
violence and insecurity. The opposition boycotted the referendum, voter 
turnout was low, and the results were contested. While Khartoum claimed 
that nearly 98 percent of the voters favored the five-state option, the US 
State Department asserted that the referendum results were not “a credible 
expression of the will of the people.” Quoted in Zeinab Mohammed Salih 
and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Light Turnout for Vote in Darfur on Region’s Fu-
ture,” New York Times, April 11, 2016.
Chapter 6: Rwanda
1. The former Belgian Congo was known successively as Congo- 
Léopoldville (1960), Congo-Kinshasa (1966), Zaire (1971), and, finally, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1997).
2. French political, economic, and military pacts with autocratic Af-
rican leaders led to numerous French military interventions during the 
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postcolonial period. The neocolonial relationship was referred to by its de-
tractors as Françafrique.
3. Concerned by the influence on exiled Tutsi activists of radical nation-
alists like Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, colonial officials claimed to 
be saving Hutu peasants from both Tutsi feudalism and Tutsi communism.
4. The United States, which was expected to pay for one-third of the 
mission’s costs, had advocated a force of only 500.
5. A 400-page report released by a French judicial commission in 
January 2012 corroborated the Belgian-US claim. New evidence has again 
shifted suspicion to the RPF, which stood to benefit from the leadership 
struggle that followed Habyarimana’s death. See Alex de Waal, “Writing 
Human Rights and Getting It Wrong,” Boston Review, June 6, 2016.
6. Susan Rice, director for international organizations and peacekeeping 
on the US National Security Council in 1994, was among those who opposed 
use of the term genocide. During an interagency teleconference in late April, 
she remarked, “If we use the word ‘genocide’ and are seen as doing nothing, 
what will be the effect on the November [congressional] election?” Quoted in 
Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” Atlantic, September 2001. 
7. UN Security Council, Resolution 912 (1994), April 21, 1994. See also 
“Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda,” S/1994/470, April 20, 1994, paras. 15–18. Although the 
initial plan was to leave behind only 270 UN troops, that number was later 
raised to 450.
8. Quoted in Department of Public Information, United Nations, 
“Rwanda—UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” 
September 1996.
9. The UN suppressed the report—a decision that was supported by 
the United States—to avoid tarnishing the new RPF-dominated govern-
ment as well as the UN mission. See “The Gersony Mission” in Alison Des 
Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Chapter 7: The Democratic Republic of Congo
1. The former Belgian Congo was known successively as Congo- 
Léopoldville (1960), Congo-Kinshasa (1966), Zaire (1971), and, finally, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1997). For the sake of clarity, this chapter 
uses “Zaire” for the period 1960–96, “DRC” for the period 1997–2017, and 
“Zaire/DRC” when both are applicable.
2. See, especially, Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the 
Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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3. Mobutu collaborated with Congolese secessionists, Belgium, and 
the CIA to assassinate the Congo’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, 
in 1961.
4. For elaboration on this argument, see Michael G. Schatzberg, 
Mobutu or Chaos: The United States and Zaire, 1960–1990 (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1991).
5. Originally the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund, and currently the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF is gen-
erally referred to by its acronym.
6. Several parties to the conflict were also members of subregional 
organizations that were charged with mediating peace agreements. ICGLR 
members that participated in the violence included Angola, Burundi, 
Chad, DRC, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia. SADC members in-
cluded Angola, DRC, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
7. Known as Katanga from the colonial period until 1971 and as Shaba 
from 1971 to 1997, the region reverted to its earlier name after Mobutu’s 
ouster.
8. The name Mai-Mai derives from the Swahili word maji (water). It re-
fers to the ritual water that, along with magical potions and charms, was used 
by local defense force members to protect themselves from enemy bullets.
9. In May 2008, Bemba was arrested in Belgium and turned over to the 
ICC to face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in connec-
tion with actions committed by his forces in the Central African Republic 
in 2002–3, when MLC mercenaries quashed an internal rebellion on behalf 
of the ruling regime. Bemba was convicted of those crimes in March 2016. 
However, the conviction was overturned in June 2018 on the grounds that 
as a “remote commander” he could not be held responsible for his soldiers’ 
crimes.
10. An ICC arrest warrant in August 2006 charged Ntaganda with war 
crimes. A second ICC arrest warrant, issued in July 2012, accused him of 
having committed crimes against humanity.
11. Following dissent within the rebel ranks, Ntaganda sought refuge 
in Rwanda in March 2013, where the Kagame regime was either unwilling 
or unable to protect him. Ntaganda then surrendered to the US Embassy 
and asked to be transferred to the ICC, perhaps concluding that confine-
ment in The Hague was the only way to save his life. His trial, which began 
in September 2015, was ongoing in 2017.
12. As the National Security Council’s director for international orga-
nizations and peacekeeping in 1994, Rice was among those who opposed 
US intervention to stop the Rwandan genocide. Subsequent remorse and 
frustrations with Mobutu and Laurent Kabila pushed her toward Rwanda. 
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As assistant secretary of state for African affairs during the Second Congo 
War, Rice developed a close relationship with RPF leader Paul Kagame, 
who served as Rwanda’s vice president and minister of defense after the 
genocide and became president in 2000. As US ambassador to the UN 
(2009–13) and national security advisor (2013–17), Rice consistently re-
fused to criticize Rwanda’s abuses in the DRC.
Chapter 8: Liberia and Sierra Leone
1. Named for the river that originates in the highlands of Guinea and 
forms a border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Mano River region 
has long been understood to embrace those three countries. Sometimes 
Côte d’Ivoire is included because of the four countries’ interlocking con-
flicts and their regional ramifications.
2. Between 1805 and 1820, a number of countries, including the United 
States, passed laws that outlawed the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The British 
law of 1807 was perhaps the most significant. It prohibited the slave trade 
throughout the British Empire, and the UK embarked on a naval campaign 
to compel other countries to comply with its ban on the trade across the 
Atlantic.
3. Most of Doe’s associates were of the Krahn ethnic group, one of the 
smallest, poorest, and least educated populations in Liberia.
4. Speakers of closely related Manding languages are known in differ-
ent West African countries by various names, including Mandingo, Ma-
linke, Mandinka, and Jula (also spelled Juula, Dyula, Dioula), which means 
“trader,” a profession historically associated with Manding speakers. They 
are often viewed as one ethnic group with regional variations.
5. Some of the motivations were personal as well as political. Houphouët- 
Boigny’s goddaughter, Désirée Delafosse, was the widow of President Wil-
liam Tolbert’s son, Adolphus, who had been killed by Doe’s forces after 
the 1980 coup. After her husband’s death, Delafosse settled in Burkina 
Faso, where she became close to Blaise Compaoré, who was also a 
Houphouët-Boigny protégé.
6. Quoted in Joshua Hammer, “Into Anarchy,” Newsweek 127, no. 18 
(April 29, 1996): 39, 41.
7. In Guinea, Mandingos are more commonly called Malinkes.
8. From 1960 to 2007, French-African affairs were largely directed 
from the Africa Cell, a secretive body that worked under the personal di-
rection of the French president to safeguard French interests in Africa. Al-
though officially disbanded under President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12), its 
work continued under other auspices.
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9. Gbagbo’s support base included Ivoirian Krahns, who are called the 
Guéré or Wè in Côte d’Ivoire.
10. See Ann Mezzell, “US Policy Shifts on Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Assessment of Contending Predictions,” Africa & Francophonie: Air & 
Space Power Journal 1, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 79–96. 
11. The International Contact Group on Liberia included representa-
tives from the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, Nigeria, Ghana, the United States, 
the UK, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the World Bank.
12. Private military companies are not included in the definition of 
mercenary used in the UN Mercenary Convention because, in theory, 
their members do not engage in combat—evidence to the contrary 
notwithstanding. See UN General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/44/34, 
“International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries,” December 4, 1989.
13. The Commonwealth (officially, the Commonwealth of Nations) in-
cludes fifty-three member states. Most were previously part of the British 
Empire. Its mission is to promote the development of free and democratic 
societies, peace and prosperity, and improvement in the lives of its mem-
bers’ citizens.
14. The number of ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone would ultimately 
reach 13,000, of whom 12,000 were Nigerian.
15. The number of UNAMSIL personnel eventually rose to 23,000.
16. The Special Court was established in 2002 by the United Nations 
and Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 
14, 2000. See “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”
Chapter 9: Côte d’Ivoire
1. According to the World Bank, 37.9 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s adult 
population was between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four in 2000.
2. Côte d’Ivoire, like most former French colonies on the continent, 
was a member of the African Financial Community, a monetary union 
whose participants shared a common currency, the value of which was 
linked to the French franc. Monetary and financial regulations were de-
termined in Paris, and France was permitted to devalue the CFA currency 
without consulting African governments.
3. Guéï was assassinated in September 2002 by pro-Gbagbo security 
forces following the coup attempt that sparked the Ivoirian civil war.
4. The OAU was succeeded by the AU in July 2002.
5. Similar terminology and justifications were used by the RUF during 
its 1997 “Operation Pay Yourself ” campaign in Sierra Leone.
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6. Charles Blé Goudé, who served as FESCI secretary-general from 
1998 to 2001, founded the Young Patriots in 2001.
7. MPIGO recruited heavily among the Dan/Yacouba people, who in 
Liberia are called the Gio. Taylor had garnered support from Gio popula-
tions along the Ivoirian border during the Liberian civil war.
Chapter 10: The Arab Spring in North Africa
1. Islamist involvement in the uprisings was particularly notable in 
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
2. Some analysts prefer the terms Arab Uprising or Arab Awakening 
in reference to the popular upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East 
during 2011–13. They note that the events were characterized by social and 
economic as well as political concerns, which distinguished them from 
European movements for political freedom and democracy such as the 
Prague Spring of 1968, the Croatian Spring of 1971, and the popular move-
ments that led to state breakdown and regime change in Eastern Europe 
in 1989–91.
3. The monarchies included Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Arab republics 
included Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.
4. “Remarks by the President upon Arrival, the South Lawn,” Septem-
ber 16, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases 
/2001/09/print/20010916-2.html.
5. Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Con-
gress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001, http://edition.cnn.com/2001 
/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/.
6. “President Obama’s Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning,” Cairo 
University, Egypt, June 4, 2009, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm 
/2009/124342.htm.
7. Wahhabism, an ascetic religious reform movement within Salafism, 
has a strong, officially sanctioned presence in both Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. Wahhabi teachings, like many other Salafist strains, 
stress law and order and obedience to authority.
8. In October 2015, the National Dialogue Quartet, comprising the 
Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, 
Trade and Handicrafts, the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, and the Tunisian 
Human Rights League, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its role 
in moving the country toward a pluralistic democracy based on human 
rights and rooted in civil society. The Norwegian Nobel Committee did 
not mention that one of the Quartet’s goals was to sideline moderate 
Islamists.
Notes to Pages 252–263  |  409
9. In 2017, TSCTP members included Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
10. In signing a separate peace with Israel, Egypt broke ranks with 
the rest of the Arab world, where the special deal negotiated outside the 
UN framework was widely perceived as treachery. Egypt was suspended 
from the Arab League for a decade. The 1979 treaty returned to Egypt the 
Sinai Peninsula, seized by Israel during the 1967 war, but left the other 
occupied territories in Israel’s hands. Israel retained control of the Gaza 
Strip (Egypt), the Golan Heights (Syria), East Jerusalem (Jordan), and the 
West Bank of the Jordan River (Jordan). The accords also left unsettled 
the fate of the Palestinian people, who had lost their homes during Israel’s 
war of independence (1947–49) and in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 
1973. Although the UN had recognized Palestinians’ right of return to their 
homeland and to an independent state defined by borders established in 
1949, Palestinians had little hope of realizing those rights without Egypt’s 
support.
11. “Obama’s Remarks on the Resignation of Mubarak,” New York 
Times, February 11, 2011.
12. David Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, “Seeming Retreat by Egypt 
Leader on New Powers,” New York Times, November 26, 2012.
13. Samer S. Shehata, “In Egypt, Democrats vs. Liberals,” New York 
Times, July 2, 2013.
14. “Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt,” July 3, 2013, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/03/statement-president 
-barack-obama-egypt.
15. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 prohibits US aid “to 
the government of any country whose duly elected head of government 
is deposed by military coup d’état or decree.” This prohibition remains in 
effect until “a democratically elected government has taken office” (https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ74/pdf/PLAW-112publ74.pdf).
16. In one case, 529 Brotherhood supporters received death sentences 
for killing a single police officer during demonstrations that followed the 
coup. In another, more than 680 Brotherhood members were sentenced to 
death for an attack on a police station in which no one was killed.
17. Quoted in “With Washington’s Complicity, Egypt Cracks Down on 
Critics,” editorial, New York Times, July 16, 2015.
18. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, quoted in Spencer Ack-
erman and Ian Black, “US Trims Aid to Egypt as Part of Diplomatic ‘Recali-
bration,’” Guardian, October 9, 2013.
19. Critics charged that support for Egyptian security forces con-
travened the Leahy provision in the US Foreign Assistance Act, which 
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prohibits aid to foreign military or police units if there is credible evidence 
that they have “committed a gross violation of human rights” and have 
not been held accountable. See Section 620M of the US Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20
Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf.
20. After taking power, Qaddafi had instituted free health care and 
education for all Libyans, dramatically improving the quality of life in 
these areas. However, in April 1973, revolutionary committees took charge 
of hospitals and universities, and during the ensuing cultural revolution 
health and education standards declined and infrastructure crumbled.
21. Ethnic groups tended to be clustered regionally: Berbers in the cen-
tral region, Tubus in the south (also in Chad and Niger), and Tuaregs in the 
west (also in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger).
22. During the Arab Spring uprising, rebels released hundreds of 
LIFG militants from prison, and many joined the revolt that overthrew the 
Qaddafi regime.
23. The African Union Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya, es-
tablished by the AU Peace and Security Council, released a statement on 
March 20, 2011, that opposed foreign military intervention. The commit-
tee, comprising five African heads of state, proposed exile for Qaddafi and 
his replacement by an interim government. 
24. The Gulf Cooperation Council is a political and economic alliance 
that includes the monarchies of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq, which also borders the Persian 
Gulf, is the only Arab Gulf state that is not a member.
25. These officials, and others who promote war as means of accomplish-
ing humanitarian ends, are sometimes called “liberal interventionists,” 
“humanitarian interventionists,” or “humanitarian hawks.”
26. UN Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), March 17, 2011.
27. The nonpermanent members that supported the resolution included 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, 
and South Africa. South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon were AU member states, 
and South Africa had served on the AU Ad Hoc High-Level Committee on 
Libya.
28. On April 4, 2011, while the Libyan operation was still in process, 
French and UN forces conducted military strikes and ground operations 
in Côte d’Ivoire. In Côte d’Ivoire, as in Libya, the official objective was the 
destruction of weapons that had been used against civilians. In both cases, 
the unstated goal and end result was regime change.
29. Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “Embassies Open, but Yemen Stays on 
Terror Watch,” New York Times, August 11, 2013.
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30. Weapons from Qaddafi’s stockpiles made their way to Algeria, Chad, 
Egypt, Gaza, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Tunisia, where 
they armed secular insurgents, religious extremists, and criminals.
31. The Benghazi organization attracted world attention on September 
11, 2012, when it attacked the US consulate in that city, killing four Amer-
icans, including the US ambassador to Libya. Although the assault oc-
curred on the eleventh anniversary of the al-Qaeda attacks on the United 
States, it was prompted by a US-made video that had provoked hundreds 
of protesters to attack the US Embassy in Tunisia and had inspired anti- 
American demonstrations in Egypt, Morocco, nine sub-Saharan African 
countries, and elsewhere in the Muslim world. In 2014, the US State De-
partment included the Ansar organizations in Benghazi and Derna on its 
official list of foreign terrorist organizations, and the UN Security Council, 
at the urging of France, the UK, and the United States, designated both as 
associates of al-Qaeda.
32. Suffering significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria in 2015 
and 2016, the Islamic State began to shift its focus from building a local 
caliphate—an Islamic state equipped with governmental and social ser-
vices—to attacking the “far enemy.” The retaliatory bombing of a Russian 
airliner over Egypt in October 2015 and attacks on a concert hall, sports 
stadium, restaurants, and bars in Paris in November 2015 were indicators 
of this transformation. Threatened by the Islamic State’s growing popu-
larity, al-Qaeda affiliates responded in kind. In early 2016, al-Qaeda oper-
atives assaulted soft targets in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire that 
were favored by Western civilian and military personnel.
33. Abu Anas al-Liby died from liver disease in January 2015, days be-
fore his scheduled trial. In November 2017, Ahmed Abu Khattala was con-
victed of supporting terrorism. 
34. By late 2017, Chouchane’s death had not been confirmed.
35. The UN conference that brokered the deal was co-chaired by Italy 
and the United States. It brought together fifteen Libyan delegates, rep-
resentatives from Libya’s neighbors (Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, 
and Tunisia), and the P5+5 group—that is, the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Russia, and China) plus Germany, Italy, Spain, the EU, and the UN. Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain were among the EU’s largest receiving countries for 
African and Middle Eastern migrants.
36. Public Law 107-40, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United 
States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks 
Launched against the United States (Authorization for Use of Military 
Force), September 18, 2001.
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37. See video included in Nima Elbagir, Raja Razek, Alex Platt, and 
Bryony Jones, “People for Sale: Where Lives Are Auctioned for $400,” 
CNN, November 14, 2017.
38. The Justice and Charity Party had initially joined the February 20 
Movement, but later withdrew its support.
Chapter 11: Mali and Nigeria
1. A legacy of the Algerian civil war, AQIM was one of wealthiest al-
Qaeda franchises worldwide, largely as a result of the millions of dollars it 
reaped from trafficking in drugs, weapons, fuel, tobacco, and other goods, 
as well as from kidnapping for ransom. AQIM frequently collaborated with 
ethnic groups, clans, and criminal networks whose goals differed from 
those of al-Qaeda but who had grievances against the same authorities.
2. Azawad, derived from the Tuareg term for savanna, is the histori-
cal name for a region that includes northeastern Mali, western Niger, and 
southern Algeria.
3. Sanogo had received military training in the United States on sev-
eral occasions, including basic officer training at Fort Benning, Georgia; 
intelligence training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; English-language training 
at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; and further training at the US Marine 
Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.
4. As noted previously, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 
prohibits US aid “to the government of any country whose duly elected 
head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree.” This pro-
hibition remains in effect until “a democratically elected government has 
taken office.” 
5. In 2013, Niger was the world’s fourth-largest uranium producer, 
and it provided approximately one-fifth of the uranium used in French 
nuclear reactors. Mali’s uranium deposits were much less extensive. How-
ever, France was concerned by the transnational nature of the Tuareg in-
surgency, which historically had affected Niger, and by the potential for 
severe regional destabilization.
6. Presidential elections held in July and August 2013 resulted in vic-
tory for former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. When he took 
office in September, the way was cleared for a resumption of direct US 
assistance to the Bamako government.
7. International Crisis Group, Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa Report 
189 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012).
8. As the former colonial power in more than a dozen West and Cen-
tral African countries, France continued to maintain troops and stage 
military interventions throughout the region. In 2015, some 3,500 French 
Notes to Pages 303–312  |  413
troops were stationed in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. 
French weapons, vehicles, fighter aircraft, transport planes, and helicopter 
gunships were housed in several countries, and they were frequently acti-
vated to protect French interests.
9. Quoted in Anthony Faiola and Michael Birnbaum, “Algerian Forces 
Search Facility after Deadly Standoff Ends,” Washington Post, January 20, 
2013.
10. Public Law 107-40, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United 
States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks 
Launched against the United States (Authorization for Use of Military 
Force), September 18, 2001.
11. AQIM, then called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, 
became al-Qaeda’s North African representative five years after the 9/11 
attacks.
12. Quoted in Edward Cody and Craig Whitlock, “French Warplanes 
Hit Central Mali in Fierce Fighting Between Soldiers, Islamist Guerrillas,” 
Washington Post, January 14, 2013.
13. Belmokhtar had been a member of the Algerian organization GIA 
and its spinoff, GSPC, which became AQIM. Al-Mulathameen splintered 
from AQIM in December 2012 to report directly to the al-Qaeda leader-
ship. The organization had acquired large quantities of Libyan weapons 
after Qaddafi’s fall and benefited financially from Belmokhtar’s position 
as head of a cigarette-smuggling monopoly in the Sahel and his lucrative 
trafficking in weapons, drugs, and hostages.
14. UN Security Council, Resolution 2100 (2013), April 25, 2013.
15. Although the people refer to themselves as Fulbe or Peul, the Hausa 
referent, Fulani, is more widely used by outsiders. The Macina Liberation 
Front aspired to reestablish a Fulani empire that had existed in Mali in the 
nineteenth century.
16. Other attacks in Burkina Faso were carried by Ansarul Islam, a 
new organization alleged to be a branch of Ansar Dine. The organization’s 
founder, a Burkinabe Fulani cleric, Malam Ibrahim Dicko, had fought with 
MUJWA in Mali, where he was influenced by the Macina Liberation Front. 
Like his Macina associates, Dicko aspired to reestablish a Fulani kingdom 
that existed prior to French conquest.
17. According to the World Bank, 1 percent of the Nigerian population 
controlled 80 percent of the nation’s wealth in 2013. Most of that wealth was 
derived from oil.
18. Civilian governments administered Nigeria during the periods 
1960–66, 1979–83, and 1999–present. Military governments ruled in 1966–
79 and 1983–99. Military rule during the latter period was punctuated by 
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a two-and-a-half-month interlude of civilian rule, followed by a military 
coup, in 1993.
19. Fulani elites intermarried with local Hausas and many elites ad-
opted the Hausa language. Today, the ethnic group is often referred to as 
the Hausa-Fulani. Forming Nigeria’s largest ethnic group, Hausa-Fulanis 
have been the dominant political force in Nigeria since independence.
20. Boko Haram (Western Education Is Forbidden) refers to the 
contempt adherents felt for Western-educated elites and their corrupt 
patronage system. It is sometimes translated as “The Sham of Western 
Education Is Forbidden.”
21. Nigerian government sources assert that militants from Algeria, 
Mali, and Mauritania joined Boko Haram. These claims have been dis-
puted by some experts and have not been verified by independent sources.
22. Boko Haram’s new title has also been translated as the Islamic 
State’s West Africa Province.
23. The private military contractors—mercenaries, to their critics—
were employed by Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection 
International, a company chaired by Eeben Barlow. Barlow was a former 
SADF officer and the founder of Executive Outcomes, the private military 
company that was hired in the 1990s to fight UNITA insurgents in Angola 
and RUF insurgents in Sierra Leone.
24. Buhari’s father was Fulani and his mother of Hausa and Kanuri de-
scent. His maternal grandfather, a Kanuri, was born in what is now Borno 
State, an area at the heart of the northeastern insurgency. After earning a 
master’s degree from the US Army War College in 1980, Buhari first came 
to power in 1983 following a military coup that overthrew a democratically 
elected government. He was ousted by another coup two years later.
25. See Section 620M of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act 
%20Of%201961.pdf. 
26. Quoted in “Nigeria’s Buhari Presses for Military Aid, Pledges ‘Zero 
Tolerance’ for Corruption,” United States Institute of Peace, July 22, 2015.
27. Days before leaving office, President Obama blocked the sale of 
twelve Super Tucano attack planes to the Nigerian air force after it bombed 
a displaced persons camp, killing hundreds of civilians and aid workers. In 
April 2017 President Trump asked Congress to authorize the sale, noting 
Nigeria’s importance as a counterterrorism partner.
Chapter 12: US Africa Policy after the Cold War (1991–2017)
1. For the origins of the Bush administration policy, see George W. 
Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 
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September 20, 2001, and US State Department, “The Global War on Ter-
rorism: The First 100 Days.”
2. Admirers of President Ronald Reagan (1981–89) claimed that his poli-
cies had defeated America’s Cold War rival. Reagan himself shared the credit 
with his close ally, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and with Soviet 
reformer Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and de facto leader of that country.
3. See Ann Mezzell, “US Policy Shifts on Sub-Saharan Africa: An As-
sessment of Contending Predictions,” Africa & Francophonie: Air & Space 
Power Journal 1, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 79–96.
4. The responsibility to protect paradigm was crystalized in a 2005 UN 
General Assembly resolution. However, the philosophy and justification 
for intervention predated the resolution (see chapter 2).
5. The new leaders most favored by the Clinton administration in-
cluded Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias 
Afwerki of Eritrea, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda.
6. The African Growth and Opportunity Act was signed into law as 
Title I of the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-200).
7. T. Andrew Mushita, a Zimbabwean NGO leader, dubbed the law the 
“American Growth and Opportunity Act.” See T. A. Mushita, “An African 
Response to AGOA,” Southern African Economist 14, no. 6 (2001): 17.
8. AGOA eligibility requirements are described in Section 104 of PL 
106-200 (see note 6 above).
9. African countries that attempted to protect domestic industries 
have been targeted for expulsion. In 2015, South Africa was threatened 
over plans to ban US chicken imports, and in 2017, Kenya, Rwanda, Tan-
zania, and Uganda were pressured when they moved to bar imports of 
used American clothing and shoes. South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda backed down, but Rwanda was suspended from the AGOA ben-
eficiaries list. 
10. These exceptions were included at the behest of US agricultural 
interests, which also lobbied successfully to retain US sugar and tobacco 
subsidies in the US Farm Bill.
11. See Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions 
Index for country rankings.
12. For 2017 MCC funding criteria, see “Guide to the MCC Indicators 
for Fiscal Year 2017.”
13. Project for the New American Century, “Statement of Principles,” 
June 3, 1997. See also Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century (Wash-
ington, DC: PNAC, 2000).
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14. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, September 2002, 1.
15. The criteria for and consequences of the designation “foreign ter-
rorist organization” can be found on the US State Department website. 
16. President Bush proclaimed, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, 
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” “Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress and the American People,” September 20, 2001 (see note 1 above).
17. United States Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign 
Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmen-
tal Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1976).
18. See declassified documents on the website of the National Security 
Archive: White House Efforts to Blunt 1975 Church Committee Investigation 
into CIA Abuses Foreshadowed Executive-Congressional Battles after 9/11, 
Electronic Briefing Book 522, July 20, 2015, and Gerald Ford White House 
Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975; Removed Section on CIA As-
sassination Plots, Electronic Briefing Book 543, February 29, 2016. As secre-
tary of defense in the George H. W. Bush administration (1989–93), Cheney 
helped direct US involvement in the First Gulf War (1990–91), which in-
cluded the invasion of Iraq. Over the protests of many neoconservatives, 
the first President Bush stopped short of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. 
The second President Bush, deeply influenced by then Vice President 
Cheney and other neoconservatives, finished the job in the Second Gulf 
War (2003–11).
19. Public Law 107-40, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United 
States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks 
Launched against the United States (Authorization for Use of Military 
Force), September 18, 2001.
20. G8 members included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Rus-
sia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Russia was suspended in 
2014 following its annexation of Crimea. The organization was then called 
the Group of Seven (G7).
21. The United States is not a signatory to the UN’s International Con-
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(adopted December 20, 2006, and entered into force December 23, 2010), 
available on the United Nations Treaty Collection website.
22. Shortly after 9/11, President Bush told reporters, “This crusade, this 
war on terrorism is going to take a while.” “Remarks by the President Upon 
Arrival,” September 16, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 
/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html.
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23. For the legal ramifications of the designation “foreign terrorist or-
ganization,” see note 15 above.
24. Each year, 40 percent of global maritime trade, including 4 percent 
of the world’s oil traffic, passes through the narrow 20-mile passageway 
that separates Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula from Djibouti and Eritrea 
on the Horn of Africa. Counterterrorism operations against jihadi insur-
gencies in Yemen and Somalia have heightened Djibouti’s strategic value. 
In 2017, Camp Lemonnier was home to more than 4,000 US military and 
civilian personnel, including members of the Combined Joint Task Force–
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC). Djibouti also hosted French, Japanese, Italian, and Chinese mil-
itary bases, and Saudi Arabia announced plans to construct one. NATO, 
the EU, Germany, Spain, and the UK also staged military operations from 
Djibouti.
25. In 2017, the CJTF-HOA area of operations encompassed Burundi, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, 
and Uganda. Its broader area of interest included the Central African Re-
public, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Madagas-
car, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.
26. In 2009, EACTI was replaced by the East Africa Regional Strategic 
Initiative (EARSI), which expanded to include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
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Ansar: helper, follower, partisan, supporter of Muhammad; originally, it 
referred to citizens of Medina who assisted Muhammad after he 
fled from Mecca.
barakat: blessing.
caliph (or khalif): Successor to Muhammad as the political and spiritual 
leader of the islamic state.
caliphate: the political-religious state of the Muslim people and the lands 
ruled by the caliph. 
dar: homeland.
emir (or amir): political or military leader; commander of the faithful.
Hadith: traditions concerning the teachings, deeds, and sayings of the 
prophet Muhammad. 
hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca, a duty for all adult Muslims who are physically 
and financially able.
Islam: a religion whose name derives from the arabic word salema, which 
means peace, purity, submission, and obedience. the name of 
the religion implies submission to allah’s will and obedience 
to his law. the two main branches of islam, Sunni and Shi’a, 
agree on its five pillars: (1) faith in a monotheistic deity, allah, 
whose messenger is Muhammad; (2) engaging in prayers five 
times daily; (3) giving alms to the poor; (4) fasting during the 
holy month of ramadan; and (5) making a pilgrimage to Mecca 
(hajj) at least once, if physically and financially able. the Qur’an 
is the central religious text of islam, which was revealed by allah 
to his prophet, Muhammad.
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Islamic fundamentalism: a strand of islam that rejects religious 
innovation or adaptation in response to new circumstances. 
practitioners of religious fundamentalism, more generally, 
advocate a return to basic religious principles and the strict 
application of religious law. Fundamentalism often emerges 
as a reaction to liberalizing trends within a religion or to 
secularization in the broader society. it represents a struggle 
between tendencies within a given religion, rather than a clash 
between religions. the descriptor religious fundamentalism 
was first associated with late nineteenth-century protestant 
Christians in the United States who embraced a literal 
interpretation of the bible. like their Christian counterparts, 
islamic fundamentalists promote strict observance of their 
religion’s basic tenets and laws. their movements have gained 
strength in the face of the religious innovation, Westernization, 
and secularization that followed the establishment of european 
colonialism in the twentieth century and globalization in the 
twenty-first. the vast majority of islamic fundamentalists are 
law-abiding and oppose violent jihad, focusing instead on 
the ethical, moral, and personal aspects of jihad (see below). 
they believe that an islamic state will emerge from a Muslim 
community (umma) that has been purified from within through 
preaching and proselytizing and that such a state cannot be 
established through political or armed struggle.
Islamic terrorism: Commonly used but misleading term that associates 
religious doctrine with terrorist activity. Islamic fundamentalism, 
radical Islamism, and political Islam, which also appear in this 
glossary, are not equivalent to islamic terrorism. Muslims 
who engage in terrorism and claim religious justification for 
these activities constitute a minuscule minority of Muslims 
worldwide, and their actions are strongly condemned by the 
majority. although violent extremists deploy the language 
and symbols of religion to justify their actions, their turn to 
terrorism was often inspired by social, political, and economic 
grievances rather than by religious beliefs. this study rejects 
the use of the term islamic terrorism as both inaccurate and 
dangerous.
Islamism: a social, political, and religious ideology and movement that 
emerged in response to european colonialism and the social 
instability wrought by encounters with the West. its adherents 
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hold that islamic principles should serve as the basis of the 
social, political, and legal order and guide the personal lives of 
individual Muslims. often led by intellectuals rather than clergy 
members, islamist movements focus on social and political 
change rather than on religious doctrine. Moderate islamists 
work within established institutions and political processes to 
pursue social and political reforms that, they hope, will result 
in states that are premised on islamic law and built from the 
bottom up. radical islamists strive to monopolize political 
power so that they can construct islamic states from the top 
down. islamists do not reject all aspects of Western culture, and 
they may even embrace Western education and technology as 
useful tools for the construction of islamic states. islamists, in 
contrast to jihadis (defined below), reject the use of violence to 
achieve their objectives.
Janjaweed: “devils on horseback,” an insulting arabic term for bandits 
who roam the desert in Chad and the darfur region of Sudan, 
robbing inhabitants. More recently, the term has been used to 
describe arab militias in the arab-Fur War (1987–89) and in the 
darfur conflict (2003–).
jihad: effort or struggle. a person who engages in jihad is a mujahid 
(plural, mujahideen). Jihad has three interrelated meanings: first, 
the inner spiritual struggle to live righteously, as a good Muslim; 
second, the struggle to build and purify the Muslim community; 
and third, the struggle to defend the islamic faith from 
outsiders, with force if necessary. the first meaning, which refers 
to a personal spiritual struggle, constitutes the greater jihad. 
the second and third meanings, which focus on the outside 
world, make up the lesser jihad. historically, jihad has been 
understood first and foremost as an inner struggle that begins 
with the self and extends outward to the broader society. those 
who undertake such struggles believe that social and political 
reforms are best achieved through preaching, proselytizing, and 
mobilizing the masses to effect change from the bottom up. 
engaging in the lesser jihad is held to be a collective duty of the 
Muslim community, as determined situationally by established 
religious and legal authorities, rather than a permanent personal 
duty as determined by individuals or self-appointed preachers. 
Since the onset of the war on terror, Western observers have 
frequently collapsed all forms of jihad into one, erroneously 
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defined as a “holy war” against nonbelievers. the concept of 
holy war originated among Christians in medieval europe to 
justify crusades against Muslims; it has no direct counterpart in 
mainstream islamic thought. Jihad is not one of the five pillars 
of islam and thus is not a practice that is essential to Muslim 
identity.
jihadi (adjective, jihadist): a militant Muslim activist who opposes the 
secular sociopolitical order at home, and Westernization and 
globalization more broadly, and who engages in armed struggle 
to establish an islamic state. the term is not synonymous with 
mujahid, which refers to a person engaged in any of the three 
forms of jihad outlined above. the term jihadi was coined in 
the early twenty-first century by militants who self-identified as 
such. Jihadis who focus on local struggles against purportedly 
impious Muslim or secular regimes constitute the majority 
of this minority faction, while those who focus on distant or 
non-Muslim regimes—the so-called global jihadis—are a tiny 
minority of the minority movement.
jihadism: a minority insurgent movement that broke from islamism 
and employs violence in the name of religion. Jihadism 
emerged in the context of severe social, political, and economic 
inequalities, and in many cases, political persecution. the 
movement has primarily attracted young men who feel alienated 
from mainstream society. its adherents reject the traditional 
interpretation of the lesser jihad as a collective struggle of 
the Muslim community, determined by officially recognized 
religious and legal authorities, and define it instead as a personal 
one, to be determined by each individual as he or she sees 
fit or by self-described clerics. From the early 1970s until the 
mid-1990s, jihadis generally targeted local secular and Muslim 
regimes that they deemed impure (the “near enemy”), with the 
goal of overthrowing them and islamizing state and society from 
the top down. however, from the mid-1990s, a small minority 
began to focus on distant impious or non-Muslim regimes (the 
“far enemy”), heralding the emergence of global jihad. this 
minority within the jihadi movement tends to conflate defensive 
and offensive actions, claiming that violence against apostate 
regimes and their foreign backers is a defense of islam. Western 
commentators often overlook these distinctions, failing to 
differentiate between jihadist factions and frequently merging 
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islamism and jihadism under the misleading rubric of “islamic 
terrorism.” Some erroneously deem both movements a threat 
to Western societies and argue that both must be opposed in 
an open-ended war on terror and an effort to restructure the 
Muslim world. policies based on this misunderstanding have 




Muhammad: Founder of the islamic faith and believed by Muslims to be 
allah’s last prophet (c. 570–632 Ce).
mujahid (plural, mujahideen): See jihad.
neocolonialism: the political and economic domination of nominally 
independent countries by former imperial powers, by private 
foreign interests in the independent countries, or by any other 
external capitalist entity or power.
neoconservatism: a movement that emerged in the 1960s to challenge 
the domestic and foreign policy agendas of the new left, 
which promoted government-run social programs at home 
and opposed military adventurism abroad. in the 1990s, 
neoconservatives claimed that the United States had won the 
Cold War and therefore had the right to reshape the world 
according to american values and interests. they argued that 
this task required a bold foreign policy and a strong military 
that the United States was prepared to use to promote american 
ideals and interests. neoconservatives advocated preemptive 
action to tackle perceived threats and to forestall crises before 
they occurred. during the george W. bush administration, 
neoconservatives held high-level positions in the State and 
defense departments, on the national Security Council, and 
in the Washington think tank world. their views were reflected 
in the 2002 national security strategy, which outlined the bush 
doctrine of preemptive war.
neoliberalism: an economic philosophy popularized in the 1980s that 
advocated limited government involvement in the economy and 
called for an end to government subsidies, price controls, and 
protective tariffs. neoliberal structural adjustment programs 
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mandated by the international Monetary Fund, the World bank, 
and the US government as a condition for loans required the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, the promotion of free 
trade, economic deregulation, and currency devaluation, and the 
reduction of government spending.
neopatrimonialism: the german sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) 
defined patrimonialism as a form of autocratic government in 
which all power emanates from the leader and in which civilian 
and military personnel are loyal to that leader, rather than to 
the state or its citizenry. the israeli sociologist Shmuel noah 
eisenstadt (1923–2010) coined the term neopatrimonialism to 
describe a form of government that includes a veneer of codified 
laws, a state bureaucracy, and a legal distinction between the 
public and private spheres, but in which the ruler still uses 
state resources for his own benefit and to buy the allegiance 
of clients inside and outside the official bureaucracy. because 
access to power and resources is at the personal discretion of the 
leader, the patron-client system often undercuts the official state 
bureaucracy.
political Islam: Sometimes used as a synonym for Islamism, although it 
constitutes only one aspect of a social, political, and religious 
ideology and movement. although political islam employs 
the language of religion, it represents a political rather than a 
religious response to Westernization. its adherents do not reject 
modernity, but they repudiate a particular brand of modernity. 
they refute the claim that the Western definition of modernity 
is a universal one and embrace an islamist variant in its place.
Qur’an (or Koran): the central religious text of islam, which was revealed 
by allah to his prophet, Muhammad.
Sahel: “Shore” of the Sahara desert, referring to the desert’s southern 
borderlands that stretch more than 3,000 miles from Senegal 
in the west to eritrea in the east. the Western Sahel comprises 
portions of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, burkina Faso, niger, 
and nigeria. parts of Cameroon, Chad, and the Central african 
republic constitute the central region, while sections of Sudan, 
South Sudan, and eritrea make up the east.
Salaf: pious ancestors or predecessors; denotes the first three generations 
of Muslims, including Muhammad’s companions and followers.
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Salafism: a strict, literal interpretation of Sunni islam that advocates a 
return to the righteous practices of the prophet Muhammad 
and the early fathers of the faith (the pious ancestors or Salaf ). 
the Salafist reform movement emerged in the late nineteenth 
century in response to Western cultural intrusion during the 
periods of conquest and colonialization. because they oppose 
religious innovations and new interpretations, Salafis reject 
modern islamic schools and brotherhoods. they also renounce 
the mystical spiritual practices and tradition of tolerance 
associated with Sufism, which incorporates pre-islamic beliefs 
and practices.
Contemporary Salafist movements not only seek modernization 
on their own terms, but they also aspire to purge Muslim 
societies of both pre-islamic and Western cultural influences. 
Contemporary Salafis can be divided into three groups: (1) 
those who focus on the personal and reject political engagement 
(quietist Salafis); (2) those who strive to establish political, 
legal, and religious systems according to islamic precepts 
(islamist Salafis); and (3) those who embrace violent jihad as 
a permanent, personal religious duty (jihadist Salafis). Most 
Salafis are quietists. of the minority that engage politically, only 
a small percentage embrace violent jihad. al-Qaeda and the 
islamic State are Salafi jihadist organizations.
Shari’a: islamic law, which regulates most aspects of life, including the 
personal, social, religious, and political.
sheikh: Man of great power; bedouin tribal leader; a religious honorific to 
denote a learned person; a term used for the royal families in the 
Middle east.
Shi’a (adjective, Shi’ite): one of two main branches of islam, and a 
person who adheres to Shi’a beliefs. disagreement over the line 
of succession led to a schism in islam after Muhammad’s death 
in 632 Ce. Shi’as claim that only blood relations of the prophet, 
ordained by allah, can succeed Muhammad. they believe that 
ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was his first legitimate 
successor. Shi’as differ from Sunnis concerning the basis of 
religious and political authority and in their interpretation of 
islamic law.
Shura: Consultative council in Muslim communities.
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Sufism: Mystical spiritual traditions associated with Sunni islam that 
focus on believers’ personal experience with the divine, rather 
than on the following of religious laws. Sufis have a tradition of 
tolerance toward other religious practices and often incorporate 
pre-islamic beliefs and practices.
sultan: ruler of a Muslim state, especially within the ottoman empire.
sultanate: the territory ruled by a sultan.
sunnah: prescribed Muslim way of life based on the sayings and teachings 
of the prophet Muhammad.
Sunni: one of two main branches of islam, and a person who adheres to 
Sunni beliefs. Sunnis, who constitute the majority of the world’s 
Muslims, argue that Muhammad’s successors should be chosen 
by councils of religious elders based on qualifications rather 
than bloodline. they claim that abu bakr, Muhammad’s father-
in-law and companion, was his first legitimate successor. Sunnis 
differ from Shi’as concerning the basis of religious and political 
authority and in their interpretation of islamic law.
talib: Seeker of the truth; student.
umma: Community of Muslims.
Wahhabism: an ascetic religious reform movement within Salafism 
that was influenced by the writings of Muhammad ibn abd 
al-Wahhab (1703–92), a preacher and scholar from central 
arabia. the official creed of Saudi arabia, Wahhabism stresses 
the importance of law and order and obedience to established 
authority. the movement rejects religious innovation as 
heretical and advocates a return to the Qur’an and the hadith 
for religious truth. 
Wahhabi influences gained strength in north africa in the 
wake of the Middle eastern oil boom of the 1970s. Many north 
africans who sought work in Saudi arabia and other gulf 
states embraced Wahhabi beliefs and practices while there and 
proselytized when they returned home. at the same time, Saudi-
based charities distributed their new riches across the Muslim 
world, spreading Wahhabi teachings through their mosques, 
schools, and clinics. disenchanted by the failed promises of 
secular movements such as arab nationalism, liberalism, and 
socialism, which had united arabs in the struggle against 
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colonialism, alienated young men, in particular, rejected Western 
forms of modernism and looked to religion for responses 
to poverty, corruption, and growing social and economic 
inequality.
Wahhabi influence in africa south of the Sahara is a more 
recent phenomenon. historically, most Muslims in West africa 
and the horn have practiced tolerant strains of Sunni islam 
that incorporated pre-islamic beliefs and practices. however, 
after the Cold War, Saudi-based Wahhabi charities, schools, 
and clinics were welcomed into communities that had few 
social services or alternative sources of funding. good works 
performed by these charities, openings provided by the arab 
Spring, and hostility to Western-backed oppressive regimes 
resulted in increased Wahhabi influence in Mali, Mauritania, 
niger, nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan and other countries in the 
Sahel and the greater horn.
warlord: a leader of an armed antigovernment movement who acts 
outside the state apparatus and who makes no attempt to 
mobilize subject populations around an ideology, to administer 
the territory he controls, or to reform corrupt and dysfunctional 
governing systems. Many men who became warlords had held 
political or military positions in previous neopatrimonial 
regimes, and they utilized those patronage networks after 
those regimes fell. they seek power in order to gain control of 
resources, which they then distribute to benefit family members 
and associates and to buy loyalty and protection. operating 
outside formal governmental institutions and the rule of law, 
they establish political and economic partnerships that include 
criminal networks and foreign businesses, which serve as 
conduits for the clandestine exportation of natural resources 
and importation of weapons. they are inclined to perpetuate 
rather than to resolve conflicts, which present them with 
opportunities to gain power and wealth.
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